Tomm W Christiansen
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The boys who could see England

Last winter, two bodies in identical wetsuits were found in Norway and the Netherlands. Police in three countries failed to identify them - and then the trail led to Calais.

Part 1: On dry land

A gale was blowing from the south-west as the elderly architect put on his jacket and rubber boots and went outside. Down in the bay, four-metre-high waves crashed against the cliffs and sent spray hundreds of metres across the grazing land at Lista, on Norway’s southernmost tip.

The first thing the architect noticed when he approached the sea was a wetsuit that lay stretched out on the small patch of grass between the rocks. It was rare for him or anyone else in the village to walk there. The wetsuit could have been there for a long time.

He could smell seaweed and the sea and a faint, sickly scent of something else.

The wetsuit was partially inside out and wedged inside the legs was a pair of blue flippers. Two white bones were sticking out of each one.

 

****

Sheriff Kåre Unnhammer from Farsund Police Station is an authoritative man with large, serious eyes, a big moustache and gold teeth that gleam when he speaks. It is a pleasant day in April.

In the waiting room at the station is a sign warning against boat thieves and a poster stating that the legal size for cod caught south of 60 degrees latitude is 40 centimetres. In the Middle Ages the people burned witches right outside this spot, but things are more relaxed now.

“This is a peaceful place,” Unnhammer says. He turns to his computer and reads from the log. “At 3.02pm, January 2 2015, a diving suit with human remains was found at Lista.”

Forensics experts from the county capital, Kristiansand, went to take photographs and scrutinise the body, but it had been in the sea for so long that there was not a lot left to examine. There was no sign of damage from propellers, stabbing or gunshot wounds. Unnhammer reckoned that it was somebody who had gone missing in the North Sea and that he or she would be identified quickly.

Sheriff Kåre Unnhammer. All photographs by Tomm W Christiansen.

Police looked at a missing persons report from the Stavanger area, on Norway’s west coast, where a man wearing a wetsuit had disappeared a year earlier. Neither that man nor anyone else who had been reported missing matched the description of the body found at Lista.

“From time to time, we get bodies floating in here, but we haven’t had one that we haven’t managed to identify before,” says Unnhammer.

There is a sea chart of the Lista area on the office wall. The currents are unpredictable and always changing. Not even professional fishermen can tell how the ocean will behave the next day. It is impossible to say where a corpse that floats ashore has come from.

In this case, there was not a lot Unnhammer could do.

“When we have so little to go on, we have to turn to DNA profiling to find the answer. And we can’t get that kind of thing done here,” he says.

 

 

****

Police Superintendent Per Angel has been identifying dead bodies for more than 25 years. He is the head of the identification unit at Norway’s National Criminal Investigation Service, known as Kripos. His team is called when there are simultaneous, multiple deaths – from the Partnair plane crash that killed 55 people off the Danish coast in 1989 to Anders Breivik’s killing spree in 2011 – or when an unidentified body is found. Angel describes Norway as a ­country made for accidents: it has heavy storms, a rugged landscape and many thousands of workplaces offshore and in the
polar region.

“We have become skilled in ID work,” he says.

The list of people who have gone missing in Norway since 1947 consists of 1,443 names. The list of dead people who were found in the same period and never identified by police is much shorter – just 16 bodies, several of which most likely originate in premodern times.

“The man in the wetsuit could be number 17,” Angel says. (DNA testing had shown the body was that of a male.) “This is a special case.”

When Kripos receives an unidentified body, forensics experts, pathologists, dentists and geneticists collect so-called post-mortem information. They create a DNA profile, take fingerprints and register details about teeth, jewellery, previous bone fractures, tattoos and any other characteristics that may help in identifying a body. They also try to establish the cause of death.

Post-mortem information is compared with data from missing reports, where family or friends have given details about a person they are looking for. The main requirements for identification are matching information on teeth, fingerprints and DNA. A single “match” is not enough to establish identity and has to be supported by one or more additional pieces of information that connect the body to a missing person. This may be the clothing the victim was wearing, medical history, phone ­records or their last known location.

No missing reports in Norway match the body found at Lista. Although DNA has been retrieved from the wetsuit, if Kripos is to be able to identify the body the man must for some reason have a registered DNA profile somewhere in the world, or a family member must have reported him missing and provided a DNA sample.

On 5 February, Kripos sends out an Interpol “Black Notice”, which is used to seek information on unidentified bodies. It contains the DNA profile and all the information pertaining to the remains found at Lista. Kripos receives a response the next day. The Lista body is not the only one that has drifted ashore in a grey-and-black wetsuit with the brand name “Tribord” on the right shoulder and on the hood.

 

****

“We call him the Wetsuitman,” says John Welzenbagh, an investigator with the Dutch special police unit for persons missing in the North Sea.

A 52-year-old former navy diver, Welzenbagh is fit-looking and wears a dark windbreaker jacket and sunglasses. On the ferry over from Den Helder, on the mainland, to the island of Texel in the northern Netherlands, Welzenbagh points to a sandbank and explains that he is still trying to ascertain the identity of a dead man who was found on a sailboat there in 1995.

Just a few weeks back, he had a breakthrough in another case and is close to identifying an older, probably French, woman who floated ashore here 15 years ago.

The Wetsuitman was discovered on Texel early in the morning of 27 October in a black-and-grey Tribord wetsuit, identical to the one that the architect stumbled upon at Lista 67 days later. The body was found by the water’s edge on the broad strand below the cafés in the small village of De Koog. It is a beach that is popular among windsurfers and tourists in the summer.

Welzenbagh and his team typically receive between 20 and 30 bodies for identification each year. Most turn out to be missing persons from the local area. Cases are usually solved quickly.

“This case is different,” Welzenbagh says.

How long had the Wetsuitman been lying in the water? Three days? Three weeks? The rate of decay is difficult to assess when a person is in a wetsuit in cold water. Where did he come from? It’s also impossible to say. Welzenbagh has found dead people from the entire North Sea and the Channel area: England, Scotland, France, Germany, Belgium and, of course, the Netherlands.

