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The Fund is back in town

The tough remedies of the IMF won it few friends and, in recent years, countries have found more obl

A year ago I attended an informal briefing in Washington by a senior British policymaker who lamented the passing of the International Monetary Fund as an institution of any worth. Globalisation meant that bankrupt nations no longer needed IMF medicine to cure their ills. Rather, they could obtain all the finance they required from the global banking system without strings attached.

Instead of a nasty IMF able to topple governments - as almost happened in Britain during the sterling crisis of 1976 - the world needed a different kind of international authority: one that was slimmer, cheaper to run, fleeter of foot and able to provide advice on the great global issues of the day, such as the mismatch of exchange rates between the US dollar and the Chinese yuan.

The IMF could no longer rely on the interest rate charges it received on loans to support its operations, as the last of a previous generation of big borrowers, Argentina and Brazil, paid back their debts by the start of 2006, two years ahead of schedule. To stay afloat, the IMF would have to sell off some of its huge gold reserves, paid in by western governments as the Second World War drew to a close. That same year, the governor of the Bank of England, Mervyn King, warned that the Fund was in danger of "slipping into obscurity".

How rapidly things changed. By the spring of 2008 the IMF, under the leadership of the then recently appointed managing director, Dominique Strauss-Kahn, a socialist and former French finance minister, was among the first global organisations to predict doom for the world's banking system. When it suggested the eventual losses from the US sub-prime debacle could reach $1trn, this was airily dismissed by bankers and policymakers as scaremongering. It is now clear that the eventual cost could be at least twice that.

Now, a crisis that began in the more recherché areas of the banking system is spreading far and wide. Countries from Iceland to Pakistan are knocking on the doors of the IMF's fortress-like headquarters in Washington, a few hundred yards from the White House, asking for advice and money. The Fund is back in business.

It is unfortunate, therefore, that just as the IMF is starting to be revitalised by the task of saving global capitalism from itself, it has been bedevilled by allegations concerning the priapic behaviour of its leader. Strauss-Kahn now finds himself under investigation by one of the world's largest law firms (on behalf of the IMF's board) over allegations of an improper relationship with a former member of staff, Piroska Nagy, an economist who worked in the Fund's Africa department. Nagy, a Hungarian national, has since moved on to work for the European Bank for Reconstruction and Development but, according to the Wall Street Journal, may have received "an excessive pay-off" when she left.

The incident will rekindle memories of the departure of Paul Wolfowitz from the World Bank in June 2007, after similar allegations of an affair with a member of staff. In both cases, the complex politics of the Bretton Woods institutions played a part. Wolfowitz was under fire for his neoconservative views and for using the Bank to support regimes he favoured. Strauss-Kahn is being targeted for his advocacy of tight market regulation and his support of Keynesian policies to refloat the global economy.

Irrespective of what the investigators turn up at the IMF (in the Wolfowitz case, a huge dossier of documents eventually emerged), it would be calamitous if Strauss-Kahn were forced to step aside at present.

The IMF's previous boss, Rodrigo Rato, resigned for mysterious "personal reasons" in October 2007, midway through his term of office. This exposed a huge rift over the traditional, undemocratic way in which the leaders of the IMF and World Bank are chosen. His torically, the Europeans - when they eventually agree among themselves - have chosen the managing director of the IMF, while the Americans have chosen the president of the World Bank.

This convention has so far blocked Asian, Russian and Latin American access to these hugely influential jobs.

The last thing the world needs now, with the banking and financial system on the edge of a precipice and the capital markets all but closed down, is a long-drawn-out fight over financial leadership. As we saw in the US Congress, when the Treasury's $700bn bailout of American banking was first rejected, politics plays badly on Wall Street and financial markets around the world. A fight for the soul of the IMF, in the middle of a crisis, could be dangerous.

The flow of capital from the west to emerging market economies is under severe pressure because of the banking catastrophe. Last year, emerging markets received inflows of $900bn from western financial institutions. This year, the figure will be only $56bn, thus starving countries across the world of the money they need to service their debts, to invest and to buy goods on global markets.

Moreover, nations holding large foreign exchange reserves, such as China and the oil-rich Gulf states, are pulling in their horns because of market uncertainty. It is when the flow of capital dries up that the global “lender of last resort”, the IMF, comes into play.

In the 1980s, the IMF was at the forefront of economic reform in Latin America. The arrival of IMF teams with proposals to end food subsidies would often result in rioting on the streets. In the 1990s, the Fund turned its attention to the former Soviet Union and its satellites, unleashing a period of klepto-capitalism.

