Mourners carry the body of a father killed by a drone strike in Gaza. Photograph: Getty Images
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Drone attacks go against every human rights principle in the book

There is a sense that international law has failed.

It has for centuries been lawful to kill enemy commanders, on the principle that “a man who is dead renews no war”, a thought that comforted Cromwell as he viewed the body of Charles I. The outcry in the 1970s over comical CIA plots to murder Fidel Castro by sending him exploding cigars and poison pens led Congress to ban political assassinations under Executive Order 12333: “No person employed by or acting on behalf of the United States government shall engage in, or conspire to engage in, assassination.” This comports with the Fifth Amendment to the US constitution, which protects “any person” (not just US citizens) from being “deprived of life . . . without due process of law”.

Until 9/11, the legal position was clear: in war, active combatants could kill and be killed, subject to rules governing surrender, use of banned weapons, etc. But “war law” applied only to conflicts between armed forces of opposing states, invoking the right of self-defence. Confrontations with insurgents, rioters and terrorists were governed by human rights law, which requires state use of force against serious criminals to be reasonable in the circumstances. This is more restrictive – after three IRA bombers were shot dead on Gibraltar in 1988, the European Court held that the UK had denied them the right to life because MI5 had jumped to mistaken conclusions. In the case of known members of terrorist organisations, the “reasonable force” requirement exercises a necessary and humane restraint over the trigger-happiness of “special forces” and drone targeters. This is why the US, Russia and Israel pretend they are bound only by the law of war, which allows suspects to be killed without much compunction.

The states that deploy drones argue that they are operating under war law, where human rights are less relevant. As Harold Koh, legal adviser to the US state department, puts it: “The US is in an armed conflict with al-Qaeda . . . and may use force consistent with its inherent right to self-defence . . . including by targeting persons such as high-level al-Qaeda leaders who are planning to attack us.” This bald statement prompts many questions. How can you have “an armed conflict” without an enemy state? What criteria are used for putting names on the secret death list: is it enough to be sympathetic to terrorism, married to a terrorist, or anti-American? To provide shelter or give funds to terrorist groups? What is the required degree of proof? There are no accountability mechanisms – no inquests, sometimes not even a casualty list (although the US usually announces and celebrates when it hits a “high-value target”).

In drone warfare, there is no fairness or due process to enable the potential victim, his relatives or any outside body to challenge the accuracy of the information on which the targeting decision has been made. The Senate foreign relations committee reported in 2009 that the Pentagon’s approved list of “prioritised targets” contained 367 names and had been expanded to include 50 Afghan drug lords suspected of donating money to the Taliban. Suppose the suspicion was unreasonable, or the donation had been at gunpoint, or of a negligible amount? What the Pentagon is doing is secretly sentencing people to death for an unproven crime.

The Israeli Supreme Court is the only tribunal to have confronted the legality of targeted kill­ing, at a time (2008) when 234 victims had been members of Hamas and a further 153 had been civilians who got in the way. The court contented itself with comments about limiting the targets to dangerous terrorists and issued Polonius-like precautionary precepts: “well-based information is needed”; “innocent civilians are not to be harmed”; “careful verification is needed before an attack is made”. In reality, innocent civilians very often are killed, and “verification” always seems careful to the minds of the targeters.

Israeli officials seem morally content to risk civilian lives: after a one-tonne bomb was dropped on Gaza City in 2002, killing many civilians in order to assassinate the Hamas military leader Salah Shehadeh, an inquiry merely noted “shortcomings” in evaluation of information. This was a case of manslaughter by gross negligence. The CIA’s anxiety to kill the al-Qaeda leader Ayman al-Zawahiri led to a drone attack in 2006 on a village in Pakistan where he was mistakenly thought to be hiding, and 18 civ­ilians were killed. There was no explanation, no accountability and no compensation for what the CIA calls a “decapitation strike”.

Koh says that drone strikes are an exercise in self-defence under Article 51 of the UN Charter. But Article 51 applies only to attacks (or imminent attacks) by other states, not by terrorist groups. Nobody has yet noticed the irony of squeezing terrorism into this war-law paradigm. Because the Geneva Conventions and customary rights must apply to terrorist and law enfor­cer alike, if it is lawful to kill Osama Bin Laden, al-Zawahiri and Hamas commanders, then it must be lawful for them to kill their opposite numbers – Barack Obama and Binyamin Netan­yahu, generals, allies. (Even the Queen, as head of a co-belligerent state, may qualify.) Those who take the lives of innocent civilians in order to spread terror deserve to be treated like dangerous criminals and shot down when necessity requires, not dignified in law as if they were warriors matched in combat with great states.
What is the position under human rights law? It would obviously be a breach of the right to life if terrorist sympathisers were targeted to deter others, or killed in circumstances where it was possible to arrest them. It would be reasonable to kill terrorists on missions to blow up civilians, or engaged in conspiracies to kill them. But the record of drone attacks demonstrates that often individuals are targeted when they constitute no clear or present danger.

