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Is Google evil?

The online search giant is the internet’s greatest success story. But as ever more data is amassed,

Records of Broughton in Buckinghamshire date back to the Domesday Book, the first medieval census - a comprehensive account of hitherto uncollected personal information. Nearly a millennium later, the online search giant Google was in the former village (now a suburb of Milton Keynes) updating records for its online mapping tool, Street View. A little after 9am on a Wednesday morning, an unmarked black Vauxhall Astra was spotted with a camera on a metre-high pole. People didn't like that "it could see over their garden walls", recalls the local councillor John Bint.

“The car was parked here on the corner," explains Edward Butler-Ellis, a member of the local Neighbourhood Watch. "A crowd gathered around it, but [it was] not the barricade with pitchforks and so forth that [the media] were so intent on promoting. It was a perfectly civil discussion." By the time the police arrived, the car was gone. "The story escalated way beyond what we'd anticipated. We just wanted the chap to go away."

By Friday morning, the event had generated thousands of hits on Google News. "A lot of people didn't realise what was happening," Butler-Ellis says. "My gran had never heard of Google really. When I told her about the cameras, it made her blood boil. 'How dare these people come and take photographs of my house without asking me?' she said."

The controversy seemed to surprise Google; the firm has long and loudly professed its objective to gather user and other data in a quest “to organise the world's information". The company is so good at this that David Cameron wants to put it in charge of organising our medical records. Its products don't just use data, they help us find it - and we continue to ask for help. When we use its software, and with our permission, Google's "bots" follow us everywhere we go: as we search the internet, look up an address, reply to an email, make a purchase, chat with our friends online or walk about with our mobile phone. Though it does not recognise you as an individual, Google's software could soon track and store almost everything you want - and everything you do.

The Google story begins in 1996 with Sergey Brin and Larry Page, two young engineers newly enrolled in a PhD programme at Stanford University in California. The web was in its infancy; finding information online was as cumbersome as wading through the Encyclopaedia Britannica, and often far less decent. Brin and Page had an idea. They chose to look at links between websites instead of just site content, as other search services did. If you, say, searched for "coffee", the old search engines would give you the pages with the most mentions of "coffee". Google gave you the pages that had the most links to them from other sites. So you might get a page that mentioned "coffee" less often, but was deemed more authoritative by previous visitors.

Within a year, the pair had raised a million dollars to develop their project, but then faced the challenge of finding a way to make money out of it. Their solution - charge companies to advertise on specific searches, right next to the results.

The pair's innovation transformed Google into a new type of company that has defined the internet, one that organises information in order to make money from advertising, knowing what users want and telling them how to get it. That's why they needed the photos from Milton Keynes: for a service that, every day, shows millions of people how to get to where they want to go and what they want to find, along with-as part of the Google Maps service-a carefully targeted advert or two.

The model has put Google in conflict with privacy campaigners. Gus Hosein, a senior fellow at Privacy International, sees it less as a search or email company than an advertising company. "That's how they make all their money," he says. Certainly, Google's growth since 2000 has been about finding ways to advance beyond search ads, advertising against thousands of other web pages, including its own email service.

In each case, Google uses information we provide to serve us the right advertisements at the right time. Sometimes, as in Gmail (now Googlemail in the UK and Germany), it's the words we're reading that drive the advertisements: a friend writes that he's livid about a recent football loss, and you see an advert for football tickets. On our mobile devices, it's the GPS tracking that could enable Google to serve up location-based ads.

Hosein thinks Google is working hard to build privacy checks into its system; no human being ever reads your email or scans your searches. But the expansionist vision of Google's chief executive, Eric Schmidt, troubles him. There are 600 million internet-enabled mobile phones out there; that could give Google an even richer seam than search. Phones are very personal in the data they collect. As Schmidt told Maria Bartiromo in BusinessWeek last month: "If we know a fair amount about a person, with their permission, we can target a useful ad - you know, 'It's Eric. You had a hamburger yesterday, do you want pizza today? There's a pizza store on the right.' That kind of ad is likely worth a lot of money to an advertiser because it will generate a sale."

It could be worth a lot to Google, too, enabling it to expand its prowess beyond PCs. With nine billion searches on its pages a month, Google has a 65 per cent share of the US search market, according to the online data-tracker comScore. Its next largest competitor, the once-mighty Yahoo!, has just fallen below the 20 per cent mark. Here in the UK, Google's dominance is even more pronounced: another data-tracker, Hitwise, puts Google's share at 90 per cent, followed by a handful of competitors with less than 3 per cent each.