There were not many physical characteristics to go on. The only thing Welzenbagh noticed was that the body had very dark hair.

“I thought he might be from Spain. There aren’t many other places in Europe where you see that hair colour – in any case, not among ethnic Europeans,” he says.

At the time the Wetsuitman was discovered, four windsurfers had been reported missing in England. The main theory in the first days was that one of them had floated ashore. However, the windsurfers were quickly found. The Dutch police’s next assumption was that the body on Texel was that of a French diver who had gone missing off Normandy.

“This was of course wrong, but even at our meetings he [the body] was known as ‘the Diver’. I didn’t like that,” Welzenbagh says. “We had no way of knowing what kind of water sports [were involved]. I was afraid if we called him the Diver, we would overlook clues that could help us. I said, ‘From now on, we will call him the Wetsuitman.’”

 

****

The Dutch police were at a loss. It was impossible to reproduce fingerprints. There were no papers found with the body, and the DNA profile and missing persons report they had sent out through Interpol met with no response.

The only strong clue Welzenbagh had was the wetsuit: a five-millimetre-thick neoprene model with a hood, designed for diving and snorkelling in temperatures between 16 and 24° Celsius. In the North Sea and the English Channel, water temperatures rarely rise above 15° Celsius. At the end of October, when the body was found, the normal temperature is 10° Celsius.

“There was something that wasn’t quite right,” Welzenbagh says.

 

****

Radio-frequency identification, or RFID, chips are tiny and weather-resistant, and have numerous uses, from identifying pets to tracking goods from the time of production until they are scanned at a cash register and disappear into a shopping bag.

When Welzenbagh discovered the little RFID symbol on the tightly sewn tag that contained the wetsuit’s serial number, he knew he could find out where and when the suit had been sold. And – if there was a credit-card number on the till receipt – who had bought it. Here is what he found out.

At 8.03pm on Tuesday 7 October 2014, a customer had stood in front of the cash register of the Decathlon sports shop in the French port city of Calais and bought a Tribord Subsea five-millimetre wetsuit, medium size, for €79. He or she also purchased hand paddles – plates that swimmers use to provide more resistance when they train – a snorkel and a diving mask, flippers, water socks usually used for aquatic gymnastics, and a waterproof A4 plastic folder.

But there was more: the receipt showed the customer had bought two of each item listed on it. Welzenbagh knew where one of the wetsuits was – in the evidence store in the Netherlands.

When the serial number on the wetsuit was sent to Norway, it became clear where the other one had ended up: found by an architect during a winter storm at Lista on the southern tip of Norway, 890 kilometres from Calais, 87 days after it was purchased.

The customer paid €256 in cash. There was no CCTV footage from the shop.

Neither of the DNA profiles from the bodies in the Netherlands and Norway produced any hits internationally through Interpol. All leads in the case trailed off at the Decathlon in Calais, barely an hour after sunset on 7 October last year.

The wetsuit found on Texel in the Netherlands on 27 October.

 

Part 2: The Jungle

A biting wind whips up the sand, making it difficult to see. A few hundred metres away, in the grey-brown dirt between two hills, a handful of refugees walk in a cloud of dust, pushing a shopping basket filled with bottles of water.

“No camera,” one man shouts when he sees us. He gestures angrily at us to go away.

All around are sheets of blue, black and green plastic, the billowing walls of the hundreds of makeshift tents that are spread across a former dump site.

More than 2,000 illegal immigrants who have fled war, oppressive regimes or poverty live here. In the summer, that number will double. They have little water, no electricity, no heating and no security.

A tall and muscular African man in his twenties walks along the road towards the building complex where since January the refugees and migrants have been served one meal a day. The only tap in the area is here.

It is 11am. The man is drunk and is clutching a bottle of rosé from Lidl. He is crying loudly. His voice breaks. “I wanna go home. I wanna go home to Africa.”

This desolate, illness-infested unofficial camp in Calais has no name, but everybody knows what it’s called: the Jungle.

 

****

Calais (population 75,000) is located at the point on the French coast where the English Channel is at its narrowest. It is 34 kilometres across to England. On good days, you can see the limestone cliffs of Dover. Lonely Planet describes Calais as the place where the most people anywhere in the world have passed through without stopping.

From the Eurotunnel terminal a few kilometres outside Calais, large trains transport cars and trucks under the Channel. The ferry to Dover also leaves from the town. Reaching the UK – by going under or over the Channel – is the only goal for most of the refugees and migrants in the Jungle.

The latest tool in the effort to prevent them doing so is a four-metre-high, 20-kilometre-long barbed-wire fence, last used during a high-level Nato meeting in Wales last year.
It was donated by the British authorities – along with £12m – to increase security around the ferry and the Channel Tunnel.

At least 15 refugees and migrants from Calais died last year, including a 16-year-old girl. Most were run over on the motorway. One died when he jumped from a bridge on to a passing truck. One was found dead in the river; one fell from his hiding place under the axle of a wheel on a tourist bus. There are also those who are not found on official lists or in news items or on activists’ blogs. The ones nobody has heard about, has enquired of, or remembers.

The refugee theory emerged when John Welzenbagh and his colleagues in the Netherlands managed to connect the wetsuits to Calais. If the victims had a permanent connection to Europe, or were ordinary tourists, they would have been reported missing by family or friends. French police would have heard about it; but in this case they had no information about two people in wetsuits who had disappeared.

Another thing puzzled Welzenbagh: the equipment listed on the receipt, a mixture of competitive swimming, water aerobics and diving gear. He felt that nobody with a minimum of knowledge about water sports would have bought such a combination.

Was it possible that the victims were refugees who had tried to swim to England?

 

****

The Decathlon shop is on an industrial estate outside the centre of Calais. It stocks a wide range of sporting goods at low prices.

When the photographer and I arrive one morning at the end of April, a young woman is arranging merchandise at the end of a rack displaying surfboards and swimsuits. We explain that we are journalists from Norway and that two men have been found dead in wetsuits that were purchased here on 7 October last year.

