High Speed 2 could have been a maglev, but isn't, and that's OK

High Speed 2 hasn't even been built yet and it looks old-fashioned compared to Japan's maglev trains - but, like Concorde, their futuristic appearance is deceptive.

Right now, there’s a group of ex-politicians from the US being shown around Japan's under-construction Tokyo to Osaka maglev line, the first stretch of which (between Tokyo and Nagoya) is due to open in 2027. When ready, its trains will be able to reach speeds as fast as 500km/h, far speedier than the 360km/h trains the UK will be getting with High Speed 2.

That might seem like a bum deal for us - if we’re spending up to £50bn on a new cross-country rail line, our instincts might make us think that only the most advanced technology available will be value for money. It’s an understandable thought, but it’s misguided.

First, here’s Motherboard’s Michael Byrne on what that group of ex-politicians is thinking of when they look at Japan:

The proposal, simply called the Northeast Maglev (TNEM), is based on a new technology (old new technology, more accurately - it’s been in development for nearly 40 years) currently being tested on a short section of line outside Tokyo called Superconducting Maglev. Japan hopes to eventually drop some $100 billion on a 320 mile line between Tokyo and Osaka. The technology holds the current rail speed record of 361 miles per hour and offers a cruising speed of just over 300 miles per hour. The TNEM group hopes to convince President Obama and regional leaders to go in on a segment of maglev between Baltimore and Washington D.C., requiring some 30 miles of underground tunneling and theoretically cutting transit times between the cities from just under an hour to 15 minutes.

While America may be known as the land of the car, the northeast corridor between New York City and Washington DC has a public transport network that Europeans would recognise (even if they may also laugh at its inadequate, antiquated infrastructure that is in need of significant investment). Trains run at capacity as they’re cheaper than flying and faster than taking the bus, and - like HS2 - new lines are necessary to increase capacity.

Why not build maglevs if they’re the best trains you can buy, though?

The first reason is one familiar to London Underground, which has multiple tunnels built to different widths and which each require unique types of trains to be custom-built every time they're replaced. That’s much more expensive than buying ordinary trains which comply to standard gauge, and the same would apply with maglev - as a new method of transport that’s still in an experimental stage, we might make a mistake and end up choosing a gauge that doesn’t become the international standard.

Or, worse, we might get locked into having to buy our trains from the one company that has the patent on using that kind of maglev standard. We also wouldn’t be able to integrate the trains with the existing High Speed 1 line that goes through the Channel Tunnel, onto the rest of the European rail network. HS2 is going to be used for freight as well as passengers, so that connection is arguably vital for trade with the continent.

Secondly, the thing with very fast modes of transport is they take a lot of time to get up to speed. This is the reasoning behind Elon Musk’s impractical vacuum-tube Hyperloop, which would - if it works, it’s only theoretical right now - fire passengers at 962km/h between Los Angeles and San Francisco, reducing the time for the 570km route between the two cities to 35 minutes. Over longer distances it would be cheaper and more practical to use fast planes, and it can’t be used over a shorter route because it needs the full length of the tube to get up to speed. This applies just as much to maglev.

HS2 will be designed to handle speeds up to 400km/h, but there are few places a maglev train would be able to get faster than that before having to slow down again in time for the next station. Considering the physical size of the UK and the planned gaps between stations, going any faster than 400km/h isn't really any use.

One thing that does go in maglev’s favour is that the 286km line between Tokyo and Osaka is expected to cost roughly £55bn, which is cheaper than the estimates of more than £50bn for the 192km first phase of HS2. Also, while maglev trains do require more energy to run than conventional trains (and, as mentioned, repairs and new parts are more expensive than off-the-shelf alternatives), track maintenance costs tend to be lower than for normal trains as there isn’t any wear or tear.

In Japan, the government is facing criticism for investing in an ambitious new rail line despite forecasts that the country’s population with shrink significantly over the next few decades. That’s not going to be a problem for the UK, which could end up the most populous EU nation by the middle of the century - and for the key aim of increasing capacity, old-fashioned trains on wheels suit us just fine. Taking a punt on a new technology isn't worth the risk.

A Japanese maglev train undergoing a test run. (Photo: Getty)

Ian Steadman is a staff science and technology writer at the New Statesman. He is on Twitter as @iansteadman.

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Hannan Fodder: This week, Daniel Hannan gets his excuses in early

I didn't do it. 

Since Daniel Hannan, a formerly obscure MEP, has emerged as the anointed intellectual of the Brexit elite, The Staggers is charting his ascendancy...

When I started this column, there were some nay-sayers talking Britain down by doubting that I was seriously going to write about Daniel Hannan every week. Surely no one could be that obsessed with the activities of one obscure MEP? And surely no politician could say enough ludicrous things to be worthy of such an obsession?

