Human rights in Libya

Despite being his global rehabilitation, Libyans continue to face torture if they criticise Gaddafi'

For democracy well-wishers, 2004 in Libya was a fairly good year. After decades of stifling oppression, with public executions and missing prisoners, the country saw cracks of light. The great leader of the revolution, Muammar al-Gaddafi, who holds no official position of power, divided the ministry of interior and justice into separate bodies.

The government talked of reforming the penal code and minimizing application of the death penalty. And in January 2005 the government abolished the notorious People’s Court, renowned for unfair political trials, and began to release some political prisoners. The changes were small but, in the Libyan context, a significant sign of hope.

In May 2005 I visited Libya for Human Rights Watch, our first-ever trip to the country known as the Jamahariya – state of the masses. I was surprised to see that, despite the pervasive control and palpable fear, officials, students and professionals engaged in debates on reform. Those closest to power felt the most comfortable to talk, and they mostly discussed how to improve the system rather than how to see it change. But they still reflected critically about their long-isolated country, eager to reestablish international ties.

Two-and-a-half years later, that criticism and the optimism it engendered are much harder to find. The People’s Court is gone but a new State Security Appeals Court took its place, holding sessions inside a prison of the Internal Security Agency. The country still has no free press and no independent organisations. Libyans continue to face arrest and torture for expressing peaceful criticism of the government and its undisputed leader, and in the past 18 months, three of those people have disappeared.

The many promised reforms, such as a new penal code and code of criminal procedure, have not taken place. Human Rights Watch has not been allowed back into the country but Libyans tell me many of the critical debates have slowed or stopped. In one opposition-oriented town, Benghazi, the authorities have for months banned football matches at the stadium—ostensibly because the structure has cracks.

One explanation for the halted reform is confusion in Gaddafi's tent. The Brother Leader, as he is known, is adept at exerting control and balancing the country’s desert clans. But he apparently lacks a road map for reform, especially one that could threaten his grip. The signs are often mixed. One week he supports the so-called reform wing, run by his western-educated son Saif al-Islam, who talks of free media and fighting corruption, and the next he promotes staunch supporters of the status quo.

Gaddafi is also reportedly surrounded by yes-men and sycophants, who instruct visitors “not to upset him.” Although he remains involved in the smallest decisions of daily life, he may be isolated and out of touch.

A more cynical view is that Gaddafi has calculated well, having benefited from global rehabilitation without pressure from foreign governments to truly reform. After taking initial steps, he was visited by foreign leaders from Europe and top officials from the United States. Business contracts flowed.

Relations with Europe stalled from the high profile case of the five Bulgarian nurses and a Palestinian doctor, imprisoned for eight years for allegedly infecting more than 400 Libyan children with HIV. But Gaddafi released the heath workers this July, and the welcome train rolled.

Indeed, western governments are driven by two primary concerns: oil and cooperation on counter-terrorism. Libya has Africa’s largest oil reserves. It is selling drilling rights, and also upgrading its facilities, buying military hardware and constructing power plants. Europe and the U.S. are eager to take part, and human rights have a nasty way of scuttling lucrative deals.
 
Governments engaging Libya argue that Gaddafi must be rewarded for renouncing terrorism and WMD.  “If we don’t welcome countries that are starting to take the path of respectability, what can we say to those that leave that path,” said French President Nicolas Sarkozy, after hosting Gaddafi in Paris in December. Indeed, Libya complains that it has not reaped enough benefits for cooperating with the West.

But Sarkozy also signed multi-billion euro deals, including the sale of 21 Airbus planes and a nuclear reactor to desalinate sea water, after the Gaddafi trip. Other governments have done the same. The contract sprint is on, and countries do not want to miss the race.

In this sense, Gaddafi's plan seems clear: governments will come running for business, as well as for the intelligence he shares on Islamist militant groups. They may pay lip service to torture and imprisoned dissidents, as Secretary of State Condoleezza Rice did last week when meeting the Libyan foreign minister in Washington, but not condition their relations on improvements in human rights. The EU is currently devising a framework agreement with Libya, and there is no substantive talk of benchmarks, such as accountability for torture or more independent courts.

How best to encourage reform in Libya is a complex affair. Gaddafi maintains total control. He brooks no unsanctioned dissent. Apart from a regime-change policy, how do governments encourage a new course?
 
At the end of the day, one fact is clear: Gaddafi is interested first and foremost in protecting and promoting his own power, and perhaps in eventually ensuring a transfer of power to one of his sons. His decision to engage with the west was driven by this calculated goal, fearing he was next after the US invasion of Iraq, and his future decisions will follow that logical course.
 
He will never undertake radical reform, such as allowing independent media or opposition groups. But acting in concert, the west can condition its relations on small but significant steps, such as abolishing the death penalty, improving the penal code, and strengthening the judicial system, all of which Gaddafi himself has placed on the agenda.

