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Cameron's Achilles' heel

Can the Conservatives handle the economy? The current opposition front bench is the least financiall

Every few months an invitation arrives on my desk to a meet a member of the shadow cabinet at an event organised by the "Conservative City Circle". These events, held in distinctive City locations such as the Mansion House, are designed to introduce movers and shakers in the Square Mile to David Cameron, George Osborne and other senior Conservatives.

The "cocktail parties", as they are engagingly described on the group's website, are a direct descendent of the "prawn cocktail offensive" conducted by Tony Blair and Gordon Brown in the run-up to the 1997 election. The Blair-Brown approach was designed to demonstrate to the world of finance that Labour had changed. Not only had new Labour taken on the trade unions and faced them down, but a new Labour government would recognise the importance of finance to Britain's economy. The free-market reforms and privatisations of the Thatcher era, which had been so bitterly opposed, would be left intact.

What is curious about the Conservative City Circle's 1950s-style cocktail parties and working groups is that they are needed at all. Historically, the idea of the Tories having to reach out to business and the City would have been risible. Business flocked to the party's doors and few self- respecting FTSE 100 companies would have omitted their hefty donations to the Conservative Party or think tanks with Tory connections.

Conservative frontbenchers didn't need to reach out to the City to be known and trusted, because they were of the City. The old merchant banks, such as N M Rothschild, were hothouses of Conservative talent. Not because they were inherently political, but because a City training in bids and deals, trading, privatisations and the like was considered an excellent education for future politicians. The idea was to establish a career, make enough money if possible and then put those talents to use in the House of Commons and government.

How much things have changed. When Peter Buckley, chairman of the publicly quoted Cayzer family vehicle Caledonian Investments (which owns a big stake in the investment bank Close Brothers), chose earlier this year to attack Labour and support the Tories, he attracted a torrent of criticism from corporate governance mavens.

In a note to shareholders, Buckley wrote: "Shorn of integrity and economic competence, rooster Brown has even less feathers than rooster Blair and lacks the latter's knack of preening himself." He backed up his words with the promise of a £75,000 corporate contribution to the Conservatives.

In fact, one of new Labour's greatest achievements - or betrayals - has been its seduction of business and the City grandees. In the Blair-Brown era, the succession of top business leaders willing to serve as policy advisers was stunning. And it hasn't stopped under Brown and Darling,

It was no coincidence that the rescue of Halifax Bank of Scotland (HBOS) by Lloyds TSB was partly cooked up a City grandee - Sir Victor Blank, chairman of Lloyds - in a "chance meeting" with the Prime Minister at a reception hosted by Citigroup, one of the world's largest banks. Nor that the top figures at both banks - Blank and Lord Stevenson, chairman of HBOS - are both regarded as business pals of Labour.

Indeed, the former chief executive of Halifax, Sir James Crosby, is the person Labour is counting on to deliver groundbreaking reforms to Britain's creaking mortgage market.

The remarkable fact is that the current Tory front bench, which within 18 months could be assuming the reins of political power at a moment of unprecedented economic turbulence, is among the least City-savvy in a generation. This is why it needs to go out and look for financial and business experience through the "City Circle".

"The problem for the Conservatives is that the front bench is largely made up by a new breed of professional politicians who know very little about anything except PR and politics," remarks Dr Andrew Hilton, director of the independent think-tank, Centre for the Study of Financial Innovation (CSFI).

Hands-on experience

Hilton is scathing about the current Conservative leadership. "The lack of financial experience is a big lacuna. The route now is straight out of Oxford and Cambridge, into PR or political research and, before you know it, they've made it on to the front bench," he says. Asked to name a prominent Tory with the requisite financial experience, he could only suggest David Gauke, MP for South West Hertfordshire, who worked for a leading City law firm, but hardly registers among the top-ranking Conservatives.

Among the new Tory frontbenchers, David Cameron, the son of a stockbroker, is one of the few who can claim that knowledge of the financial world courses through his veins. His hands-on business experience stems from his short period as communications director of the tele v ision franchise Carlton, now part of ITV.

His time at Carlton stored up troubles for Cameron among the notoriously hard-to-please financial press. The BBC's influential former business editor Jeff Randall, now an editor-at-large for the Daily Telegraph, is among his sternest critics. "In my experience," he noted in the paper, "Cameron never gave a straight answer when dissemblance was a plausible alternative."