“I know that,” she says. “The police rang here. I was the one at the cash desk.”

She says she must speak to the boss and will be gone a short while. When she comes back she says she cannot speak to us and that
we must not mention the name of the sports shop if we write anything.

We do a round of the shop and find her again some minutes later at the wetsuit rack.

“They bought two of these,” she says quietly and points to one of the wetsuits.

She appears nervous, keeps her voice down and makes sure that nobody sees she is talking to us. “I remember them, but only just. There were two young men, perhaps in their very early twenties. They were refugees and looked as if they might be from Afghanistan,” she says.

After finding the body on Texel, the Dutch police took pictures and sent them to a British expert in England who compiled an identikit of the man. We show it to the woman in the shop.

“I can’t answer if it was one of them. I don’t remember.”

“Did they say anything about what they were going to use the wetsuits for?”

“No. But what I heard is that they swim out to small boats that take them over to England.”

“Have refugees been in here buying wetsuits?”

“I’ve just heard it from others who work here. It happens around once a month. I don’t know any more.”

 

****

The refugee problem in Calais began in earnest in 1999. In an unused hangar right by the tunnel, the Red Cross opened the Sangatte refugee centre. It was intended to be a place of refuge for a few hundred ­Kosovar Albanians who had fled the war in the Balkans.

Three years later, Sangatte’s population had swelled to 1,600 refugees and migrants, mainly from the Middle East and Africa. Every night hundreds of them tried to get to the UK by hiding in trucks that were driving on to the ferry or through the tunnel. Accusations flew back and forth across the Channel about who was responsible.

At Sangatte, fights broke out between different ethnic groups. Refugees cut holes in the old fence and stormed the tunnel terminal. “Stop the invasion” was the headline on the front page of the Daily Express.

In December 2002 the then home secretary, David Blunkett, announced that France had agreed to the closure of Sangatte, and that the UK would accept 1,200 of the asylum-seekers registered at the camp. The refugees continued to come to Calais. The only thing that had changed was that they no longer had a place to go.

Some lived on the street; others set up small slum communities. Most settled on an industrial site belonging to one of Europe’s largest producers of titanium dioxide. That was the first “jungle” in Calais, the Tioxide Jungle.

 

****

It is afternoon in the new Jungle. Henok, 26, fled the repressive regime in Eritrea and has been here one month. He wears jeans and an old flannel jacket. He speaks slowly, says little and has tired eyes.

He takes us to an Eritrean area of the Jungle. Refugees mostly stay within their own ethnic groups.

“This is a dangerous place,” he says.“We are cold, have no water and there are snakes here. It is not a place for human beings.”

He explains that he left Eritrea eight months ago. First he went to Sudan, then through the Sahara to Libya, where he was detained in prison for three weeks. With $500 he bought his freedom. Then he sought out a gang of people traffickers in Tripoli, got money sent over from his family in Eritrea, and paid $1,700 for a place on a boat across the Mediterranean.

“I can get killed in Eritrea, get killed in Libya or drown in the Mediterranean. I must try all the same.”

Henok’s 21-year-old wife, Bethelem, and their son, Fire-Ab Henok, who is one, are still in Eritrea, he assumes. He hasn’t spoken to them in several months.

“I think about them all the time. Far too much. Every second,” he says.

Before we manage to ask Henok if he has heard about any refugees who tried to swim to England or about people smugglers who use small boats to make the journey, an Ethiopian man tries to rob my photo­grapher. The Eritreans we are sitting with become angry and the thief runs away. We are told to leave.

“He might come back with more people,” Henok says. “It is not safe for you here now.”

A few hours later a fight breaks out in the Jungle between the Sudanese and the Eritreans. We are told that they are fighting about whose turn it is to try to board the trucks. One of the few women living in the Jungle ends up in hospital with burn injuries after her tent is set on fire.

 

****

Like many refugees in Calais, Khalil Khaman Khalily, a 26-year-old Afghan, has scars that remind him of the perilous life in his home country. One is 20 centimetres long and goes from his navel up to his ribcage. “Taliban,” he says.

Khalily explains that he was employed by a construction company that was contracted by Nato from 2007, and that among other places he worked at Camp Bastion, the former Nato base in Helmand Province.

He says that five months ago he was kidnapped, locked up and stabbed when he went to meet a potential new employer.

“All Afghans who worked for Nato live dangerously.”

He fled when one of the guards got drunk and made his way through Afghanistan, Iran and Turkey. In Serbia, he travelled to the border town of Subotica, crossing through the forest into Hungary – and into the European Union. From there he travelled mostly on the train, dodging fares, to Paris and then on to Calais.

“I don’t feel safe here either,” Khalily says. “Look around you. The longer you are here, the more depressed you get.”

During his 20 days in Calais, Khalily has made 25 failed attempts to get to England, where he has a brother studying IT. He dreams about becoming a military surgeon and travelling back to Afghanistan.

“I must be careful on account of my wounds, but I will get to England when I can take bigger chances,” he says.

We ask if he has heard about refugees trying to swim. He laughs and shakes his head. “We barely manage to shower,” he says.

We show him the Wetsuitman identikit. “He looks Afghan. I haven’t heard of him, but I haven’t been here long. People come here, then they leave as soon as they can.”

Another group of Afghans approaches, offers us tea and takes us into the tent where up to ten men live at a time. They are eating a small meal of onions and potatoes. Nearby is a shopping trolley with rice and pasta and a campfire where they warm tea in a big pot. They are far from the first we encounter who have stories to tell about police violence in France.

One of them has his right arm in plaster. He says he is called Khalid and is 26 years old, and that he fell and broke his arm when he and several others were chased by the police in Calais.

“We didn’t do anything. The police here are like lions and we are the buffalo flock.”

Many of the refugees say that they have been hit with batons, kicked and doused with pepper spray when the police find and pull them out of the trucks.

Their stories echo those in a January report from Human Rights Watch, based on interviews with 44 refugees in Calais. The accusations were dismissed by the French authorities, which said that HRW had not verified the claims.