In other areas of advertising, such as banner ads on partner pages, no one player has a clear majority share yet. But data from Credit Suisse and Evercore Partners suggests that Google is poised to grasp one, showing the fastest growth in each category of advertising, as well as the largest single share (31 per cent) of all online advertising. In the UK, the situation is even more pronounced. As Nigel Gwilliam of the Institute of Practitioners in Advertising puts it, "You can get figures for Google's total revenue in the UK from their financial statements [and] compare their total income to the total UK market. Certainly, the last time I looked, they were in their own right half the [online advertising] market. Search is traded as a dedicated marketplace, and within that they were almost the market."

Google's unparalleled popularity makes its targeting technology even more valuable to advertisers, because having more users delivering collective wisdom about what they find relevant increases the chances of a good advertising match. How much more valuable is hard to quantify, but Google took $21bn in advertising revenue last year, and managed to make a profit of almost $8bn. That represents 30 per cent growth since 2007 and a 40 per cent operating margin - an astonishing performance in any year, but especially during a global recession.

Though some of the protesters in Broughton might have been concerned that Google was out to make a profit from the images of their homes, there is nothing wrong, in legal terms, with it doing so - especially as, in this case, the photos were taken from a public street. On Google's home turf in the US, there are no privacy laws that specifically govern online user data, just a host of voluntary compliance guidelines. For the most part, these guidelines permit all forms of data collection, so long as companies don't lie to consumers about what is being recorded. The European Commission goes a little further: it bars companies in EU member states from holding personal data longer than their express business purpose requires. Google's express business purpose, Hosein notes, is to hold the data we provide in the online "cloud", where it may stay indefinitely. As Schmidt's vision of hamburger-hawking mobile phones reveals, Google is not apologetic about its business model.

Hosein is critical of what he sees as the failings of a legal order built on what companies say they will do, rather than explicit restrictions on what they can do, which means that they can only be penalised for breaking their own commitments - that is, for holding more data, for a longer period of time or for a different use, than they initially promised. The penalty a company faces for going against its word is a flat £5,000 in the UK; in the US, it's just a verbal slap on the wrist.

Yet data aggregation and targeted advertising - the practices that make Google so profitable, and so alarming to some - risk landing the company in a different sort of trouble: the quagmire of competition law. By being strategically so good at pursuing its founders' data-driven vision of the social good, might Google cross a legal line with its potential dominance in gathering and organising information? The question agitates the otherwise amiable Oliver Rickman, Google's UK spokesman. A casual post on the social networking site Twitter, requesting information from friends for this story, received a quick rebuttal from the company.

Rickman is not wrong to be worried. After all, antitrust law (as competition law is known across the Atlantic) succeeded in breaking up the world's largest oil company, Standard Oil, in 1911, and came close to victory against Microsoft a decade ago. That is why Google has invested in a top-of-the-line legal defence team, led by Dana Wagner, a young lawyer who cut his teeth at the US department of justice. Fresh from the older, greyer offices of federal regulators, Google's new recruit is fiercely committed to the company's mission and promises. He dismisses most anti­trust arguments as the cynicism of competitors, or those who haven't seen the digital light. "One of the reasons the internet has been so successful and such an engine for growth and innovation is that there hasn't been a lot of regulation," he says. "There is certainly a role for sensible antitrust law, but it should be kept to a minimum."

The law is broadly similar in the US and the EU. Structured to protect companies from one another as much as to protect consumers, competition provisions (or antitrust laws) bar dominant companies from abusing their position to destroy rivals or overcharge customers, and seek to prevent rising stars in an industry from using unfair practices - such as price manipulation, customer coercion, collusion with rivals or merger activity - to secure dominance. Mergers and acquisitions involving dominant players that reduce competition are particularly closely scrutinised, even if the company hasn't otherwise abused its position.

