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The NS Interview: David Remnick, editor of the New Yorker

“The fist-bump cover? Obama’s people were not amused”

“The fist-bump cover? Obama’s people were not amused”

Do you vote?
I do. Most journalists do. Len Downie, who was the editor of the Washington Post, very concertedly did not vote. He was a superb journalist but, to me, that was too decorous by half. I'm a civilian, a citizen.

You once said of Ben Bradlee that an editor should be like a general, inspiring the enlisted.
The editor of a big national newspaper, like Ben Bradlee was at the Washington Post, is the general of hundreds of people. The New Yorker is a smaller, more subtle operation.

Your background is in newspapers. How has that affected the magazine?
The last thing we should be doing is playing a newspaper game! That aspect is very slight.

You've discussed protecting the New Yorker's "core" - long-form journalism.
What makes it successful is the whole of it. Very rarely is there a spike in news-stand sales. For more commercial magazines, like Vanity Fair, the cover can make a huge difference.

What about your Obama fist-bump cover?
That sold a lot of copies because it became . . . what's the opposite of a cause célèbre? The Obama people were unamused, but we're not publishing covers to amuse powerful people.

When you were writing your biography of Obama, how much time did you have with him?
I had an hour the first time, and close to an hour the second time. But the more valuable reporting is the next level down, and the next.

What was your impression of the young Obama?
He was an OK student and a curious kid, but he was having a good time, too. He got a lot more serious when he got to Columbia. But even there, he took a course with Edward Said and hated it - he found it too fancy, too theoretical. Then, at Harvard Law School, his main intellectual influences were the straight-up liberals.

Such as?
Larry Tribe and Martha Minow, the constitutional scholars. The liberal mainstream. He's a man of the centre left.

In your book, you talk about what you call Obama's "multilingualism".
He speaks to different groups using different languages without losing who he is. Right-wing bloggers take this as proof that he's a phoney, but it is the talent of any first-rate rhetorician.

His poll numbers aren't looking great.
If you're the president, all that oil is going to rub off on you.

Isn't there concern about his competence?
Look, I have concerns about him, but I don't see a lack of competence. Nobody knows what the government should do. We're in BP's hands.

What about before the oil spill?
About his competence? I don't think so. About character, sure. Columnists like Maureen Dowd see him as arrogant and self-regarding.

The American left seems frustrated by him.
He believes in conservative means to liberal ends. The health-care programme is a gigantic advance, but it's not universal. So he's just put
32 million Americans on the health-care roll, and it didn't help his poll numbers at all.

Why has the US right wing become so strident?
All but true believers came to see Bush as a failure. To some extent, the mainstream's absence means the Tea Party is the Republican Party.

Is the Tea Party Obama's best hope of getting re-elected?
No. I'd rue the day I said that. If it came to an election between Obama and Sarah Palin, I think Obama would win. But you can't say these things categorically. Events, dear boy . . .

You seem relatively sanguine about the right.
American movements of this kind can be quite powerful, but they don't elect presidents.

Is there a Republican candidate on the horizon?
The name on everyone's lips is Sarah Palin, but I don't see her winning, unless we all go mad. Although there's a precedent for that.

Is there a plan?
If God had a plan, God was a fantastic comedian. There's a scene in The Human Stain by Philip Roth where Nathan Zuckerman is listening to an orchestra rehearse. People are having a good time and all he can think of is that, in 40 years, every single one of them will be dead.

What would you like to forget?
That God is an excellent comedian.

Are we all doomed?
I am. But you're asking about mankind. Nature is cold, wet, hard and unforgiving. Yet people seem to like it, and we're doing our damnedest to destroy it. It scares the hell out of me. We need worldwide self-denial and a technological revolution. It's asking everything, yet everything depends on it. Sorry to bum you out.

Defining Moments

1958 Born in Hackensack, New Jersey
1981 Graduates from Princeton
1982 Joins the Washington Post, eventually becoming the paper's Moscow reporter
1992 Becomes a New Yorker staff writer
1994Lenin's Tomb, about the collapse of the Soviet Union, wins a Pulitzer prize
1998 Succeeds Tina Brown as editor of the New Yorker, a position he continues to hold
2010 The Bridge, his 672-page biography of Barack Obama, is published

Jonathan Derbyshire is Managing Editor of Prospect. He was formerly Culture Editor of the New Statesman.