In June the organisation Calais Migrant Solidarity released a video, made on 5 May, showing policemen beating migrants and pushing them over the roadside fence.

The French authorities say they will investigate the events, and that police in Calais are considering buying GoPro cameras to prove that, at times, they have no choice but to use force to stop the refugees.

“The rest of the world has no idea how we are treated. Go out and tell them about the suffering of the people in the Jungle,” Khalid says.

Among the men in the tent he seems to be the boss. He says he lived for several years in England, but was deported after he “did something stupid”. Now he has been in Calais for four months.

We tell him about the case we are working on, show him the picture and ask if he or the others have heard something. They study the face.

“He looks like a Hazara. They are Afghans, but are originally Mongols,” Khalid says. “But I haven’t heard about anyone buying wetsuits or swimming and I am the one who is here the longest. It is sad if he came from here and nobody can find out who he was. That’s the way it is. Hundreds of Afghans could die and nobody cares.”

We thank him for the tea, wish them luck and go back out into the Jungle to look for the Hazaras. They used to have their own little camp here somewhere, but most of them are gone.

While we are showing the identikit to other refugees our translator interrupts and takes us aside. He used to be a refugee in Calais. Now he is a journalist and has started up an Afghan radio station in London.

“You have to stop showing them the drawing,” he says. “There are many talking about you now. They think you are police or people smugglers posing as journalists . . . We should go.”

The translator mentions the Afghans we drank tea with in the tent.

“I don’t know if you noticed it, but several of them had been in England. They had smartphones, English SIM cards and seem to be having an easy enough life. They are the top people.”

Traffickers?

“It is hard to say. They are probably a contact point for smugglers and they help them to get people. There were several of them who did not want you around.”

Georges Gilles is a pensioner who has been a voluntary aid worker in Calais for four years. Every day he drives around in an old white Fiat van and gives out blankets, food and tarpaulins. It is never enough. We ask him if he knows anything about how the people smugglers operate.

“They are everywhere, but stay in the shadows,” he says. “They are often Kurds, Afghans or Albanians. Albanians are the worst.”

The refugees who can afford to pay the smugglers are taken tens of kilometres along the motorway outside Calais to avoid strict security. At night, at rest stops and petrol stations, the smugglers hide them in and under parked trailers.

“If I were you, I would have kept far away. If they see that you are taking pictures, you will be killed,” Gilles says.

 

****

Evening is approaching and the refugees are on the move. They put on dark clothes, pack their bags and start walking towards the tunnel and the ferry terminal. Just outside the Jungle, at the Jules Ferry day centre, where women and children refugees are allowed to sleep, dinner has been served, and it is now quiet. None of the helpers knows of any men who went missing last October, nor of anyone trying to swim across the Channel. Nobody can confirm that smugglers use small boats to cross to the UK.

From the beach in Calais, we see the Pride of Burgundy ferry gliding out of the harbour and setting course for Dover. England is a grey stripe on the horizon. Under the deck, hidden in containers or trucks, are likely to be refugees or migrants. They will have held their breath through the checkpoints, past the police dogs and into the ferry. They will have heard the heavy chains locking the wheels before the crossing, and finally the ferry slip closing. The sound of safety. In 90 minutes a new life will begin.

Lines of inquiry: identikit of the Wetsuitman.

Before we leave Calais, our translator says that there are Afghan groups on Facebook, where information about refugees is sometimes posted. He uploads a copy of the identikit and writes a brief description of the case on the sites.

Two days later, his report is seen by a French aid worker in Calais. She says she has been in contact with a Syrian who lives in England and who knows of another Syrian man there who has been searching for his nephew for months. The nephew was in Calais before he disappeared.

After three phone calls in broken English we hear the story of Mouaz for the first time.

 

Part 3: The long journey

In a strange land, thousands of kilometres from home, a young man stood and looked out to sea. He had been travelling for 142 days. As usual, the weather in autumn was bitter along the coast of north-west France.

The place the young man once called home, Damascus, in Syria, was no longer home. His family – mother, father and four sisters – had fled to Jordan. He hadn’t seen them since he left there five months earlier. Now it was 7 October 2014. He had been in Calais for only a couple of hours.

On his phone, he opened the WhatsApp messaging service and texted his uncle living in Bradford. “I can see England,” the young man wrote. He added that he thought it was possible to get out to a boat, or swim across the Channel.

The uncle replied that the Channel in some ways resembled the Sea of Marmara, an inland sea that separates Turkey’s European and Asian parts: you can see land on the other side, but it is much further away than you think.

“You must not try to swim. That wouldn’t work. Hide in a lorry,” the uncle texted.

“I will try today,” the young man replied. That same evening, one hour and 43 minutes before two wetsuits were sold in the Decathlon sports shop outside the centre of Calais, the young man sent a message to his sister and other family members in Jordan: “I miss you.”

Since then nobody has heard a word from 22-year-old Mouaz al-Balkhi.

 

****

The uncle’s name is Badi. He has slicked-back hair, a checked shirt and a warm smile that appears when he is looking for the apposite word in English. He came to England as a refugee in 2013, hiding in a trailer at Dunkirk, just north of Calais, and travelling through the Channel Tunnel.

Badi was granted limited leave to remain in England, and now lives with his wife and two small daughters in a red-brick house in a district of Bradford popular with immigrants.

Badi tried to ring Mouaz on 8 October. The phone was switched off. In the following days, he and other family members called several times a day, but the phone always went directly to an Arabic song that they heard countless times over the next eight months.

They feared that something had happened to Mouaz. They knew he had €300 on him and worried that he had been robbed and killed. After a week, two of Mouaz’s relatives who live in Scotland travelled to Calais, where they contacted the police. They were hoping to find that Mouaz had been arrested and was unable to answer his phone.

“The police said that they couldn’t help us,” Badi says.

A month later, the two relatives returned to Calais, but the police still had no in­formation. They took a picture of Mouaz and showed it to refugees in the Jungle. They visited the local hospital and the morgue, but nobody had seen Mouaz or heard anything.