All these provisions, however, begin with market definition: what is the company really selling and to whom? And has it done anything specific and deliberate to block out - or buy out - the competition or to manipulate price to the customer? Google says it hasn't, insisting that its dominance in search and search-based advertising is a function of its superior products and technology. Indeed, the company has even set up a "Data Liberation Front", apparently to ensure consumers are not "locked in" to its products. They remain with Google by choice. Richard Liebeskind, a former justice department lawyer who now specialises in antitrust litigation, explains: "If you gain a monopoly by skill, foresight and industry, none of that violates the antitrust laws." Google being big may be scary, but it's not illegal.

Nonetheless, in 2007, when Google decided to buy another advertising firm - DoubleClick - rivals including Microsoft and Yahoo! were quick to condemn the deal, arguing that it gave Google an unfair monopoly. By a vote of four to one, the US Federal Trade Commission decided it did not. But Google was now being watched. When, in 2008, it tried to strike a partnership with Yahoo!, the US department of justice decided it would investigate. Google abandoned the deal. Wagner claims that many challengers are just envious of Google's search skills. After all, rivals - led by Microsoft - have pooled their funds to get their own team, a venture euphemistically named Initiative for a Competitive Online Marketplace (ICOMP).

Momentum to challenge Google is building from smaller players, too, with different search technology. One firm,, filed suit in February this year, alleging that Google had "terminated the voluntary course of dealing it had with SourceTool [TradeComet's affiliate] by manipulating its auctions so that SourceTool faced vastly higher prices to acquire search traffic, prices so high it was uneconomical for SourceTool to win auctions that it had routinely won prior to Google's exclusionary strategy". Google denies the allegations and is fighting them vigorously.

Wagner is unperturbed. "As a successful company, we expect scrutiny; we're not bothered by it," he says. Yet Christine Varney, newly appointed by President Obama to lead the antitrust division at the US justice department, has an eye on the company. "Microsoft are so last century," Varney is reported to have said before her appointment. "Google has a monopoly in online advertising."

Her first task will be to rule on the legality of a deal Google has struck with US copyright holders to digitise millions of old library books and make them available and searchable online. The endeavour is costing Google hundreds of millions of pounds and has won praise for its scope, but the deal includes clauses that could make it harder for anyone else to do the same. While publishers may offer similar agreements to other companies, they may not offer them better terms than Google now enjoys. In addition, in a quirk of the terms, Google obtained exclusive access to so-called orphan works - out-of-print books with expired copyrights where there is no copyright holder who can offer the books to other companies. The case goes to the heart of Google's core business model: acquiring access to, searching and then monetising data that is already out there. Like the gardens of Milton Keynes, what's valuable about the library to Google is finding out what users search for within it.

Predictably, Microsoft was the first to complain. David Wood of ICOMP says: "If antitrust law fails in this case, that means we need new regulations." The case for new regulations - or at least new case law - was previously made by Pamela Jones Harbour, the one US federal trade commissioner who dissented from the Double­Click judgment in December 2007. (The FTC, incidentally, couldn't find her opinion, and advised that we use Google to search for it.)

Google successfully argued that, because DoubleClick was a display ad firm specialising in flashy banners and Google's ads were mostly tied to keywords and came in text form, the two firms weren't really in the same business, and so Google would not gain a significant advantage in the market. Harbour's view had been that Google was in the business of "targeted online advertising", and any and all data that advertisers want would eventually be useful to it. She explained: "Search information, gathered by Google, combined with browsing information [information on what sites we visit], gathered by DoubleClick, will create a far richer source of data to enable highly targeted advertising."

In Harbour's view, expansion that brought Google new data could further its dominance in targeting adverts to what we say we want. Whether it is adding new books to search pages that users visit or new features to Gmail, Google is expanding its share in the only online market from which anyone has worked out how to make money: online user data.

Harbour was arguing that Google's expanding share of user data would give it an unassailable advantage in targeting online adverts. In doing so, she was making the link between privacy concerns about Google's control of personal information and competition concerns about Google's dominance in online advertising. As Harbour wrote in her dissent, "After all, why would Google pay billions of dollars for Double­Click out of the hands of competitors, if Google does not intend to combine the two firms' valuable datasets?"

At the time, Google insisted advertisers did not see it that way. Since then, the ground has shifted. As Wagner says: "Before, text-based search ads were like direct-response ads, where display ads were based on branding, but now people realise that there's a branding value to search ads and, as the technology improves, they do converge." Increasingly, Google uses the same insights about our preferences to target all internet advertising.

