Policing and its consequences

Proponents of 'hard-headed' policing lose sight of the moral difference between what is done to us a

On 22 July 2005, Brazilian electrician Jean Charles de Menezes had seven bullets pumped into his brain by a plain-clothes police officer at Stockwell Underground station. De Menezes was an innocent man, travelling to work, who was killed suddenly and brutally, in public, by the representatives of a democratic state.

This kind of policing disaster raises important questions of principle. It is deeply shocking when incidents of this sort take place in the mundane and familiar surroundings of a London tube train, and we need to get our thinking straight about the implications of what happened.

There are broadly two views of how the police should respond to the terrorist threat. To put things in a fairly crude way, the division between the two corresponds to a familiar division between different ways of thinking about freedom and security.

The first kind of view is self-avowedly hard-headed and prides itself on being realist. On this view, the chief responsibility of the police is to safeguard the bodily security of citizens. If this can only be done through increasing police powers (whether by extending the entitlement to detention without charge, or relaxing the rules on the use of firearms) then so be it.

Even if some members of the public – like De Menezes – are put at risk by more aggressive forms of policing, this is a price worth paying as long as the long-run aggregate level of personal security is increased. On this hard, realist view, the occasional terrible accident, such as the De Menezes killing, is a price worth paying if it reduces the threat from terrorists.

The second sort of view takes a less consequentialist position, and denies that the police should be there to protect our security by any means necessary. Instead, this view sees the police as being under very particular kinds of constraints when they operate in democratic countries such as ours. On this view, rights trump considerations of aggregate security, and we should not (for example) extend detention without trial, or relax restrictions on the police use of firearms, even if the result of this is that more people will be killed by terrorists.

Holders of this second view are condemned by the ‘hard-headed realists’ for being impractical idealists who simply refuse to confront the terrible reality of the threat posed by terrorism to our way of life.

There is a particular kind of error lurking in the hard-headed realist position, insofar as it suggests that all that we should care about are consequences, and that almost any course of action that makes us safer is thereby justifiable. What this sort of view misses is that we care about how outcomes are brought about and by whom as much as we care about end results. There is an enormous difference between falling victim to a terrorist attack and being killed by the agents of the state in which one lives.

Life in open democratic societies is risky, and among those risks is that of being attacked by those who want to cause damage and suffering to such societies. Insofar as we care about preserving an open and free way of life, the risks of terrorism (although reducible) are surely ineradicable; but they are something that are imposed, unjustly, on us by others.

What is so terrible about the De Menezes case is that his death was not caused by some alien, external threat. It was carried out by an agency of the state; something done "in our name", through our institutions. The mistake made by extreme versions of the ‘hard-headed realist’ view of policing is to think it appropriate to care only about numbers of deaths or injuries. It loses sight of the difference between what is done to us and what we ourselves collectively decide to do.

A surprising proponent of the ‘realist’ view is London’s mayor, Ken Livingstone. Following the conviction of the Metropolitan Police for breaching health and safety laws in the De Menezes case, Livingstone said the court's verdict was "disastrous" for anti-terrorist police. Livingstone’s claims are worth investigating, not least in how (perhaps surprisingly) he seems to avow a rather crude version of the ‘realist’ view.

As he put it: “If an armed police officer believes they are in pursuit of a terrorist who might be a suicide bomber and they start making these sort of calculations based on, ‘How's this going to be seen... am I going to be hauled off to court?... At the end of the day, mistakes are always going to happen in wars or situations like this. The best you can do is to try and make the potential risks the minimum possible.”

This perplexing judgement has a number of problems. Firstly, it’s very odd to suggest that we would not want police officers to ask themselves "How’s this going to be seen?", or to worry about their legal position, when they’re thinking of shooting someone who might be a suicide bomber. If someone might be a suicide bomber, then presumably they also might not be.

Shots should be fired by those who act in our name only gravely, as a final resort, and with awareness of the seriousness of what is being done. To suggest otherwise is highly troubling.

Yet, secondly, Livingstone’s rather less than cautious approach is amplified by his choice of metaphor – “mistakes,” he tells us, “are always going to happen in wars or situations like these.”