This time around, Iceland, which has caused so much grief for British local authorities and consumers, is at the front of the queue and will collect $3.5bn in loans. Iceland is a classic case of a country in need. The banks have been nationalised. The currency, the krona, has fallen 18 per cent since March, and interest rates have been raised to 15 per cent with little noticeable effect.

But what is true of Iceland is typical of many nations around the world that have been able to live beyond their means because of the explosion in free capital flows. No one has worried about running a balance-of-payments deficit, because the assumption has always been that there will be a bank or foreign investment fund willing to meet the difference.

The year 2008 is starting to feel like 1996-97, when the Asian economies were under siege and suffered a precipitous drop in living standards.

Eastern European economies led by Hungary and Ukraine are struggling to remain solvent. South Korea, having had a run on its currency, has made a desperate call to Washington. Tur key, a perennial IMF client, is back in trouble. And Pakistan, up to its neck in debt and political unrest, also needs a bailout.

It could all become much worse, and developing nations are likely to be the victims hardest hit. One of the features of a slump is falling prices for primary goods and commodities. Just since July, commodity prices have fallen 37 per cent, cutting off a huge source of income for growers and people working in the mining industry. With western banks in disarray, there is little possibility that private capital flows will fill the vacuum. The only choice countries will have is to borrow from the IMF, whose money does not come cheap. And its loan fees come with austerity packages attached.

Strauss-Kahn may plead the Keynesian case to save the world from depression, but the IMF economists have been trained on a diet of balanced budgets, an end to subsidy, and privatisation. The result can be politically disruptive and socially divisive. The Fund is back and there is no reason to believe that it will be any more accommodating than in the past. That is not its way.

Alex Brummer is City editor of the Daily Mail

This article first appeared in the 27 October 2008 issue of the New Statesman, The death of Gucci capitalism

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Inside the minds of the Isis murderers

As pressure on the terror group who claimed responsiblity for the Manchester attack intensifies, the threat to Britain will only become more acute.

The police and security services had consistently warned that a significant terrorist attack in Britain was inevitable. Yet no warning could have prepared us for the horror of the suicide attack on the Manchester Arena on Monday night. Twenty-two people were killed and at least 60 were wounded as they were leaving a concert by Ariana Grande in what was the most deadly attack in Britain since the London bombings of 7 July 2005, in which 56 people died.

Like the London bombers, the Manchester suicide attacker, Salman Ramadan Abedi, was British. He was 22, lived in Manchester and studied business management at Salford University before dropping out. He worshipped at Didsbury Mosque. The son of Libyans, Abedi is said to have returned recently from a visit to the North African country, where Islamic State has a foothold.

Ariana Grande is a former children’s TV star who made her name on channels such as Nickelodeon. Her fan base is overwhelmingly young and female, and many of those killed or wounded were children, including Saffie Rose Roussos, an eight-year-old girl from Leyland, Lancashire.

Islamic State inevitably claimed responsibility for the massacre, dismissing the victims as “crusaders”, “polytheists” and “worshippers of the cross”. This is not the first time Islamist terrorists have targeted children.

A Chechen jihadist group calling itself ­Riyad-us Saliheen (meaning “Gardens of the Righteous”) took more than 1,100 hostages, including 777 children, in a school siege in Beslan, Russia, in September 2004. In the event, more than 330 were massacred, including 186 children. Gunmen from the Pakistani Taliban also stormed a school in 2014, killing 148.

For terrorist actors, these are neither whimsical nor irrational acts. Contemporary jihadist movements have curated a broad and expansive intellectual ecosystem that rationalises and directs their actions. What they want is to create an asymmetry of fear by employing indiscriminate barbarism to intimidate and subdue their opponents into submission.

We have grown accustomed to a wave of terrorist attacks being carried out in the name of the self-styled Islamic State ever since the group’s official spokesman Abu Muhammad al-Adnani began prioritising them in 2014. (He was killed in an American air strike on Aleppo province in Syria in August last year.)

The US-led coalition against Islamic State has weakened the terror group in its former strongholds of Mosul in Iraq and Raqqa in Syria. In response, IS has been forced to concentrate more on what it calls “external operations” – by which it means inspiring its sympathisers and operatives to carry out attacks on Western countries. Indeed, al-Adnani encouraged the group’s supporters not to migrate towards IS-held territory but rather to focus their efforts on attacks in their home countries.