This is leading some lawyers to look back at Harbour's proposed remedies. In the case of Google and DoubleClick, she wrote, "The commission could have asked the parties to make binding commitments regarding their handling of data, and to memorialise those representations in a consent agreement." She suggested that the FTC adopt this standard as a "future approach to data mergers".

As Google's legal team points out, other companies such as Microsoft now see advertising based on user preferences as the main revenue source online and can seek to obtain, and monetise, user data, too. That hardly helps regulators and consumers who may want less, not more, surveillance. However, solving the problem is difficult: on the fast-changing web, predictions about what Google and its peers will do next are often shots in the dark. We know a whole lot less about their plans than they do about us.

Maha Atal is a business journalist in New York. Damian Kahya is a journalist based in London

This article first appeared in the 24 August 2009 issue of the New Statesman, Is Google Evil?

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When it comes to responding to Islamic State, there is no middle ground

If Britain has a declared interest in curtailing Islamic State and stabilising Syria, it is neither honourable nor viable to let others intervene on our behalf.

Even before the brutal terrorist attacks in Paris, British foreign policy was approaching a crossroads. Now it is time, in the words of Barack Obama, addressing his fellow leaders at the G20 Summit in Turkey on 16 November, “to step up with the resources that this fight demands”, or stand down.

The jihadist threat metastasises, and international order continues to unravel at an alarming rate. A Russian civilian charter plane is blown out of the sky over the Sinai Peninsula in Egypt, killing 224 people, most of them returning from holiday, and the various offshoots of Islamic State bare their teeth in a succession of brutal attacks in France, Lebanon, Tunisia, Turkey and further afield. Our enemies are emboldened and our friends want to know to what extent we stand with them. The UK can no longer afford to postpone decisions that it has evaded since the Commons vote of August 2013, in which the government was defeated over the question of joining US-led air strikes against President Bashar al-Assad’s regime following a chemical weapons attack on Syrian civilians. MPs’ continued introspection is on the verge of becoming both irresponsible and morally questionable. There is no fence left to sit on.

On Sunday night, two days after the Paris attacks, the French – with US support – launched a series of bombing raids against Islamic State targets in Raqqa. With much more to come, the choice facing this country may not be easier but it is certainly clearer. Britain must determine whether it wants to be a viable and genuine partner in the fight against Islamic State, and in the long-term efforts to bring an end to the assorted evils of the Syrian civil war; or whether we are content to sit on the sidelines and cheer on former team-mates without getting our knees dirty. We can join our two most important allies – France and the United States, at the head of a coalition involving a number of Arab and other European states – in confronting a threat that potentially is as grave to us as it is to France, and certainly more dangerous than it is to the US. Alternatively, we can gamble that others will do the work for us, keep our borders tighter than ever, double down on surveillance (because that will certainly be one of the prices to pay) and hope that the Channel and the security services keep us comparatively safe. There is no fantasy middle ground, where we can shirk our share of the burden on the security front while leading the rest of the world in some sort of diplomatic breakthrough in Syria; or win a reprieve from the jihadists for staying out of Syria (yet hit them in Iraq), through our benevolence in opening the door to tens of thousands of refugees, or by distancing ourselves from the ills of Western foreign policy.

That the international community – or what is left of it – has not got its act together on Syria over the past three years has afforded Britain some space to indulge its scruples. Nonetheless, even before the Paris attacks, the matter was coming to the boil again. A vote on the expansion of air operations against Islamic State has been mooted since the start of this year, but was put on the back burner because of the May general election. The government has treated parliament with caution since its much-discussed defeat in the House in summer 2013. The existing policy – of supporting coalition air strikes against Islamic State in Iraq but not Syria – is itself an outgrowth of an awkward compromise between David Cameron and Ed Miliband, an attempt to reverse some of the damage done by the 2013 vote in parliament.

The Conservatives have waited to see where the ground lies in a Jeremy Corbyn-led Labour Party before attempting to take the issue back before the Commons. Labour pleaded for more time when Corbyn was elected, but there is no sign that the Labour leader is willing to shift in his hostility to any form of intervention. More significantly, he has now ruled out Labour holding a free vote on the matter.