Cultural and educational exchanges for Libyans are also key. Ultimately, while foreign governments have placed drilling rights above human rights, the Libyans must push themselves for the construction of independent institutions and the rule of law.

Fred Abrahams is senior emergencies researcher at Human Rights Watch. He spent three weeks in Libya on a fact-finding mission in May 2005 and authored the organization’s first report on the country, Words to Deeds: the Urgent Need for Human Rights Reform

Jeremy Corbyn. Photo: Getty
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Lexit: the EU is a neoliberal project, so let's do something different when we leave it

Brexit affords the British left a historic opportunity for a decisive break with EU market liberalism.

The Brexit vote to leave the European Union has many parents, but "Lexit" – the argument for exiting the EU from the left – remains an orphan. A third of Labour voters backed Leave, but they did so without any significant leadership from the Labour Party. Left-of-centre votes proved decisive in determining the outcome of a referendum that was otherwise framed, shaped, and presented almost exclusively by the right. A proper left discussion of the issues has been, if not entirely absent, then decidedly marginal – part of a more general malaise when it comes to developing left alternatives that has begun to be corrected only recently, under Jeremy Corbyn and John McDonnell.

Ceding Brexit to the right was very nearly the most serious strategic mistake by the British left since the ‘70s. Under successive leaders Labour became so incorporated into the ideology of Europeanism as to preclude any clear-eyed critical analysis of the actually existing EU as a regulatory and trade regime pursuing deep economic integration. The same political journey that carried Labour into its technocratic embrace of the EU also resulted in the abandonment of any form of distinctive economics separate from the orthodoxies of market liberalism.

It’s been astounding to witness so many left-wingers, in meltdown over Brexit, resort to parroting liberal economics. Thus we hear that factor mobility isn’t about labour arbitrage, that public services aren’t under pressure, that we must prioritise foreign direct investment and trade. It’s little wonder Labour became so detached from its base. Such claims do not match the lived experience of ordinary people in regions of the country devastated by deindustrialisation and disinvestment.

Nor should concerns about wage stagnation and bargaining power be met with finger-wagging accusations of racism, as if the manner in which capitalism pits workers against each other hasn’t long been understood. Instead, we should be offering real solutions – including a willingness to rethink capital mobility and trade. This places us in direct conflict with the constitutionalised neoliberalism of the EU.

Only the political savvy of the leadership has enabled Labour to recover from its disastrous positioning post-referendum. Incredibly, what seemed an unbeatable electoral bloc around Theresa May has been deftly prized apart in the course of an extraordinary General Election campaign. To consolidate the political project they have initiated, Corbyn and McDonnell must now follow through with a truly radical economic programme. The place to look for inspiration is precisely the range of instruments and policy options discouraged or outright forbidden by the EU.

A neoliberal project

The fact that right-wing arguments for Leave predominated during the referendum says far more about today’s left than it does about the European Union. There has been a great deal of myth-making concerning the latter –much of it funded, directly or indirectly, by the EU itself.

From its inception, the EU has been a top-down project driven by political and administrative elites, "a protected sphere", in the judgment of the late Peter Mair, "in which policy-making can evade the constraints imposed by representative democracy". To complain about the EU’s "democratic deficit" is to have misunderstood its purpose. The main thrust of European economic policy has been to extend and deepen the market through liberalisation, privatisation, and flexiblisation, subordinating employment and social protection to goals of low inflation, debt reduction, and increased competitiveness.

Prospects for Keynesian reflationary policies, or even for pan-European economic planning – never great – soon gave way to more Hayekian conceptions. Hayek’s original insight, in The Economic Conditions of Interstate Federalism, was that free movement of capital, goods, and labour – a "single market" – among a federation of nations would severely and necessarily restrict the economic policy space available to individual members. Pro-European socialists, whose aim had been to acquire new supranational options for the regulation of capital, found themselves surrendering the tools they already possessed at home. The national road to socialism, or even to social democracy, was closed.

The direction of travel has been singular and unrelenting. To take one example, workers’ rights – a supposed EU strength – are steadily being eroded, as can be seen in landmark judgments by the European Court of Justice (ECJ) in the Viking and Laval cases, among others. In both instances, workers attempting to strike in protest at plans to replace workers from one EU country with lower-wage workers from another, were told their right to strike could not infringe upon the "four freedoms" – free movement of capital, labour, goods, and services – established by the treaties.

More broadly, on trade, financial regulation, state aid, government purchasing, public service delivery, and more, any attempt to create a different kind of economy from inside the EU has largely been forestalled by competition policy or single market regulation.

A new political economy

Given that the UK will soon be escaping the EU, what opportunities might this afford? Three policy directions immediately stand out: public ownership, industrial strategy, and procurement. In each case, EU regulation previously stood in the way of promising left strategies. In each case, the political and economic returns from bold departures from neoliberal orthodoxy after Brexit could be substantial.

