4Chan plays racist Where's Wally to find the Boston bomber

There's enough misinformation coming from the traditional media itself over the bombings, but Reddit and 4Chan think they're helping.

The Boston bombings have an interesting quirk to them: the bomber, whoever they are, was almost certainly caught on camera at some point. And not just grainy CCTV footage, either. The blasts occurred during a worldwide media event, in a part of the course featured in blanket coverage. On top of that, a huge proportion of the photos of the marathon taken by individuals are now online as well, on Twitter, Instagram, Flickr and Facebook.

As a result, Reddit and 4Chan are on it. The two communities have begun poring over all the photos they can find, in an effort to spot the Boston bomber first and bring them to justice. The only problem is, with no idea what they're looking for, the whole thing has devolved into a sort of racist Where's Wally.

The archive of the first 4Chan thread on the topic – it calls itself the "ThinkTank" – has had over two million views on imgur, and the first image basically says it all:



(That man, it turns out, is most likely law enforcement; his partner is visible next to him, and the two of them are standing with first responders in later pictures)

To be fair to them, not everyone focused on in the thread is brown. There's a white guy who's been picked up on because he's carrying a bag which looks like it might be the same type of bag that contained the bomb:

And another man, of indeterminate ethnicity, who's picked on because he started running away after the explosion (which seems a pretty understandable thing to do):

The subreddit, /r/findbostonbombers, which is devoted to the same thing is at least slightly more responsible. Threads are dedicated to confirming people as innocent, and highly up-voted posts call on the media not to spread images, remind redditors of the dangers of false accusations, and lay down pretty stiff rules of conduct.

But it's still clear that the community hopes to repeat earlier successes, as when a car used in a hit and run was identified from just the headlight, or when the site reported on the Aurora cinema shootings with a speed and depth which normal journalists would dream of. The problem is that this scenario is more difficult than the others – its unlikely the bomber was tweeting about their plans beforehand, or that they'll have used a bag which was uniquely identifiable – and that the widespread interest in the event vastly increases the damage done by a false positive, of which there are sure to be many.

The subreddit's rules clearly state "we do not condone vigilante justice" and "r/FindBostonBombers is a discussion forum, not a journalistic media outlet" – but when this many people are being associated with an act of terrorism, it takes more than that to stop damage being done. Already, one pair of men, who were fingered on the "evidence" that they were Arabic with backpacks, have been tracked down on Facebook only to be revealed as Moroccan-American runners from Massachusetts. That's been dutifully reported back to the subreddit, but the damage has already been done.

There's enough misinformation coming from the traditional media itself over the bombings. Reddit and 4Chan may think they're helping, but by flinging suspicion at innocent people with no real evidence, they're only spreading more rumours.

The worst thing, though? Given the sheer weight of numbers behind this, chances are someone has drawn a circle around the actual bomber and written "suspicious?!" in red text on it. And even though if you libel enough people, you're bound to be right at some point, we'll be subjected to endless headlines about "how Reddit caught the Boston bomber" – and the whole cycle will be reinforced.


The two guys who Reddit fingered then backed down on are now being accused of being terrorists on the front page of one of America's biggest tabloids. If, as seems likely, they are entirely innocent, it will be interesting to see whether Reddit is directly responsible for starting that chain of misinformation.

Alex Hern is a technology reporter for the Guardian. He was formerly staff writer at the New Statesman. You should follow Alex on Twitter.

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Battle for Mosul: will this be the end of Islamic State?

The militant group's grip on power is slipping but it has proved resilient in the past.

The battle for Mosul is the latest stage in the long struggle to defeat Islamic State. The group has been around since the late 1990s in one form or another, constantly mutating in response to its environment. Undoubtedly its ejection from Mosul will be a significant moment in the group’s history, but it is unlikely to be its final chapter. The destruction of the group will only be complete when some fundamental changes occur within Iraq and the war in Syria comes to an end.

IS’s roots go back to a training camp established by the militant Islamist Abu Musab al Zarqawi in the late 1990s in Herat, Afghanistan. Founded as an army to overthrow the apostate regimes of the Levant, it fled to northern Iraq in the wake of the US-led invasion of Afghanistan post-9/11 where it re-established itself as a force alongside Ansar al Shariah, a hardline Salafi jihadi organisation.

As American attention shifted from Afghanistan to Iraq, the group was ideally placed to become one of the leading lights in the post-Saddam Iraqi insurgency. Brutally announcing itself to the world in August 2003 with successive attacks on the Jordanian Embassy in Baghdad, the UN headquarters and a Shia shrine in Najaf — the latter being the deadliest attack in Iraq that year with a death toll of 95 — the group grew to assume the mantle of al-Qaeda in Iraq. By 2006 this brand had become somewhat damaged through the brutal sectarian campaign the group waged, and when its founder, Zarqawi, died it sought to reinvent itself as the Mujahedeen Shura Council. This incarnation did not last long either, and eventually it assumed the title of the Islamic State of Iraq (ISI), alongside a more Iraqi leadership.

This was the start of a diffcult period in the group's history. Its excesses in Iraq (including indiscriminate slaughter of Shia Muslims to stir sectarian hatred and filmed decapitations of prisoners) lost it local support and led to the tribes in Sunni Iraq rising up and supporting the government in Baghdad's fight back against the group. By 2009, when the west abruptly stopped paying attention and withdrew from Iraq the group was largely perceived as in decline, with the Shia Muslim-led Iraqi government appearing to slowly assert itself more effectively across the country.

The terrorist attacks by the group continued. And the new government started to advance an increasingly sectarian agenda. These two played off each other in a downward spiral that was given a fresh boost of blood when the civil war in Syria erupted in 2011. Drawing on its existing networks (that were leftovers from when Syria was used as a staging point by the organisation to launch attacks into Iraq), the leadership sent a cell to Syria to explore what opportunities existed within the emerging fight there. This cell became the seed that grew into Jabhat al Nusrah and ultimately IS – a label the group adopted when in June 2013 IS leader Abu Bakr al-Baghdadi decided it was time to reveal this link between his Iraqi group and Jabhat al Nusrah. This led to divisions and the breaking up of the two organisations.

For IS, however, it was the beginning of an upward trajectory, building on this division to grow itself substantially in Syria (with Raqqa as its capital) and in 2014 taking over Iraq’s second biggest city of Mosul. We then reach the apex of IS’s success and the biggest expansion of the group yet.

It now seems that this growth had a shelf life of just two-and-a-half years. As the group appears to be losing Mosul, it is likely that we will see the beginning of a period of retraction. But this will not be its end – rather, it will flee back to the hills and the ungoverned spaces in Iraq and Syria from where it will continue a persistent terrorist strategy in both countries. Here it will bide its time until the moment presents itself to rise up. Waiting until the governance in Iraq and Syria fails its people again, the group can paint itself as the protector of Sunnis and once more build on that group's disenfranchisement to win supporters and occupy a space vacated by local governments.

IS's grip on power might currently be slipping but as history has shown, it has waxed and waned depending on the context it is operating in. We are now going to see a period of withdrawal, but unless attention is paid by the global community, it will expand again in the future.

Raffaello Pantucci is Director of International Security Studies at the Royal United Services Institute (RUSI). Visit his website at http://www.raffaellopantucci.com