The shadow chancellor, George Osborne, also has a "trade" background. The quoted family firm Osborne & Little is a favourite among interior designers for its catholic collection of wallpaper and soft furnishing designs. Osborne is thus familiar with the travails of medium-sized firms in a globalised world and, to his credit, he has surrounded himself with informed thinkers such as Matthew Hancock, formerly of the Bank of England.

When the Northern Rock crisis first broke a year ago, Osborne was quick to embrace the idea of an old-fashioned Bank of England-organised rescue, where City banks would offer a lifeboat to a failing bank. This is precisely what has happened with Alliance & Leicester, Bradford & Bingley and, most recently, HBOS. Osborne was also supportive of Mervyn King's proposals for a strengthened deposit insurance scheme at a time when Labour has dithered and delayed.

But there is no hiding the fact that, unlike previous Tory shadow and real chancellors, his experience and knowledge of finance is negligible. Oliver Letwin, shadow chancellor under Mich ael Howard, may have lacked political gravitas, but he came with the stamp of N M Rothschild. Ken Clarke was a heavyweight political operator with commercial experience gained as a lawyer, and John Major had climbed through the ranks at Standard Chartered, one of the nation's most successful banking concerns. Even Norman Lam ont could boast a career at N M Rothschild from 1968 to 1979.

As PM, Margaret Thatcher was surrounded with people with serious City and business experience. Peter Walker was a junior partner in the asset-stripping bank Slater Walker, William Waldegrave was a Dres dner Kleinwort Benson veteran, Michael Heseltine an entrepreneur who founded one of the UK's most successful private companies, Hay- market Publishing, and so on. Thatcher also had her late husband Denis, a former senior executive of his family business Burmah Oil (since swallowed up by BP), to whisper in her ear.

David Davis, a senior executive at Tate & Lyle, was one of the few business heavyweights in Cameron's shadow cabinet, but he now adorns the back benches after his decision to seek re-election on an erosion of freedoms platform. The shadow trade secretary Alan Duncan boasts a period as an "oil trader" on his CV. But one would been hard-pressed to judge, from his performance on the BBC's Question Time a week ago, what his understanding is of the scale of the financial crisis facing Britain.

Among the leading City figures now at Cameron's elbow is Michael Spencer, the extrovert chief executive of Icap, an electronic broker and City derivatives trading firm which has been suggested as a potential merger partner for the London Stock Exchange. As treasurer for the Tories, Spencer has been in perpetual motion in recent times.

When I visited him at his offices in the months after the credit crunch hit, he was entertaining an exclusive group of high-street bank chairmen whom he was seeking to persuade of the wisdom of supporting Cameron and his team. His success in the City, in one of the most volatile periods of recent times, has won him credibility among his fellow financiers. He is also one of the City's most accomplished philanthropists, with a particular devotion to Africa. But because of recent personal problems, it is unlikely that he will play a very prominent role at conference.

At a time of unprecedented financial turmoil, almost certainly the greatest banking crisis since the Great Depression, Tory expertise in the increasingly complex and globalised world of finance seems thin on the ground. Vince Cable, the Liberal Democrat economic spokesman, demonstrated throughout the current crisis that it is possible constructively to oppose and come up with credible ideas without talking the economy down. But Cable has hands-on knowledge of business from his period as chief economist of Shell.

The Conservatives' failure to say anything significant about the current catastrophe is unsurprising, when it falls so far outside the comfort zone of their present front bench.

This article first appeared in the 29 September 2008 issue of the New Statesman, The crash of 2008

ANDRÉ CARRILHO
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The Great Huckster: Boris Johnson’s reckless distortions of history

As a scholar of Churchill, Boris Johnson could have articulated a constructive vision for Britain and Europe. Instead, he wilfully manipulates and distorts the historical record.

This month, 76 years ago, the defeated British Expeditionary Force was making for the Channel ports. Thanks to the ferocious resistance put up by the garrison at Calais, and Hitler’s hesitation, the bulk of the men were safely taken off the beaches at Dunkirk to fight another day. Whatever their private feelings during those terrible hours may have been, most of them knew even then that they would return to Europe to finish the job.

Their forefathers had been intervening in Europe for as long as anyone could remember. From Shakespeare’s Henry V through to Elizabeth’s support for the Dutch revolt, the Second Hundred Years War against Louis XIV, the French Revolution and Napoleon, and the First World War, London had always been profoundly invested in the continent. Defending the “liberties of Europe” and thus British freedoms was what Englishmen and Britons did. It was part of what they were.

