We must not uphold gender norms at the expense of human dignity

Sexual intimacy, gender variance and criminal law.

Imagine the following scenario:

A white woman and a man of mixed race, who outwardly appears white, meet in a wine bar. They flirt with each other. The man returns with the woman to her apartment where mutually satisfying sexual intercourse takes place. Subsequently, the woman discovers the mixed-race background of the man and claims to feel violated. She reports the matter to the police and requests that he be charged with rape on the basis of his failure to disclose his racial background.

There are people who would consider a rape charge an appropriate, or at least legitimate, outcome on these facts, and certainly in circumstances where the man was aware in advance of the complainant's feelings. However, for the rest of us, such a suggestion seems not only counter-intuitive, but ludicrous. It is also true to say, as a matter of law, that on such facts a rape or other sexual offence prosecution is highly unlikely ever to be brought and if it were it would certainly fail to secure a conviction. The same is true in relation to non-disclosure of all kinds of other personal facts. Thus facts about a potential sexual partner that might be considered material, but to which no legal consequences attach in the event of non-disclosure, include (in the heterosexual context) prior homosexual or bi-sexual sexual experience, convictions for child abuse and heroin addiction. The list is potentially endless. Indeed, even in the context of HIV positive status, non-disclosure will not serve to vitiate consent in relation to a rape charge1.

Now consider a different scenario:

A woman and a transgender man meet in a wine bar. They flirt with each other. The man returns with the woman to her apartment where mutually satisfying sexual intercourse takes place. Subsequently, the woman discovers the man is transgender and claims to feel violated. She reports the matter to the police and requests that he be charged with rape on the basis of his failure to disclose his gender history.

While I imagine my comments concerning the mixed-race example proved uncontroversial to most, if not all readers, I know from experience that the second scenario is likely to lead to a more complicated and variegated set of emotional responses. The comparison is designed to tease out such differential responses and encourage reflection upon them. And what is at stake for transgender people is a great deal. Conviction on such facts not only leads to loss of liberty, it also serves to call into question the validity or authenticity of something as profoundly personal as gender identity. Nor are these issues hypothetical. In March 2013, two young transgender men, Scott McNally and Chris Wilson, were convicted, in London and Edinburgh respectively, of sexual offences on the basis that they had obtained consent by fraud through failure to disclose their gender history to female sexual partners, and in the case of Chris Wilson, two 15-year-old girls. McNally was sentenced to three years imprisonment while Wilson received three years probation and 240 hours of community service. Both were placed on the Sex Offender’s Register for life.

Yet neither of these young men committed fraud. They identified as men, and had done so from an early age, presented as men and were desired as men. There is nothing fabricated about their feelings or performance of masculinity, or at least none more so than in the case of cisgender men. Fraud, and encroachment on sexual autonomy in any meaningful sense, only becomes intelligible once we deny the gender identities of the male defendants. For those who feel (and it tends to be a matter of feeling) that they have a right to know about the backgrounds of transgender men prior to sexual encounters, they do so because they want to retain the right not to have sexual congress with someone they do not consider to be a man. This view of transgender men as “posing,” “pretending to be” (Mail Online, 21/3/12) or “masquerading as” men (Telegraph, 24/2/13) was extensively reproduced in the press. Yet we live in a society that recognises transgenderism, provides public funding for associated medical needs as well as legal recognition. Indeed, Scott McNally and Chris Wilson have both indicated a desire to undergo reassignment surgery. This state of affairs is undermined by criminal prosecution as it serves to call into question the reality of transgender people’s gender identities.

For those who still see wisdom in prosecuting these types of cases it is important to recognise that disclosure of gender history to a sexual partner would not serve to protect transgender people from prosecution. In practice, it would also be necessary to disclose to the friends and/or family of sexual partners. This is because a transgender person is always vulnerable to the accusation of non-disclosure even where disclosure has actually taken place, and we need to bear in mind the possibility that prosecution might be motivated in these circumstances by a desire to conceal from parents and the world "lesbian" feelings. In the event of false allegation, a cisgender person’s claim that she did not know will be hard to rebut. This is because the view, one reproduced by these legal judgments, that a cisgender person would not knowingly engage in sexual congress with a transgender person, enjoys considerable weight in normative terms. We might call this a kind of "hostage problem". In effect, what law requires is a more generalised form of institutionalised "outing". This is not consistent with promoting the safety of transgender people, especially young transgender people like the defendants in these cases. On the contrary, transgender visibility can, and frequently does, lead to violence, and sometimes deadly violence, as the tragic cases of Brandon Teena and Gwen Araujo testify.

