Ai Weiwei and his legal team have, since 2011, fought allegations, arrests and fines for tax evasion case widely regarded as "political retaliation" by the Chinese goverment.
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The Ai Weiwei papers

On 27 September, the Chinese courts rejected Ai’s second appeal against a £1.5m fine for tax evasion. Here, his legal team sets out the facts of a case riddled with corruption and secrecy.

An Introduction
Jerome A Cohen

The New Statesman is rendering a great public service in making available an English-language account of the Chinese government’s use of its tax laws to persecute the innovative and courageous Chinese artist and activist Ai Weiwei. Having been pressured by world opinion to release Ai from the harsh and blatantly illegal confinement to which its police had subjected him for almost three months, the Chinese government decided to crush him by resorting to economic measures whose illegality would presumably be less apparent both to its own citizens and to the outside world.

Fortunately, thanks to the presentation that follows this introduction, the unfairness and abuses that have marked this tax case have been unmasked. As Ai’s lawyers make clear, at both the administrative and the judicial levels the proceedings against him have been a farce. Much of the evidence apparently used against Ai was unlawfully collected and retained by the police and the tax authorities. Administrative hearings that purported to determine his alleged tax liability were truncated and plainly in violation of international standards of due process of law, and the subsequent judicial reviews were no better.

I personally am saddened at this spectacle for reasons that transcend our friendship and my admiration for Ai. It is nauseating to witness the damage that the Chinese government has chosen to inflict on its reputation through the misuse of its criminal justice and tax systems. As an international lawyer and a law professor seeking to assist in China’s economic development, I spent over 20 years co-operating with Chinese officials who were seeking to develop a legal  system that would earn the confidence of its own people and of the foreign business community. Beginning in 1979, for several years I enjoyed especially close relations with the National Taxation Bureau, which, during the early period of the Deng Xiaoping reform era, led the way for other government agencies in establishing impressive regulations and procedures for carrying out its responsibilities and for developing a legal process worthy of respect.

The handling of the Ai Weiwei case has been totally inconsistent with that earlier accomplishment. Neither the Chinese nor the foreign communities can afford to ignore the scandalous mistreatment of Ai. If he can become the victim of criminal and commercial injustice, no one in China or who deals with China can feel safe.

Jerome Cohen is a professor of law at New York University and an expert in Chinese law

The Fake Cultural Development Ltd tax case

1. Process summary

On 3 April 2011 in the morning, Ai Weiwei was taken away by police at passport control at Beijing Capital International Airport.

On 3 April 2011 at midday, Beijing Public Security searched Ai Weiwei’s residence for almost 12 hours. They confiscated 127 items, including computers and CDs. Ten people were taken to the police station for questioning until the early morning.

On 3 April 2011 at midday, Ai Weiwei’s assistant Wen Tao was kidnapped by four plainclothes police officers and went missing. He was illegally detained at a secret location and not released by public security until 24 June. Before this, his family was unaware of his location and received no official notification.

On 6 April 2011 in the evening, Beijing Municipal Public Security went to Beijing Huxin Ltd, the bookkeepers of Fake Ltd. They searched company information, including bookkeeping records and financial statements, dating from its establishment. Xinhua News Agency then published an English bulletin: “Ai Weiwei is suspected of economic crimes and is now being investigated according to the law.”

On 7 April 2011, Beijing Public Security brought the company accountant, Hu Mingfen, who was visiting family in Lanzhou, back to Beijing. After being put in a detention centre for one month, she was transferred to a secret location and detained illegally until she was “granted bail” on 13 June. Her family received no official notification.

On 8 April 2011, the Second Tax Inspection Bureau and Beijing Public Security searched and confiscated all of Fake’s financial and accounting information, contracts and seals from 2005 to 2010.

On 9 April 2011, the Fake shareholder and manager Liu Zhenggang was kidnapped by four men in plain clothes. After being put in a detention centre for one month, he was transferred to a secret location and detained illegally until he was “granted bail” on 11 June. His family was unaware of his location and received no official notification.