“The tiniest action you do in the heart of their [Western] land is dearer to us than the biggest action by us,” he said in an audio statement released last year. “There are no innocents in the heart of the lands of the crusaders.”

Islamic State refers to its strategy as “just terror”. Its framing places culpability for attacks on Western states on these nations themselves by claiming that IS actions are a response to aggression or assault. That much has been outlined in the group’s literature. “When will the crusaders end their hostilities towards Islam and the Muslims? . . . When will they recognise that the solution to their pathetic turmoil is right before their blinded eyes?” the militants ask in the IS magazine Dabiq. “Until then, the just terror will continue to strike them to the core of their deadened hearts.”

IS offered a rationale of this sort as justification for its bombing of a Russian commercial aircraft – Metrojet Flight 9268, travelling from Sharm el-Sheikh in Egypt to St Petersburg. That attack in October 2015 killed 224. Similar reasoning was offered for the attacks in Paris the following month in which 137 people were killed, in a series of co-ordinated, commando-style gun and bomb outrages across the city.

“Revenge was exacted upon those who felt safe,” IS declared in Dabiq. “Let the world know that we are living today in a new era. Whoever was heedless must now be alert. Whoever was sleeping must now awaken . . . The [caliphate] will take revenge for any aggression against its religion and people, sooner rather than later. Let the ­arrogant know that the skies and the lands are Allah’s.”

***

Through my academic research at King’s College London, I have ­interviewed scores of Westerners who became foreign fighters in Syria and Iraq to quiz them about their motives. Last year, one man from High Wycombe who had joined IS told me that it wanted to attack British targets in response to the vote in the House of Commons to extend British air strikes against IS targets to include sites in Syria (the British had only been targeting the group in Iraq until that point). “Do they [the British government] expect us to sit back and do nothing? ­Idiots,” he said.

In this respect, IS frames its attacks as acts of “revenge” and predicates its response on the Islamic principle of qisas, which is comparable to lex talionis or the doctrine of “an eye for an eye”. Qisas was always intended to be a tool of private redress for an individual or his/her family to seek justice in matters relating to bodily harm. Typically, it relates to cases of murder and manslaughter, or acts involving physical mutilation (say, leading to loss of limbs). The principle creates a framework for retributive justice.

The contemporary Salafi-jihadi movement has adopted a particularly innovative approach to the concept of qisas in two ways. First, groups such as IS have taken the idea and construed it in a way that justifies indiscriminate terrorism, such as the attack in Manchester. They argue that qisas has a political dimension and that it can be applied to international affairs in a way that holds civilians responsible for the perceived crimes of their governments.

Second, qisas is normally applied only in cases where the aggressor is known. IS, by contrast, holds every citizen-stranger of an enemy state responsible for the actions of his or her government. Thus, when it released its statement claiming responsibility for the Manchester attack, it said that it had struck against a “gathering of the crusaders . . . in response to their transgressions against the lands of the Muslims”.

It is this militaristic construction of qisas that allows IS to rationalise the bombing of a venue where large numbers of young girls had gathered to watch a pop concert, dismissing them as “crusaders”.

This is not new. In 1997, Osama Bin Laden told CBS News that “all Americans are our enemies, not just the ones who fight us directly, but also the ones who pay their ­taxes”. His rationale was that all Americans, by virtue of citizenship alone, are vicariously liable for the actions of their government.

Just a few years later, Bin Laden used the same idea to justify the 11 September 2001 attacks and also invoked it in reference to the Israeli-Palestinian conflict. “The blood pouring out of Palestine must be equally revenged,” he wrote. “You must know that the Palestinians do not cry alone; their women are not widowed alone; their sons are not orphaned alone.”

IS used the concept most dramatically in January 2015, when it burned alive a Royal Jordanian Air Force pilot, Muath al-Kasasbeh, whose plane had crashed in its territory. A video of the killing was circulated on the internet and social media. The group claimed his bombing raids had killed civilians and that it wanted to punish him with “equal retaliation”, in keeping with qisas.

What is well known about al-Kasasbeh’s murder is that he was burned alive inside a cage – but that is not the whole story. To understand how IS tethered this to the principle of qisas, it is the end of the gruesome video that is invested with most significance. After al-Kasasbeh has died, a truck emerges and dumps rubble over the cage. It was claimed this was debris from a site he had bombed, thus completing the “equal retaliation” of returning like for like. The idea was that IS had retaliated using the two principal forms in which a missile attack kills – by fire or debris.

