A world too full of people

Politicians of western countries avoid talking about population control, but if we invest in family

Leucadia Quispe, a 60-year-old mother-of-eight, was born and raised in Botijlaca, a settlement that sits in the foothills of the Chacaltaya and Huayna Potosí mountains in Bolivia. High above, the Chacaltaya glacier is retreating at an unexpected pace: three times as fast as predicted ten years ago. It will be gone in a generation.

Seven out of her eight children have already migrated to other parts of the country, Leucadia says, "because there is no way to make a living here". Because of the dwindling water supply, she must spend hours hauling water in five-litre containers, one in each hand. The scarcity of this precious resource makes it hard to find fodder for her llamas and sheep, and some of her llamas have starved to death.

Women such as Leucadia are on the front line of the struggle against climate change, according to Robert Engelman of the Worldwatch
Institute. But her plight as a mother dramatises an issue that was largely ignored at the UN summit in Copenhagen last December and is also missing from the agenda of the UN summit in Mexico (COP16), scheduled for late this year. It is the problem of human numbers.

It is predicted that, if the global population continues to grow at the present rate, the world will need the resources of a second earth to sustain it by 2050. Today, there are 6.9 billion people on the planet; in 40 years, this figure will reach 9.2 billion. Most political leaders, however, are reluctant to examine the matter. The term "population control" has connotations too sinister for many, even though it can simply mean sensible family planning.

It is estimated that nearly 40 per cent of all pregnancies around the world are unintended; addressing this could make a vital difference. Research from the Optimum Population Trust, whose patrons include the environmentalists David Attenborough, James Lovelock and Jonathon Porritt, suggests that, for every $7 (£4.50) spent on basic family planning services over the next 40 years, global CO2 emissions could be reduced by more than a tonne. It would cost a minimum of $32 (£20.50) to achieve the same result with low-carbon technologies.

Between now and 2050, meeting the world's family planning needs could save up to 34 gigatonnes of CO2 - nearly 60 times the UK's annual total. As Unicef reported as far back as 1992: "Family planning could bring more benefits to more people at less cost than any other single technology available to the human race."

This hasn't escaped the notice of the UN Population Fund (UNFPA), whose latest State of World Population report - written by Engelman - revealed that there are more than 215 million women across the world wanting but unable to get contraception. The logic goes that if more resources were poured into fixing this, fewer unwanted babies would be born - and it would be better both for the women involved and for mankind as a whole, because it would lead to lower carbon emissions.

Wrong multiplication

So far, so uncontroversial. However, the world's poorest billion people (who account for very many of the 215 million women without adequate contraception) produce only 3 per cent of the global carbon footprint. In other words, focusing exclusively on this group is not particularly efficient. If change is to be made through family planning, it follows that richer countries must be involved: by current estimates, the average British child has a heavier carbon footprint than 30 children in sub-Saharan Africa.

Yet when I asked the head of the UNFPA's population and development branch about the need to introduce policies encouraging women throughout the world - and particularly in the west - to have fewer children, he would not endorse it. "We're not promoting any particular policy to increase or decrease fertility," José Miguel Guzman explained to me on the phone from New York. "Our main goal is to give women the power to decide how many children they have, and to pressure governments into introducing policies that reduce per-capita emissions." The focus, in other words, should be on reducing human consumption rather than human numbers.

This seems logical for wealthy countries such as Britain, which is among the world's highest per-capita energy consumers but has just two children per family, on average. Yet due in part to immigration, the UK's population is projected to rise from the current 61 million to 70 million by 2029, and 77 million in 2050. That's more than another two Londons. If the Tories and the Lib Dems manage to agree on an immigration policy, this could have an impact, but no one can say how much. And no matter how "green" the coalition says it is, this volume of extra people will add substantially to the UK's already heavy carbon footprint. If British families have two children on average, at least some women must be having three children or more. Given Britain's disproportionate consumption patterns, can the world afford this?