On 10 April 2011, the driver Zhang Jinsong was taken away. After being put in a detention centre for one month, he was transferred to a secret location and detained illegally until he was “granted bail” on 23 June. During this time, his family was unaware of his location and received no official notification.

On 12 April, Beijing Local Taxation Bureau Second Tax Inspection Bureau questioned Fake’s legal representative, Lu Qing, for the first time. On 20 May 2011, Xinhua News Agency published a bulletin stating: “Public Security has investigated the alleged Ai Weiwei economic crimes case. The preliminary finding is that Beijing Fake Cultural Development Ltd, under the actual control of Ai Weiwei, has committed offences including evading a large tax payment and deliberately destroying accounting records.”

On 22 June 2011, after 81 days in detention, Ai Weiwei was released “on bail” and returned home. His family members received no official notification. They could not get information about his suspected crime, what forceful measures were used and where he had been detained.

On 14 July 2011, the Bejing Local Taxation Bureau Second Tax Inspection Bureau held a closed hearing.

On 1 November 2011, the Beijing Local Taxation Bureau Second Tax Inspection Bureau decided that Fake had committed tax evasion and was required to pay 5,263,756.61 yuan in back taxes, a 3,190,331.52 yuan late-payment penalty and a 6,766,822.37 yuan fine. The three payments totalled 15,220,910.50 yuan (£1.5m).  n 29 December 2011, Fake asked for an administrative review at the Beijing Local Taxation Bureau. On 29 March 2012, the Beijing Local Taxation Bureau turned down the request for a review.

On 13 April 2012, Fake sued the Beijing Local Taxation Bureau Second Tax Inspection Bureau at Beijing Chaoyang District People’s Court. The trial opened on 20 June 2012. On 20 July, the court rejected the entire Fake case.

On 3 August 2012, Fake lodged an appeal at Beijing Second Intermediate People’s Court. On 27 September 2012, in the company’s second and final appeal, the intermediate court upheld the original decision.

2. Points of controversy in the tax case

The Fake tax case contains grave problems and controversy in terms of both procedure and facts.

1. Points of controversy in the procedure

Procedure is essential in implementing justice.

Although Fake repeatedly raised serious procedural issues, the tax authorities and courts gave
no response. The main problems at each stage of the procedure are as follows:

1.1. Beijing Municipal Public Security Bureau
1.1.1. Public security exceeded its authority in the Fake tax case.

According to the Criminal Law Amendment (7) and the regulations on the administrative pre-procedure related to “Provisions (II) of the Supreme People’s Procuratorate and the Ministry of Public Security on the Standards for Establishing Criminal Cases under the Juris - diction of the Public Security Organs for In - vestigation and Prosecution”, only after the offending party has declined to implement tax administration penalties and after the tax organs have transferred the case to public security organs can public security organs establish a criminal case against the responsible parties. The Second Tax Inspection Bureau made its decision against Fake only on 1 November 2011. It is clear that in April 2011 public security detained five people in secret, including Ai Weiwei, on the grounds of “tax evasion”. They searched and confiscated Fake financial information, which was exceeding their authority and handling the case illegally.

In the Fake tax case, the tax organs were completely reliant on the Public Security Bureau for their evidence, and the police were pushed to the legislative foreground, which strengthened the contradiction and artificially produced   case of “major impact”. The police administration was brought into the government administration mechanism, which in essence weakened the function of legal and responsible adminstration.

1.1.2. “Arrest before investigation” is a violation of the law. On 3 April 2011, public security took Ai Weiwei away. They then detained four people, including a Fake shareholder and the company accountant. However, of the evidence  in the file put together by public security, none was collected before 3 April 2011. The essence of “an arrest before investigation” is assuming that a suspect is guilty.

1.1.3. The authorities confiscated all the company’s account books and refused to give them back. During the Fake case review, first hearing and final hearing, the company’s account books were confiscated by Beijing Municipal Public Security and not given back.