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No peace after progress

How the death of the industrial way of life gave us choice – and stoked resentment and fear.

Now that the making of useful and necessary things in Britain is only a shadow of what it once was, we can see more clearly the effects of the Manufacturing Age. The cost was high to the producers of prodigious wealth; a ten-year difference in life expectancy remains between people living in the richest areas and those in Glasgow. The (fleeting, it now seems) visitation of industrialism has made life more comfortable and its dismantling has liberated millions from choiceless occupations. The legacy is one of spectacular improvement, unequally shared.

Perhaps the most dramatic experience of the 20th century was the suddenness with which profligate plenty replaced a skinflint subsistence. Was it the speed of this that distracted us from wondering why, instead of the secure sustenance that generations of needy people had asked of an unyielding economic system, we were offered a promiscuous spillage of goods, promoted with quasi-religious zeal by the converts of a capitalism that had previously delivered to most of its captive workers a life of penury? Such a rapid reversal might have alerted us to changes beneath the surface that elided losses incurred.

The greatest of these was certainly not the extinction of the industrial way of life itself, release from which has been an unqualified blessing. But the transition from relentlessly work-driven lives (in the 1950s, two-thirds of Britain’s workers were still manual labourers) was marked by perfunctory obituaries for the disintegration of industrial communities, with no acknowledgement that, for a century and a half, they had represented the inescapable destiny of the people they sheltered.

Even less recognition was given to the fortitude with which they had borne a long, coercive labour. A way of life, buried without ceremony in the unmarked grave of progress, could not be mourned; and this has generated some social pathologies of our time: resentment over an arbitrary obliteration of industry, disengagement from a party of labour by those it called, like feudal lords, its “own people”, loss of memory of the economic migrants we also were, passing from the goad of industry into the pastures of consumption, and thence into the liberating servitude of technology.

Grief makes no judgement on the intrinsic value of what is lost. Absence of the known and familiar is the object of melancholy in its own right, even if replaced by something immeasurably better. Objectively, there was little to mourn in the vanished industrial way of life: insufficiency and humiliation, malice of overseer and manager, officiousness of poor-law administrator and means-test man. Male industrial workers exhausted in body and spirit, instead of protecting those for whom the power of their hands was the only shelter against destitution, visited similar punishment on their wives and children. There is nothing to be lamented in an end to the penitential life of women, scrubbing not only the red tiles of the kitchen floor, but even an arc of pavement outside the front door; their interception of men on payday before wages were wasted on beer and oblivion; the clenching against joyless invasion of their bodies in the boozy aftermath. But it was the only life they knew, and they adhered to it with grim stoicism and even pride.

There is much to be said for their resistance. The fragile lattice formed by women’s arms was often the only safety net against destitution. Trade unions and friendly and burial societies that shielded folk from economic violence foreshadowed the welfare state and the National Health Service.

The life of labouring people in Britain was strikingly homogeneous, despite diversity of occupation, dialect and local sensibility. There was the same collective experience: terraced house with parlour reserved for celebration or mourning; the three-piece suite, plaster figure on a stand behind the window, chenille curtain against the draught, engraving of The Stag at Bay on the wall; the deal table and Windsor chairs in the living room, the mantelpiece a domestic shrine with clock, candlesticks and pictures of soldiers smiling before they died; the music of cinders falling through the bars in the grate; cheerless bedrooms where husband and wife slept in high connubial state, more bier than bed, where sexual enjoyment was ritually sacrificed as flowers of frost formed on the inside of the window.

And everywhere photographs: wraithlike children with ringlets or in sailor suits, fated never to grow up; weddings in the back garden, a bouquet of lilies and a grandmother in boots and astrakhan hat; the smudged features of a kinsman no one can now identify. Identical memories, too: the shotgun wedding in the dingy finery of a Co-op hall; the funeral tableau around the grave, amid ominous inscriptions of “Sleeping where no shadows fall”; queues outside the ocean-going Savoy or Tivoli to watch Gone With the Wind; the pub where “Vilia” or “The Last Rose of Summer” was hammered out on a discordant piano.