If anything, the coalition of Little Englanders, anti-interventionists and anti-Americans in the House of Commons seems to have dug its trenches deeper. This leaves the Prime Minister with few options. One is to use the Royal Prerogative to announce that an ally has been attacked, and that we will stand with her in joining attacks against Islamic State in Syria. The moment for this has probably already passed, though the prerogative might still be invoked if Isis scores a direct hit against the UK. Yet even then, there would be problems with this line. A striking aspect of the killing of 30 Britons in the June attacks in Sousse, Tunisia, is just how little domestic political impact it seems to have made.

Another option for Cameron is to try to make one final effort to win a parliamentary majority, but this is something that Tory whips are not confident of achieving. The most likely scenario is that he will be forced to accept a further loss of the UK’s leverage and its standing among allies. Co-operation will certainly come on the intelligence front but this is nothing new. Meanwhile, the government will be forced to dress up its position in as much grand diplomatic verbiage as possible, to obfuscate the reality of the UK’s diminishing influence.

Already, speaking at the G20 Summit, the Prime Minister emphasised the need to show MPs a “whole plan for the future of Syria, the future of the region, because it is perfectly right to say that a few extra bombs and missiles won’t transform the situation”. In principle, it is hard to argue with this. But no such plan will emerge in the short term. The insistence that Assad must go may be right but it is the equivalent of ordering the bill at a restaurant before you have taken your seat. In practice, it means subcontracting out British national security to allies (such as the US, France and Australia) who are growing tired of our inability to pull our weight, and false friends or enemies (such as Russia and Iran), who have their own interests in Syria which do not necessarily converge with our own.

One feature of the 2013 Syria vote was the government’s failure to do the required groundwork in building a parliamentary consensus. Whips have spent the summer scouting the ground but to no avail. “The Labour Party is a different organisation to that which we faced before the summer,” Philip Hammond, the Foreign Secretary, has said. It is ironic, then, that the Prime Minister has faced strongest criticism from the Labour benches. “Everyone wants to see nations planning for increased stability in the region beyond the military defeat of the extremists,” says John Woodcock, the chairman of the Parliamentary Labour Party defence committee, “but after two years of pussy-footing around, this just smacks of David Cameron playing for time when he should be showing leadership.”

The real story is not the distance between the two front benches but the divisions within both parties. There are as many as 30 Conservative MPs said to be willing to rebel if parliament is asked to vote for joining the coalition against Islamic State in Syria. It seems that the scale of the Paris attacks has not changed their position. A larger split in the Labour ranks also seems likely. Even before Paris, there were rumoured to be roughly 50 MPs ready to defy their leader on this question.


At first, in the wake of last week’s attacks, it seemed as if the Prime Minister might force the issue. To this end, he began the G20 in Turkey with a bilateral meeting with President Putin. His carefully chosen words before and after that discussion, in which he was much more emollient about Moscow’s role, showed the extent to which he was prepared to adapt to the changing situation. Cameron hoped that if he could show progress in building an international coalition on the diplomatic front, that might just give him enough to get over the line in a parliamentary vote.

This new approach has not had the desired effect. At the time of writing, the government believes it is too risky to call another vote in the short term. It calculates another defeat would hugely diminish Britain’s standing in the world. In truth, the government was already swimming upstream. On 29 October, the Conservative-
dominated Commons foreign affairs select committee, chaired by Crispin Blunt, released a report on the extension of British military operations into Syria, in anticipation of government bringing forward a parliamentary vote on the question. The report recommended that Britain should avoid further involvement unless a series of questions could be answered about exit strategy and long-term goals. The bar was set deliberately high, to guard against any further involvement (even the limited option of joining the existing coalition undertaking air strikes against IS in Syria).

The most flimsy of the five objections to further intervention in the report was that it will somehow diminish the UK’s leverage as an impartial arbiter and potential peacemaker. This is based on an absurd overestimation of the UK as some sort of soft-power saviour, valued by all parties for its impartiality in Middle Eastern affairs. Britain cannot hope to have any influence on policy if it is always last to sign up while others put their lives on the line. As so often in the past, what masquerades as tough-minded “realpolitik” is nothing of the sort. It is just another post-facto rationale for inaction.