In early June 1944 – on D-Day – the British, Americans and Canadians hurled themselves into northern France as their ancestors had done since the late Middle Ages. At least one British officer tried to inspire his men that morning as the landing craft approached the strongly defended beaches by reading out Henry V’s speech before Harfleur, in which Shakespeare has him exhort the men, “once more unto the breach”. The film version of the play was released that same year, dedicated to the “commando and airborne troops of Great Britain”. In the popular mind, these Englishmen and their North American descendants were part of the continuity of a European story that went back to the medieval English empire in France.

Some of those liberating Europe thought that they could not simply return to “business as usual” after the war. One of them was the later Conservative prime minister Ted Heath, the man who took Britain into the European Economic Community in 1973. He first defended Liverpool as an anti-aircraft gunner and then took the fight to Hitler as an artillery man during the campaign in north-west Europe. Over the course of the next 11 months, Heath and his comrades fought their way across the traditional battlefields of northern France and the Low Countries, including the Walcheren swamps in which their ancestors had been mired in Napoleonic times; and through western Germany into the centre of the Reich. They were to stay there, at the heart of Europe, for some 60 years. They created a stable European order, based on Nato and what was to become the European Union, which remains with us to this day.

Now the Brexit stalwart Boris Johnson, my fellow historian, claims that it was all in vain. “The European Union,” he says, “is an attempt to do what Hitler wanted by different methods.” Worse still, the EU is a German plot, whose currency, the euro, was “intended by the Germans” to “destroy” Italian manufacturing and generally grind the faces of its unfortunate members. Johnson has also invoked the spirit of Churchill in support of his arguments. He has since doubled down on his remarks and has received support from other members of the Brexit camp, such as Iain Duncan Smith, though not apparently from more informed figures such as Michael Gove. Unfortunately, Johnson’s claims are as historically wrong as it is possible to be, comparable in their crassness only to his predecessor as London mayor Ken Livingstone’s suggestion that Hitler supported Zionism.

Far from supporting European political unity, Hitler was violently and explicitly opposed to the idea. This was partly because it was proposed by his opponents on the “left” of the Nazi Party, such as the Strasser brothers. They belonged to the “anti-imperialist” wing of the Nazi Party, which wanted a pan-European front against the Jews and the British empire. Hitler’s hostility to the European project was also in part due to a racial antipathy to the half-Japanese Richard, Count Coudenhove-Kalergi, the author of the widely discussed book Pan-Europa (1923). One way or the other, Hitler condemned the Pan-Europa movement as “a fantastical, historically impossible childishness”, which would be no more than a “Jewish protectorate”.

Nor did he hold back with his alternative view of what the continent should look like. “The solution,” he wrote, “cannot be Pan-Europa, but rather a Europe of free and independent national states, whose spheres of interest are separate and clearly delineated.” Comparisons involving Hitler are usually odious but if one is going to draw parallels, his view of European integration then was much closer to that of the Brexiters today than that of the advocates of the European Union.

Moreover, the European project did not originate in the Nazis’ attempt to mobilise the continent on their behalf but rather in the resistance movement against Hitler. Take Sicco Mansholt, who hid Dutch resisters on his farm during the war, at great personal risk. He subsequently became the Dutch minister for agriculture and one of the fathers of the Common Agricultural Policy (CAP). Take Altiero Spinelli, the Italian anti-fascist who spent ten years in Mussolini’s prisons. It was there, in June 1941, at the height of Hitler’s power, that he secretly wrote his draft manifesto For a Free and United Europe.

Take Paul-Henri Spaak, later prime minister of Belgium, first president of the Common Assembly of the European Coal and Steel Community – the forerunner of the EU – and secretary-general of Nato. He was forced to make a daring escape from wartime Europe in the false bottom of a lorry in order to carry on the struggle against Hitler in exile. Indeed, across Europe there were thousands of men and women who fought, died, were imprisoned or tortured because they believed in a free and united Europe. To suggest that they were trying to achieve the same thing as Hitler by different methods is an outrageous slur on their memory. If Johnson ever makes it to the top of the Conservative Party, and thence to No 10, he will have a lot of explaining and apologising to do in Europe.

***

As if all this were not bad enough, Boris Johnson’s invocation of Churchill flies in the face of everything we know of the great man’s attitude to the European project. To be sure, he began as a Eurosceptic. When army reforms were proposed in 1901 to support the creation of a substantial land force on the continent, the young Winston Churchill was one of the few MPs to oppose them on the grounds that the navy, rather than the army, was of crucial importance to British security. Writing in the Morning Post, Churchill argued that “history” and “geography” showed that the British empire was “essentially commercial and marine”, and had been defended by armies of foreigners.