The question drifts dangerously into the arena of women's autonomy. Initiatives encouraging smaller families - such as child benefits, or tax breaks for families with two children or fewer - could be seen as unfairly weighting a woman's reproductive choices. When does an incentive become something more sinister? What, in policy terms, amounts to coercion?

It is an area fraught with difficulty and efforts to tackle it invariably meet with opposition. Oxfam's head of research, Duncan Green, has been critical of the Optimum Population Trust's PopOffsets initiative, which invites people to offset their carbon emissions by funding family planning services in the developing world. The scheme, he said, is tantamount to blaming the victims. "I'm all for supporting women's reproductive rights," Green explained to me, but, in his view, PopOffsets puts "the wrong people in the frame". This kind of attitude, he says, tries to make light of the harm to the environment done by the developed world and by emerging-market economies such as China. "Would you have more population control in China?"

At its heart, the debate exposes a worrying paradox: the fundamental contradictions in the goals aimed at helping poorer countries. The UNFPA, along with many major charities, advocates reducing carbon emissions and promoting investment and education. Yet, as nations get wealthier, they pollute more. This means that helping countries to develop - at all - sits awkwardly with the goal of reducing CO2 emissions.

It is argued that, with enough support committed to helping countries grow sustainably, a damaging jump in pollution can be avoided. (It's also true that, as nations become richer, their fertility rates drop.) But most experts concede that, even with the best-laid development plans, there will be a time lag during which emissions will rise. And given that one of the few agreements at Copenhagen was that Planet Earth's temperature cannot rise beyond 2°C in the coming decades, this could be the worst possible time for such a blip.

In the mincer

Thinking about population numbers is important for many reasons - many of them basic and uncontentious. The UNFPA used this year's World Population Day in July to drive home a message about the importance of governments gathering good demographic data, in order better to predict where resources will be needed and to mitigate, for example, the effects of India's swelling cities. So, why are the consequences of birth trends not being considered more seriously?

“Population growth is the kind of area that gets ignored because people want to ignore it," says the environmental scientist James Lovelock. "But it can't be wished away." He points out that humans and animals contribute 25 per cent of global emissions by "just existing on the planet, [even] before you add cars or anything".

What can be done? No one would suggest that we should hold back on helping countries to get richer or their citizens healthier in order to cut down human numbers. Nor is China's one-child policy palatable to most western voters or policymakers, even if it has produced between 300 and 400 million fewer people on the planet. Likewise, population control should not be seen as the catch-all solution to climate change: technological innovation, political co-operation and meaningful social change will all have important roles to play if, as Lovelock puts it, we are to give our descendants a chance, "instead of letting them get ground up in the mincer".

But just as in the past not enough attention was paid to the effects of polluting gases on our atmosphere, now too little thought is going into what multiplying human numbers will mean for future generations. We must ask ourselves tough questions. Although we cannot deny women the right to choose how many children they have, does offering tax breaks for smaller families in richer countries amount to the same thing? Or does it, in fact, grant the poorest citizens of the developing world, people such as Leucadia, the right to a better life?

Mary Fitzgerald is assistant and online editor of Prospect magazine.

This article first appeared in the 30 August 2010 issue of the New Statesman, Face off

MILES COLE FOR NEW STATESMAN
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Meet the Three Brexiteers: the men who could change how we exit the EU

What is really going on between Boris Johnson, David Davis and Liam Fox over Britain’s exit from the EU?

For newspapers with only the Olympics to write about during August, the squabbling “Three Brexiteers” – the senior ministers supposedly tasked with executing the will of the British people to remove us from the European Union – came as a gift. The men concerned are David Davis, the new Secretary of State for Exiting the European Union; Boris Johnson, who is what our passports used to call Her Majesty’s Principal Secretary of State for Foreign and Commonwealth Affairs; and Liam Fox, the Secretary of State for International Trade. This odd trio amused the press for several reasons, mostly bogus: that they share responsibility for securing Brexit (untrue); that they all hate each other (untrue); that Fox has parked his tanks on Johnson’s lawn to the extent of demanding that some of the powers of the Foreign Office be transferred to his department (apparently true); and that they must take it in turns to use Chevening, hitherto the foreign secretary’s grace-and-favour, 115-room pile in Kent (certainly true, though none rushed to avail himself of the privilege). Inevitably, the whole question is far more layered and complex than the silly-season column fillers even began to suggest.