1.2. Beijing Local Taxation Bureau Second Tax Inspection Bureau

The Bureau was responsible for the adminis - trative handling of the case. The following problems existed in its administration and law enforcement:

1.2.1. More than 95 per cent of the evidence came from public security and was obtained illegally. The Second Tax Inspection Bureau issued the following statement on the composition and source of the “evidence list”:

“1. Account books, certificates and related tax documents were provided to the defendant after they were obtained by public security  organs from the plaintiff’s bookkeeping company;

2. Third-party account books, certificates, instructions and other materials were provided to the defendant after public security organs obtained them;  

3. Notes from public security questioning were taken by public security and then provided to the defendant;

4. Bank statements etc were provided to the defendant after they were obtained from the bank by public security;

5. Inspection process documents and notes were produced by the defendant; 6. Tax records, inspection materials and certificates from tax organs were obtained by the defendant.”

This indicates that most of the evidence that the defendant cited in the Fake tax case and for making a decision came from the Public Security Bureau.

Fake believed that: first, the evidence “transferred” from public security organs was obtained while violating legal procedures. It therefore constituted illegal evidence and should be discounted. Second, the Law on the Administration of the Levy and Collection of Taxes has given tax organs tax inspection rights through legal means. This is the responsibility of the tax organs, and the public security organs should not be investigating on their behalf.

The Second Tax Inspection Bureau argued that the public security organisations exercise judicial authority. According to the 57th and 58th clauses of the Law on the Administration of the Levy and Collection of Taxes, tax organs have the right to obtain relevant documents from organisations including public security organs. Based on this, obtaining evidence from public security organs is legal.

Fake believed that the 57th and 58th clauses of the Law on the Administration of the Levy and Collection of Taxes gave tax organs the right to investigate “relevant organizations and individuals, regarding taxpayers, withholding agents and other parties and their situation regarding tax payments or tax withheld and remitted or collected and remitted”. This is completely different from public security investigating taxpayers and transferring evidence, so the defendant’s response was irrelevant.

1.2.2. None of the evidence had been crossexamined. This should be regarded as a lack of factual basis. During the hearing procedure, the bureau presented only part of the review document. It had not been checked. During the trial, the plaintiff’s right to cross-examine was also removed by the court.

1.2.3. In order to comply with public security, coercive methods were used to obtain evidence. The Second Tax Inspection Bureau and public security, on condition of “bail”, coerced Ai Weiwei, who was in prison, to sign a “recognition of alleged tax violations” on 22 June 2011.
This was self-incrimination, and was used as forceful evidence that Fake had evaded taxes. It would be hard to imagine that the “recognition of alleged tax violations” could be a legal document at the tax inspection trial stage. However, it appeared at the previous tax inspection stage, as if a man-made satellite had appeared in the Qin or Han Dynasty.

1.2.4. The tax inspection work had no statutory elements or contents.

The Second Tax Inspection Bureau did not have documents such as the “tax inspection working paper”, “tax inspection report” and “tax inspection trial report”. The contents of the “decision declaration” were incomplete. It did not mention how the “tax evasion” amount or the late-payment penalty amount were calculated.

1.2.5. The hearing process violated the law. The Second Tax Inspection Bureau did not conduct an open hearing on the basis that the case involved commercial secrets. This reason is not valid, and the facts later confirmed that the socalled commercial secrets did not exist.

1.3. Beijing Local Taxation Bureau

The bureau carried out the review. On 2 February 2012, Fake applied to the bureau for a review of the documents and hearing attendance. On 27 and 28 March the document inspection started. On 29 March, the bureau made a decision about the review. Not only did it refuse to conduct a hearing, it made a decision about the review in less than 12 hours after the lawyers finished inspecting the document. They deprived the attorney of his right to state his case and the right to defence.

1.4. Beijing Chaoyang District People’s Court

Fake sued the Beijing Local Taxation Bureau Second Tax Inspection Bureau at Beijing Chao - yang District Court. The hearing was held on 20 June 2012.

1.4.1. It was called an open trial but in fact it was a secret trial. A trial as conspicuous as this was arranged in a small court, which could hold five spectators only. Five insiders were arranged to take up all the seats, and Fake was not allocated any spectator seats.

