Is the outrage over Stuart Hall’s 15-month sentence justified?

There has been anger expressed at Hall receiving “only” 15 months for a series of sex offences, but it must be remembered that the judge was working within the law as it stood when the offences were committed, not as it is now.

Today Stuart Hall was sentenced for a series of sex offences against girls aged between 9 and 17. The sentence imposed at the Crown Court at Preston was one of 15 months. The response on Twitter was predictable; there was palpable anger at the “disgustingly low” sentences.

Hall pleaded guilty to 14 counts of indecent assault. The offences included at the lower end, kissing with an open mouth and touching over clothing. At the higher end, the activity involved placing a hand on a 10 year-old’s leg whilst she lay in bed and moving it towards her crotch and the digital penetration of a 13 year-old girl. The first offence was committed in 1967 and the last in 1985 or 1986.  

When assessing the sentences, there are several important points to note. First is that Hall falls to be sentenced on the law as it was when he committed the offences, not on the basis of the law now. Sentencing of sexual offences has changed dramatically; attitudes are wildly different and this can be seen, for example, in the way in which rape complainants are protected from cross-examination on the sexual history. Previously, it was deemed “fair game”, but now, society understands that, for example, wearing a short skirt doesn’t mean that a woman was “up for it”. Further, the European Convention on Human Rights Art 7(1) prohibits the imposition of a heavier penalty than one “applicable” at the time of the offence. Fairness dictates that one should know, at the time of the offence, what the maximum sentence is.  That is unarguable.

In that regard, the Judge was significantly restricted in the sentences that he could impose. The maximum sentence for many of Hall’s offences was two years at the time he committed them; for the remainder, the maximum was five years. Since then, the maximum sentences have been raised to 10 years and had these offences been committed today, the sentences would undoubtedly be higher.

The effect of this is that Hall’s offences need to be viewed within the context of those maximum sentences. On a very basic level, if the maximum sentence is two years’ imprisonment, a sentence of two years can be said to roughly represent the worst case of such an offence. In the context of the offence, Hall’s offences are not towards that upper limit and some of them, as the Judge noted, did not pass the custody threshold (requiring a term of imprisonment). In that light, 15 months begins to look more reasonable.

Secondly, many offences are subject to guidelines, issued by the non-governmental quango the Sentencing Council. Many are critical of them (myself included) for the way in which their guidelines arrive at unjust and illogical results. Unfortunately, on this occasion, they are not to blame. The sexual offences guideline only applies to offences charged under the Sexual Offences Act 2003. Hall’s offences were under the Sexual Offences Act 1956. The guideline is therefore only “useful” in terms of the principles it espouses, including the way in which breach of trust (pertinent to Hall) should be viewed in the context of such offences.

Turning to the offences, this type of sentencing exercise presents a difficult mental exercise. The third point to note is the way in which the court assesses such offences. It is necessary, amongst other things, to consider a) the nature of the activity (e.g. the touching, kissing, penetration etc.) b) the age of the victim (here, from 9 to 17) and c) the surrounding facts (for example the position of responsibility or breach of the parent’s trust, who trusted Hall to, in one case, read their child a bedtime story).

The Judge must impose a sentence, within the parameters set by Parliament, that reflects the totality of the offending behaviour. Looking at the features of the offences, it is relevant that Hall is 83 years of age; a sentence of imprisonment will be harder for a man of 83 than 23. It is relevant that the offences were committed a long time ago, and since 1986, there have been no other offences. Of course, it is relevant that Hall pleaded guilty. For that, he received a 25 per cent discount on his sentence (the rationale being that a discount in pleading guilty saves time and money and prevents witnesses having to give evidence, which can be traumatic. Without such a discount, there would be no incentive to plead guilty).

Further points to note are that Hall will be subject to “notification requirements” – colloquially known as the sex offenders register – for a period of 10 years. He will be placed on the list of persons barred from working with children.

Shortly after Mr Hall was sentenced, the Attorney-General confirmed that he would be reviewing the sentences. This involves an assessment of whether he believes they are 'unduly lenient'. If so, he can refer the case to the Court of Appeal and ask them to impose higher sentences. 