Drone killings in tribal areas of Pakistan and in Yemen have taken the lives of targets who are armed and in conspiratorial meetings, but others have merely been attending weddings or funerals or emerging from hospitals or mosques. In Pakistan, there have been cases where pro-government leaders, their families and even army soldiers have been killed by mistake in drone attacks that have severely damaged US relations with a politically tense, nuclear-armed nation that is not at war with the US.

There was little protest in the US until last year, when a drone strike in Yemen targeted a US citizen, Anwar al-Awlaki, rumoured to be al-Qaeda’s leader in that area. The rockets were fired at his pick-up truck, in which he might have been picked up rather than bombed. Obama’s lawyers said that the Fifth Amendment could not avail a US citizen who joined an enemy force. This is correct as far as it goes, but the Fifth Amendment must entitle a citizen or his family to know whether he is on a death list and to apply to have himself taken off it. When al-Awlaki’s father sought judicial review, the judge told him he did not have standing. If a father does not have standing to challenge a targeted killing, who does?

The Obama administration seems to have given the CIA carte blanche to choose targets, subject to the approval of Koh, a law professor, now an executioner. Those who press the Hellfire buttons in Nevada do not pause to consider whether their targets are engaged in combatant missions or not. But there is no point speculating about the criteria for listing or executing: these are secret CIA prerogatives, beyond the jurisdiction of the courts or the provisions of the Freedom of Information Act.

The battlefield utility of drone technology is such that it will be used widely in future conflicts, and by states much less scrupulous than the US and Israel (Syria and Iran, for example). Drones will become more compact, and more difficult to detect or shoot down – already there are plans for bird- and even insect-sized drones, capable of crawling inside homes or squatting on window ledges to listen and send “kill” messages to their bigger brethren without any “pilot” in Nevada pressing a button.

There is an urgent need for the US to make its drone operations more principled, first, by moving responsibility from the CIA to the department of defence, which is more accountable and bound by the Geneva Conventions. Second, there must be transparency in respect of both the target list and criteria for listing, and an opportunity for those listed to surrender or seek judicial review of whether the evidence against them proves they are an active combatant. Third, rules of engagement must exclude any killing if civilians are likely to be present, and finally, rules must prevent killing of a target who can be captured or arrested.

There is a sense that international law has failed: the UN Charter, the conventions and the norms of the courts have not provided satisfactory guidance for waging asymmetric warfare. Hence the silence of states and the recent earnest request, by the UN’s human rights commissioner, for urgent clarification of the law. The way forward may be to find a way back, to reasonable force and proportionality. At present, many drone killings can only be described as summary executions – the punishment of the Red Queen (“sentence first, trial later”), which denies the right to life, the presumption of innocence and the right to a fair trial.

Geoffrey Robertson QC’s full legal analysis of drone warfare is in his fourth edition of “Crimes Against Humanity” (Penguin, September 2012). Also in the New Statesman's Drones issue: Chris Woods on the legality of drones, Jemima Khan's interview with former Pakistani president Pervez Musharraf and Michael Brooks on the science that makes drones work

This article first appeared in the 18 June 2012 issue of the New Statesman, Drones: video game warfare

MILES COLE
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The new Brexit economics

George Osborne’s austerity plan – now abandoned by the Tories – was the most costly macroeconomic policy mistake since the 1930s.

George Osborne is no longer chancellor, sacked by the post-Brexit Prime Minister, Theresa May. Philip Hammond, the new Chancellor, has yet to announce detailed plans but he has indicated that the real economy rather than the deficit is his priority. The senior Conservatives Sajid Javid and Stephen Crabb have advocated substantial increases in public-sector infrastructure investment, noting how cheap it is for the government to borrow. The argument that Osborne and the Conservatives had been making since 2010 – that the priority for macroeconomic policy had to be to reduce the government’s budget deficit – seems to have been brushed aside.

Is there a good economic reason why Brexit in particular should require abandoning austerity economics? I would argue that the Tory obsession with the budget deficit has had very little to do with economics for the past four or five years. Instead, it has been a political ruse with two intentions: to help win elections and to reduce the size of the state. That Britain’s macroeconomic policy was dictated by politics rather than economics was a precursor for the Brexit vote. However, austerity had already begun to reach its political sell-by date, and Brexit marks its end.

