The world after Bush

Former UK ambassador to the US, Christopher Meyer, predicts more continuity than change from the US

It’s fairly clear that Gordon Brown is waiting for a new president to set a pattern for British-American relations over the next few years. The signals sent from London have been those of cool distance from George W. Bush. Tony Blair’s "hug them close" approach is dead and buried, at least until January 2009 and the inauguration of Bush’s successor.

I cannot recall any American President attracting the obloquy abroad suffered by George W. Bush. From the very beginning it went wrong, with a French newspaper talking in 2000 of the “cretinisation” of American politics, a view widely held in Britain too. A brief comeback for his reputation, which surfed a wave of sympathy for America after 9/11, was rapidly aborted by hostility to the war in Iraq. There is nothing easier today than to raise a laugh in public at Bush’s expense (actually that’s not true – Don Rumsfeld is an even easier target). This is not the kind of leader with whom Brown wants to be intimately associated.

The near-universal disdain for Bush is a big factor driving the unusual level of British interest in the American elections. Of course, there is a lot else besides. Obama-mania has crossed the Atlantic. People are intrigued at the possibility of a woman in the White House. The absence of an obvious Republican front-runner has added to the spice. Then there is the joker in the pack: the possible third-party candidacy of New York Mayor, Michael Bloomberg, just when increasing numbers of Americans are registering as independent voters at the expense of the two big parties.

With a black and a woman in contention, there is on both sides of the Atlantic an expectation of change, big change, in 2009. This has driven all the candidates, Democratic and Republican, to resort to the rhetoric of change. But, as Michael Kinsley tartly noted in the New York Times, “change sounds dynamic without committing you to anything in particular. Any slogan shared by Barack Obama and Mitt Romney is going to be pretty meaningless.”

In Britain we would do well to temper our hopes for change after the passing of Bush. Let us assume, as the US Federal Reserve and Treasury do, that the American economy weakens further this year. Let us also assume – a more uncertain bet – that Iraq continues relatively quiet, with low American casualties, even as the “surge” recedes. Come election day in November the overwhelming concern of Americans will be the economy, with a particular focus on jobs and immigration. Globalisation and free trade are already seen as destroying, to coin a phrase, American jobs for American workers. On this analysis, “change” points to greater economic nationalism with the emphasis on “fair” trade at the expense of free trade. To borrow again from Kinsley, that would in reality be protection from change. For us in Britain it would be change for the worse.

But economic nationalism is not isolationism. The United States is too tightly enmeshed in the affairs of the world for that. It is one of the engines of globalisation. The next President will inherit more than 100,000 troops in Iraq and Afghanistan. Even Barack Obama does not promise a precipitous withdrawal from Iraq. The question is not, will Bush’s successor engage with the outside world, but how? Over the past 50 years or so, the US has sometimes acted abroad unilaterally, sometimes through international organisations, sometimes through bilateral treaties, sometimes in so-called coalitions of the willing. It has always acted against a hard-headed cost/benefit analysis of where its national interest lies.

The neo-conservative ascendancy was an ideological aberration from this “realist”, pragmatic tradition of US foreign policy. The gates were thrown open to it by the shock and horror of 9/11, something that we in Britain constantly underestimate in its personal impact on the President. Before 9/11 Bush’s foreign policy was settling comfortably into the traditional mainstream. Seven years later, with the neo-cons in retreat, Bush’s drive for a settlement between Israel and the Palestinians looks like a reversion to the pre-9/11 template. All this assumes, of course, that there is no terrorist attack on the US mainland in 2008.

Whoever wins in November, on the basis of what the main candidates are saying on Iraq - the issue which has most divided British public opinion from the US - there will be more continuity of policy than rupture. And consider this. What if, against the odds, Bush breaks the stalemate between Israel and the Palestinians? What if, against the odds, Shia, Sunni and Kurd in Iraq inch towards a new and durable settlement? What if Bush decides to engage directly with Iran?

None of this is unthinkable. If it comes to pass, won’t we want continuity, not change, from the next president of the United States?

Christopher Meyer will be a speaker at the Fabian Society Change the World conference on 19 January

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The New Times: Brexit, globalisation, the crisis in Labour and the future of the left

With essays by David Miliband, Paul Mason, John Harris, Lisa Nandy, Vince Cable and more.