1.4.2. The court did not carry out its obligation in collecting evidence. Fake had previously requested the court to provide evidence of the plaintiff’s account books and certificates that were confiscated by public security, but the court had decided not to collect the evidence prior to the court session, nor had it sent a notification to the plaintiff saying that collecting this evidence was not allowed.

When Fake asked the court about this, the collegiate bench said, “We will answer this after the trial opens.”

1.4.3. The court did not carry out its obligationto call witnesses. Fake applied to summon Liu Zhenggang, Hu Mingfen and others as witnesses, but the court did not inform them. It claimed that the obligation to notify lay with the plaintiff. Fake asked for the defendant’s law- enforcement officials – ten people, including You Pengnan – to testify, but the court did not arrange for it.

On the contrary, however, after the court opened, You Pengnan appeared, representing the defendant. Fake raised an objection, but the collegiate bench replied that the company should raise it again after the trial.

1.4.4. The court removed the plaintiff’s right to present evidence. Fake requested evidence
from the collegiate bench prior to the opening of the court, but received no response. On 20
June in the morning, Fake went to the Three Shadows Cultural Exchange Centre and obtained evidence partly sufficient to overrule the decision. In the afternoon of 20 June, before the court opened and three times during the court session, the evidence was presented to the collegiate bench, but the court did not accept it, because it “overran the deadline for presenting evidence”.

1.4.5. The court refused to investigate the legitimacy of the sources of the evidence. According to law, the defendant can collect his own evidence, but it was all collected by public security authorities. More than 95 per cent of the evidence on administrative behaviour presented by the defendant was collected by public security organs.

Public security intervened in the tax case illegally, and the evidence was illegally obtained from detainees, which was not legitimate. Therefore, the plaintiff asked for the above evidence to be discounted. However, the court claimed that “the legitimacy of the public security investigations is not within the range of this court’s hearing”.

1.4.6. The court refused the plaintiff’s legitimate request to check the original evidence documents, and illegally removed the plaintiff’s right to cross-examination. During the session, the defendant failed to present any original documents for evidence. The presiding judge, Wu Nan, upon the request to see the documents, repeatedly struck his gavel and said, “As for the documents, the court has already made a decision; do not bring it up again!”

The court “summarised” when questioning the evidence and did not control the questioning time reasonably. Pieces of evidence numbering a thousand pages were given five minutes for questioning: on average, less than one second for every page of evidence. If the time exceeded five minutes, then the questioning would be regarded as abandoned.

1.4.7. The court removed the plaintiff’s right to debate. The plaintiff’s speech was repeatedly interrupted by the judges and was counted down. During the debate stage, three attorneys spoke for only ten minutes in total. The plaintiff could not fully express an opinion.

1.4.8. For these reasons, the plaintiff considered that the collegiate bench could not carry out this trial justly, and therefore requested the court to withdraw the case.

After the court was adjourned, the collegiate bench refused the request. The plaintiff appealed the decision, and the Chaoyang District Court refused orally, refusing to offer any written documentation.

1.4.9. The court refused to allow the litigants and the representatives to copy the court notes.
After the hearing, the court administrative divisional director promised the defendant that the following day at two o’clock in the afternoon they could come to the court to copy the notes, but the next day when they went to court, copying was no longer permitted, the court citing internal regulations.

1.4.10. The order of legal procedures was swapped when the court refused Fake’s request for evidence only after the trial. On 7 June 2012, Fake made its “application for collecting evidence” to the court.  The court did not respond. Yet after the court opened on 4 July, it decided not to allow any evidence to be collected. The reason given was that the defendant “did not meet the conditions for requesting evidence”. However, the decision did not contain a notification, required by law, to specify “which group and which piece of evidence violated which condition for evidence collection”.

2. Focus of controversy over the facts of the case 

Global Times, a subsidiary of the Chinese official newspaper the People’s Daily, published an editorial, entitled “The law will not bend for mavericks”, on the Ai Weiwei tax case, saying that certain western governments and “human rights organisations” had attacked China with strong commentary without understanding the true situation.