While not banned outright by EU law, public ownership is severely discouraged and disadvantaged by it. ECJ interpretation of Article 106 of the Treaty on the Functioning of the European Union (TFEU) has steadily eroded public ownership options. "The ECJ", argues law professor Danny Nicol, "appears to have constructed a one-way street in favour of private-sector provision: nationalised services are prima facie suspect and must be analysed for their necessity". Sure enough, the EU has been a significant driver of privatisation, functioning like a ratchet. It’s much easier for a member state to pursue the liberalisation of sectors than to secure their (re)nationalisation. Article 59 (TFEU) specifically allows the European Council and Parliament to liberalise services. Since the ‘80s, there have been single market programmes in energy, transport, postal services, telecommunications, education, and health.

Britain has long been an extreme outlier on privatisation, responsible for 40 per cent of the total assets privatised across the OECD between 1980 and 1996. Today, however, increasing inequality, poverty, environmental degradation and the general sense of an impoverished public sphere are leading to growing calls for renewed public ownership (albeit in new, more democratic forms). Soon to be free of EU constraints, it’s time to explore an expanded and fundamentally reimagined UK public sector.

Next, Britain’s industrial production has been virtually flat since the late 1990s, with a yawning trade deficit in industrial goods. Any serious industrial strategy to address the structural weaknesses of UK manufacturing will rely on "state aid" – the nurturing of a next generation of companies through grants, interest and tax relief, guarantees, government holdings, and the provision of goods and services on a preferential basis.

Article 107 TFEU allows for state aid only if it is compatible with the internal market and does not distort competition, laying out the specific circumstances in which it could be lawful. Whether or not state aid meets these criteria is at the sole discretion of the Commission – and courts in member states are obligated to enforce the commission’s decisions. The Commission has adopted an approach that considers, among other things, the existence of market failure, the effectiveness of other options, and the impact on the market and competition, thereby allowing state aid only in exceptional circumstances.

For many parts of the UK, the challenges of industrial decline remain starkly present – entire communities are thrown on the scrap heap, with all the associated capital and carbon costs and wasted lives. It’s high time the left returned to the possibilities inherent in a proactive industrial strategy. A true community-sustaining industrial strategy would consist of the deliberate direction of capital to sectors, localities, and regions, so as to balance out market trends and prevent communities from falling into decay, while also ensuring the investment in research and development necessary to maintain a highly productive economy. Policy, in this vision, would function to re-deploy infrastructure, production facilities, and workers left unemployed because of a shutdown or increased automation.

In some cases, this might mean assistance to workers or localities to buy up facilities and keep them running under worker or community ownership. In other cases it might involve re-training workers for new skills and re-fitting facilities. A regional approach might help launch new enterprises that would eventually be spun off as worker or local community-owned firms, supporting the development of strong and vibrant network economies, perhaps on the basis of a Green New Deal. All of this will be possible post-Brexit, under a Corbyn government.

Lastly, there is procurement. Under EU law, explicitly linking public procurement to local entities or social needs is difficult. The ECJ has ruled that, even if there is no specific legislation, procurement activity must "comply with the fundamental rules of the Treaty, in particular the principle of non-discrimination on grounds of nationality". This means that all procurement contracts must be open to all bidders across the EU, and public authorities must advertise contracts widely in other EU countries. In 2004, the European Parliament and Council issued two directives establishing the criteria governing such contracts: "lowest price only" and "most economically advantageous tender".

Unleashed from EU constraints, there are major opportunities for targeting large-scale public procurement to rebuild and transform communities, cities, and regions. The vision behind the celebrated Preston Model of community wealth building – inspired by the work of our own organisation, The Democracy Collaborative, in Cleveland, Ohio – leverages public procurement and the stabilising power of place-based anchor institutions (governments, hospitals, universities) to support rooted, participatory, democratic local economies built around multipliers. In this way, public funds can be made to do "double duty"; anchoring jobs and building community wealth, reversing long-term economic decline. This suggests the viability of a very different economic approach and potential for a winning political coalition, building support for a new socialist economics from the ground up.

With the prospect of a Corbyn government now tantalisingly close, it’s imperative that Labour reconciles its policy objectives in the Brexit negotiations with its plans for a radical economic transformation and redistribution of power and wealth. Only by pursuing strategies capable of re-establishing broad control over the national economy can Labour hope to manage the coming period of pain and dislocation following Brexit. Based on new institutions and approaches and the centrality of ownership and control, democracy, and participation, we should be busy assembling the tools and strategies that will allow departure from the EU to open up new political-economic horizons in Britain and bring about the profound transformation the country so desperately wants and needs.

Joe Guinan is executive director of the Next System Project at The Democracy Collaborative. Thomas M. Hanna is research director at The Democracy Collaborative.

This is an extract from a longer essay which appears in the inaugural edition of the IPPR Progressive Review.