Why did it take ten years to block the extradition of Gary McKinnon?

What you believe about the McKinnon extradition case is probably false

The Home Secretary has decided that the extradition of Gary McKinnon will not go ahead. 

Relying on the same human rights law which she has strongly criticised in the past in respect of other extradition cases, the Home Secretary has ruled that the suicide risk is such that it would be contrary to McKinnon's human rights for the extradition to proceed. 

If that is what the evidence is before the Home Secretary in respect of a suicide risk, then it was plainly the right decision for her to make, though it opens obvious questions as to whether it can be now a precedent for other extradition cases.

However, it appears that, but for this determination, the extradition would have proceeded - put another way, the legal case for McKinnon's extradition was otherwise sound.

 

But how can we best understand how the McKinnon case has taken so long to get to this stage? 

The alleged offences took place in 2001 and 2002, and based on mainstream media accounts, it just seemed such a clear injustice being inflicted on a sympathetic defendant.  

The answer, in part, is that there has long been a mismatch between the mainstream media accounts of the McKinnon case and the underlying legal facts. 

On one hand, there was an admirable, tireless, and spiritied campaign on McKinnon's behalf.  Unfortunately, one consequence of this campaign is that there were many contentions about the case which "everyone knew" even if few ever seemed to check if they were true.

On the other hand, there have been a series of legal judgments which provided a very different perspective on the case. In 2010, in a sequence of blogposts at Jack of Kent, I set out the correct legal position.  This is not to say I believed McKinnon should have been extradited; it was just to balance the media narrative on the case with a more source-based approach.  This was important as, without understanding there was a mismatch between the mainstream media version of the case with the legal realities, one could not understand why the extradition had gone on so long.

 

My survey at Jack of Kent set out a number of points which did not feature in mainstream media accounts of the case.

First, the contention that all McKinnon was doing was looking for evidence extraterrestrial life had no basis in the legal case.  UFOs played no part in the litigation whatsoever.  The UFO explanation was never provided by McKinnon or his legal team in the court cases.  In fact, McKinnon's original case was that his motives were political and he contended that political opinions should be taken so seriously that he should not be allowed to be extradited on those grounds alone.

Then there was the assertion that his offences were trivial and more the fault of lax US security.  Again, this is not supported by the legal documents.  Instead, the alleged offences are serious and were sustained over a lengthy period.  The allegations are in respect of a hacking exercise which took place over fourteen months and involving 96 computers in five US government departments, and which came to an end (it seems) only with his detection and arrest.  The CPS also provided detailed reasons as to why they would not prosecute McKinnon in the UK - and this was not a supririse, as both the unauthorised access and the alleged damage occured entirely in the US.

Moreover, the allegations against McKinnon also went beyond unauthorised access to substantial file deletion and copying.  The US alleged that there was significant operational damage and that they could evidence the damage.

It was also usually overlooked that the unauthorised access (ie the offence) had been actually admitted by McKinnon's legal team (so it was likely to be no issue to be tried).  His legal team even indicated that he may also admit the damage as well as the unauthorised access.

Accordingly, the US could thereby show a prima facie case.  Therefore the disparities in respect of the UK/US extradition arrangements were not actually relevant in this case -  the notorious "one-sided" extradition treaty was a red herring here, even if it was relevant in other cases.

And given the human dimension in all this, and perhaps most importantly of all, the US even provided detailed assurances as to how McKinnon's condition of Asperger's Syndrome would have been accommodated should he be extradited. 

It should also be noted that McKinnon  rejected a highly advantageous plea bargain in 2003 (and so would have been free of all this by around 2006, rather than still waiting as late as 2012). 

Finally, the US also stated that there was no principled opposition to McKinnon applying to serve his sentence in the UK.

 

The McKinnon legal case was never how the mainstram media presented the case; and so it was always difficult for anyone following to comprehend why the extradition went on for so long.

But, unless the DPP decides to now prosecute McKinnon in England, none of the above legal analysis matters any more. 

