The draft Libel Reform Bill is a good thing

Why the proposals should be welcomed.

The draft Libel Reform Bill, published two days ago, has had a mixed reception. Those in favour of libel reform have broadly welcomed it, though some do not think it goes far enough; and many established libel practitioners have sought to minimise the draft bill's importance and novelty. Some libel veterans even say it will make no difference: it is almost as if they are discouraging the government from taking the draft bill forward at all.

However, as a practising media defence lawyer, I would say that there is a lot of good in the draft bill, and that if it were to pass into legislation in its present form it would make a marked difference to the nature of libel litigation. That is not to say that the draft bill could not be improved; but it is to say that it is misconceived and illiberal to dismiss the bill completely.

Let us start from first principles. One problem with libel litigation is that it is far too easy to bring a libel claim and thereby to threaten plausibly to bring a libel claim. This is one of the main causes of "libel chill". As it currently stands, libel is one of few areas of law where the claimant does not have to show any damage at all to threaten or actually bring a claim: damage is presumed. Until fairly recently, the courts used to allow claims where there had been no actual damage to proceed to full trial: the claimant could then get nominal damages of a penny or a pound, and may have to pay the defendant's legal costs, but there was nothing in principle preventing the claim running its full expensive course.

This complacent approach has shifted over the last few years. The courts are now more willing to allow a defendant to strike out a claim as an abuse of process where there has been little or no damage. But it is still for the defendant to make that application and at his or her own costs risk. It is not for the claimant to show there is substantial damage to the reputation, but for the defendant to show there has not been substantial damage.

The proposed clause 1 of the draft bill addresses this problem head on in a satisfactory and subtle way. By introducing a requirement that the claimant has to show substantial harm, the draft bill is in effect reformulating the tort of libel. Some established claimant lawyers are saying this will lead to more expense because of futile debates about whether there is substantial harm or not. I do not think this will be the case. It is more likely that the same lawyers will have to explain to their clients why claims cannot now be threatened because of this new requirement. Indeed, one may say that if a claimant and their lawyer thinks it is open to genuine dispute whether an alleged libel has not caused (or is not likely to cause) substantial harm, then they have no business to bring or threaten a claim in the first place.

The substantial harm test set out in clause 1 of the draft libel bill is a liberal and constructive provision, and one should be rather sceptical of the libel claimant lawyers who say it is not really needed. It is common sense that potential libel claimants should be required to show substantial harm before they can even threaten a libel case: at a stroke it weakens the might of heavy-handed "reputation management" lawyers who somehow appear to think that using legal threats is a legitimate form of pubic relations.

Equally significant, if not more so, is the proposed abolition of the presumption of a jury trial. Again, established libel lawyers will seek to downplay the importance of this provision. And it is indeed correct that jury trials are now infrequent. However, the effect of there being usually a jury trial at the end of the litigation process forces parties into years of complex and expensive interim litigation, as applications are made for striking out parts of the claim and the defence that will eventually go before the jury. Moreover, rulings on each of these interim applications can then be appealed by the losing party, sometimes all the way to the Supreme Court (formerly the House of Lords).

The mere fact of defamation cases having an eventual jury trial makes pre-trial proceedings more costly and elaborate than they need to be. Bringing them to an end will have a beneficial effect on libel litigation generally.

The proposal for a statutory public-interest defence should also be welcomed. However, the draft bill makes this defence more elaborate than it needs to be. It should be enough that the publication was on a matter of public interest and was published without malice: after all, the United States seems to manage with libel law being on a restricted basis without any grave problems. The draft bill, however, subjects the proposed public interest defence to a non-exhaustive checklist of matters to which the court should have regard. Some of these factors are common sense; however, the risk is that the courts will apply these factors in a formulaic and pedantic manner without any regard to the overall purpose of a public-interest defence.

There are other good parts to this draft bill. The "truth" and "honest opinion" defences are not merely cosmetic changes to the old "justification" and "fair-comment" defences as has been asserted by some commentators. Instead, the old defences are expressly abolished. Therefore, these new statutory defences will not necessarily be suffocated by the case law of the old defences; indeed, deployed sensibly by the courts, these new defences could mean that truth and honest opinion are full defences to any claim, unencumbered by the complexities of the current common law defences. And the proposed single-publication rule will bring certainty and sanity to libel litigation: no longer will each download constitute a fresh tort and the basis of a new libel claim.

The draft bill could be better. For example, one hopes the consultation period will address issues such as the capability of corporations to sue for libel. The issue of costs also have to be dealt with, though that will be done by other costs-specific legislation.

But, for me, the tests of this draft legislation are simple. Will it make it harder for a libel (or "reputation management") lawyer to advise his or her client that a spurious claim can be threatened? Will it make libel litigation less expensive and complex? Will it make it easier for defendants to point to complete defences when threatened? And will it make it easier for statements to be published on matters of public interest without the adverse effects of "libel chill"?

On each of these questions, the answer is cautiously affirmative. But the draft bill is not a default position: it is certainly not the case that this is what will be passed into law unless it can be improved. There is a real risk the established libel claimant lawyers will persuade the government that no legislation is really needed, other than in respect of making libel litigation cheaper to bring. In other words, after years of campaigning, there still may be no legislative change to libel law and procedure.

All this said, this draft Libel Bill is a great step forward. It is important that all right-minded people press for improvements; but it is also crucial to recognise that even these modest reforms are still up for grabs.

 

David Allen Green is legal correspondent of the New Statesman and is a practising media lawyer. His Jack of Kent blog chronicled the libel defence campaign of Simon Singh, 2008-10.