What is the truth behind the Ai tax case? Fake Ltd was established by the shareholders Lu Qing and Liu Zhenggang. Lu Qing was the legal representative and the wife of Ai Weiwei. Liu Zhenggang was business manager, responsible for company operations. The company’s income came mainly from design services. Ai Weiwei was not a staff member of Fake, but provided guidance and advice to the design services of Fake as an independent artist.

Fake went into operation in 2001. The tax organs believed that, over ten years of operation (until 2010), Fake concealed three counts of income, totalling 15,823,724.36 yuan. They pursued unpaid taxes of 5,263,756.61 yuan, a fine for overdue payment of 3,190,331.52 yuan and a penalty of 6,766,822.37 yuan, totaling 15,220,910.50 yuan.

Regarding the facts, the parties were in controversy over the following:

2.1. Who was the tax-paying entity for these three projects with alleged tax issues?

The standard for determining the tax-paying entity depends not on form, but on substance. This is the so-called principle of substance over formality in tax law. The heart of the problem is, who was the true controller of these three projects? Usually the actual controller is determined by who has the right to dispose of and the right to benefit from income. In tax law, the object of the test to determine the right to dispose of and the right to benefit from income is the sum of income. The public security organ, tax organ and the lawyers of Fake all acknowledged that Liu Zhenggang disposed of and controlled the project funding in the case. It is a shame that the conclusion drawn by each party was very different.

2.2. Was it tax evasion?

Regardless of whether the tax-paying entity was Ai Weiwei, Fake Ltd or Liu Zhenggang, the fact that tax duty had not been declared on the income for the three engineering projects is not in dispute. The key to the problem is, does the failure to declare taxable income constitute tax evasion?

According to China’s Law on the Administration of the Levy and Collection of Taxes, there are generally three types of failure to declare tax duty:

2.2.1. “Tax evasion”: falsely filing or deliberately failing to file taxes, causing an underpayment
of tax, following Term 63 of the Law on the Administration of the Levy and Collection of Taxes. This is breaking the law. If it reaches a certain ratio, it constitutes a crime.

According to Term 201 of the Criminal Law, it is the crime of evading payment of tax. The constituents must consist of the resulting elements, namely underpayment of tax and of a clear amount.

2.2.2. “Tax leakage”: not deception or concealment, but human error causing underpayment of tax, according to Term 64, Article 2 of the Law on the Administration of the Levy and Collection of Taxes. It counts as a normal administrative offence, not a criminal offence.

2.2.3. “Making up tax”: underpayment of tax caused by reasons not related to the actor (including incomplete factors in levying tax), as in Article 35 of the Law on the Administration of the Levy and Collection of Taxes. For example, where, although it is clearly income, the expenditure can’t be verified. The tax organ, by approving the profit rate, makes complete the factors in levying tax to realise the aim of levying tax. This type of underpayment of tax is the result of the expansion of administrative powers of the tax organs. It is not breaking the law, so the authorities cannot levy an overdue payment fine or penalty fine.

The contention of this case is focused on the dispute between “tax evasion” and “making up tax”. A simplified breakdown illustrates:

According to the law, when the cost is difficult to verify, an estimated tax should be levied. It should not be handled as a case of tax evasion. When the costs and expenses of a project cannot be checked, it cannot be asserted that the party has been evading tax.

2.3. The issue of verifying costs and expenditures for the three projects

The Second Tax Inspection Bureau said, “The defendant, upon confirming the total amount of taxes that the plaintiff should have paid, has also confirmed the costs related to the taxable income and subtracted it according to regulations.”

The plaintiff believed that the three projects that the tax bureau considered as evading taxes are defined by incomes that greatly mismatch with their costs. The Second Tax Inspection Bureau verified the income of the Boya Garden project as 1,107,716.00 yuan and its costs as nil. That goes against common sense. Income from the Three Shadows and Upper House projects was 14,716,008.36 yuan, the confirmed cost was nearly 1,047,349.39 yuan and the rate of profit was 92.88 per cent.