Once again the “new times” are associated with the ascendancy of the right. The financial crash of 2007-2008 – and the Great Recession and sovereign debt crises that were a consequence of it – were meant to have marked the end of an era of runaway “turbocapitalism”. It never came close to happening. The crash was a crisis of capitalism but not the crisis of capitalism. As Lenin observed, there is “no such thing as an absolutely hopeless situation” for capitalism, and so we discovered again. Instead, the greatest burden of the period of fiscal retrenchment that followed the crash was carried by the poorest in society, those most directly affected by austerity, and this in turn has contributed to a deepening distrust of elites and a wider crisis of governance.

Where are we now and in which direction are we heading?

Some of the contributors to this special issue believe that we have reached the end of the “neoliberal” era. I am more sceptical. In any event, the end of neoliberalism, however you define it, will not lead to a social-democratic revival: it looks as if, in many Western countries, we are entering an age in which centre-left parties cannot form ruling majorities, having leaked support to nationalists, populists and more radical alternatives.

Certainly the British Labour Party, riven by a war between its parliamentary representatives and much of its membership, is in a critical condition. At the same time, Jeremy Corbyn’s leadership has inspired a remarkable re-engagement with left-wing politics, even as his party slumps in the polls. His own views may seem frozen in time, but hundreds of thousands of people, many of them young graduates, have responded to his anti-austerity rhetoric, his candour and his shambolic, unspun style.

The EU referendum, in which as much as one-third of Labour supporters voted for Brexit, exposed another chasm in Labour – this time between educated metropolitan liberals and the more socially conservative white working class on whose loyalty the party has long depended. This no longer looks like a viable election-winning coalition, especially after the collapse of Labour in Scotland and the concomitant rise of nationalism in England.

In Marxism Today’s “New Times” issue of October 1988, Stuart Hall wrote: “The left seems not just displaced by Thatcherism, but disabled, flattened, becalmed by the very prospect of change; afraid of rooting itself in ‘the new’ and unable to make the leap of imagination required to engage the future.” Something similar could be said of the left today as it confronts Brexit, the disunities within the United Kingdom, and, in Theresa May, a prime minister who has indicated that she might be prepared to break with the orthodoxies of the past three decades.

The Labour leadership contest between Corbyn and Owen Smith was largely an exercise in nostalgia, both candidates seeking to revive policies that defined an era of mass production and working-class solidarity when Labour was strong. On matters such as immigration, digital disruption, the new gig economy or the power of networks, they had little to say. They proposed a politics of opposition – against austerity, against grammar schools. But what were they for? Neither man seemed capable of embracing the “leading edge of change” or of making the imaginative leap necessary to engage the future.

So is there a politics of the left that will allow us to ride with the currents of these turbulent “new times” and thus shape rather than be flattened by them? Over the next 34 pages 18 writers, offering many perspectives, attempt to answer this and related questions as they analyse the forces shaping a world in which power is shifting to the East, wars rage unchecked in the Middle East, refugees drown en masse in the Mediterranean, technology is outstripping our capacity to understand it, and globalisation begins to fragment.

— Jason Cowley, Editor 

Tom Kibasi on what the left fails to see

Philip Collins on why it's time for Labour to end its crisis

John Harris on why Labour is losing its heartland

Lisa Nandy on how Labour has been halted and hollowed out

David Runciman on networks and the digital revolution

John Gray on why the right, not the left, has grasped the new times

Mariana Mazzucato on why it's time for progressives to rethink capitalism

Robert Ford on why the left must reckon with the anger of those left behind

Ros Wynne-Jones on the people who need a Labour government most

Gary Gerstle on Corbyn, Sanders and the populist surge

Nick Pearce on why the left is haunted by the ghosts of the 1930s

Paul Mason on why the left must be ready to cause a commotion

Neal Lawson on what the new, 21st-century left needs now

Charles Leadbeater explains why we are all existentialists now

John Bew mourns the lost left

Marc Stears on why democracy is a long, hard, slow business

Vince Cable on how a financial crisis empowered the right

David Miliband on why the left needs to move forward, not back

This article first appeared in the 22 September 2016 issue of the New Statesman, The New Times