The Rape Crisis crisis

Nine Rape Crisis Centres have closed in the last five years, 69% describe themselves as unsustainabl

‘Rape Crisis’ – what vision does that conjure up to you? Weeping, hysterical women with torn clothing and mascara running down their face?

In fact, Rape Crisis is a bit of a misnomer – most of the women and girls who contact us have lived with their experiences of rape for many years before they feel able to pick up the phone and tell anyone about it. And its not ‘just’ rape – we are contacted about a wide range of different forms of sexual violence, including those that no-one wants to talk about: women and girls who are forced to have sex with animals; women and girls who are forced to have sex with their brothers; women and girls who were raped when they were babies and toddlers; women and girls whose videos and pictures of abuse exist forever on internet sites making money for abuse profiteers.

Instead, the term Rape Crisis probably best describes the state of the movement at the moment. New research, to be launched tomorrow by Rape Crisis and the Women’s Resource Centre, lists a catalogue of funding failures. It describes the series of hoops Rape Crisis Centres have to jump through, for example the centre that receives its annual funding of £77,000 from a total of 14 separate funders. On the other hand, it describes centres with no or few funders - the centre that had to close for part of the year because it had no income at all and another with just £306 for the year.

Scarily, 69 per cent of centres described themselves as ‘unsustainable’ in the future. Six centres reported situations where they had not been able to pay their staff – but where these staff had continued to work without pay during these periods of financial crisis. But despite this remarkably high level of staff dedication, nine Rape Crisis Centres have closed in the last five years. The research concludes that while Rape Crisis has always been marginalised and suffered from underinvestment, that the crisis point is here, and it’s happening right now.

The real problem of course lies in what all these figures mean. Last year Rape Crisis had almost 135,000 contacts. This is just the tip of the iceberg; we know there are many more women who try to access our services. The longer helplines stay open, the more calls they receive. Telephone line monitoring shows that the women who manage to get through are in the minority. Imagine receiving an engaged tone after lifting up the phone ready to talk about being raped or being told there is a long waiting list for some services. Support for women and girls to rebuild their lives after rape should be a right, not a privilege determined by a postcode lottery.

It doesn’t take a genius to work out the problem. But - and here is the really good news - nor does it take a genius to work out the solution.

In 1997 New Labour put violence against women on the public agenda alongside an elevation in the ‘status’ of victims and witnesses of crime generally. The increase of women in government, appointment of pro-feminist ministers and support from femocrat ‘insiders’ has led to a much needed shift in the way violence against women is understood within Whitehall. A strong policy message has been articulated from the top: that violence against women is not acceptable in modern society and will not be tolerated. Although rape has not received the attention that other forms of violence against women have (described by Liz Kelly last week as ‘the forgotten issue’), attitudes have undoubtedly shifted. Students in my classes find it hard to understand the political climate that allowed men to rape their wives. Many of the women in key government roles today would probably accept the feminist label.

The good news then is that the hard work is done. Rape Crisis has been consulted, researched, visited and evaluated. We’ve been invited to launches, meetings, forums, committees and conferences. The policies, strategies and workplans are in place. We know what works and what women want. Our views are generally listened to and taken seriously. Except when it comes to money.

This is the point at which whoever we’re talking to starts to get that faraway, glazed look in their eyes. Ministers and officials are sick to the back teeth of hearing that our sector is massively under funded. To be perfectly honest, we’re sick of saying it. But we guarantee that we will never to stop saying it until it is fixed.

We are at a unique point in history in terms of partnership working, but without funding for services none of it means anything. If there is a serious commitment – in reality not rhetoric – then why are Rape Crisis Centres scrabbling around for spare coppers every March? Why are 79% of grants for one year or less? Why are Rape Crisis Centres closing down? The hard work is done; it is now time for the government to put its money where its mouth is. It’s been done across the border and Scotland have committed to a Rape Crisis specific ‘ring fenced’ fund that includes funding to establish new centres where there are no existing ones.

We issue this plea to the Home Office, Ministry of Justice and Department of Health: help women and girls access the services they need by placing £5 million in a Rape Crisis specific fund, and do it now while there is still a Rape Crisis movement to save.

Dr Nicole Westmarland is chair of Rape Crisis (England and Wales) and a rape expert at Durham University

Jeremy Corbyn. Photo: Getty
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Lexit: the EU is a neoliberal project, so let's do something different when we leave it

Brexit affords the British left a historic opportunity for a decisive break with EU market liberalism.

