Cutting the NHS to fund defence is bad politics and bad policy

Raiding £500m from the health and schools budgets to fund defence might please Tory MPs but the voters won't like it.

David Cameron and George Osborne have long rejected calls from figures such as Vince Cable and Liam Fox to end the protection of health spending in order to limit cuts elsewhere. But the NHS ring-fence is looking less secure today. Ahead of June's Spending Review, the Telegraph reports that Philip Hammond is in talks with the Treasury about transferring up to £500m from the health and schools budgets to reduce the expected cuts to defence. The Defence Secretary, you'll recall, has previously publicly demanded that welfare is cut again to protect the MoD. But with the Lib Dems vetoing any further cuts to welfare (bar those to pensioner benefits, which David Cameron has pledged to protect), Hammond has been forced to look elsewhere. 

Cameron has already demonstrated his willingess to raid other departments' budgets to fund defence by suggesting that aid spending could be used to meet the cost of peacekeeping and other defence-related projects. It's thought that the government would justify any decision to divert resources from health and education to defence by pointing to the hundreds of millions of pounds a year the MoD spends on health care for armed forces personnel and the education of their children. But while the move will prove popular with Tory MPs, who are furious that defence is being cut by 7.5 per cent, while aid is being increased by 37 per cent, it is likely to be judged less favourably by the public. 

As a ComRes/ITV News poll published in February showed, health and education are the two most popular spending areas, with defence trailing in sixth place (behind police and law enforcement, welfare and transport). It was partly for this reason that Cameron and Osborne chose to ring-fence the NHS and schools budgets. At last week's PMQs, Cameron made much of his commitment to protect health spending, contrasting it with Labour's decision not to pledge to do so before the 2010 election. "The right hon. Gentleman’s answer is to cut NHS spending, whereas we are investing in it," he declared. A decision to now do otherwise would offer Labour an easy political hit. 

It is also doubtful whether the NHS, which is already required to make unprecedented efficiency savings of £20bn over four years, should be cut for the purpose of reducing cuts to defence. The above-average levels of inflation in the health service mean that it requires real-term increases in spending just to stand still. But under pressure from his recalcitrant backbenchers and the National Union of Ministers, Cameron may yet give away. 

David Cameron with British soldiers based at Lashkar Gah in Helmand Province, Afghanistan. Photograph: Getty Images.

George Eaton is political editor of the New Statesman.

Getty
Show Hide image

Leader: Europe and the long shadow of war

Amid the rancour, it is easy to forget what drove European integration in the first place: the two great wars in the first half of the 20th century.

Amid all the claims and counterclaims about David Cameron’s so-called renegotiation of Britain’s membership of the European Union, it is often forgotten, or conveniently ignored, just how successful the European project has been in helping to create and maintain the post-Second World War peace order.

We support continued British membership of the EU but are sceptical of the imperial ambitions of the European elites. We opposed British membership of the single currency, a decision that the eurozone crisis has vindicated. It is obvious that the Schengen Agreement is unravelling and in all likelihood is unsustainable, as embattled nation states reimpose emergency border controls and the continent grapples with its worst refugee crisis since the end of the Second World War. Like the British government, we are opposed to further political and economic integration and to the creation of a federal or quasi-federal superstate.

However, at a time of profound instability in the world, we accept that it would be foolish for the United Kingdom to retreat from our various multilateral peace alliances – whether that be membership of the EU or, indeed, Nato (as some on the left would wish) – all of which involve some kind of surrender of sovereignty.

Amid the rancour, it is easy to forget what drove European integration in the first place. The two great wars in the first half of the 20th century racked the continent, with neighbouring armies slaughtering each other on a scale that still defies comprehension. As Alistair Horne writes on page 22, “the most atrocious battle in history” began a century ago next week in Verdun, France, on the Western Front. The German army hoped to lure the enemy into a trap and then “bleed the French army white” using its superior firepower. Yet the rivers of blood flowed both ways: in ten months, over 25 square miles, pounded by heavy artillery and poisoned with gas, 300,000 French and German soldiers died.

The lessons of the battle were not quickly learned – the carnage of the Second World War was still to come – yet ultimately they were. In 1963, France’s Charles de Gaulle, who was wounded at Verdun, signed a treaty with the then German chancellor, Konrad Adenauer, binding two countries that had engaged for centuries in tit-for-tat wars in an enduring nexus of co-operation. The aim, as David Reynolds notes in his article on page 28, was “to free the next generation from the vice of nationalism”.

Two decades later, President François Mitterrand, who fought near Verdun in 1940, and Chancellor Helmut Kohl, whose father served there in 1916, attended a commemoration ceremony at one of the battle sites. In what became an iconic image of reconciliation at the heart of Europe, Mitterrand impulsively gripped Kohl’s hand during their national anthems. The two men were later the architects of the Maastricht Treaty, which created the European Union under its current name.

These are troubling times for Europe. Confidence and optimism are low. The wars in the Middle East and the rise of Islamic State, Russian revanchism and financial and economic turbulence have dented the morale of even the most committed liberal Europhiles. In addition, the EU seems unable or unwilling to control or police its borders, just as it has been unable to bring an end to the crisis in the eurozone. Nor is it any closer to forging a common foreign policy, let alone forming a common European army that might be necessary in future years to patrol the outer edges of the continent.

“Unless the EU can find solutions to the problems Europe is facing that are acceptable to its members . . . the Union will be on a glide path to collapse,” wrote the historians Brendan Simms and Timothy Less in a recent issue of the New Statesman. And yet, for all its flaws and present difficulties, the EU remains a force for stability in the world. It embodies the liberal, rules-based order without which barbarism and war are never far away, as the centenary of the Battle of Verdun so poignantly reminds us. 

This article first appeared in the 11 February 2016 issue of the New Statesman, The legacy of Europe's worst battle