As the German threat loomed large, however, he changed his mind. Churchill, then first lord of the admiralty, told the Australians and New Zealanders in April 1913 that Europe was “where the weather came from”. It was the terrible storm of the First World War that caused Churchill not only to believe in the centrality of Europe but in the need for European – or at least continental European – unity.

In May 1930, the president of the Pan-Europa Union, the former French prime minister Aristide Briand, made a formal proposal for a “European federal union” based on a “European conference” with an executive to co-ordinate economic and military co-operation. The British government of the time rejected the surrender of sovereignty involved but many were sympathetic to the idea of continental European union under liberal auspices. The arch-imperialist Leo Amery, secretary of state for the colonies and later a powerful critic of appeasement, was a strong admirer of Coudenhove and his projects, which he regarded as the extension of Anglo-Saxon principles to the continent.

Likewise, Churchill, then chancellor of the Exchequer, told parliament in June 1925 that he hoped that one could “weave Gaul and Teuton so closely together economically, socially and morally as to prevent the occasion of new quarrels and make old antagonisms die in the realisation of mutual prosperity and interdependence”. Then, he continued, “Europe could rise again”. Churchill did not believe, however, that Britain should be part of any continental political union. “We are with Europe, but not of it,” he wrote in 1930. “We are linked but not compromised. We are interested and associated but not absorbed.”

In mid-June 1940, however, as western Europe buckled under the Nazi onslaught, Churchill went a step further. He made an unsuccessful offer of union with France – involving joint citizenship and a common government – designed to lock the French into the war effort against Germany or, failing that, to secure their fleet. The Nazi threat was so existential, in other words, that it justified the surrender, or at least the pooling, of British sovereignty.

When the threat of invasion passed, Churchill returned to the theme of continental European integration. In October 1942, he “look[ed] forward to a United States of Europe in which barriers between the nations will be greatly minimised. He “hope[d] to see the economy of Europe studied as a whole”, and the establishment of a council of “ten units, including the former Great Powers [and thus presumably Britain], with several confederations – Scandinavian, Danubian, Balkan, etc, which would possess an international police and be charged with keeping Prussia disarmed”.

Churchill returned to the subject immediately after the war, as the Soviet threat menaced Europe. In a speech at Zurich University in September 1946, he urged the continent to “unite”, with Britain supporting the project from the outside. Once again, including the Germans was central to his conception. Churchill urged no less than the full political union of the continent in a “kind of United States of Europe” under the “principles embodied in the Atlantic Charter”. He again praised the work of Hitler’s bugbear, Count Coudenhove-Kalergi’s “Pan-European Union”.

Churchill demanded an “act of faith”, beginning with “a partnership between France and Germany”, assembling around them the states of Europe “who will and . . . can” join such a union. Its purpose was clear, namely “to make the material strength of a single state less important. Small nations will count as much as large ones and gain their honour by their contribution to the common cause.”

Moreover, Churchill argued, “The ancient states and principalities of Germany, freely joined together for mutual convenience in a federal system, might each take their individual place among the United States of Europe.” In short, the new polity was designed to solve not merely the European question but the German problem, the two being one and the same. Once again, Churchill conceived of this United States of Europe alongside but not including the United Kingdom and the British “Commonwealth of Nations”, that is, the empire. Instead, he believed that Britain should be one of the “sponsors of the new Europe”.

Churchill’s attitude to continental European union was, unlike Hitler’s, highly positive. For Johnson to suggest, therefore, that he is donning the mantle of Churchill to prevent the current European Union from achieving Hitler’s aims through other means is a complete travesty of the historical truth.

Far from being intended to promote German power, the European Union was designed to contain it, or at least to channel it in the right direction. Contrary to what Johnson suggests, the euro was not planned by Germany to subjugate Italian industry or any other European economy. It was insisted on by the French to decommission the deutschmark, which they described as Germany’s “nuclear weapon”. Likewise, the Germans are not incarcerating the Greeks in their European prison: Greeks are desperate not to be released back into the “freedom” of the drachma and the corrupt national politics that they joined “Europe” to escape. If there is one thing worse than being dominated by Germany in the European Union, evidently, it is not being in the EU at all.

