Salman Rushdie. Photograph: Getty Images
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Salman Rushdie versus the mullocracy

Colin MacCabe reviews "Joseph Anton: a Memoir".

Joseph Anton: a Memoir
Salman Rushdie
Jonathan Cape, 656pp, £25

The first policeman would arrive at our house up to an hour early to make an initial search. It was before the days of mobile phones but there would be a lot of traffic on sophisticated walkie-talkies and then a large black car would pull up outside. Our front door would be opened as the car stopped and a man wearing a baseball cap would emerge. Once he was inside, the cap would be removed, the door shut and, except for the policemen watching television upstairs in one of the children’s rooms, it would be just another dinner party in Islington.

Nobody thought it extraordinary at the time but this book reminds us that it was. Ours was one of many houses in which Salman Rushdie was always welcome as a guest after he had been condemned to death by the mullocracy in Tehran. What was extraordinary, as this book insists on several occasions, was not just that so many friends – and we were in the outer circle – were determined to offer him hospitality and refuge but that they kept it secret. In nearly ten years, no word of any kind leaked out. The chattering classes didn’t chatter.

The title page of Joseph Anton announces a memoir, the genre of our age, and from one perspective that is an accurate description. The book takes us through a childhood in Bombay and then boarding school at Rugby; our pro­tagonist studies at Cambridge before becoming an advertising copywriter in London. He is desperate to become a writer and desperate to understand his translated situation, to conjugate his Indian and his English selves. These twin desperations fuse and give rise to a great novel, Midnight’s Children, which is both Rushdie’s story and the story of modern India. He follows this with Shame, a much shorter novel but equally fine, which takes as its topic Pakistan.

If these two novels bear witness to Rushdie’s experience of being brought up as an Indian Muslim and to a partitioned subcontinent, they do not address his experience in England or his experience as a Londoner. London is the site of his comfortable, middle-class existence and the destination of the vast numbers of immigrants who have made the journey from the subcontinent in altogether more uncertain circumstances. He thus conceives of a book with ambition far outstripping that of his previous, very ambitious books; it is an attempt, as Milton put it, to achieve “things unattempted yet in prose or rhyme”.

If this memoir were a conventional addition to the form, then the part of the story that takes us through the first two-thirds of the writer’s life would have taken up about 400 pages of this book of more than 600 pages. Yet a little more than 70 pages are devoted to it. The reason for this is that the ambitious book Rushdie publishes, at the age of 42, is The Satanic Verses. Joseph Anton is not, then, a memoir in the sense of a subjective account of a life; rather, that account is part of a history, of an objective account of what happened after the author was condemned to death by Ayatollah Khomeini.

The book opens with a bravura account of 14 February 1989, the day Rushdie was woken by a phone call from a BBC reporter asking him how it felt to be sentenced to death. This prologue is followed by the account of his life up to that day, a story that will be familiar to readers of Midnight’s Children and The Satanic Verses, for Rushdie shares many details of his life with Saleem Sinai and Saladin Chamcha, his fictional alter egos.

Rushdie further signals his distance from the memoir form with his decision to write not in the first but in the third person. This device, slightly odd in the discussion of his early life, pays off once Khomeini has pronounced his sentence. For at that moment Rushdie the writer, well known internationally in literary circles, becomes a world-historical figure – his name instantly recognisable around the globe. Rushdie is well aware of the almost accidental nature of this fame and the distancing device by which he turns himself into a figure in a wider history works brilliantly. It is the formal analogue of the extraordinary psychic adjustment that he had to make in order to cope with events that would have driven many insane. Indeed, he could have been forgiven for succumbing to paranoia or megalomania.

The extent of Rushdie’s fame was brought home to me in 1997 when, while he was still under full security protection, he came to give a reading at the University of Pittsburgh, where I teach. When he entered a hall packed with 800 members of the faculty and students, the audience erupted into a five-minute ovation quite unlike any reception I have ever witnessed in an academic setting.

Equally memorable was the occasion when I took him to an Italian restaurant high above Mount Washington so that he could enjoy a spectacular view of Pittsburgh and its three rivers. The restaurant had not been alerted to the visit but we were barely through the front door when the barman, who looked more like a character from The Sopranos than a habitué of libraries and bookshops, abandoned his post to greet us formally: “Mr Rushdie, it is a great honour to welcome you to our restaurant.”