To understand why austerity today is opposed by nearly all economists, and to grasp the partial nature of any Conservative rethink, it is important to know why it began and how it evolved. By 2010 the biggest recession since the Second World War had led to rapid increases in government budget deficits around the world. It is inevitable that deficits (the difference between government spending and tax receipts) increase in a recession, because taxes fall as incomes fall, but government spending rises further because benefit payments increase with rising unemployment. We experienced record deficits in 2010 simply because the recession was unusually severe.

In 2009 governments had raised spending and cut taxes in an effort to moderate the recession. This was done because the macroeconomic stabilisation tool of choice, nominal short-term interest rates, had become impotent once these rates hit their lower bound near zero. Keynes described the same situation in the 1930s as a liquidity trap, but most economists today use a more straightforward description: the problem of the zero lower bound (ZLB). Cutting rates below this lower bound might not stimulate demand because people could avoid them by holding cash. The textbook response to the problem is to use fiscal policy to stimulate the economy, which involves raising spending and cutting taxes. Most studies suggest that the recession would have been even worse without this expansionary fiscal policy in 2009.

Fiscal stimulus changed to fiscal contraction, more popularly known as austerity, in most of the major economies in 2010, but the reasons for this change varied from country to country. George Osborne used three different arguments to justify substantial spending cuts and tax increases before and after the coalition government was formed. The first was that unconventional monetary policy (quantitative easing, or QE) could replace the role of lower interest rates in stimulating the economy. As QE was completely untested, this was wishful thinking: the Bank of England was bound to act cautiously, because it had no idea what impact QE would have. The second was that a fiscal policy contraction would in fact expand the economy because it would inspire consumer and business confidence. This idea, disputed by most economists at the time, has now lost all credibility.

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The third reason for trying to cut the deficit was that the financial markets would not buy government debt without it. At first, this rationale seemed to be confirmed by events as the eurozone crisis developed, and so it became the main justification for the policy. However, by 2012 it was becoming clear to many economists that the debt crisis in Ireland, Portugal and Spain was peculiar to the eurozone, and in particular to the failure of the European Central Bank (ECB) to act as a lender of last resort, buying government debt when the market failed to.

In September 2012 the ECB changed its policy and the eurozone crisis beyond Greece came to an end. This was the main reason why renewed problems in Greece last year did not lead to any contagion in the markets. Yet it is not something that the ECB will admit, because it places responsibility for the crisis at its door.

By 2012 two other things had also become clear to economists. First, governments outside the eurozone were having no problems selling their debt, as interest rates on this reached record lows. There was an obvious reason why this should be so: with central banks buying large quantities of government debt as a result of QE, there was absolutely no chance that governments would default. Nor have I ever seen any evidence that there was any likelihood of a UK debt funding crisis in 2010, beyond the irrelevant warnings of those “close to the markets”. Second, the austerity policy had done considerable harm. In macroeconomic terms the recovery from recession had been derailed. With the help of analysis from the Office for Budget Responsibility, I calculated that the GDP lost as a result of austerity implied an average cost for each UK household of at least £4,000.

Following these events, the number of academic economists who supported austerity became very small (they had always been a minority). How much of the UK deficit was cyclical or structural was irrelevant: at the ZLB, fiscal policy should stimulate, and the deficit should be dealt with once the recession was over.

Yet you would not know this from the public debate. Osborne continued to insist that deficit reduction be a priority, and his belief seemed to have become hard-wired into nearly all media discussion. So perverse was this for standard macroeconomics that I christened it “mediamacro”: the reduction of macroeconomics to the logic of household finance. Even parts of the Labour Party seemed to be succumbing to a mediamacro view, until the fiscal credibility rule introduced in March by the shadow chancellor, John McDonnell. (This included an explicit knockout from the deficit target if interest rates hit the ZLB, allowing fiscal policy to focus on recovering from recession.)

It is obvious why a focus on the deficit was politically attractive for Osborne. After 2010 the coalition government adopted the mantra that the deficit had been caused by the previous Labour government’s profligacy, even though it was almost entirely a consequence of the recession. The Tories were “clearing up the mess Labour left”, and so austerity could be blamed on their predecessors. Labour foolishly decided not to challenge this myth, and so it became what could be termed a “politicised truth”. It allowed the media to say that Osborne was more competent at running the economy than his predecessors. Much of the public, hearing only mediamacro, agreed.

An obsession with cutting the deficit was attractive to the Tories, as it helped them to appear competent. It also enabled them to achieve their ideological goal of shrinking the state. I have described this elsewhere as “deficit deceit”: using manufactured fear about the deficit to achieve otherwise unpopular reductions in public spending.