One may wish to consider whether it is necessary to lock Mr Hall up for a prolonged period of time. Punishment is of course an aim of sentencing, but so is public protection and rehabilitation. Mr Hall’s reputation is in tatters; he has been humiliated. I question whether a longer sentence would serve any purpose.

Irrespective of whether one agrees with the length of the sentences, in my opinion on the law as it is, the Judge imposed sentences which are neither to short, nor too long.

Lyndon Harris is the Editor of Banks on Sentence

Stuart Hall arriving at Preston Magistrates Court earlier this year. Photograph: Getty Images
Photo: Getty
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Forget planning for no deal. The government isn't really planning for Brexit at all

The British government is simply not in a position to handle life after the EU.

No deal is better than a bad deal? That phrase has essentially vanished from Theresa May’s lips since the loss of her parliamentary majority in June, but it lives on in the minds of her boosters in the commentariat and the most committed parts of the Brexit press. In fact, they have a new meme: criticising the civil service and ministers who backed a Remain vote for “not preparing” for a no deal Brexit.

Leaving without a deal would mean, among other things, dropping out of the Open Skies agreement which allows British aeroplanes to fly to the United States and European Union. It would lead very quickly to food shortages and also mean that radioactive isotopes, used among other things for cancer treatment, wouldn’t be able to cross into the UK anymore. “Planning for no deal” actually means “making a deal”.  (Where the Brexit elite may have a point is that the consequences of no deal are sufficiently disruptive on both sides that the British government shouldn’t  worry too much about the two-year time frame set out in Article 50, as both sides have too big an incentive to always agree to extra time. I don’t think this is likely for political reasons but there is a good economic case for it.)

For the most part, you can’t really plan for no deal. There are however some things the government could prepare for. They could, for instance, start hiring additional staff for customs checks and investing in a bigger IT system to be able to handle the increased volume of work that would need to take place at the British border. It would need to begin issuing compulsory purchases to build new customs posts at ports, particularly along the 300-mile stretch of the Irish border – where Northern Ireland, outside the European Union, would immediately have a hard border with the Republic of Ireland, which would remain inside the bloc. But as Newsnight’s Christopher Cook details, the government is doing none of these things.

Now, in a way, you might say that this is a good decision on the government’s part. Frankly, these measures would only be about as useful as doing your seatbelt up before driving off the Grand Canyon. Buying up land and properties along the Irish border has the potential to cause political headaches that neither the British nor Irish governments need. However, as Cook notes, much of the government’s negotiating strategy seems to be based around convincing the EU27 that the United Kingdom might actually walk away without a deal, so not making even these inadequate plans makes a mockery of their own strategy. 

But the frothing about preparing for “no deal” ignores a far bigger problem: the government isn’t really preparing for any deal, and certainly not the one envisaged in May’s Lancaster House speech, where she set out the terms of Britain’s Brexit negotiations, or in her letter to the EU27 triggering Article 50. Just to reiterate: the government’s proposal is that the United Kingdom will leave both the single market and the customs union. Its regulations will no longer be set or enforced by the European Court of Justice or related bodies.

That means that, when Britain leaves the EU, it will need, at a minimum: to beef up the number of staff, the quality of its computer systems and the amount of physical space given over to customs checks and other assorted border work. It will need to hire its own food and standards inspectors to travel the globe checking the quality of products exported to the United Kingdom. It will need to increase the size of its own regulatory bodies.

The Foreign Office is doing some good and important work on preparing Britain’s re-entry into the World Trade Organisation as a nation with its own set of tariffs. But across the government, the level of preparation is simply not where it should be.

And all that’s assuming that May gets exactly what she wants. It’s not that the government isn’t preparing for no deal, or isn’t preparing for a bad deal. It can’t even be said to be preparing for what it believes is a great deal. 

Stephen Bush is special correspondent at the New Statesman. His daily briefing, Morning Call, provides a quick and essential guide to domestic and global politics.