It would appear the "Free Gary" campaign has succeeded in keeping the case going in England until they could get the official decision they sought. This is an incredible achievement.  The fact that the legal realities of the case were often ignored along the way by the mainstream media is now perhaps only of academic importance.

 

 

(Supporting analysis and links to all the above is at my blog at Jack of Kent.)

Gary McKinnon. Photograph: Getty Images

David Allen Green is legal correspondent of the New Statesman and author of the Jack of Kent blog.

His legal journalism has included popularising the Simon Singh libel case and discrediting the Julian Assange myths about his extradition case.  His uncovering of the Nightjack email hack by the Times was described as "masterly analysis" by Lord Justice Leveson.

David is also a solicitor and was successful in the "Twitterjoketrial" appeal at the High Court.

(Nothing on this blog constitutes legal advice.)

Photo: Getty Images
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There are risks as well as opportunities ahead for George Osborne

The Chancellor is in a tight spot, but expect his political wiles to be on full display, says Spencer Thompson.

The most significant fiscal event of this parliament will take place in late November, when the Chancellor presents the spending review setting out his plans for funding government departments over the next four years. This week, across Whitehall and up and down the country, ministers, lobbyists, advocacy groups and town halls are busily finalising their pitches ahead of Friday’s deadline for submissions to the review

It is difficult to overstate the challenge faced by the Chancellor. Under his current spending forecast and planned protections for the NHS, schools, defence and international aid spending, other areas of government will need to be cut by 16.4 per cent in real terms between 2015/16 and 2019/20. Focusing on services spending outside of protected areas, the cumulative cut will reach 26.5 per cent. Despite this, the Chancellor nonetheless has significant room for manoeuvre.

Firstly, under plans unveiled at the budget, the government intends to expand capital investment significantly in both 2018-19 and 2019-20. Over the last parliament capital spending was cut by around a quarter, but between now and 2019-20 it will grow by almost 20 per cent. How this growth in spending should be distributed across departments and between investment projects should be at the heart of the spending review.

In a paper published on Monday, we highlighted three urgent priorities for any additional capital spending: re-balancing transport investment away from London and the greater South East towards the North of England, a £2bn per year boost in public spending on housebuilding, and £1bn of extra investment per year in energy efficiency improvements for fuel-poor households.

Secondly, despite the tough fiscal environment, the Chancellor has the scope to fund a range of areas of policy in dire need of extra resources. These include social care, where rising costs at a time of falling resources are set to generate a severe funding squeeze for local government, 16-19 education, where many 6th-form and FE colleges are at risk of great financial difficulty, and funding a guaranteed paid job for young people in long-term unemployment. Our paper suggests a range of options for how to put these and other areas of policy on a sustainable funding footing.

There is a political angle to this as well. The Conservatives are keen to be seen as a party representing all working people, as shown by the "blue-collar Conservatism" agenda. In addition, the spending review offers the Conservative party the opportunity to return to ‘Compassionate Conservatism’ as a going concern.  If they are truly serious about being seen in this light, this should be reflected in a social investment agenda pursued through the spending review that promotes employment and secures a future for public services outside the NHS and schools.

This will come at a cost, however. In our paper, we show how the Chancellor could fund our package of proposed policies without increasing the pain on other areas of government, while remaining consistent with the government’s fiscal rules that require him to reach a surplus on overall government borrowing by 2019-20. We do not agree that the Government needs to reach a surplus in that year. But given this target wont be scrapped ahead of the spending review, we suggest that he should target a slightly lower surplus in 2019/20 of £7bn, with the deficit the year before being £2bn higher. In addition, we propose several revenue-raising measures in line with recent government tax policy that together would unlock an additional £5bn of resource for government departments.

Make no mistake, this will be a tough settlement for government departments and for public services. But the Chancellor does have a range of options open as he plans the upcoming spending review. Expect his reputation as a highly political Chancellor to be on full display.

Spencer Thompson is economic analyst at IPPR