But precisely what is at stake is whether the situation we find ourselves in, with regard to the terrorist threat, does put us in something analogous to a war situation, where it is worth sacrificing some of the central features of our way of life for the preservation of our society in the long term. One does not downplay the significance and awfulness of terrorist attacks to deny that our situation is analogous to a war situation. And, if we’re not at war, one should not be so ready to cast aside the rights and protections of a democratic society.

Lastly, Livingstone’s final claim seems to encapsulate the errors of a crudely consequentialist approach to the ethics and politics of anti-terrorist policing. It is simply not true to say that “the best you can do is to try and make the potential risks the minimum possible”, both because some risks can only be reduced at the price of an unacceptable erosion of rights and liberties, and because it is a distorting over-simplification to weigh the risks that we face from others (e.g. the terrorists) and the risks we impose upon ourselves (e.g. through the way in which our police forces operate) as if they were all of the same kind.

What we do to ourselves, and what is done in our name, has a moral significance that goes well beyond that which is merely done to us, and Livingstone’s remarks miss this crucial difference.

Martin O’Neill is a political philosopher, based at the Centre for Political Theory in the Department of Politics at the University of Manchester. He has previously taught at Cambridge and Harvard, and is writing a book on Corporations and Social Justice.
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The humbling of Theresa May

The Prime Minister has lost all authority. The Tories will remove her as soon as they feel the time is right.

Being politicians of unsentimental, ruthless realism, the Conservatives did not linger in the grief stage of their collective disaster after the general election. Disbelief, too, was commendably brief.

Currently, their priority is to impose some sort of order on themselves. This is the necessary prelude to the wholesale change that most see as the next phase in their attempt at recovery, which they all know is essential to their career prospects – and believe is vital to a country whose alternative prime minister is Jeremy Corbyn.

For that reason, talk of Theresa May enduring as Prime Minister until the end of the Brexit negotiations in two years’ time is the preserve of just a few wishful thinkers. Some sort of calm is being established but the party is far from settled or united; there is a widespread conviction that it cannot be so under the present leader.

Elements of the great change have been executed, as Nick Timothy and Fiona Hill, May’s former advisers, will testify.

However, this is only beginning, as shown by the debate in the media about how long May can survive in Downing Street. There is dissatisfaction about elements of her recent reshuffle, but it is quieted because few believe that some of the more contentious appointments or reappointments will last more than a matter of months. Her colleagues are also alarmed by the meal she has made of doing what was supposed to be a straightforward deal with the DUP.

The climate in the party at the moment is one in which everything – jobs, policies and, of course, the leadership – will soon be up for grabs. Debate over “hard” and “soft” Brexits is illusory: anyone who wants to be Conservative leader will need to respect the view of the party in the country, which is that Britain must leave the single market and the customs union to regain control of trade policy and borders. That is one reason why the prospects of David Davis, the Brexit Secretary, are being talked up.

Some of May’s MPs, for all their hard-mindedness about the future, speak of feeling “poleaxed” since the general election. Even before the result changed everything, there was dismay about the bad national campaign; but that, it was felt, could be discussed in a leisurely post-mortem.

Now, instead, it has undermined faith in May’s leadership and credibility. “The social care disaster was key to our defeat,” an MP told me. “It wasn’t just that the policy damaged our core vote, it was the amateurishness of the U-turn.” A more seasoned colleague noted that “it was the first election I’ve fought where we succeeded in pissing off every section of our core vote”.

The limited ministerial reshuffle was inevitable given May’s lack of authority, and summed up her untenability beyond the short term. Most of her few important changes were deeply ill judged: notably the sacking of the skills and apprenticeships minister Robert Halfon, the MP for Harlow in Essex, and a rare Tory with a direct line to the working class; and the Brexit minister David Jones, whose job had hardly begun and whose boss, Davis, was not consulted.

George Bridges, another Brexit minister, who resigned, apparently did so because he felt May had undermined the government’s position in the negotiations so badly, by failing to win the election comprehensively, that he could not face going on.