In March, they turned to the British police for help. According to Badi, the relatives were told that it wasn’t really a matter for the UK, as Mouaz had gone missing in France, but they promised to do a search through Interpol. The relatives say that the only message they received from UK police was that Mouaz was not in prison in Bradford. They made further inquiries through a lawyer, the Red Cross and the immigration office, to no avail.

“Mouaz’s mother rings me every day to find out if there is anything new,” Badi says. “It is absolutely terrible to live with uncertainty and nobody was able to help us. When you rang was the first time we heard something concrete about what might have happened.”

Badi was searching for his nephew Mouaz, lost in Calais in 2014.

Badi wants to hear all the details about the bodies found in Norway and the Netherlands. He asks if we think one of them could be his nephew. A lot of the information Badi provides about Mouaz – dates, location, how much money he had, that he mentioned swimming – fits in with the details of the case. On the other hand, Mouaz was travelling on his own, according to his family. Would somebody have decided to swim to England with somebody they didn’t know?

We explain to Badi that the only thing that can provide an answer is a DNA test. We give him a pair of plastic gloves and a little cotton swab, of the kind you remove make-up with, and ask him to scrape it against the inside of his cheek. We place the swab in a small plastic bag. He also draws a family tree showing his relationship to Mouaz.

Back in Norway, we give the sample to the identification group at Kripos, which starts building a DNA profile to compare with the findings from Lista. Kripos also requests the Netherlands police to send the DNA records extracted from the body found on Texel.

 

****

Rahaf is Mouaz’s sister. She is 19 and lives  in the Jordanian capital, Amman, with the rest of the family. We talk to them on Skype. Rahaf translates while her mother talks about the son she hasn’t seen in more than a year.

Mouaz and his sisters grew up in Damascus. Their father was in prison for 11 years because he supported the opposition, but was released at the beginning of 2011. They lived in a multicultural neighbourhood. Shias, Sunnis, Christians, Jews, Alawites – Mouaz was friends with everyone. He never fought with anyone, his mother says.

“If somebody was fighting, he tried to make peace,” she says.

He liked to watch films and to swim. Every week before the civil war broke out in 2011, he went to a swimming pool in Damascus, Rahaf says. The family became one of the many millions that fled the conflict. They arrived in Jordan in 2013, but Mouaz stayed behind in Damascus to finish his electrical engineering studies. He was often stopped on the street by forces loyal to President Bashar al-Assad: it made no difference if you were a rioter or a university student. Sometimes he was taken to a police station and detained.

Mouaz held out for six months before fleeing to Jordan, too.

He couldn’t get a place at the university in Amman, and with his father struggling to find work, he felt increasingly responsible for the family’s welfare. He decided to travel to Turkey in the hope of studying there, and that his family would be able to follow. But his university application was again unsuccessful, his sister said. Mouaz now faced a conundrum: he couldn’t return to Jordan as a refugee because he had already left the country voluntarily. He decided to try to make it to England.

“They have good laws for refugees, he could study there and our uncle lives there,” Rahaf says.

 

****

On 17 August 2014, Mouaz took a flight from Turkey to Algeria. He then travelled through the desert for two days and crossed the border into Libya.

The family knows only that he was there for ten days before he got a place on one of the refugee boats that cross the Mediterranean. After three days at sea, the vessel was intercepted by the Italian navy and the refugees were brought safely to shore.

Mouaz made his way west through Italy and France by train, and on 5 September he arrived in Dunkirk. Over the next two weeks, he made ten failed attempts to hide in a truck heading for the UK. He often sent messages to his family. His parents and his sisters would ask how he was, whether he was keeping warm and whether he’d had something to eat. He always answered that they shouldn’t worry.

He went back to Italy after hearing that it was possible for him to board a plane from there to England. That proved to be wrong, so he returned to Dunkirk, where he made two more failed attempts to hide in a truck. On the morning of 7 October, he travelled from Dunkirk to Calais. His family does not know if he went with someone or alone, but says that the refugees he knew from before had moved on.

Mouaz’s sister Rahaf was the last one to speak to him. He told her that he would try to get to England from Calais, but he didn’t say how. He had mentioned a few times that he thought it would be easy to swim out to a boat or ferry near the coast and climb on board, though he never spoke about swimming across the entire Channel.

She received the last message just before 6.30pm on 7 October. He wrote that he missed them. “Mouaz would have told us if he had thought of doing anything dangerous, so we are certain that he didn’t try to swim. We think he is in jail in France or England and we are trying to get an answer from the police. They are the ones responsible,” Rahaf says.

 

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Kripos informs us that the DNA sample we took from Mouaz’s uncle Badi in Bradford shows that there is no genetic relationship between him and the body found at Lista. For the body found in the Netherlands – the Wetsuitman – the results have been inconclusive.

It is rare that anybody disappears without trace from Calais. The details of Mouaz’s history – the date he disappeared, that he had talked about swimming, that he had enough money for a wetsuit but not enough to get the help of smugglers – lead us to contact the family again and suggest getting a new DNA test.

To avoid any doubt, we obtain sampling equipment from the Norwegian Institute of Public Health and send it to a contact in Jordan who takes Mouaz’s mother, father and one of his sisters to a clinic in Amman where two sets of tests are conducted. One sample is sent to Kripos, the other to police in the Netherlands.

Kripos rings first. None of the new DNA material matches that from the body found at Lista in Norway. We get an answer from the Netherlands a few days later. The samples supplied by Mouaz al-Balkhi’s father and mother reveal that they have a direct family link with the body that washed up on the beach on Texel. Investigator John Welzenbagh of the Dutch special police unit for missing persons says he believes the case is solved.

 

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What do you hope for when a son, a brother, a nephew goes missing for eight months and the only alternative to a constant, nagging uncertainty is depths of grief? There is always hope in uncertainty. Notification of a death is an answer, but it is final. The telephone call you are waiting for, with the voice you’ve missed saying, “Mother, I’m alive,” will never come.

Twenty-two years is not a life. It is barely a beginning.

