For years, Washington has prioritised countering China’s rising influence and addressing Russia’s revisionism, with national security strategies under both Republican and Democratic administrations focusing on them. Alongside Iran and North Korea, these four countries make up the “axis of autocracies,” a grouping of states that share an ideological alignment against the United States and its allies. As the United States and Israel continue their war with Iran, the perceived lack of support given by Moscow and Beijing to Tehran has highlighted the supposed weakness of this group. But Donald Trump’s actions against Iran have done little to blunt the long-term threat posed by Russia or China. If anything, the war is increasingly benefiting them.
After Russia launched its full-scale invasion of Ukraine in 2022, cooperation between these states increased. Iran provided cheap, effective drones to the front line; North Korea sent thousands of troops to fight on the front line; while China supplied military equipment and technology to Russia.
But questions remain about just how strong a partnership these countries really have. Russia and North Korea are the only two nations of this group that have a mutual defence alliance. At the outset of the war, Tehran’s allies responded first with statements rather than concrete actions, with China calling for the conflict to be “immediately ceased.”
Now, a month in, the level of aid is becoming clear. Moscow has provided Tehran with targeting data, sharing the information required for Iran to carry out its strikes against US forces in the region. While China has continued to provide support for Tehran’s evasion of sanctions. Still, Russia is occupied fighting its own war, which has consumed its military capabilities and any available economic resources. China’s lack of involvement is driven more by its flexibility in world politics. Beijing does not want to be drawn into a major war and aims to maintain its broad relations with many different Gulf nations.
These very real constraints on the level of support that the axis of autocracies can provide to its members have led some analysts to see the war as an easy and effective way for the US to severely weaken a core member of the group and deal a blow to the axis overall. But the conflict is actively boosting the fortunes of Moscow and Beijing. Russia has long faced sanctions related to its decision to launch its invasion of Ukraine, including a cap on oil prices and an increasing crackdown on Russia’s shadow fleet of tankers. However, in an attempt to ease the burgeoning energy crisis caused by the war, the Trump administration temporarily removed sanctions on Russian oil. A decision that has allowed Moscow to earn the most money from its oil exports since just after its 2022 invasion of Ukraine. The war is also providing a potential windfall to Russia beyond oil. India, eager to secure fertiliser ahead of the summer planting season, is exploring the potential to increase its purchases from Russia, among other nations.
China is benefiting from the Iran war, both economically and strategically. China is one of the only countries with the ability to transform coal into petroleum products and other chemicals, and its petrochemical companies have seen a rise in their stock prices. It is also proving to be a boon to Chinese renewable energy companies, as countries look to secure and diversify their energy supplies away from a reliance on oil and gas. But the biggest benefit to Beijing is geopolitical. The war with Iran is exposing Washington’s limits and consuming the munitions and capabilities needed to deter China and maintain an active presence in the Indo-Pacific.
Even Iran, in the midst of an active war, is receiving a potential windfall from the United States. The decision by the White House to temporarily lift sanctions on Iranian oil at sea could give the regime in Tehran a windfall of up to $14 billion. Once the war does end, Tehran will walk away from the conflict with having both set the precedent of shutting down the Strait and demonstrating the ability to do so, adding a dangerous new option to Tehran’s toolbox.
Ultimately, the biggest boost to the axis of autocracies might be the stress that the Iran war has put on the dynamic between the United States and its allies.
Relations between Washington and its transatlantic allies have been tense since the start of the second Trump administration. The crisis over Greenland had already pushed the relationship to its limits, and Iran has only exacerbated the crisis. The UK initially refused to let the US use its bases in the war, a decision that was reversed but still took “far too long,” according to Trump. Spain, which has continued to refuse the US access to its bases, was met with threats of Washington halting all trade with Madrid. German leaders have also criticised the war, framing it as a “fateful mistake.” Allies and the United States still have not agreed on the path forward, though some allies have issued statements pledging their support in ensuring the Strait remains free and open, but these operations are likely to occur only after hostilities have ended.
In Asia, where the Trump Administration’s National Defence Strategy recognises China as the second most powerful country in the world and calls to “ensure that neither China nor anyone else can dominate us or our allies,” Washington has moved marines from Okinawa and a THAAD missile defence system from South Korea to the Middle East. Actions that raise very real concerns in Tokyo and Seoul about the seriousness of Washington’s commitment to Asia, deterring China, and supporting allies in the region.
For the United States, the war in Iran is burning through munitions, undermining relations with allies and raising serious questions about Washington’s ability to prioritise countering its adversaries as a core tenet of its foreign policy. China and Russia are serious threats, but neither is invincible. Both face very real economic constraints, demographic challenges, and questions about just how capable their militaries actually are. And the Iran war has made clear the limits of partnership with Beijing. The United States has worked to limit the reach and power of its adversaries before, by imposing sanctions or limiting the export of critical technologies, and there is no reason it cannot do so again.
It remains to be seen how the war will end. But Iran is likely to become weakened, yet still assertive and aggressive, posing an enduring threat to US allies in the region. The bigger challenge will be in Moscow and Beijing, and the United States must not trade a short-term victory in Iran for a position of longer-term weakness.
[Further reading: The West cannot understand Iran]
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