The costs were ridiculously low because the public security and tax organs jointly and deliberately concealed evidence of costs. For example, it has already been proved that Three Shadows, upon requests from the public security organ, presented it with receipts for expenditure of 3,738,551.06 yuan for materials used in the project. However, the total cost for all three projects that the tax organ received from the public security organ was only 1,047,349.39
yuan, less than a third of the cost for one project. Through this kind of deliberate selection of evidence, the profits of the projects were artificially enhanced to frame the company.

3. Conclusion

When one looks at the overall progress of the case, it is clearly an erroneous lawsuit. How could it have proceeded so smoothly? Because all the processes had already been arranged. The tax law-enforcement organ, the administrative review organ, the judicial court or representative lawyer were all following a set course. Administrative surveillance, independent trial and lawyer participation had no opportunity to exercise their rightful functions.

Tax cases such as that of Fake are ubiquitous in China. Unjust cases of sanctioning a party through tax means are also common. Most of the affected parties choose to remain silent in exchange for a reduction of the penalty by the tax organisation.

Fake used all means to fight its case, exposing illegality at each stage. This is unprecedented. The wish is that, through the heavy price paid by Fake, through the price for freedom paid by a person who doesn’t believe in following trends and who dares to speak the truth, we can make progress in China’s law enforcement.

The information used in this article was provided by Ai Weiwei’s lawyers

This article first appeared in the 22 October 2012 issue of the New Statesman, Ai Weiwei guest-edit

Picture: Archives Charmet / Bridgeman Images
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What Marx got right

...and what he got wrong.

1. You’re probably a capitalist – among other things

Are you a capitalist? The first question to ask is: do you own shares? Even if you don’t own any directly (about half of Americans do but the proportion is far lower in most other countries) you may have a pension that is at least partly invested in the stock market; or you’ll have savings in a bank.

So you have some financial wealth: that is, you own capital. Equally, you are probably also a worker, or are dependent directly or indirectly on a worker’s salary; and you’re a consumer. Unless you live in an autonomous, self-sufficient commune – very unusual – you are likely to be a full participant in the capitalist system.

We interact with capitalism in multiple ways, by no means all economic. And this accounts for the conflicted relationship that most of us (including me) have with capitalism. Typically, we neither love it nor hate it, but we definitely live it.

2. Property rights are fundamental to capitalism . . . but they are not absolute

If owning something means having the right to do what you want with it, property rights are rarely unconstrained. I am free to buy any car I want – so long as it meets European pollution standards and is legally insured; and I can drive it anywhere I want, at least on public roads, as long as I have a driver’s licence and keep to the speed limit. If I no longer want the car, I can’t just dump it: I have to dispose of it in an approved manner. It’s mine, not yours or the state’s, and the state will protect my rights over it. But – generally for good reason – how I can use it is quite tightly constrained.

This web of rules and constraints, which both defines and restricts property rights, is characteristic of a complex economy and society. Most capitalist societies attempt to resolve these tensions in part by imposing restrictions, constitutional or political, on arbitrary or confiscatory actions by governments that “interfere” with property rights. But the idea that property rights are absolute is not philosophically or practically coherent in a modern society.

3. What Marx got right about capitalism

Marx had two fundamental insights. The first was the importance of economic forces in shaping human society. For Marx, it was the “mode of production” – how labour and capital were combined, and under what rules – that explained more or less everything about society, from politics to culture. So, as modes of production change, so too does society. And he correctly concluded that industrialisation and capitalism would lead to profound changes in the nature of society, affecting everything from the political system to morality.

The second insight was the dynamic nature of capitalism in its own right. Marx understood that capitalism could not be static: given the pursuit of profit in a competitive economy, there would be constant pressure to increase the capital stock and improve productivity. This in turn would lead to labour-saving, or capital-intensive, technological change.

Putting these two insights together gives a picture of capitalism as a radical force. Such are its own internal dynamics that the economy is constantly evolving, and this in turn results in changes in the wider society.