We don’t know how far he got. We don’t know what his plan was. We don’t know exactly where he took the first steps into the cold water or who was beside him. We don’t know if he was afraid.

But we do know his name. We know that he wanted to complete his engineering studies in England and help his family in Jordan. We know that he missed them.

In a graveyard on the island of Texel, in a corner of Field E between the tombstones of Anneke Molenaar van den Brink and Anna Cornelia Alida Boer, is a grave without a name. Beneath the daisies and dandelions rests the young man who could see England.

He is called Mouaz al-Balkhi and he was born on 6 November 1991 in Damascus and he dreamed of a better life.

This is an edited and translated version of an article first published in the Norwegian newspaper Dagbladet.

Anders Fjellberg and Tomm W Christiansen pursued the story of the second body and published their findings on 18 July. See: http://www.dagbladet.no/spesial/vatdraktmysteriet/eng/#del4

This article first appeared in the 09 July 2015 issue of the New Statesman, The austerity war

JON BERKELEY
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The empire strikes back

How the Brexit vote has reopened deep wounds of empire and belonging, and challenged the future of the United Kingdom.

Joseph Chamberlain, it has been widely remarked, serves as an inspiration for Theresa May’s premiership. The great municipal reformer and champion of imperial protectionism bestrode the politics of late-Victorian and Edwardian Britain. He was a social reformer, a keen ­unionist and an advocate for the industrial as well as the national interest – all values espoused by the Prime Minister.

Less noticed, however, is that May’s excavation of Chamberlain’s legacy is a symptom of two larger historical dynamics that have been exposed by the vote for Brexit. The first is the reopening on the British body politic of deep wounds of race, citizenship and belonging, issues that home rule for Ireland, and then the end of empire, followed by immigration from the former colonies, made central to British politics during the 20th century. Over the course of the century, the imperial subjects of the queen-empress became British and Irish nationals, citizens of the Commonwealth and finally citizens of a multicultural country in the European Union. The long arc of this history has left scars that do not appear to have healed fully.

The second dynamic is the renewal of patterns of disagreement over free trade and social reform that shaped profound divisions roughly a century ago. Specifically, the rivalry was between a vision of Britain as the free-trade “world island”, supported by the City of London and most of the country’s governing elite, and the protectionist project, or “imperial preference”, articulated by Chamberlain, which sought to bind together the British empire in a new imperial tariff union, laying the foundations for industrial renewal, social progress and national security. The roots of these commitments lay in his career as a self-made businessman and reforming mayor of Birmingham. A leading Liberal politician, Chamberlain broke with his own party over home rule for Ireland and, with a small group of Liberal Unionists, joined Lord Salisbury’s Conservative government of 1895, becoming colonial secretary. He subsequently resigned in 1903 to campaign on the question of imperial preference.

The fault lines in contemporary political economy that Brexit has starkly exposed mimic those first staked out in the early part of the 20th century, which lie at the heart of Chamberlain’s career: industry v finance, London v the nations and regions, intervention v free trade. This time, however, these divides are refracted through the politics of Britain’s relationship with Europe, producing new economic interests and political ­alliances. What’s more, the City now serves the European economy, not just Britain and her former colonies.

Chamberlain is the junction between these two critical dynamics, where race and political economy interweave, because of his advocacy of “Greater Britain” – the late-Victorian idea that the white settler colonies of Canada, Australia, New Zealand and South Africa should be joined with the mother country, in ties of “kith-and-kin” solidarity, or more ambitiously in a new imperial federation. Greater Britain owed much to the Anglo-Saxonism of Victorian historians and politicians, and was as much a Liberal as a Conservative idea. Greater Britain was a new way of imagining the English race – a ten-million-strong, worldwide realm dispersed across the “white” colonies. It was a global commonwealth, but emphatically not one composed of rootless cosmopolitans. Deep ties, fostered by trade and migration, held what the historian James Belich calls “the Anglo-world” together. It helped equip the English with an account of their place in the world that would survive at least until the 1956 Suez crisis, and it was plundered again by latter-day Eurosceptics as they developed a vision of the UK as an integral part, not of the EU, but of an “Anglosphere”, the liberal, free-market, parliamentary democracies of the English-speaking world.

Greater Britain carried deep contradictions within itself, however. Because it was associated with notions of racial membership and, more specifically, with Protestantism, it could not readily accommodate divisions within the UK itself. The political realignment triggered by Chamberlain’s split with Gladstone over Irish home rule, which set one of the most enduring and intractable political divides of the era, was symptomatic of this. For Chamberlain, Irish home rule would have entailed Protestant Ireland being dominated by people of “another race and religion”. Unless there could be “home rule all round” and a new imperial parliament, he preferred an alliance with “English gentlemen” in the Tory party to deals with Charles Stewart Parnell, the leader of Ireland’s constitutional nationalists.

The failure of Chamberlain’s kith-and-kin federalism, and the long struggle of nationalist Ireland to leave the UK, left a bitter legacy in the form of partition and a border that threatens once again, after Brexit, to disrupt British politics. But it also left less visible marks. On Ireland becoming a republic, its citizens retained rights to travel, settle and vote in the UK. The Ireland Act 1949 that followed hard on the Irish Free State’s exit from the Commonwealth defined Irish citizens as “non-foreign”.

A common travel area between the two countries was maintained, and when immigration legislation restricted rights to enter and reside in the UK in the 1960s and 1970s, Irish citizens were almost wholly exempted. By the early 1970s, nearly a million Irish people had taken up their rights to work and settle in the UK – more than all of those who had come to Britain from the Caribbean and south Asia combined. Even after the Republic of Ireland followed the UK into the European common market, its citizens retained rights that were stronger than those given to other European nationals.

In 1998, the Good Friday Agreement went a step further. It recognised the birthright of all the people of Northern Ireland to hold both British and Irish citizenship. Common EU citizenship north and south of the border made this relatively straightforward. But under a “hard Brexit”, Britain may be asked to treat Irish citizens just like other EU citizens. And so, unless it can secure a bilateral deal with the Republic of Ireland, the UK will be forced to reinvent or annul the common travel area, reintroducing border and customs controls and unstitching this important aspect of its post-imperial, 20th-century settlement. Will Ireland and its people remain “non-foreign”, or is the past now another country?