The Brexit vote to leave the European Union has many parents, but "Lexit" – the argument for exiting the EU from the left – remains an orphan. A third of Labour voters backed Leave, but they did so without any significant leadership from the Labour Party. Left-of-centre votes proved decisive in determining the outcome of a referendum that was otherwise framed, shaped, and presented almost exclusively by the right. A proper left discussion of the issues has been, if not entirely absent, then decidedly marginal – part of a more general malaise when it comes to developing left alternatives that has begun to be corrected only recently, under Jeremy Corbyn and John McDonnell.

Ceding Brexit to the right was very nearly the most serious strategic mistake by the British left since the ‘70s. Under successive leaders Labour became so incorporated into the ideology of Europeanism as to preclude any clear-eyed critical analysis of the actually existing EU as a regulatory and trade regime pursuing deep economic integration. The same political journey that carried Labour into its technocratic embrace of the EU also resulted in the abandonment of any form of distinctive economics separate from the orthodoxies of market liberalism.

It’s been astounding to witness so many left-wingers, in meltdown over Brexit, resort to parroting liberal economics. Thus we hear that factor mobility isn’t about labour arbitrage, that public services aren’t under pressure, that we must prioritise foreign direct investment and trade. It’s little wonder Labour became so detached from its base. Such claims do not match the lived experience of ordinary people in regions of the country devastated by deindustrialisation and disinvestment.

Nor should concerns about wage stagnation and bargaining power be met with finger-wagging accusations of racism, as if the manner in which capitalism pits workers against each other hasn’t long been understood. Instead, we should be offering real solutions – including a willingness to rethink capital mobility and trade. This places us in direct conflict with the constitutionalised neoliberalism of the EU.

Only the political savvy of the leadership has enabled Labour to recover from its disastrous positioning post-referendum. Incredibly, what seemed an unbeatable electoral bloc around Theresa May has been deftly prized apart in the course of an extraordinary General Election campaign. To consolidate the political project they have initiated, Corbyn and McDonnell must now follow through with a truly radical economic programme. The place to look for inspiration is precisely the range of instruments and policy options discouraged or outright forbidden by the EU.

A neoliberal project

The fact that right-wing arguments for Leave predominated during the referendum says far more about today’s left than it does about the European Union. There has been a great deal of myth-making concerning the latter –much of it funded, directly or indirectly, by the EU itself.

From its inception, the EU has been a top-down project driven by political and administrative elites, "a protected sphere", in the judgment of the late Peter Mair, "in which policy-making can evade the constraints imposed by representative democracy". To complain about the EU’s "democratic deficit" is to have misunderstood its purpose. The main thrust of European economic policy has been to extend and deepen the market through liberalisation, privatisation, and flexiblisation, subordinating employment and social protection to goals of low inflation, debt reduction, and increased competitiveness.

Prospects for Keynesian reflationary policies, or even for pan-European economic planning – never great – soon gave way to more Hayekian conceptions. Hayek’s original insight, in The Economic Conditions of Interstate Federalism, was that free movement of capital, goods, and labour – a "single market" – among a federation of nations would severely and necessarily restrict the economic policy space available to individual members. Pro-European socialists, whose aim had been to acquire new supranational options for the regulation of capital, found themselves surrendering the tools they already possessed at home. The national road to socialism, or even to social democracy, was closed.

The direction of travel has been singular and unrelenting. To take one example, workers’ rights – a supposed EU strength – are steadily being eroded, as can be seen in landmark judgments by the European Court of Justice (ECJ) in the Viking and Laval cases, among others. In both instances, workers attempting to strike in protest at plans to replace workers from one EU country with lower-wage workers from another, were told their right to strike could not infringe upon the "four freedoms" – free movement of capital, labour, goods, and services – established by the treaties.

More broadly, on trade, financial regulation, state aid, government purchasing, public service delivery, and more, any attempt to create a different kind of economy from inside the EU has largely been forestalled by competition policy or single market regulation.

A new political economy

Given that the UK will soon be escaping the EU, what opportunities might this afford? Three policy directions immediately stand out: public ownership, industrial strategy, and procurement. In each case, EU regulation previously stood in the way of promising left strategies. In each case, the political and economic returns from bold departures from neoliberal orthodoxy after Brexit could be substantial.

