Theresa May’s Chequers plan has achieved the rare feat of alienating everyone for different reasons. Remainers, Brexiteers, the Conservative Party and the European Union have all rejected it. A mere eight months before the UK is due to leave the EU, what could possibly break the deadlock?
For Brexiteers, the alternatives proposed by Remainers – a second referendum or an early general election – are wholly undesirable. Pragmatic Leavers also reject no-deal – for the economic harm it would inflict on the UK and the political harm it would inflict on the Tories.
In these circumstances, some Brexiteers are contemplating an option once regarded as unthinkable: a soft Brexit. Paul Goodman, the editor of the pro-Leave ConservativeHome, recently suggested temporary membership of the European Economic Area (for four years) as a “port in the storm”. The government would then seek to negotiate a superior agreement with the EU or make advance preparations for no deal. Significantly, the Financial Times reports, the same option was privately floated by Michael Gove at a dinner of Tory MPs and peers on 25 June.
The appeal of the EEA model is obvious: the EU has consistently offered it as an “off-the-shelf” model for the UK (and would extend the Article 50 period if necessary). And the existing EEA members – Norway, Iceland and Liechtenstein – have signalled that they are prepared to welcome Britain.
Some Tory Leavers cite additional advantages: though the UK would have to follow most EU rules, it would be outside the customs union (permitting it to sign trade deals with non-EU members), the Common Agricultural Policy and the Common Fisheries Policy. But Britain’s commitment to avoiding a hard Irish border would likely force it to accept de facto membership of these (unlike other EU members). The UK would, however, acquire an “emergency brake” on immigration, albeit one that can only be triggered “if serious economic, societal or environmental difficulties of a sectorial or regional nature liable to persist are arising”.
The politics are no less complex. As ConHome acknowledged, Theresa May could not credibly advocate a soft Brexit and would have to depart as Prime Minister. A Brexiteer replacement – such as Gove – could make a stronger case for EEA membership (under the “Nixon goes to China” principle) but would still struggle to win sufficient support from Tory MPs. Jacob Rees-Mogg and his allies regard this model as mere “vassaldom” and would vote against it at all costs (including no-deal). They, not unreasonably, fear a “Hotel California” Brexit: checking out but never leaving. As Norway can testify, there is nothing more permanent than “temporary” membership.
It is not only Tory Brexiteers who tighten the parliamentary arithmetic. Though 90 Labour MPs rebelled to vote for EEA in June, the party leadership has no intention of backing this option for reasons of both principle and politics. Jeremy Corbyn and his allies fear the economic limitations a soft Brexit could impose on the UK (in areas such as state aid) and also aim to defeat whatever deal the government puts before parliament – in the hope of triggering an early election.
Labour Leavers (such as Frank Field and Kate Hoey) and Re-Leavers (such as Caroline Flint and Gareth Snell) would also vote against EEA membership – an alliance of those opposed to free markets and those opposed to free movement means May cannot simply borrow a majority from Labour. Finally, Labour Remainers have less incentive to rebel if EEA is presented as a refuge for the UK, rather than a final destination.
For these reasons, EEA is less safe than it first appears. It ultimately defers, rather than answers, the Brexit question. The EU will not offer the UK the agreement it wants merely because the discussion is strung out. And, even with the benefit of time, no-deal would remain a calamitous act of national self-harm. But faced with a remorseless clock, and a deadlocked parliament, these could be regarded as nice problems to have.
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