The dynamic between the three men is not straightforward. Davis and Fox are hardcore Brexiteers of long standing. In this year’s referendum campaign Davis was more closely associated with the unofficial Leave.eu group and its sister organisation Grassroots Out, and shared platforms with (among others) Nigel Farage and the Labour MP Kate Hoey. Fox, who announced just before Christmas 2015 that he would support Leave, appeared on various platforms and was more closely associated with the mainstream Vote Leave campaign, which was little more than a Tory front operation.

Davis was runner-up to David Cameron in the Tories’ 2005 leadership election, Fox an also-ran. There was little empathy between the two men during that race. Fox is immersed in US politics and has a wide range of senior contacts in the Republican Party, in and out of Congress, and in those days was seen as something of a neocon. Davis is a more conventional Tory, but with that 19th-century Liberal strain in his ­political make-up that also distinguished Margaret Thatcher (he calls himself a “Thatcherite”). He and Fox share many economic ideas as well as a dislike of the EU, but their ideas about foreign policy and, particularly, the degree of reverence with which the US world-view should be treated, differ sharply.

In June 2008 Davis resigned as shadow home secretary and from the Commons, triggering a by-election, in which he stood, to draw attention to the erosion of civil liberties in Britain. David Cameron, who found Davis wearing, saw this as a stunt and took the opportunity not to readmit him to the shadow cabinet after his re-election a month later. It was claimed Cameron offered Davis a place in the coalition cabinet in 2010 to appease the right, but Davis – disliking a range of the coalition’s policies –
preferred the back benches. His friends believed his leadership ambitions had not been quelled and that he would build up his constituency in the party better by not being in government with the Liberal Democrats. No offer of a job in cabinet came after June 2015, which seems to have hardened Davis further against the Cameron line on Europe; but Davis, not the most popular man in the parliamentary party, chose not to offer himself as a potential leader after Cameron’s auto-defenestration this summer.

Fox, however, did, even though there was equally scant evidence of his popularity. Finishing bottom of the first ballot, he then shrewdly put himself behind Theresa May, with whom he is said to have cordial relations, rather than one of the Brexiteer candidates. This helped ensure his return to cabinet. He had served in 2010-11 as defence secretary, departing in odd circumstances. It was disclosed that Adam Werritty, 17 years Fox’s junior and best man at his wedding, had been passing himself off as an adviser to Fox, but wasn’t on the official payroll and had no security clearance. Werritty reportedly attended 40 of 70 recorded engagements that Fox made as defence secretary, had been Fox’s business partner in his Atlantic Bridge charity, and had accompanied him on numerous official trips.

Though no harm had been done to British interests, Fox conceded that he had made an error of judgement and resigned. For him, too, the road back was long: he turned down the offer of a minister of state’s job at the Foreign Office in July 2014 in order to retain the freedom to criticise government (and particularly economic) policy. He became ever less warm to Cameron, who offered him nothing after the 2015 Tory victory. His Euroscepticism is of long duration, and it hardened in his absence from government.

***

Boris Johnson has no such pedigree, which begins to explain the suspicion in which Davis and Fox are said to hold him. It was shortly before the end of his second term as mayor of London, and the day after Michael Gove’s spectacular announcement that he would be voting to leave the EU, that Johnson decided which way to jump. Few in his party believed his choice to embrace Leave was made after anything other than a calculation about how best to further his rampant ambition to lead the Conservative Party and become prime minister. He had spent many years as a columnist being rude about Europe, but there is a world of difference between that and advocating complete withdrawal. Until Gove blew the whistle on Johnson as a potentially inadequate prime minister – to the relief of scores of Tory MPs who nonetheless do nothing to defend Gove against accusations of disloyalty – the plan seemed to be working perfectly.

