There is an old English nursery rhyme about Prince Frederick Duke of York, a man who marched ten thousand men up a hill only to march them down again. Its origins lie in military campaigns of the late 18th century, when ambition outpaced strategy and motion substituted for purpose. It is, at heart, a story about activity mistaken for achievement.
The world should welcome the agreement due to be signed by the United States and Iran on Friday. After more than three months of conflict, thousands of deaths and significant economic disruption, a return to diplomacy is plainly preferable to continued military confrontation. But this initial accord should be understood for what it is: not a settlement, but the beginning of what is likely to be a difficult and protracted negotiating process.
Abbas Araghchi is the Iranian foreign minister and apparently still influential in Tehran, despite everything. He is among the most accomplished of diplomats I encountered during my 35-year career at the Foreign Office. When I was UK Ambassador in Tehran he was my main interlocutor. Araghchi wrote a book last year. He offers a valuable nugget for anyone dealing with Iran at this point:
“The Iranian negotiation style is generally known in the world as the ‘bazaar style,’ which means continuous and tireless bargaining…. This method is a process of interaction that requires great patience and time,” and thus, “he who gets tired and bored quickly will lose.” I wonder whether anyone in the White House read it. I’m more confident, though not certain, that those in European and Gulf foreign ministries might have. Nobody should be surprised if at this point – feeling bullish, despite the bruises, and having the upper hand over the ingenu US customer wishing to buy their tacky wares – Iran might be tempted to drive a hard bargain.
Most governments in the region and beyond will welcome the prospect of de-escalation. Yet opposition remains strong within both Iran and Israel. Some influential Republicans are also uneasy about the concessions to Iran that may be required to secure a lasting peace. Even now, there remains a residual risk that Washington could reverse course, as it has done repeatedly during the conflict. If it does, Iran, true to one of its fundamental foreign policy doctrines, will respond with reciprocity. For the moment, however, diplomacy appears to have regained the initiative.
The immediate objective will be to stabilise the ceasefire and create a framework for more substantive negotiations. The war itself lasted only a few weeks, but the aftermath has been considerably longer. Despite overwhelming military superiority demonstrated by the United States and Israel, neither side achieved a decisive political outcome. Iran’s leadership survived. The Strait of Hormuz remained vulnerable to disruption. Low-level confrontation continued through maritime incidents, cyber operations and Iran’s use of proxy forces to inflict pain in the region.
This reality points towards the likely destination of the next phase: an expanded version of the Joint Comprehensive Plan of Action (JCPOA). Any sustainable settlement would almost certainly resemble a “JCPOA Plus”.
Such an agreement would extend beyond nuclear restrictions. It would likely include enhanced inspection and verification arrangements, limitations on missile development, mechanisms to reduce maritime tensions in the Gulf and understandings governing the activities of Iranian-backed groups across the region. In return, Iran would receive phased sanctions relief – ideally, including the lifting of US primary sanctions, which would lead to real transformation for the better in Iran – acceptance, at least implicit, by the US and the West of the Islamic Republic’s continued oppressive political system, and guarantees against efforts at externally imposed regime change.
Neither side would obtain everything it seeks. Washington would have to accept the continued existence of a regime that repeatedly triggers a 47-year national trauma caused by the US Embassy hostage crisis in Tehran which lasted 444 days. Tehran would face constraints on activities it regards as central to its security and autonomy. Yet this is the nature of durable diplomacy. Successful agreements are usually those that leave all parties dissatisfied in roughly equal measure.
The more difficult question is why it has taken so long to arrive at a point that was foreseeable from the outset?
The eventual return to negotiations was always the most likely end state. The final round of pre-war talks took place in Geneva on 26 February. Many American specialists on Iran, including those within the Trump administration, European partners and Gulf allies argued consistently that diplomacy, however frustrating, offered the only realistic path to a sustainable outcome.