 

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Today’s equivalent of 19th-century Irish nationalism is Scottish national sentiment. Like Gladstone and his successors, Theresa May is faced with the question of how to accommodate the distinct, and politically powerful, aspirations of a constituent nation of the United Kingdom within the unsteady framework associated with the coexistence of parliamentary sovereignty and ongoing devolution. Scotland’s independence referendum bestowed a sovereign power on its people that cannot be set aside in the Brexit negotiations. The demand for a “flexible Brexit” that would allow Scotland to stay in the European single market is also, in practice, a demand for a federal settlement in the UK: a constitutional recognition that Scotland wants a different relationship to the EU from that of England and Wales.

If this is not couched in explicitly federal terms, it takes the unitary nature of the UK to its outer limits. Hard Brexit is, by contrast, a settlement defined in the old Conservative-Unionist terms.

Unionism and federalism both failed as projects in Ireland. Chamberlain and the Conservative Unionists preferred suppression to accommodation, a stance that ended in a war that their heirs ultimately lost.

Similarly, the federal solution of Irish home rule never made it off the parchment of the parliamentary legislation on which it was drafted. The federalist tradition is weak in British politics for various reasons, one of which is the disproportionate size of England within the kingdom. Yet devising a more federal arrangement may now be the only means of holding the UK together. May’s unionism – symbolised by her visit to Edinburgh to meet Scotland’s First Minister, Nicola Sturgeon, in the first days of her premiership – will be enormously tested by a hard Brexit that cannot accommodate Scottish claims for retention of single-market status or something close to it. Separation, difficult as this may be for the Scottish National Party to secure, may follow.

The idea of Greater Britain also left behind it a complex and contentious politics of citizenship. As colonial secretary at the end for 19th century, Chamberlain faced demands for political equality of the subjects of the crown in the empire; Indians, in particular, were discriminated against in the white settler colonies. He strongly resisted colour codes or bars against any of the queen’s subjects but allowed the settler colonies to adopt educational qualifications for their immigration laws that laid the foundation for the racial discrimination of “White Australia”, as well as Canadian immigration and settlement policies, and later, of course, the apartheid regime in South Africa.

Nonetheless, these inequalities were not formally written into imperial citizenship. The British subject was a national of the empire, which was held together by a common code of citizenship. That unity started to unravel as the colonies became independent. Specifically, a trigger point was reached when, in 1946, the Canadian government legislated to create a new national status, separate and distinct from the common code of imperial citizenship hitherto embodied in the status of the British subject.

The Attlee government responded with the watershed British Nationality Act 1948. This created a new form of citizenship for the UK and the colonies under its direct rule, while conferring the status of British subject or Commonwealth citizen on the peoples of the former countries of empire that had become independent. It was this that has made the act so controversial: as the historian Andrew Roberts has argued, it “gave over 800 million Commonwealth citizens the perfectly legal right to reside in the United Kingdom”.

This criticism of the act echoed through the postwar decades as immigration into the UK from its former empire increased. Yet it is historically misplaced. The right to move to the UK without immigration control had always existed for British subjects; the new law merely codified it. (Indeed, the Empire Windrush, which brought British subjects from the Caribbean to London in June 1948, docked at Tilbury even before the act had received royal assent.)

At the time, ironically, it was for precisely opposite reasons that Conservative critics attacked the legislation. They argued that it splintered the subjects of empire and denied them their rights: “. . . we deprecate any tendency to differentiate between different types of British subjects in the United Kingdom . . . We must maintain our great metropolitan tradition of hospitality to everyone from every part of our empire,” argued Sir David Maxwell Fyfe, the Tory shadow minister of labour and future home secretary.

As the empire withered away in the postwar period, some Conservatives started to change their minds. Enoch Powell, once a staunch imperialist, came to believe that the idea of the Commonwealth as a political community jeopardised the unity of allegiance to the crown, and so was a sham. The citizens of the Commonwealth truly were “citizens of nowhere”, as Theresa May recently put it. As Powell said of the 1948 act: “It recognised a citizenship to which no nation of even the most shadowy and vestigial character corresponded; and conversely, it still continued not to recognise the nationhood of the United Kingdom.”

Once the British empire was finished, its core Anglo-Saxon populace needed to come back, he believed, to find their national mission again, to what he viewed as their English home – in reality, the unitary state of the UK – rather than pretend that something of imperialism still survived. On England’s soil, they would remake a genuine political community, under the sovereignty of the Crown-in-Parliament. If Greater Britain could not exist as an imperial political community, and the Commonwealth was a fiction, then the kith and kin had to live among themselves, in the nation’s homeland.

Contemporary politicians no longer fuse “race” and citizenship in this way, even if in recent years racist discourses have found their way back into mainstream politics in advanced democracies, Britain included. However, the legacies of exclusivist accounts of nationality persist, and not merely on the populist right. British politics today is dominated by claims about an irreconcilable division between the attitudes and national sentiments of the white working classes, on the one hand, and the cosmopolitanism of metropolitan liberals, on the other.

But thinking and speaking across this artificial divide is imperative in both political and civic terms. Many Remainers have the same uncertainties over identity and political community as commentators have identified with those who supported Brexit; and the forms of patriotism exhibited across the UK are not necessarily incompatible with wider commitments and plural identities. Above all, it is vital to challenge the assumption that a regressive “whiteness” defines the content of political Englishness.

 

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Brexit thus forces us once again to confront questions about our citizenship, and the question of who is included in the nation. In an ironic twist of fate, however, it will deprive the least cosmopolitan of us, who do not live in Northern Ireland, or claim Irish descent, or hold existing citizenship of another EU country, of the European citizenship we have hitherto enjoyed. Conversely it also leaves a question mark over the status of EU nationals who live and work in the UK but do not hold British nationality. The government’s failure to give guarantees to these EU nationals that they will be allowed to remain in the UK has become a matter of deep controversy, on both sides of the Brexit divide.