Theresa May’s appointment of Johnson was cunning. Although pundits include him in the trio conducting Brexit, his role seems limited to maintaining friendships with those we are divorcing. An early engagement was a Bastille Day party in London, at which the French audience booed him. May’s establishment of the Brexit Department under Davis means the Foreign Office follows rather than leads on this most crucial question of foreign policy. She is no fool, and knows that among Johnson’s attested failings is his inability (apparently because of idleness) to acquaint himself with detail. The accomplishment of our departure from Europe is greatly about detail and the Prime Minister knew he could not master it.

Davis had been a successful minister for Europe in the 1990s, had worked in the private sector for years – he was an executive with Tate & Lyle – and, as a genuine Leaver, had the motivation as well as the experience to see that the job was done. However, making Johnson Foreign Secretary allowed May to appease that section of the party, mainly at the grass roots, that believes he is a great statesman. Yet word from Downing Street is that as well as Europe being parcelled off to Davis, the really important issues of foreign policy – notably relations with the US, China and Russia – will be handled from No 10, the Foreign Office again following rather than leading. This confirms a trend begun by Tony Blair nearly 20 years ago. So the powers Johnson will have are unlikely to make him the Anthony Eden de nos jours.

Davis surfaced for an anodyne speech in Ulster on 1 September confirming his desire to avoid tariffs when trading with the EU, but has kept a low profile since his appointment for, it seems, two reasons. First, his task is considerable, and while his department and the expert negotiators it requires are being assembled it was wiser to avoid saying anything, despite the growing restlessness of some of his allies on the right. His statement to the Commons on Monday was no more revelatory, serving to confirm what little we knew but to emphasise that it is not likely we will stay in the single market – the obvious conclusion to draw from May’s insistence that free movement of people is over. Even if the government has decided to leave by means of repealing the European Communities Act 1972, which many Tory Brexiteers think probable, there is nothing Davis can say about detail until the government decides exactly how to pursue that strategy – and that may be weeks yet.

Second, he knows Remainers outnumber Brexiteers in cabinet. He is deeply concerned to bring support with him, and knows he will do that best by keeping May close. Ministers who wouldn’t have a career in politics but for her will be careful to follow her lead. In July and August, May made it clear that she favoured caution, and caution was what her secretary of state provided. So, when she said (again) at last week’s special cabinet meeting at Chequers that Brexit means Brexit – that those Remainers in denial should recognise the inevitability of our leaving – and that immigration controls were inevitable, it seemed that she and Davis were united on the key questions, and the hardliners in their party could rest easy.

The tensions among the trio of ministers were really between just two of them, Johnson and Fox, and Fox appears responsible. Probably presuming on what he considered his good relationship with May, he asked during August that the Foreign Office should lose its role in trading relationships. May immediately voiced annoyance at what some of her colleagues and officials branded a “turf war”. Her anger may have been provoked in part by her failure to see the clash coming – she created overlaps between departments in her restructuring of Whitehall that a little more thought would have avoided – but also by her sense that a public which voted for Brexit would expect her ministers to be getting on with it, not jockeying for position and making the political class even more despised than it already was.

Fox asked to have “economic diplomacy” moved to his department in a “rational restructuring”. He had a point. He has no responsibility for securing Brexit – that lies squarely in Davis’s department – but until it is accomplished he cannot usurp the EU and make definitive trading arrangements with other nations. He can, however, hold preparatory talks with his American friends and others (he has just visited India). That does create an overlap of economic diplomacy, so one presumes the arguments between Fox and Johnson have only just begun. Fox claimed his acquisition of these powers was “crucial to the delivery of objectives I have been set by the Prime Minister”.