Boris Johnson may not have known the details of Hitler’s attitude to European integration, or the European sympathies of many resisters, but he is very well informed about Churchill and Europe. His ignorance is thus not just a matter of making mistakes; we all make those as historians. Nor is it simply a matter of these mistakes being, like bank errors, in favour of one’s own argument. To say that Johnson knows better is not a figure of speech: he has shown in print that he does. His recent book, The Churchill Factor, contains a very balanced account of Churchill’s position on Europe, including most of the statements listed above.

In making his arguments, Johnson is not appealing to the baser instincts of the electorate; it is far worse than that. The deeply ingrained British instinct to fight European tyranny is not base but fine. What Johnson and those who defend his rhetoric have done is to take something virtuous and pervert it. The European Union is not, as we have seen, the continuation of Hitlerism by other means and to suggest so is blatant manipulation.

The shame of it is that there is a perfectly plausible Eurosceptic argument on its own merits. It was well stated by Michael Gove at the start of the campaign. It insists on the historical distinctiveness of the United Kingdom, whose history does indeed set it apart from the rest of the continent. It makes the case for a reform of the EU. It rejects the scaremongering of “Project Fear”, on the cogent grounds that the United Kingdom has the political, economic and military weight to prevail even without the stabilisers of the EU. It scorns President Obama’s impertinent warning that Britain would have to “get to the back of the queue” for a trade deal after Brexit, with a reminder that Britain and her empire defied Nazi Germany for two years before the Americans joined the fray, when Hitler declared war on them (not vice versa). One does not have to accept every detail of this discourse to feel its force. Uniquely among the democratic European powers, the United Kingdom can “stand alone” if it must or wants to.

The Achilles heel of the Brexit campaign, however, is that it has no viable vision for continental Europe. Even Gove falls down here, as his idea of a British departure unleashing a “democratic liberation” of the continent is pure fantasy. It seems odd to have to explain this to Brexiters but Britain really is special. Casting off the bonds of Brussels will not emancipate mainland Europe but let loose the nationalist and xenophobic demons tamed by the integration project. This is clear when we look at the rise of radical anti-European parties in France, Hungary, Austria, Germany and many other parts of Europe as the European project fragments. These developments should not surprise anyone who knows the history of mainland Europe before the mid-20th century and to a considerable sense beyond.

***

 

Most of continental Europe had failed before 1945 and even now the European Union is only failing better. Unlike virtually every other European state, which has at some point or other been occupied and dismembered, often repeatedly, England and the United Kingdom have largely – with very brief exceptions – been subjects of European politics, never merely objects. In this sense, too, she is exceptional. Yet this should not be an occasion for British triumphalism. Whatever the outcome of the referendum on 23 June, the European Union is not an enemy of the United Kingdom. It should best be understood as a modern version of the old Holy Roman Empire; hapless and officious, perhaps, but not malign. It needs help. The failure of the European project and the collapse of the current continental order would be not only a catastrophic blow to the populations on the far side of the Channel but also to the United Kingdom, which would be
directly exposed to the resulting disorder, as it always has been.

In short, the Brexit camp in general and Boris Johnson in particular are missing a great opportunity in Europe. A student and partisan of Winston Churchill, the former mayor of London was qualified to articulate a constructive vision for Britain and the continent. He has failed to understand that the only safe way that Britain can exit from the European Union is not through Brexit – whose consequences for mainland Europe would be dire – but through Euroexit; that is, a Churchillian political union of the continent in close co-operation with the UK.

Instead, in addition to their distortion of the historical record, Johnson and the Brexit camp are committing the cardinal sin of making a decision before they need to. The European Union is not, sadly, a United States of Europe, even though it needs to become one to survive, and is becoming less like one every day. If and when it musters the strength for full political union, there will be plenty of time to leave. Meanwhile, the EU needs all the support that Britain can give it from within.

In 1940, the British forces had been defeated and retreat was the only option. The situation could not be more different today. This is no time to head for the beaches in what will be a legislative Dunkirk of epic proportions, with incalculable consequences not so much for Britain as for the rest of the continent. Unlike in 1940, the United Kingdom is not being forced out of Europe. It has hardly begun to fight there, unless shooting oneself in the foot through Brexit counts as combat. The battle in Britain today is a distraction from the great struggle on the mainland. There is much work to be done in Europe. It is time the British stop tearing themselves apart and return unto the breach once more.

Brendan Simms is a NS contributing writer. His latest book is “Britain’s Europe: a Thousand Years of Conflict and Co-operation” (Allen Lane). He is president of the Project for Democratic Union

This article first appeared in the 19 May 2016 issue of the New Statesman, The Great Huckster