4. And what he got wrong . . .

Though Marx was correct that competition would lead the owners of capital to invest in productivity-enhancing and labour-saving machinery, he was wrong that this would lead to wages being driven down to subsistence level, as had largely been the case under feudalism. Classical economics, which argued that new, higher-productivity jobs would emerge, and that workers would see their wages rise more or less in line with productivity, got this one right. And so, in turn, Marx’s most important prediction – that an inevitable conflict between workers and capitalists would lead ultimately to the victory of the former and the end of capitalism – was wrong.

Marx was right that as the number of industrial workers rose, they would demand their share of the wealth; and that, in contrast to the situation under feudalism, their number and geographical concentration in factories and cities would make it impossible to deny these demands indefinitely. But thanks to increased productivity, workers’ demands in most advanced capitalist economies could be satisfied without the system collapsing. So far, it seems that increased productivity, increased wages and increased consumption go hand in hand, not only in individual countries but worldwide.

5. All societies are unequal. But some are more unequal than others

In the late 19th and early 20th centuries, an increasing proportion of an economy’s output was captured by a small class of capitalists who owned and controlled the means of production. Not only did this trend stop in the 20th century, it was sharply reversed. Inherited fortunes, often dating back to the pre-industrial era, were eroded by taxes and inflation, and some were destroyed by the Great Depression. Most of all, after the Second World War the welfare state redistributed income and wealth within the framework of a capitalist economy.

Inequality rose again after the mid-1970s. Under Margaret Thatcher and Ronald Reagan, the welfare state was cut back. Tax and social security systems became less progressive. Deregulation, the decline of heavy industry and reduction of trade union power increased the wage differential between workers. Globally the chief story of the past quarter-century has been the rise of the “middle class”: people in emerging economies who have incomes of up to $5,000 a year. But at the same time lower-income groups in richer countries have done badly.

Should we now worry about inequality within countries, or within the world as a whole? And how much does an increasing concentration of income and wealth among a small number of people – and the consequent distortions of the political system – matter when set against the rapid ­income growth for large numbers of people in the emerging economies?

Growing inequality is not an inevitable consequence of capitalism. But, unchecked, it could do severe economic damage. The question is whether our political systems, national and global, are up to the challenge.

6. China’s road to capitalism is unique

The day after Margaret Thatcher died, I said on Radio 4’s Today programme: “In 1979, a quarter of a century ago, a politician came to power with a radical agenda of market-oriented reform; a plan to reduce state control and release the country’s pent-up economic dynamism. That changed the world, and we’re still feeling the impact. His name, of course, was Deng Xiaoping.”

The transition from state to market in China kick-started the move towards truly globalised capitalism. But the Chinese road to capitalism has been unique. First agriculture was liberalised, then entrepreneurs were allowed to set up small businesses, while at the same time state-owned enterprises reduced their workforces; yet there has been no free-for-all, either for labour or for capital. The movement of workers from rural to urban areas, and from large, unproductive, state-owned enterprises to more productive private businesses, though vast, has been controlled. Access to capital still remains largely under state control. Moreover, though its programme is not exactly “Keynesian”, China has used all the tools of macroeconomic management to keep growth high and relatively stable.

That means China is still far from a “normal” capitalist economy. The two main engines of growth have been investment and the movement of labour from the countryside to the cities. This in itself was enough, because China had so much catching-up to do. However, if the Chinese are to close the huge gap between themselves and the advanced economies, more growth will need to come from innovation and technological progress. No one doubts that China has the human resources to deliver this, but its system will have to change.

7. How much is enough?

The human instinct to improve our material position is deeply rooted: control over resources, especially food and shelter, made early human beings more able to reproduce. That is intrinsic to capitalism; the desire to acquire income and wealth motivates individuals to work, save, invent and invest. As Adam Smith showed, this benefits us all. But if we can produce more than enough for everybody, what will motivate people? Growth would stop. Not that this would necessarily be a bad thing: yet our economy and society would be very different.