While not banned outright by EU law, public ownership is severely discouraged and disadvantaged by it. ECJ interpretation of Article 106 of the Treaty on the Functioning of the European Union (TFEU) has steadily eroded public ownership options. "The ECJ", argues law professor Danny Nicol, "appears to have constructed a one-way street in favour of private-sector provision: nationalised services are prima facie suspect and must be analysed for their necessity". Sure enough, the EU has been a significant driver of privatisation, functioning like a ratchet. It’s much easier for a member state to pursue the liberalisation of sectors than to secure their (re)nationalisation. Article 59 (TFEU) specifically allows the European Council and Parliament to liberalise services. Since the ‘80s, there have been single market programmes in energy, transport, postal services, telecommunications, education, and health.

Britain has long been an extreme outlier on privatisation, responsible for 40 per cent of the total assets privatised across the OECD between 1980 and 1996. Today, however, increasing inequality, poverty, environmental degradation and the general sense of an impoverished public sphere are leading to growing calls for renewed public ownership (albeit in new, more democratic forms). Soon to be free of EU constraints, it’s time to explore an expanded and fundamentally reimagined UK public sector.

Next, Britain’s industrial production has been virtually flat since the late 1990s, with a yawning trade deficit in industrial goods. Any serious industrial strategy to address the structural weaknesses of UK manufacturing will rely on "state aid" – the nurturing of a next generation of companies through grants, interest and tax relief, guarantees, government holdings, and the provision of goods and services on a preferential basis.

Article 107 TFEU allows for state aid only if it is compatible with the internal market and does not distort competition, laying out the specific circumstances in which it could be lawful. Whether or not state aid meets these criteria is at the sole discretion of the Commission – and courts in member states are obligated to enforce the commission’s decisions. The Commission has adopted an approach that considers, among other things, the existence of market failure, the effectiveness of other options, and the impact on the market and competition, thereby allowing state aid only in exceptional circumstances.

For many parts of the UK, the challenges of industrial decline remain starkly present – entire communities are thrown on the scrap heap, with all the associated capital and carbon costs and wasted lives. It’s high time the left returned to the possibilities inherent in a proactive industrial strategy. A true community-sustaining industrial strategy would consist of the deliberate direction of capital to sectors, localities, and regions, so as to balance out market trends and prevent communities from falling into decay, while also ensuring the investment in research and development necessary to maintain a highly productive economy. Policy, in this vision, would function to re-deploy infrastructure, production facilities, and workers left unemployed because of a shutdown or increased automation.

In some cases, this might mean assistance to workers or localities to buy up facilities and keep them running under worker or community ownership. In other cases it might involve re-training workers for new skills and re-fitting facilities. A regional approach might help launch new enterprises that would eventually be spun off as worker or local community-owned firms, supporting the development of strong and vibrant network economies, perhaps on the basis of a Green New Deal. All of this will be possible post-Brexit, under a Corbyn government.

Lastly, there is procurement. Under EU law, explicitly linking public procurement to local entities or social needs is difficult. The ECJ has ruled that, even if there is no specific legislation, procurement activity must "comply with the fundamental rules of the Treaty, in particular the principle of non-discrimination on grounds of nationality". This means that all procurement contracts must be open to all bidders across the EU, and public authorities must advertise contracts widely in other EU countries. In 2004, the European Parliament and Council issued two directives establishing the criteria governing such contracts: "lowest price only" and "most economically advantageous tender".

Unleashed from EU constraints, there are major opportunities for targeting large-scale public procurement to rebuild and transform communities, cities, and regions. The vision behind the celebrated Preston Model of community wealth building – inspired by the work of our own organisation, The Democracy Collaborative, in Cleveland, Ohio – leverages public procurement and the stabilising power of place-based anchor institutions (governments, hospitals, universities) to support rooted, participatory, democratic local economies built around multipliers. In this way, public funds can be made to do "double duty"; anchoring jobs and building community wealth, reversing long-term economic decline. This suggests the viability of a very different economic approach and potential for a winning political coalition, building support for a new socialist economics from the ground up.

With the prospect of a Corbyn government now tantalisingly close, it’s imperative that Labour reconciles its policy objectives in the Brexit negotiations with its plans for a radical economic transformation and redistribution of power and wealth. Only by pursuing strategies capable of re-establishing broad control over the national economy can Labour hope to manage the coming period of pain and dislocation following Brexit. Based on new institutions and approaches and the centrality of ownership and control, democracy, and participation, we should be busy assembling the tools and strategies that will allow departure from the EU to open up new political-economic horizons in Britain and bring about the profound transformation the country so desperately wants and needs.

Joe Guinan is executive director of the Next System Project at The Democracy Collaborative. Thomas M. Hanna is research director at The Democracy Collaborative.

This is an extract from a longer essay which appears in the inaugural edition of the IPPR Progressive Review.