They were wrong, on both counts. Daniel and I are as one on this: Leave and Remain, working hand in glove to deliver on our shared national mission. There’s a lesson there for my fellow Remoaners, I’m sure.

Anyway. It’s week three, and just as I was worrying what I might write this week, Dan has ridden to the rescue by writing not one but two columns making the same argument – using, indeed, many of the exact same phrases (“not a club, but a protection racket”). Like all the most effective political campaigns, Dan has a message of the week.

First up, on Monday, there was this headline, in the conservative American journal, the Washington Examiner:

“Why Brexit should work out for everyone”

And yesterday, there was his column on Conservative Home:

“We will get a good deal – because rational self-interest will overcome the Eurocrats’ fury”

The message of the two columns is straightforward: cooler heads will prevail. Britain wants an amicable separation. The EU needs Britain’s military strength and budget contributions, and both sides want to keep the single market intact.

The Con Home piece makes the further argument that it’s only the Eurocrats who want to be hardline about this. National governments – who have to answer to actual electorates – will be more willing to negotiate.

And so, for all the bluster now, Theresa May and Donald Tusk will be skipping through a meadow, arm in arm, before the year is out.

Before we go any further, I have a confession: I found myself nodding along with some of this. Yes, of course it’s in nobody’s interests to create unnecessary enmity between Britain and the continent. Of course no one will want to crash the economy. Of course.

I’ve been told by friends on the centre-right that Hannan has a compelling, faintly hypnotic quality when he speaks and, in retrospect, this brief moment of finding myself half-agreeing with him scares the living shit out of me. So from this point on, I’d like everyone to keep an eye on me in case I start going weird, and to give me a sharp whack round the back of the head if you ever catch me starting a tweet with the word, “Friends-”.

Anyway. Shortly after reading things, reality began to dawn for me in a way it apparently hasn’t for Daniel Hannan, and I began cataloguing the ways in which his argument is stupid.

Problem number one: Remarkably for a man who’s been in the European Parliament for nearly two decades, he’s misunderstood the EU. He notes that “deeper integration can be more like a religious dogma than a political creed”, but entirely misses the reason for this. For many Europeans, especially those from countries which didn’t have as much fun in the Second World War as Britain did, the EU, for all its myriad flaws, is something to which they feel an emotional attachment: not their country, but not something entirely separate from it either.

Consequently, it’s neither a club, nor a “protection racket”: it’s more akin to a family. A rational and sensible Brexit will be difficult for the exact same reasons that so few divorcing couples rationally agree not to bother wasting money on lawyers: because the very act of leaving feels like a betrayal.

Or, to put it more concisely, courtesy of Buzzfeed’s Marie Le Conte:

Problem number two: even if everyone was to negotiate purely in terms of rational interest, our interests are not the same. The over-riding goal of German policy for decades has been to hold the EU together, even if that creates other problems. (Exhibit A: Greece.) So there’s at least a chance that the German leadership will genuinely see deterring more departures as more important than mutual prosperity or a good relationship with Britain.

And France, whose presidential candidates are lining up to give Britain a kicking, is mysteriously not mentioned anywhere in either of Daniel’s columns, presumably because doing so would undermine his argument.

So – the list of priorities Hannan describes may look rational from a British perspective. Unfortunately, though, the people on the other side of the negotiating table won’t have a British perspective.

Problem number three is this line from the Con Home piece:

“Might it truly be more interested in deterring states from leaving than in promoting the welfare of its peoples? If so, there surely can be no further doubt that we were right to opt out.”

If there any rhetorical technique more skin-crawlingly horrible, than, “Your response to my behaviour justifies my behaviour”?

I could go on, about how there’s no reason to think that Daniel’s relatively gentle vision of Brexit is shared by Nigel Farage, UKIP, or a significant number of those who voted Leave. Or about the polls which show that, far from the EU’s response to the referendum pushing more European nations towards the door, support for the union has actually spiked since the referendum – that Britain has become not a beacon of hope but a cautionary tale.

But I’m running out of words, and there’ll be other chances to explore such things. So instead I’m going to end on this:

Hannan’s argument – that only an irrational Europe would not deliver a good Brexit – is remarkably, parodically self-serving. It allows him to believe that, if Brexit goes horribly wrong, well, it must all be the fault of those inflexible Eurocrats, mustn’t it? It can’t possibly be because Brexit was a bad idea in the first place, or because liberal Leavers used nasty, populist ones to achieve their goals.

Read today, there are elements of Hannan’s columns that are compelling, even persuasive. From the perspective of 2020, I fear, they might simply read like one long explanation of why nothing that has happened since will have been his fault.

Jonn Elledge is the editor of the New Statesman's sister site CityMetric. He is on Twitter, far too much, as @JonnElledge.