Osborne's new dividing line: a 0% tax rate against a 10p tax rate

The Chancellor appears to rule out a 10p tax rate for the Budget and says raising the personal allowance is "a better policy".

Ed Miliband's pledge to reintroduce the 10p tax rate has left the Tories with a dilemma. Having previously hinted that they might adopt the measure, which was first proposed by a Conservative MP, Robert Halfon, do they seek to match Miliband's offer or do they reject it? 

It now looks as if George Osborne has settled on the latter option. In his interview on ITV's The Agenda last night, the Chancellor declared that the coalition had "a better policy" - "a zero per cent tax rate". He pointed out that the increase in the tax-free personal allowance from £6,475 in 2010 to £9,440 (from this April) had already compensated all of those who lost out from Gordon Brown's abolition of the 10p tax rate, adding: "We've taken a million people out of tax altogether so I would say a zero per cent tax rate is going to be a little bit more attractive at an election than a 10% tax rate and that's certainly been our priority."

Coming from the man who remains the Conservatives' chief election strategist, it was a significant statement. The Lib Dems have long made it clear that they will go into the next election promising to raise the personal allowance to £12,500, so that no one on the minimum wage pays any income tax. Osborne's words suggest that the Tories are now more likely to match this offer than are they to cut the starting rate.

It's not an approach that will please all Tory MPs. Halfon is fond of quoting former Conservative chancellor Nigel Lawson, who began his time at the Treasury by raising personal allowances but later reversed direction. He later explained: "I wished to create a large constituency in favour of income-tax reductions. The last thing I wanted to do was to reduce the size of that constituency by taking people out of tax altogether." But the imperative for the Tories to differentiate themselves from Labour now trumps this concern. 

With two years of the parliament remaining, the tax threshold is just £560 from the coalition's target of £10,000 after a larger-than-expected increase in the Autumn Statement. If Osborne chooses to pull a rabbit out of the hat on Budget day (as he usually does), one wonders if it will be to meet this pledge ahead of schedule. Having unambiguously rejected a mansion tax and now cast scorn on the 10p tax rate, the Chancellor has shown that he has no intention of dancing to Labour's tune. 

Chancellor George Osborne leaves 11 Downing Street on January 7, 2013 in London. Photograph: Getty Images.

George Eaton is political editor of the New Statesman.

Photo: Getty Images
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I'm far from convinced by Cameron's plans for Syria

The Prime Minister has a plan for when the bombs drop. But what about after?

In the House of Commons today, the Prime Minister set out a powerful case for Britain to join air strikes against Isil in Syria.  Isil, he argued, poses a direct threat to Britain and its people, and Britain should not be in the business of “outsourcing our security to our allies”. And while he conceded that further airstrikes alone would not be sufficient to beat Isil, he made the case for an “Isil first” strategy – attacking Isil now, while continuing to do what we can diplomatically to help secure a lasting settlement for Syria in which Assad (eventually) plays no part.

I agreed with much of David Cameron’s analysis. And no-one should doubt either the murderous barbarism of Isil in the region, or the barbarism they foment and inspire in others across the world.  But at the end of his lengthy Q&A session with MPs, I remained unconvinced that UK involvement in airstrikes in Syria was the right option. Because the case for action has to be a case for action that has a chance of succeeding.  And David Cameron’s case contained neither a plan for winning the war, nor a plan for winning the peace.

The Prime Minister, along with military experts and analysts across the world, concedes that air strikes alone will not defeat Isil, and that (as in Iraq) ground forces are essential if we want to rid Syria of Isil. But what is the plan to assemble these ground forces so necessary for a successful mission?  David Cameron’s answer today was more a hope than a plan. He referred to “70,000 Syrian opposition fighters - principally the Free Syrian Army (FSA) – with whom we can co-ordinate attacks on Isil”.

But it is an illusion to think that these fighters can provide the ground forces needed to complement aerial bombardment of Isil.  Many commentators have begun to doubt whether the FSA continues to exist as a coherent operational entity over the past few months. Coralling the myriad rebel groups into a disciplined force capable of fighting and occupying Isil territory is a heroic ambition, not a plan. And previous efforts to mobilize the rebels against Isil have been utter failures. Last month the Americans abandoned a $500m programme to train and turn 5,400 rebel fighters into a disciplined force to fight Isil. They succeeded in training just 60 fighters. And there have been incidents of American-trained fighters giving some of their US-provided equipment to the Nusra Front, an affiliate of Al Qaeda.

Why has it proven so hard to co-opt rebel forces in the fight against Isil? Because most of the various rebel groups are fighting a war against Assad, not against Isil.  Syria’s civil war is gruesome and complex, but it is fundamentally a Civil War between Assad’s forces and a variety of opponents of Assad’s regime. It would be a mistake for Britain to base a case for military action against Isil on the hope that thousands of disparate rebel forces can be persuaded to change their enemy – especially when the evidence so far is that they won’t.

This is a plan for military action that, at present, looks highly unlikely to succeed.  But what of the plan for peace? David Cameron today argued for the separation of the immediate task at hand - to strike against Isil in Syria – from the longer-term ambition of achieving a settlement in Syria and removing Assad.  But for Isil to be beaten, the two cannot be separated. Because it is only by making progress in developing a credible and internationally-backed plan for a post-Assad Syria that we will persuade Syrian Sunnis that fighting Isil will not end up helping Assad win the Civil War.  If we want not only to rely on rebel Sunnis to provide ground troops against Isil, but also provide stable governance in Isil-occupied areas when the bombing stops, progress on a settlement to Syria’s Civil War is more not less urgent.  Without it, the reluctance of Syrian Sunnis to think that our fight is their fight will undermine the chances of military efforts to beat Isil and bring basic order to the regions they control. 

This points us towards doubling down on the progress that has already been made in Vienna: working with the USA, France, Syria’s neighbours and the Gulf states, as well as Russia and Iran. We need not just a combined approach to ending the conflict, but the prospect of a post-war Syria that offers a place for those whose cooperation we seek to defeat Isil. No doubt this will strike some as insufficient in the face of the horrors perpetrated by Isil. But I fear that if we want not just to take action against Isil but to defeat them and prevent their return, it offers a better chance of succeeding than David Cameron’s proposal today. 

Stewart Wood is a former Shadow Cabinet minister and adviser to Ed Miliband. He tweets as @StewartWood.