Lib Dems hit back over boundary changes speculation

Source close to Clegg insists "election will be on old boundaries".

Yesterday I wrote this blog speculating about Conservative motives for keeping the boundary review in play, even when the Lib Dems have signalled their determination to vote against the plan.

The Tories, I surmised, are desperate to sustain the project on life support, even when all vital signs have gone, partly in the hope that it might yet one day be resuscitated but also because postponing its final extinction gives Conservatives a bargaining chip in other negotiations.

I have since spoken to a senior source close to Nick Clegg who, while not disputing my analysis of Tory motives, wanted to make clear that, as far as the Lib Dem leadership is concerned, the boundary changes are finished. That is non-negotiable and if the Conservatives think otherwise they "don’t quite get it".

"The next election will be fought on the old boundaries," my source said. "They [the Tories] need to accept that we are deadly serious about that … We are not going to allow boundary reform."

As for the idea of scraping together a majority in the Commons with votes from Ulster Unionists and Welsh Nationalists, Lib Dems politely point out that there are Tory MPs who would rebel in a vote on boundary changes. The whole concept of driving the whole thing through with pork-barrel promises to minor parties, say top Lib Dems, smacks of desperation on the Conservative side as the realisation dawns that winning a majority next time will be very, very hard indeed.

It is worth noting also that the "mid-term review" of coalition policy, due in November some time, has been postponed until January. This is the project that was once going to be grand renewal of vows under the Steve Hilton-esque "Coalition 2.0" rubric but was downgraded to a more modest audit of progress so far on policy implementation and outline of future priorities.

I am confidently assured that the delay says nothing at all significant about the state of relations between the two parties and that it is simply a function of the fact that the Autumn Statement (due on 5 December) is more urgent and takes up too much time, so the sequence of the two events changed. That is perfectly plausible.

Still, if there is to be a chapter on political or constitutional reform in the mid-term review the two sides clearly need to be communicating a bit more effectively about those boundary changes.

Nick Clegg pledged to veto the proposed boundary changes after David Cameron abandoned plans for House of Lords reform. Photograph: Getty Images.

Rafael Behr is political columnist at the Guardian and former political editor of the New Statesman

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An Irish Sea border – and 3 other tricky options for Northern Ireland after Brexit

There is no easy option for Northern Ireland after Brexit. 

Deciding on post-Brexit border arrangements between Northern Ireland and the Irish Republic is becoming an issue for which the phrase "the devil is in the detail" could have been coined. Finding a satisfactory solution that delivers a border flexible enough not to damage international trade and commerce and doesn’t undermine the spirit, or the letter, of the Good Friday Agreement settlement is foxing Whitehall’s brightest.

The dial seemed to have settled on David Davis’s suggestion that there could be a "digital border" with security cameras and pre-registered cargo as a preferred alternative to a "hard border" replete with checkpoints and watchtowers.

However the Brexit secretary’s suggestion has been scotched by the new Irish foreign minister, Simon Coveney, who says electronic solutions are "not going to work". Today’s Times quotes him saying that "any barrier or border on the island of Ireland in my view risks undermining a very hard-won peace process" and that there is a need to ensure the "free movement of people and goods and services and livelihoods".

The EU’s chief Brexit negotiator, Michel Barnier, has made dealing with the Irish border question one of his top three priorities before discussions on trade deals can begin. British ministers are going to have to make-up their minds which one of four unpalatable options they are going to choose:

1. Hard border

The first is to ignore Dublin (and just about everybody in Northern Ireland for that matter) and institute a hard border along the 310-mile demarcation between Northern Ireland and the Irish Republic. Given it takes in fields, rivers and forests it’s pretty unenforceable without a Trump-style wall. More practically, it would devastate trade and free movement. Metaphorically, it would be a powerful symbol of division and entirely contrary to the spirit of the Good Friday Agreement. The Police Federation in Northern Ireland has also warned it would make police officers "sitting ducks for terrorists". Moreover, the Irish government will never agree to this course. With the EU in their corner, there is effectively zero chance of this happening.

2. Northern EU-land

The second option is to actually keep Northern Ireland inside the EU: offering it so-called "special status". This would avoid the difficulty of enforcing the border and even accord with the wishes of 56 per cent of the Northern Irish electorate who voted to Remain in the EU. Crucially, it would see Northern Ireland able to retain the £600m a year it currently receives from the EU. This is pushed by Sinn Fein and does have a powerful logic, but it would be a massive embarrassment for the British Government and lead to Scotland (and possibly London?) demanding similar treatment.

3. Natural assets

The third option is that suggested by the Irish government in the Times story today, namely a soft border with customs and passport controls at embarkation points on the island of Ireland, using the Irish Sea as a hard border (or certainly a wet one). This option is in play, if for no other reason than the Irish government is suggesting it. Again, unionists will be unhappy as it requires Britain to treat the island of Ireland as a single entity with border and possibly customs checks at ports and airports. There is a neat administrate logic to it, but it means people travelling from Northern Ireland to "mainland" Britain would need to show their passports, which will enrage unionists as it effectively makes them foreigners.

4. Irish reunification

Unpalatable as that would be for unionists, the fourth option is simply to recognise that Northern Ireland is now utterly anomalous and start a proper conversation about Irish reunification as a means to address the border issue once and for all. This would see both governments acting as persuaders to try and build consent and accelerate trends to reunify the island constitutionally. This would involve twin referendums in both Northern Ireland and the Republic (a measure allowed for in the Good Friday Agreement). Given Philip Hammond is warning that transitional arrangements could last three years, this might occur after Brexit in 2019, perhaps as late as the early 2020s, with interim arrangements in the meantime. Demographic trends pointing to a Catholic-nationalist majority in Northern Ireland would, in all likelihood require a referendum by then anyway. The opportunity here is to make necessity the mother of invention, using Brexit to bring Northern Ireland’s constitutional status to a head and deal decisively with the matter once and for all.

In short, ministers have no easy options, however time is now a factor and they will soon have to draw the line on, well, drawing the line.

Kevin Meagher is a former special adviser at the Northern Ireland Office and author of "A United Ireland: Why unification is inevitable and how it will come about"

Kevin Meagher is associate editor of Labour Uncut and a former special adviser at the Northern Ireland office.