As only England and Wales voted for it, Brexit has also exposed the emergence once again of distinct identities in the constituent nations of the UK. Although Scottish nationalism has been the most politically powerful expression of this trend, Englishness has been growing in salience as a cultural and, increasingly, as a political identity, and an insistent English dimension has become a feature of British politics. Although talk of a mass English nationalism is misplaced – it can scarcely be claimed that nationalism alone explains the complex mix of anxiety and anger, hostility to large-scale immigration and desire for greater self-government that motivated English voters who favoured Brexit – it is clear that identity and belonging now shape and configure political arguments and culture in England.

Yet, with a handful of notable exceptions, the rise in political Englishness is being given expression only on the right, by Eurosceptics and nationalists. The left is significantly inhibited by the dearth of serious attempts to reimagine England and ­different English futures, whether culturally or democratically.

It is not just the deep politics of the Union and its different peoples that Brexit has revived. The divisions over Britain’s economy that were opened up and positioned during the Edwardian era have also returned to the centre of political debate. Though as yet this is more apparent in her rhetoric than in her practice, Theresa May seems drawn to the project of reviving the Chamberlainite economic and social agendas: using Brexit to underpin arguments for an industrial strategy, a soft economic nationalism and social reform for the “just about managing” classes. She has created a new department responsible for industrial strategy and advocated places for workers on company boards (before watering down this commitment) as well as increased scrutiny of foreign takeovers of British firms. Housing policy is to be refocused away from subsidising home ownership and directed towards building homes and supporting private renters. Fiscal policy has been relaxed, with increased infrastructure investment promised. The coalition that delivered Brexit – made up of struggling working-class voters and middle-class older voters (or the “excluded and the insulated”, as the Tory peer David Willetts puts it) – is seen as the ballast for a new Conservative hegemony.

Presentationally, May’s vision of Brexit Britain’s political economy is more Chamberlainite than Thatcherite, a shift that has been obscured in Brexit-related debates about migration and tariff-free access to the European single market. Her economic utterances are edged with a national, if not nationalist, framing and an economic interventionism more commonly associated with the Heseltinian, pro-European wing of her party. In a calculated move replete with symbolism, she launched her economic prospectus for the Tory leadership in Birmingham, advertising her commitment to the regions and their industries, rather than the City of London and the financial interest.

It is therefore possible that May’s project might turn into an attempt to decouple Conservative Euroscepticism from Thatcherism, creating a new fusion with Tory “One Nation” economic and social traditions. It is this realignment that has left the Chancellor, Philip Hammond, often exposed in recent months, since the Treasury is institutionally hostile both to economic interventionism and to withdrawal from the single market. Hence his recent threat to the European Union that if Britain cannot secure a decent Brexit deal, it will need to become a deregulated, low-tax, Dubai-style “world island” to remain competitive. He cannot envisage another route to economic prosperity outside the European Union.

It also leaves those on the Thatcherite right somewhat uncertain about May. For while she has sanctioned a hard Brexit, in crucial respects she appears to demur from their political economy, hence the discontent over the government’s deal to secure Nissan’s investment in Sunderland. As her Lancaster House speech made clear, she envisages Brexit in terms of economically illiberal goals, such as the restriction of immigration, which she believes can be combined with the achievement of the new free trade deals that are totemic for her party’s Eurosceptics.

In practice, the Prime Minister’s willingness to endorse Hammond’s negotiating bluster about corporate tax cuts and deregulation shows that she is anything but secure in her Chamberlainite orientation towards industrial strategy and social reform. Her policy positions are shot through with the strategic tension between an offshore, “global Britain” tax haven and her rhetoric of a “shared society”, which will be difficult to resolve. May has embraced hard (she prefers “clean”) Brexit, but a transformation of the axes of conservative politics will only take place if she combines Euroscepticism with a return to pre-Thatcherite economic and social traditions. This would make her party into an even more potent political force. The recent shift of the Ukip vote into the Tory bloc and the notable weakening of Labour’s working-class support suggest what might now be possible. This is the domestic politics of Chamberlain’s social imperialism shorn of empire and tariff – only this time with better electoral prospects.

 

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There are some big pieces of 20th-century political history missing from this jigsaw, however. In the 1930s, Chamberlain’s son Neville succeeded where his father had failed in introducing a modest version of tariff reform, and trade within the empire rebounded. Britain abandoned the gold standard in 1931 and cheap money revived the national economy. The collectivism of the wartime command economy and the postwar Keynesian settlement followed. New forms of economic strategy, industrial policy and social reform were pioneered, and the Treasury beliefs in limited state intervention, “sound money” and free trade that had defined the first decades of the 20th century were defeated.

This era was brought to an end by the election of Margaret Thatcher in 1979. Her government smashed the industrial pillars and the class compromises that had underpinned the postwar world. The ensuing “New Labour” governments inherited a transformed political economy and, in turn, sought to fuse liberal with collectivist strands in a new settlement for the post-industrial economy. What many now view as the end of the neoliberal consensus is, therefore, better seen as the revival of patterns of thinking that pre-date Thatcherism. This tells us much about the persistent and deep problems of Britain’s open economic model and the continuing, unresolved conflict between finance and parts of industry, as well as London and the regions.

Brexit brings these tensions back to the surface of British politics, because it requires the construction of a completely new national economic and political settlement – one that will be thrashed out between the social classes, the leading sectors of the economy, and the nations and regions of the United Kingdom.

Few peacetime prime ministers have confronted the scale and kinds of challenge that Brexit will throw up: holding together the UK, revitalising our industrial base, delivering shared prosperity to working people and renegotiating Britain’s place in Europe and the wider world. This is the most formidable list of challenges. Lesser ones, we should recall, defeated Joe Chamberlain.

Michael Kenny is the inaugural director of the Mile End Institute policy centre, based at Queen Mary University of London

Nick Pearce is professor of public policy at the University of Bath

This article first appeared in the 19 January 2017 issue of the New Statesman, The Trump era