Much has been made of how Philip Hammond, the Chancellor, was marginalised and briefed against, yet reappointed. Patrick McLoughlin, the party chairman, suffered similarly. Conservative Central Office was largely shut out from the catastrophic campaign, though no one got round to briefing against McLoughlin, who kept his head down – unheard-of conduct by a party chairman in an election.

As a political force, Central Office is for now more or less impotent. It has lost the knack of arguing the case for Conservatism. MPs are increasingly worried that their party is so introspective that it just can’t deal with the way Corbyn is spinning his defeat. “An ugly mood is growing,” one said, “because militant leftism is going unchallenged.” That cannot change until May has gone and the party machine is revived and re-inspired.

***

Nobody in the party wants a general election: but most want a leadership election, and minds are concentrated on how to achieve the latter without precipitating the former. One angry and disillusioned ex-minister told me that “if there were an obvious candidate she’d be shitting herself. But most of us have realised Boris is a wanker, DD isn’t a great communicator and is a bit up himself, Hammond has no charisma, and Amber [Rudd] has a majority of 346.”

On Monday a group of senior ex-ministers met at Westminster to discuss next steps. It was agreed that, with the Brexit talks under way, the most important thing in the interests of restoring order was securing the vote on the Queen’s Speech. Then, May having done her duty and steadied the proverbial ship, the party would manage her dignified and calm evacuation from Downing Street.

Those who agree on this do not always agree on the timing. However, few can make the leap of imagination required to see her addressing the party conference in October, unless to say “Thank you and goodnight” and to initiate a leadership contest. Many would like her out long before then. The only reason they don’t want it this side of securing the Queen’s Speech is that the result, as one put it, would be “chaos”, with a leadership contest resembling “a circular firing squad”.

That metaphor is popular among Tories these days. Others use it to describe the ­apportioning of blame after the election. As well as Timothy and Hill, Lynton Crosby has sustained severe wounds that may prevent the Tories from automatically requesting his services again.

Following the Brexit referendum and Zac Goldsmith’s nasty campaign for the London mayoralty, Crosby has acquired the habit of losing. And then there was Ben Gummer, blamed not only for the social care debacle, but also for upsetting fishermen with a vaguely couched fisheries policy. These failings are becoming ancient history – and the future, not the past, is now the urgent matter – yet some Conservatives still seethe about them despite trying to move on.

“I haven’t heard anyone say she should stay – except Damian Green,” a former minister observed, referring to the new First Secretary of State. Green was at Oxford with May and seems to have earned his job because he is one of her rare friends in high politics. He is regarded as sharing her general lack of conviction.

Older activists recall how the party, in 1974, clung loyally to Ted Heath after he lost one election, and even after he lost a second. Now, deference is over. Most Tory activists, appalled by the handling of the campaign, want change. They would, however, like a contest: annoyed at not having been consulted last time, they intend not to be left silent again.

That view is largely reflected at Westminster, though a few MPs believe a coronation wouldn’t be a problem, “as we don’t want a public examination of the entrails for weeks on end when we need to be shown to be running the country effectively”. Most MPs disagree with that, seeing where a coronation got them last time.

With the summer recess coming up, at least the public’s attention would not be on Westminster if the contest took place mostly during that time: hence the feeling that, once the Queen’s Speech is dealt with, May should announce her intention to leave, in order to have a successor in place before the conference season. It is then up to the party to design a timetable that compresses the hustings between the final two candidates into as short a time as compatible with the democratic process, to get the new leader in place swiftly.

Some letters requesting a contest are said to have reached Graham Brady, the chairman of the 1922 Committee of backbenchers. One MP told me with great authority that there were eight; another, with equal certainty, said 12. Forty-eight are needed to trigger the procedure. However, engineering such a contest is not how most Tories would like to proceed. “She has had an international humiliation,” a former cabinet minister said, “and it is transparently ghastly for her. Then came the [Grenfell Tower] fire. There is no sense our rubbing it in. I suspect she knows she has to go. We admire her for staying around and clearing up the mess in a way Cameron didn’t. But she is a stopgap.”