Instead, the White House – in defiance of one of the most basic principles of successfully waging war, as set out by Clausewitz – embarked upon a conflict without clearly defining its objectives. At various points, the US appeared to pursue regime change, deterrence, military degradation and coercive diplomacy simultaneously. Somewhat bizarrely, at one point the main objective of the US military campaign seemed to be rescuing an airman shot down over Iran. These are distinct goals requiring different strategies. The absence of clarity created confusion not only among allies but within the Administration itself.
This confusion was compounded by an ingrained tendency to discount expert advice. Warnings from regional partners and closely allied European governments with embassies in Tehran (unlike the US) were frequently overlooked. More significantly, Donald Trump appears to have accepted disingenuous assurances from the Israeli prime minister – not a disinterested party – that the Iranian regime could be destabilised and potentially removed within a matter of days. That assessment proved profoundly mistaken.
As the conflict developed, the gap between military success and political achievement became increasingly apparent. The US and Israel were able to strike targets across Iran almost at will. But military operations did not produce the anticipated political collapse. Instead, they generated a prolonged confrontation characterised by economic disruption, attacks on shipping and growing international concern.
The war also produced unintended consequences, which have largely benefited the Iranian position. These are the “plus” in any new deal. Notably, a new de facto Iranian control over the Strait of Hormuz, and Tehran able to demand not only that the US cease attacks on Iran, but that Israel should also be restrained in Lebanon. Both would have been judged incredible before the war.
The White House also struggled to adapt when its initial assumptions proved incorrect. Effective wartime leadership requires not only a clear objective but the political determination to pursue it through unexpected developments and setbacks. President Trump frequently oscillated between escalation and de-escalation. Public statements often contradicted one another. There was sabre-rattling talk of overwhelming force – for instance, a laughable promise to send Iranian civilisation (incidentally, the source of much Western civilisation) back to the stone age. That was swiftly followed by calls for negotiation and declarations of victory (without evidence). The result was uncertainty among allies, adversaries and markets alike. Rarely in the history of human conflict has so much been said to so little coherent effect.
The economic consequences extended well beyond Iran. The maritime blockades imposed by Iran and the US in turn imposed huge costs on the global economy through higher energy prices, fertiliser shortages and renewed inflationary pressures. Iran’s economy is under huge pressure – a pain borne by normal citizens, rather than the ruling elite. But it has not buckled yet and sanctions, a blunt instrument at the best of times, tend not to produce the decisive results promised by their advocates.
None of this should obscure the significance of this week’s agreement. Diplomacy is returning because the US and Iran have recognised the limitations of military force. The challenge now is to convert an initial accord into a comprehensive settlement.
Yet, it is difficult to avoid the conclusion that this conflict could have been avoided altogether. Had negotiations continued after the last round of talks that took place in Geneva on 26 February, Washington might well have secured a more favourable outcome at a far lower cost. The concessions now likely to form part of a final settlement appear greater than those previously under discussion. They may include a larger Iranian role in arrangements concerning the Strait of Hormuz and tighter constraints on Israel’s freedom of action against Hezbollah in Lebanon.
Three months of conflict have therefore brought the parties back towards a destination that was visible from the beginning. The difference is that thousands have died, the regime in Tehran is more hardline and less predictable than the previous one, regional stability has been damaged and the eventual agreement is likely to be less advantageous than the one that might have been reached through uninterrupted diplomacy. That is not a victory. It is an expensive lesson in the importance of defining realistic objectives before embarking upon war. What we have now is a conflict declared finished without having been fully resolved, a victory proclaimed without having been defined.
And so – with apologies to poetry purists for poor scansion – the first stanza of that old nursery rhyme invites revision:
Oh, President Trump,
He had ten thousand marines,
He sailed them to Hormuz Strait—
And sailed them home again.
When they were up, they were up,
And when they were down, they were down,
And when they were only halfway up,
They were neither up nor down.
[Further reading: Why is America still talking about Kamala Harris?]
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