The opening up of such sombre lives might have been expected to call forth cries of gratitude. Instead, a synthetic joy has emanated largely from the same sources that, until recently, offered people grudging survival only, the change of tune outsourced to producers of manufactured delight, purveyors of contrived euphoria to the people – a different order of industrial artefact from the shoes, utensils and textiles of another era.

***

A more authentic popular res­ponse exists beneath the official psalmody, a persistent murmur of discontent and powerlessness. Anger and aggression swirl around like dust and waste paper in the streets of our affluent, unequal society. As long-term recipients of the contempt of our betters, we know how to despise the vulnerable – people incapable of work, the poor, the timid and the fearful, those addicted to drugs and alcohol. Sullen resentment tarnishes the wealth of the world, a conviction that somebody else is getting the advantages that ought to be “ours” by right and by merit.

Rancour appears among those “left behind” in neighbourhoods besieged by unknown tongues and foreign accents: people who never voted for unchosen change, as all political options are locked up in a consensus of elites. “Give us back our country!”
they cry; even though that country is not in the custody of those from whom they would reclaim it. There was no space for the working class to grieve over its own dissolution. If, as E P Thompson said, that class was present at its own making, it was certainly not complicit in its own undoing.

Grief denied in individuals leads to damaging psychological disorders. There is no reason to believe that this differs for those bereaved of a known way of living. The working class has been colonised, as was the peasantry in the early industrial era. When the values, beliefs and myths of indigenous peoples are laid waste, these lose meaning, and people go to grieve in city slums and die from alcohol, drugs and other forms of self-inflicted violence. Though the dominant culture’s erasure of the manufacturing way of life in Britain was less intense than the colonial ruin of ancient societies, this subculture was equally unceremoniously broken. It is a question of degree. The ravages of drugs and alcohol and self-harm in silent former pit villages and derelict factory towns show convergence with other ruined cultures elsewhere in the world.

Depression is a symptom of repressed grief: here is the connection between unfinished mourning and popular resentment at having been cheated out of our fair share, our due, our place in the world. If we are unable to discern our own possible fate in suffering people now, this is perhaps a result of estrangement from unresolved wrongs in our own past. Nothing was ever explained. Globalisation occurred under a kind of social laissez-faire: no political education made the world more comprehensible to the disaffected and disregarded, people of small account to those who take decisions on their behalf and in their name.

Anyone who protested against our passage into this changed world was criminalised, called “wrecker” and “extremist”. The miners’ strike of 1984 was the symbol of this: their doomed fight to preserve a dignity achieved in pain and violence was presented by the merchants of deliverance not only as retrograde, but also as an act of outlawry. Resistance to compulsory change was derided as a response of nostalgics protecting the indefensible, when the whole world was on the brink of a new life. Early in her tenure of Downing Street, Margaret Thatcher, that sybil and prophet who knew about these things, warned that Britain would become “a less cosy, more abrasive” place: a vision confirmed by the Battle of Orgreave – redolent of civil war – and the anguish of Hillsborough.

It is too late to grieve now. Scar tissue has healed over the untreated wound. Though no one expects the ruling classes to understand the distress of perpetual “modernisation”, the leaders of labour might have been able to recognise capitalism’s realm of freedom and a gaudy consumerism that concealed hardening competitiveness and the growth of a crueller, more bitter society.

The ills of this best of all worlds, its excessive wealth and extreme inequality, are on show in hushed thoroughfares of London, shuttered sites of “inward investment”, where the only sound is the faint melody of assets appreciating; while elsewhere, people wait for charitable tins of denutrified substances to feed their family, or sit under a grubby duvet, a Styrofoam cup beseeching the pence of passers-by.

Unresolved feelings about industrialism, enforced with great harshness and abolished with equal contempt for those who served it, are certainly related to the stylish savagery of contemporary life. The alibi that present-day evils are an expression of “human nature” is a poor apology for what is clearly the nature – restless and opportunistic – of a social and economic system that has, so far at least, outwitted its opponents at every turn.

Jeremy Seabrook’s book “The Song of the Shirt” (C Hurst & Co) won the Bread and Roses Award for Radical Publishing 2016

This article first appeared in the 23 June 2016 issue of the New Statesman, Divided Britain