Although it is sometimes said that Britain has yet to recover from the consequences of the invasion of Iraq, the committee report had a retro, 1990s feel. Many of the objections raised to burden-sharing in Syria were the same as those raised against humanitarian intervention in the Balkans two decades ago, when Blunt was working as special adviser to Michael Rifkind as defence and foreign secretary, and the UK was at the forefront of non-intervention. Likewise, two of the committee’s Labour members, Ann Clwyd and Mike Gapes, were veterans of the other side of that debate, and strong supporters of the Nato intervention in Kosovo in 1999. They expressed their dissent from the report’s conclusions but were voted down by their Conservative and SNP fellow committee members. “Non-intervention also has consequences,” said Gapes when he broke rank. “We should not be washing our hands and saying, ‘It’s too difficult.’”

Polling figures have shown majority public support for air strikes against IS since the spate of gruesome public executions that began last year, but nothing seems to change the calculus of the rump of anti-interventionist MPs.

All this promises an uncertain future for British foreign policy. On 6 November, the Defence Secretary, Michael Fallon, suggested that the UK’s existing position, of joining the coalition in Iraq but stopping at the borders of Syria, is “morally indefensible”. The killing of Mohammed Emwazi, aka “Jihadi John”, by a US predator drone on 12 November demonstrates what he meant. Emwazi was a Briton who was responsible for the beheading of British and American citizens, as well as countless Syrians. While the UK government was closely involved in that operation – and has previously used the justification of “self-defence” to “take out” targets in Syria – such are the restrictions placed upon it that we are forced to ask our allies to conduct potentially lethal operations (which are in our core national interests) on our behalf. The very act of “self-defence” is subcontracted out once again.

How long can this last when Islamic State poses a much greater threat to the UK than it does to the US? There is an issue of responsibility, too, with hundreds of British citizens fighting for and with Islamic State who clearly pose a grave danger to other states.


The very notion that Britain should play an expansive international role is under attack from a pincer movement from both the left and the right. There are two forms of “Little Englanderism” that have made a resurgence in recent years. On the left, this is apparent in the outgrowth of a world-view that sees no role for the military, and holds that the UK is more often than not on the wrong side in matters of international security, whether its opponent is Russia, Iran, the IRA or Islamic State. The second, and arguably just as influential, is the Little Englanderism of the right, which encompasses a rump of Tory backbenchers and Ukip. This is a form of neo-mercantilism, a foreign policy based on trade deals and the free movement of goods that regards multilateralism, international institutions and any foreign military intervention with great suspicion, as a costly distraction from the business of filling our pockets.

The time is ripe for long-term, hard-headed and unsentimental thinking about Britain’s global role. The country is not served well by the impression of British “decline” and “retreat” that has gained ground in recent times; and it is no safer for it, either. Given how quickly the security and foreign policy environment is changing, the publication of the Strategic Defence and Security Review in the coming week, alongside an update of the National Security Strategy, is likely to raise more questions than it answers. The officials responsible for its drafting do not have an easy brief, and news forecasting is a thankless task. Strategic vision and leadership must come from our elected politicians.

For all the talk of British decline, we are still one of the five wealthiest nations in the world. What we do matters, particularly at moments when our friends are under attack. However, until a new broad consensus emerges between the mainstream Labour and Conservative positions on foreign policy, the Little England coalition will continue to have the casting vote.

Syria continues to bleed profusely and the blood seeps deeper into different countries. There will be no political solution to the civil war there for the foreseeable future; to pretend that there is a hidden diplomatic solution is to wish to turn the clock back to 2011, when that might have been possible. Nor is the security situation any easier to deal with. A few hours before the attacks in Paris began, President Obama gave an interview in which he argued that he had successfully “contained” Islamic State. For the wider Middle East and Europe, that is simply not the case. Now, France will escalate its campaign, and the US will do more. Russia already has troops on the ground and will most likely send reinforcements.

The war in Syria is becoming more complicated and even more dangerous. The best that can be hoped for is that the Syrian ulcer can be cauterised. This will be achieved through the blunting of Islamic State, simultaneous pressure on Assad, and the creation of more safe places for Syrians. All roads are littered with difficulties and dangers. Yet, in the face of this ugly reality, is Britain to signal its intention to do less as every other major actor – friend and foe alike – does more? If we have a declared national interest in curtailing Islamic State and stabilising Syria – both because of the growing terrorist threat and because of the huge flow of refugees – then it is neither honourable nor viable to let others take care of it on our behalf.

John Bew is an NS contributing writer. His new book, “Realpolitik: a History”, is newly published by Oxford University Press

This article first appeared in the 19 November 2015 issue of the New Statesman, The age of terror