***

The Manchester attack came on the fourth anniversary of the brutal murder of Fusilier Lee Rigby in Woolwich, south London. Rigby was killed by Michael Adebolajo and Michael Adebowale in the middle of the afternoon on a street outside a military barracks. That attack was in keeping with a pattern we have become increasingly accustomed to in Europe: an unsophisticated plot that employs ordinary, everyday items – a car, say, or a knife.

The consequences of such attacks have been seen across Europe, most notably in Nice on 14 July 2016, when 86 people were killed during Bastille Day celebrations after a jihadist drove a truck into crowds on the promenade. Similar attacks followed in Berlin, Westminster and Stockholm.

The security services find that these murderous attacks are extremely hard to disrupt because they typically involve lone actors who can mobilise quickly and with discretion. The Manchester attack was different. Explosives were used, which means the plot was inherently more sophisticated, requiring careful planning and preparation.

We know that two of the 7/7 bombers had previously trained in Pakistan’s lawless tribal regions, where they honed their skills. In other plots, such as the connected attacks in London and Glasgow Airport of 2007, the explosive devices failed mainly because the bomb-makers had found it difficult to travel abroad and develop their skills in safe environments. Whatever Abedi’s connections, the long war in Syria and Iraq has once again created a permissive environment for terrorist training and attack planning.

The devastating impact of this has already been felt across Europe. Since the Syrian uprising began in 2011, more than 800 Britons are believed to have travelled there to fight. From Europe as a whole, the figure is over 5,000, of which a significant number are believed to have joined IS. Of the British contingent, the security services estimate that about half have returned or become disengaged from the conflict. Of those who remained, a hundred are believed to be active, the rest having been killed.

It is improbable that Abedi acted alone in Manchester or that this plot had no international component. Indeed, he was already known to the authorities (and had returned recently from Libya). As pressure on IS intensifies across Syria and Iraq, the threat to Britain will only become more acute as the group’s sympathisers prepare for what they consider to be a fightback.

This speaks to the scale of the threat facing Britain, and Europe more generally. Our police and security services have been stretched and continuously tested in recent years. Just recently, in March, the Metropolitan Police assistant commissioner Mark Rowley told Radio 4’s Today programme that 13 plots had been thwarted since Lee Rigby’s murder in 2013. Put another way, the police have disrupted terrorist plots every four months for the past four years.

Naturally, Islamic State is not the only threat. On 13 May, one of Osama Bin Laden’s sons, Hamza, released a video, titled “Advice for martyrdom-seekers in the West”, on behalf of al-Qaeda. Hamza, 27, who was his father’s favoured successor to lead the group, called on its supporters to concentrate on attacks in the West rather than migrating to conflict zones in the Middle East and beyond. Scenes of previous ­terrorist attacks in Britain played throughout the video.

The central leadership of al-Qaeda is increasingly looking for opportunities to reassert itself after being eclipsed by Islamic State and losing control of its affiliates in Syria. It needs attacks and a cause in the West with which to revive itself. Hamza therefore cited the January 2015 Charlie Hebdo attack in Paris as a critical example, calling for the assassination of anyone deemed to have “insulted” Islam.

The Charlie Hebdo attack was especially important for al-Qaeda because it enabled the group to transcend the fratricidal conflicts that frequently define relations between the various jihadist groups. In Syria, for instance, al-Qaeda’s affiliates (when it had better control over them) and Islamic State have been in open war with each other.

Yet, the Charlie Hebdo attack brought warm praise from the group’s Islamist rivals because none of them wanted to appear ­unsupportive of an atrocity that had, as the terrorists proclaimed, “avenged” the Prophet Muhammad’s honour.

The British man from High Wycombe who joined IS told me the group had welcomed the attack for precisely those reasons. It was something that, in his view, had confirmed the “nobility” of the attackers, even if they had not been members of IS.

Is it too late for the West to save itself, I asked him. What if the West simply accepted all of Islamic State’s demands: would that provide respite?

The answer was as emphatic as it was stark: “We primarily fight wars due to ppl [sic] being disbelievers. Their drones against us are a secondary issue.”

He went on: “Their kufr [disbelief] against Allah is sufficient of a reason for us to invade and kill them. Only if they stop their kufr will they no longer be a target.”

In other words, we are all guilty, and we are all legitimate targets.

Shiraz Maher is a contributing writer for the New Statesman and a senior research fellow at King’s College London’s International Centre for the Study of Radicalisation.

This article first appeared in the 25 May 2017 issue of the New Statesman, Why Islamic State targets Britain

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