May slapped him down, to the amusement of Johnson partisans, but Johnson had to second some officials to Fox’s department. Fox found himself briefed against by a Foreign Office mandarin who called him “nutty and obsessive” and likened him to “Donald Rumsfeld on steroids”. This did not restrain Fox, who told a US radio show in July that his department would be taking over “a wing” of the Foreign Office, a reflection of the importance of its duties. He added: “We are effectively taking all of the elements that were UK trade and investment out of what was the Business Department. We’re taking defence and security exports from what was the Ministry of Defence where I used to be secretary of state. We’re taking UK export finance out of the Treasury, and we’re creating a totally new trade negotiation department all within itself.” Fox has also been given the venerable title of President of the Board of Trade, and has not been idle. Besides his mission to India, his department is about to open three new offices in the US – in Minneapolis, Raleigh and San Diego – to add to the existing 11.

After Fox’s spat with Johnson the two ministers, and Davis, who seemed merely an innocent bystander, held a “clear the air” meeting at the Cabinet Office on 24 August. In so far as differences between the three matter, the main one was over immigration: Davis and Fox wanted border controls with Europe reinstated, whatever the effect on the single market, but Johnson didn’t. Given May’s statement after the Chequers meeting, Johnson seems to have lost.

***

The initiative is now very much with Davis. Some backbench colleagues are telling him, in effect, there doesn’t need to be a negotiation: John Redwood has made this point seriatim on his blog, and vocally during a BBC Radio 4 documentary presented by Gus O’Donnell, the former cabinet secretary, at the end of August. Brexiteers have accused O’Donnell, and other former officials who have joined the debate, of talking up the difficulties of leaving. What the hardliners want is for Davis to announce the repeal of the European Communities Act, by which we joined what is now the EU. Given the EU’s net trade surplus with the UK – £70bn a year – the hardline view is that the EU has much more to lose than we do from denying us access to the single market.

As one of Davis’s friends told me: “There are 47 countries that have access to the single market without having to concede free movement of people. America, Russia and China have Most Favoured Nation status with the EU. Given all the money the EU makes from us, is it really in their interests to offer us a worse deal than any of those 50 countries?” This line is playing well in the Brexit Department. Davis is also being told that whatever the rhetoric of other nations – notably the doomed regime in France – ­Europe relies too much on doing business on favourable terms in the City of London to deny “passporting” rights (the ability to do business across the EU while based in the UK) to British financial institutions.

Backbenchers anxious for the process to start are telling Davis to say to the EU that it can either allow Britain access to the single market, without insisting on free movement, in return for tariff-free operation here; or the two parties can trade on World Trade Organisation terms, with tariffs, which will harm the EU more than it will harm the UK. The lack of hostile response from Germany, the biggest importer of British exports in Europe, gives the Brexiteers cause for hope that things may not be so acrimonious, and the reality far from the gloom of George Osborne’s Project Fear.

For the moment, the three ministers are not squabbling: but then it is a mistake to see them as interdependent. May will have to sort out the overlaps between Johnson and Fox’s departments: but Davis knows what he has to do, and what his remit is to do it. What remains to be decided is whether this will be a so-called hard Brexit (coming out on our terms) or “soft” (coming out on Europe’s). The rhetoric so far suggests the former; unless Davis forfeits May’s support, that is how it will stay. May must also remember that if she does feel she must stop backing Davis, she will not only have to find someone else to do his job, but deal with backbenchers who remain to be convinced that she will see the job through. In the end, as chief executive, fulfilling the will of the British people will be her responsibility.

Simon Heffer is a columnist for the Daily and Sunday Telegraphs

Simon Heffer is a journalist, author and political commentator, who has worked for long stretches at the Daily Telegraph and the Daily Mail. He has written biographies of Thomas Carlyle, Ralph Vaughan Williams and Enoch Powell, and reviews and writes on politics for the New Statesman

This article first appeared in the 08 September 2016 issue of the New Statesman, The Three Brexiteers