David Allen Green is legal correspondent of the New Statesman and author of the Jack of Kent blog.

His legal journalism has included popularising the Simon Singh libel case and discrediting the Julian Assange myths about his extradition case.  His uncovering of the Nightjack email hack by the Times was described as "masterly analysis" by Lord Justice Leveson.

David is also a solicitor and was successful in the "Twitterjoketrial" appeal at the High Court.

(Nothing on this blog constitutes legal advice.)

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A new German law wants to force mothers to reveal their child’s biological father

The so-called “milkmen’s kids law” would seek protection for men who feel they have been duped into raising children they believe are not biologically theirs – at the expense of women’s rights.

The German press call them “Kuckuckskinder”, which translates literally as “cuckoo children” – parasite offspring being raised by an unsuspecting innocent, alien creatures growing fat at the expense of the host species’ own kind. The British press have opted for the more Benny Hill-esque “milkmen’s kids”, prompting images of bored Seventies housewives answering the door in negligées before inviting Robin Asquith lookalikes up to their suburban boudoirs. Nine months later their henpecked husbands are presented with bawling brats and the poor sods remain none the wiser.

Neither image is particularly flattering to the children involved, but then who cares about them? This is a story about men, women and the redressing of a legal – or is it biological? – injustice. The children are incidental.

This week German Justice Minister Heiko Maas introduced a proposal aimed at to providing greater legal protection for “Scheinväter” – men who are duped into raising children whom they falsely believe to be biologically theirs. This is in response to a 2015 case in which Germany’s highest court ruled that a woman who had told her ex-husband that her child may have been conceived with another man could not be compelled to name the latter. This would, the court decided, be an infringement of the woman’s right to privacy. Nonetheless, the decision was seen to highlight the need for further legislation to clarify and strengthen the position of the Scheinvater.

Maas’ proposal, announced on Monday, examines the problem carefully and sensitively before merrily throwing a woman’s right to privacy out of the window. It would compel a woman to name every man she had sexual intercourse with during the time when her child may have been conceived. She would only have the right to remain silent in cases should there be serious reasons for her not to name the biological father (it would be for the court to decide whether a woman’s reasons were serious enough). It is not yet clear what form of punishment a woman would face were she not to name names (I’m thinking a scarlet letter would be in keeping with the classy, retro “man who was present at the moment of conception” wording). In cases where it did transpire that another man was a child’s biological father, he would be obliged to pay compensation to the man “duped” into supporting the child for up to two years.

It is not clear what happens thereafter. Perhaps the two men shake hands, pat each other on the back, maybe even share a beer or two. It is, after all, a kind of gentlemen’s agreement, a transaction which takes place over the heads of both mother and child once the latter’s paternity has been established. The “true” father compensates the “false” one for having maintained his property in his absence. In some cases there may be bitterness and resentment but perhaps in others one will witness a kind of honourable partnership. You can’t trust women, but DNA tests, money and your fellow man won’t let you down.

Even if it achieves nothing else, this proposal brings us right back to the heart of what patriarchy is all about: paternity and ownership. In April this year a German court ruled that men cannot be forced to take paternity tests by children who suspect them of being their fathers. It has to be their decision. Women, meanwhile, can only access abortion on demand in the first trimester of pregnancy, and even then counselling is mandatory (thereafter the approval of two doctors is required, similar to in the UK). One class of people can be forced to gestate and give birth; another can’t even be forced to take a DNA test. One class of people can be compelled to name any man whose sperm may have ventured beyond their cervix; another is allowed to have a body whose business is entirely its own. And yes, one can argue that forcing men to pay money for the raising of children evens up the score. Men have always argued that, but they’re wrong.

Individual men (sometimes) pay for the raising of individual children because the system we call patriarchy has chosen to make fatherhood about individual ownership. Women have little choice but to go along with this as long as men exploit our labour, restrict our access to material resources and threaten us with violence. We live in a world in which it is almost universally assumed that women “owe” individual men the reassurance that it was their precious sperm that impregnated us, lest we put ourselves and our offspring at risk of poverty and isolation. Rarely do any of us dare to protest. We pretend it is a fair deal, even that reproductive differences barely affect our lives at all. But the sex binary – the fact that sperm is not egg and egg is not sperm – affects all of us.

The original 2015 ruling got it right. The male demand for reassurance regarding paternity is an infringement of a woman’s right to privacy. Moreover, it is important to see this in the context of all the other ways in which men have sought to limit women’s sexual activity, freedom of movement and financial independence in order to ensure that children are truly “theirs”.  Anxiety over paternity is fundamentally linked to anxiety over female sexuality and women’s access to public space. Yet unless all women are kept under lock and key at all times, men will never, ever have the reassurance they crave. Even then, the abstract knowledge that you are the only person to have had the opportunity to impregnate a particular woman cannot rival the physical knowledge of gestation.

We have had millennia of pandering to men’s existential anxieties and treating all matters related to human reproduction, from sex to childbirth, as exceptional cases meaning women cannot have full human rights. Isn’t it about time we tried something new? How about understanding fatherhood not as winning gold in an Olympic sperm race, but as a contract endlessly renewed?

What each of us receives when a child is born is not a biological entity to do with as we choose. It is a relationship, with all of its complexities and risks. It is something worth contributing to and fighting for. Truly, if a man cannot understand that, then any money wasted on a Kuckuckskind – a living, breathing child he could get to know – has got to be the least of his worries. 

Glosswitch is a feminist mother of three who works in publishing.