The UK recovery from the 2008/2009 recession was the weakest on record. Although employment showed strong growth from 2013, this may have owed much to an unprecedented decline in real wages and stagnant productivity growth. By the main metrics by which economists judge the success of an economy, the period of the coalition government looked very poor. Many economists tried to point this out during the 2015 election but they were largely ignored. When a survey of macroeconomists showed that most thought austerity had been harmful, the broadcast media found letters from business leaders supporting the Conservative position more newsworthy.

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In my view, mediamacro and its focus on the deficit played an important role in winning the Conservatives the 2015 general election. I believe Osborne thought so, too, and so he ­decided to try to repeat his success. Although the level of government debt was close to being stabilised, he decided to embark on a further period of fiscal consolidation so that he could achieve a budget surplus.

Osborne’s austerity plans after 2015 were different from what happened in 2010 for a number of reasons. First, while 2010 austerity also occurred in the US and the eurozone, 2015 austerity was largely a UK affair. Second, by 2015 the Bank of England had decided that interest rates could go lower than their current level if need be. We are therefore no longer at the ZLB and, in theory, the impact of fiscal consolidation on demand could be offset by reducing interest rates, as long as no adverse shocks hit the economy. The argument against fiscal consolidation was rather that it increased the vulnerability of the economy if a negative shock occurred. As we have seen, Brexit is just this kind of shock.

In this respect, abandoning Osborne’s surplus target makes sense. However, there were many other strong arguments against going for surplus. The strongest of these was the case for additional public-sector investment at a time when interest rates were extremely low. Osborne loved appearing in the media wearing a hard hat and talked the talk on investment, but in reality his fiscal plans involved a steadily decreasing share of public investment in GDP. Labour’s fiscal rules, like those of the coalition government, have targeted the deficit excluding public investment, precisely so that investment could increase when the circumstances were right. In 2015 the circumstances were as right as they can be. The Organisation for Economic Co-operation and Development, the International Monetary Fund and pretty well every economist agreed.

Brexit only reinforces this argument. Yet Brexit will also almost certainly worsen the deficit. This is why the recent acceptance by the Tories that public-sector investment should rise is significant. They may have ­decided that they have got all they could hope to achieve from deficit deceit, and that now is the time to focus on the real needs of the economy, given the short- and medium-term drag on growth caused by Brexit.

It is also worth noting that although the Conservatives have, in effect, disowned Osborne’s 2015 austerity, they still insist their 2010 policy was correct. This partial change of heart is little comfort to those of us who have been arguing against austerity for the past six years. In 2015 the Conservatives persuaded voters that electing Ed Miliband as prime minister and Ed Balls as chancellor was taking a big risk with the economy. What it would have meant, in fact, is that we would already be getting the public investment the Conservatives are now calling for, and we would have avoided both the uncertainty before the EU referendum and Brexit itself.

Many economists before the 2015 election said the same thing, but they made no impact on mediamacro. The number of economists who supported Osborne’s new fiscal charter was vanishingly small but it seemed to matter not one bit. This suggests that if a leading political party wants to ignore mainstream economics and academic economists in favour of simplistic ideas, it can get away with doing so.

As I wrote in March, the failure of debate made me very concerned about the outcome of the EU referendum. Economists were as united as they ever are that Brexit would involve significant economic costs, and the scale of these costs is probably greater than the average loss due to austerity, simply because they are repeated year after year. Yet our warnings were easily deflected with the slogan “Project Fear”, borrowed from the SNP’s nickname for the No campaign in the 2014 Scottish referendum.

It remains unclear whether economists’ warnings were ignored because they were never heard fully or because they were not trusted, but in either case economics as a profession needs to think seriously about what it can do to make itself more relevant. We do not want economics in the UK to change from being called the dismal science to becoming the “I told you so” science.

Some things will not change following the Brexit vote. Mediamacro will go on obsessing about the deficit, and the Conservatives will go on wanting to cut many parts of government expenditure so that they can cut taxes. But the signs are that deficit deceit, creating an imperative that budget deficits must be cut as a pretext for reducing the size of the state, has come to an end in the UK. It will go down in history as probably the most costly macroeconomic policy mistake since the 1930s, causing a great deal of misery to many people’s lives.

Simon Wren-Lewis is a professor of economic policy at the Blavatnik School of Government, University of Oxford. He blogs at: mainlymacro.blogspot.com

 Simon Wren-Lewis is is Professor of Economic Policy in the Blavatnik School of Government at Oxford University, and a fellow of Merton College. He blogs at mainlymacro.

This article first appeared in the 21 July 2016 issue of the New Statesman, The English Revolt