Although we are at least twice as rich as we were half a century ago, the urge to consume more seems no less strong. Relative incomes matter. We compare ourselves not to our impoverished ancestors but to other people in similar situations: we strive to “keep up with the Joneses”. The Daily Telegraph once described a London couple earning £190,000 per year (in the top 0.1 per cent of world income) as follows: “The pair are worried about becoming financially broken as the sheer cost of middle-class life in London means they are stretched to the brink.” Talk about First World problems.

Is there any limit? Those who don’t like the excesses of consumerism might hope that as our material needs are satisfied, we will worry less about keeping up with the Joneses and more about our satisfaction and enjoyment of non-material things. It is equally possible, of course, that we’ll just spend more time keeping up with the Kardashians instead . . .

8. No more boom and bust

Are financial crises and their economic consequences part of the natural (capitalist) order of things? Politicians and economists prefer to think otherwise. No longer does anyone believe that “light-touch” regulation of the banking sector is enough. New rules have been introduced, designed to restrict leverage and ensure that failure in one or two financial institutions does not lead to systemic failure. Many would prefer a more wholesale approach to reining in the financial system; this would have gained the approval of Keynes, who thought that while finance was necessary, its role in capitalism should be strictly limited.

But maybe there is a more fundamental problem: that recurrent crises are baked into the system. The “financial instability” hypothesis says that the more governments and regulators stabilise the system, the more this will breed overconfidence, leading to more debt and higher leverage. And sooner or later the music stops. If that is the case, then financial capitalism plus human nature equals inevitable financial crises; and we should make sure that we have better contingency plans next time round.

9. Will robots take our jobs?

With increasing mechanisation (from factories to supermarket checkouts) and computerisation (from call centres to tax returns), is it becoming difficult for human beings to make or produce anything at less cost than a machine can?

Not yet – more Britons have jobs than at any other point in history. That we can produce more food and manufactured products with fewer people means that we are richer overall, leaving us to do other things, from economic research to performance art to professional football.

However, the big worry is that automation could shift the balance of power between capital and labour in favour of the former. Workers would still work; but many or most would be in relatively low-value, peripheral jobs, not central to the functioning of the economy and not particularly well paid. Either the distribution of income and wealth would widen further, or society would rely more on welfare payments and charity to reduce unacceptable disparities between the top and the bottom.

That is a dismal prospect. Yet these broader economic forces pushing against the interests of workers will not, on their own, determine the course of history. The Luddites were doomed to fail; but their successors – trade unionists who sought to improve working conditions and Chartists who demanded the vote so that they could restructure the economy and the state – mostly succeeded. The test will be whether our political and social institutions are up to the challenge.

10. What’s the alternative?

There is no viable economic alternative to capitalism at the moment but that does not mean one won’t emerge. It is economics that determines the nature of our society, and we are at the beginning of a profound set of economic changes, based on three critical developments.

Physical human input into production will become increasingly rare as robots take over. Thanks to advances in computing power and artificial intelligence, much of the analytic work that we now do in the workplace will be carried out by machines. And an increasing ability to manipulate our own genes will extend our lifespan and allow us to determine our offspring’s characteristics.

Control over “software” – information, data, and how it is stored, processed and manipulated – will be more important than control over physical capital, buildings and machines. The defining characteristic of the economy and society will be how that software is produced, owned and commanded: by the state, by individuals, by corporations, or in some way as yet undefined.

These developments will allow us, if we choose, to end poverty and expand our horizons, both materially and intellectually. But they could also lead to growing inequality, with the levers of the new economy controlled by a corporate and moneyed elite. As an optimist, I hope for the former. Yet just as it wasn’t the “free market” or individual capitalists who freed the slaves, gave votes to women and created the welfare state, it will be the collective efforts of us all that will enable humanity to turn economic advances into social progress. 

Jonathan Portes's most recent book is “50 Ideas You Really Need to Know: Capitalism” (Quercus)

Jonathan Portes is senior fellow The UK in a Changing Europe and Professor of Economics and Public Policy, King’s College London.

This article first appeared in the 22 June 2017 issue of the New Statesman, The zombie PM

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