MPs believe, with some justification, that the last thing most voters want is another general election, so caution is paramount. None doubts that the best outcome for all concerned would be for May to leave without being pushed.

Her tin-eared response to the Grenfell disaster shocked colleagues with its amateurishness and disconnection. “I’m sure she’s very upset by Grenfell,” someone who has known her since Oxford said. “But she is incapable of showing empathy. She has no bridge to the rest of the world other than Philip.” Another, referring to the controversial remark that torpedoed Andrea Leadsom’s leadership ambitions last year, said: “You would get shot for saying it, but not having had children hasn’t helped her when it comes to relating to people. Leadsom was right.”

***

May was quicker off the mark on Monday, issuing a statement condemning the appalling attack at Finsbury Park Mosque swiftly after it occurred, and going there shortly afterwards to meet community leaders. No one could fault her assurance that Muslims must enjoy the same protection under the law as everyone else, or the speed and sincerity with which it was made. She is learning what leadership entails, but too late.

Her administration has become unlucky. This happened to John Major, but, as in his case, the bad luck is partly down to bad decisions; and the bad luck that comes out of the blue simply piles in on top of everything else. Grenfell Tower, lethal and heartbreaking for its victims and their families, was merely more bad luck for the Prime Minister because of her slow-witted response and failure – presumably because shorn of her closest advisers – to do the right thing, and to do it quickly.

But then it turned out that her new chief of staff, Gavin Barwell, had in his previous incarnation as a housing minister received a report on improving fire safety in tower blocks and done nothing about it. That is either more bad luck, or it shows May has dismal judgement in the quality of people she appoints to her close circle. Form suggests the latter.

The idea aired last weekend, that May had “ten days to prove herself”, was a minority view. For most of her colleagues it is too late. It was typical of Boris Johnson’s dwindling band of cheerleaders that they should broadcast a story supporting Davis as an “interim” leader: “interim” until Johnson’s credibility has recovered sufficiently for him to have another pop at the job he covets so much.

They also sought to create the impression that Davis is on manoeuvres, which he resolutely is not. Davis has been around long enough to know that if he wants to succeed May – and his friends believe he does – he cannot be seen to do anything to destabilise her further. It is a lesson lost on Johnson’s camp, whose tactics have damaged their man even more than he was already.

Andrew Mitchell, the former international development secretary and a close ally of Davis, told the Guardian: “. . . it is simply untrue that he is doing anything other
than focusing on his incredibly important brief and giving loyal support to the Prime Minister. Anyone suggesting otherwise is freelancing.” That summed up the contempt Davis’s camp has for Johnson, and it will last long beyond any leadership race.

There is a sense that, in the present febrile climate, whoever is the next leader must be highly experienced. Davis qualifies; so does Hammond, who before his present job was foreign secretary and defence secretary, and who has belatedly displayed a mind of his own since May was hobbled. Hugo Swire, a minister of state under Hammond in the Foreign Office, said of him: “He’s got bottom. He was very good to work for. He is an homme sérieux. I liked him very much and he would calm things down.”

But, as yet, there is no contest. Calls for calm have prevailed, not least thanks to Graham Brady’s steady stewardship of the 1922 Committee, and his success in convincing the more hot-headed of his colleagues to hold their fire. Yet MPs say the 1922 is not what it was 20 years ago: ministers have become used to taking it less seriously.

However, many MPs expect Brady, at a time of their choosing, to go to Downing Street and deliver the poison pill to Theresa May if she is slow to go. Some who know her fear she might take no notice. If she were to play it that way, her end would be unpleasant. As the old saying goes, there is the easy way, and there is the hard way. Remarkably few of her colleagues want to go the hard way but, like everything else in the Tory party at the moment, that could change.

Simon Heffer is a journalist, author and political commentator, who has worked for long stretches at the Daily Telegraph and the Daily Mail. He has written biographies of Thomas Carlyle, Ralph Vaughan Williams and Enoch Powell, and reviews and writes on politics for the New Statesman

This article first appeared in the 22 June 2017 issue of the New Statesman, The zombie PM

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