Recognition of these dangers to the physical body needs to be supplemented by recognition of the psychic trauma potentially suffered by transgender people having to disclose their chromosomal status, earlier or present gonadal and/or genital condition as well as a history of coerced gender performance. It is acknowledged that sexual partners who remain unaware of gender history may, upon discovery, experience harm in the form of distress, disgust and/or revulsion. It is not my intention to trivilise these experiences. Nevertheless, these forms of harm ought not to be viewed as justification for state intervention against such a marginalised minority group through the criminal law. This is especially so given that these feelings of disgust only make sense when viewed through the lens of transphobia and/or homophobia, outlooks which are, in turn, legitimised through prosecution and conviction. In this sense, law proves to be implicated in a problem that, should it take any stance, ought to be one of remedial action. It seems unlikely on the facts of these cases that prosecutions would have been brought had the defendants been cisgender. This is true even in regard to those charges relating to minors because the Crown Prosecution Service does not normally prosecute, in the absence of aggravating factors, where consensual sexual activity takes place between young persons who are similar in age. These young men have been punished not, primarily, because of any concern over the sexual autonomy of the complainants, but in order to uphold gender norms, specifically ideas of masculinity and heterosexuality that, in legal hands, prove resistant to including transgender men and treating them with human dignity.

To return to the two scenarios with which we began, it would seem that the intolerance that we rightly bring to expressions of racism in our society deserts us when we are asked to accommodate the fact of gender variance. Of course, transgender men are different from cisgender men and this is so irrespective of whether reassignment surgery has taken place. But multiple differences exist within the group we denote men. In relation to cisgender men, and for that matter cisgender women, we do not require such total transparency of self in the face of negotiating the complexities of the sexual life world. Indeed, given that we all have gender histories but only some of us (transgender people) are required to disclose them, there appears to be a good basis for arguing that a legal requirement to disclose gender history constitutes discrimination contrary to Article 14 of the European Convention on Human Rights. The requirement might also be viewed as an encroachment on the right to privacy guaranteed by Article 8, especially once it is appreciated that disclosure to a sexual partner alone is unlikely, in practical terms, to bring transgender people within the protection of the law. Certainly, the Law Commission appear to think so.2

Alex Sharpe is a Professor of Law at Keele University

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1R v Dica (Mohammed) [2004] EWCA Crim 1103; R v Konzani [2005] EWCA Crim 706. 

2Law Commission, Consent in Sexual Offences: A Policy Paper: Appendix C of Setting the Boundaries (London: Home Office, 2000, para 5.31). 

Keir Starmer, Director of Public Prosecutions. Photograph: Getty Images

Alex Sharpe is a Professor of Law at Keele University.

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Theresa May missed an easy opportunity on EU citizens' rights

If the UK had made a big, open and generous offer, the diplomatic picture would be very different.

It's been seven hours and 365 days...and nothing compares to EU, at least as far as negotiations go.

First David Davis abandoned "the row of the summer" by agreeing to the EU's preferred negotiating timetable. Has Theresa May done the same in guaranteeing the rights of EU citizens living here indefinitely?

Well, sort of. Although the PM has said that there have to be reciprocal arrangements for British citizens abroad, the difficulty is that because we don't have ID cards and most of our public services are paid for not out of an insurance system but out of general taxation, the issues around guaranteeing access to health, education, social security and residence are easier.

Our ability to enforce a "cut-off date" for new migrants from the European Union is also illusory, unless the government thinks it has the support in parliament and the logistical ability to roll out an ID card system by March 2019. (It doesn't.)

If you want to understand how badly the PM has managed Britain's Brexit negotiations, then the rights of the three million EU nationals living in Britain is the best place to start. The overwhelming support in the country at large for guaranteeing the rights of EU citizens, coupled with the deep unease among Conservative MPs about not doing so, meant that it was never a plausible bargaining chip. (That's before you remember that the bulk of the British diaspora in Europe lives in countries with small numbers of EU citizens living in the UK. You can't secure a good deal from Spain by upsetting the Polish government.) It just made three million people, their friends and their families nervous for a year and irritated our European partners, that's all.

If the United Kingdom had made a big, open and generous offer on citizens' rights a year ago, as Vote Leave recommended in the referendum, the diplomatic picture would be very different. (It would be better still if, again, as Vote Leave argued, we hadn't triggered Article 50, an exit mechanism designed to punish an emergent dictatorship that puts all the leverage on the EU27's side.)

As it happens, May's unforced errors in negotiations, the worsening economic picture and the tricky balancing act in the House of Commons means that Remainers can hope both for a softer exit and that they might yet convince voters that nothing compares to EU after all. (That a YouGov poll shows the number of people willing to accept EU rules in order to keep the economy going stretching to 58 per cent will only further embolden the soft Brexiteers.)

For Brexiteers, that means that if Brexit doesn't go well, they have a readymade scapegoat in the government. It means Remainers can credibly hope for a soft Brexit – or no Brexit at all. 

Stephen Bush is special correspondent at the New Statesman. His daily briefing, Morning Call, provides a quick and essential guide to domestic and global politics.

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