Anybody who comes under the kind of protection that Rushdie was accorded after the fatwa must choose a pseudonym, a nom de guerre. He composed his, Joseph Anton, from the first names of Conrad and Chekhov and this name gives the book its title. Rushdie is a historian by training and the book is perhaps best described as a chronicle. It takes us step by step through the events following the fatwa: first, the battle of ideas, then the political struggle. In both strands, there are the good, who defend stalwartly a friend and a cause; the bad, who through fear, jealousy or stupidity abandon the most elementary defence of freedom; and the ugly, a succession of clerics and bigots who want the unbeliever killed as quickly as possible. In this unlovely gallery, Iqbal Sacranie, Tony Blair’s favourite Muslim, cuts a peculiarly disgusting figure.

The story Rushdie tells is never less than gripping. And there are moments, particularly in his description of his now regretted reconversion to Islam, when he writes as well as he has ever done. And there are also the personal details: an account of a much-married, uxorious man and most insistently, perhaps, the thoughts of a devoted father.

When Rushdie first told me in the mid-1980s of the new novel he was writing, which had as its centre Quranic verses accepting other gods that the Prophet then disowned, he was emphatic that what he wanted to do was to create a space in which one could pay one’s respects to Islamic culture without believing in God. This was his unforgiveable sin. If he had written a book that repeated the ludicrous slanders of medieval Christianity to the effect that a Christian necromancer had dictated the Quran to Muhammad or that he had died making love to a Jewess and then his body was eaten by pigs, no mullah would have felt threatened. For Muhammad, unlike Moses and Jesus, is a fully historical prophet. We know exactly how he lived and died.

Equally, a full-frontal attack from the perspective of modern atheism, à la Richard Daw­kins or Christopher Hitchens, in which the whole edifice of belief is reduced to nonsense would have troubled no one. What Rushdie dared to do was to attempt to appropriate the Islamic tradition for unbelievers, to take it out of the hands of the clerics. Ayatollah Khomeini didn’t have to read the book to recognise it for the threat it was and perhaps still is.

Sadly – but probably inevitably – reading this otherwise inspiring book jostles with the recognition that Rushdie has now given up this struggle. Islam is as the Islamophobes would have it. Early on in Joseph Anton, as he describes the moment at which Midnight’s Children took shape, he writes: “He was a historian by training and the great point of history, which was to understand how indi­vidual lives, communities, nations and social classes were shaped by great force yet retained at times, the ability to change the direction of those forces, must also be the point of his fiction.”

However, no attempt is made to offer a historical explanation of Islamic fundamentalism; instead, in the architecture of the book, it becomes as incomprehensible as the malignant birds in Alfred Hitchcock’s great movie.

Islamic fundamentalism, like its Christian counterpart, is a recent phenomenon. “Born again” as an adjective does not occur in American English until 1959. The thinking of al-Qaeda springs from the writings of Sayyid Qutb in the same decade. To an old-fashioned Marxist, the explanation is obvious: these fundamental­isms indicate the failures of capitalism to offer even the hope of a system of global justice in which the staggering advances in knowledge and science over the past 400 years would contribute to the general well-being of the species.

The academic Darko Suvin once remarked that the desire to be born again amounted to an immanent critique of capitalism. Islamic fundamentalism is born in the failures of third-world socialism. If its intolerant ideas must be continuously contested – and Rushdie’s book shows him as eloquent as ever in this contest – they will only evaporate with social and political changes of which there is currently little sign.

Colin MacCabe is distinguished professor of English and Film at the University of Pittsburgh

This article first appeared in the 24 September 2012 issue of the New Statesman, Lib Dem special

Picture: SÉBASTIEN THIBAULT
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Jeremy Corbyn, Emmanuel Macron and the age of volatility

The rise of populism in Britain and France is the result of a restless “crowd electorate”. Both countries' future stability depends on their changing relationship with the EU.

Britain seems to have joined the rest of the democratic world in the volatility of its politics. Electorates are no longer armies, but crowds. Identities shaped by religion, class, region, ideology and tradition weaken. Conventional parties are hollowed out, and disoriented and angry voters turn to single-issue campaigns or insurgent populism. In every country this takes diverse forms shaped by political institutions and political cultures – Donald Trump and Bernie Sanders in America, Marine Le Pen and Emmanuel Macron in France, Beppe Grillo and the Five Star Movement in Italy, Nigel Farage’s Ukip and now Jeremy Corbyn’s Labour Party.

The trend, noticeable from the 1990s, was analysed in a now classic work by Peter Mair, Ruling the Void: the Hollowing of Western Democracy, which was published in 2013, two years after the author’s death. Elected governments had conceded powers to non-elected agencies such as the IMF, the World Bank, the World Trade Organisation (WTO), and above all the EU. Politicians had become professionals, largely detached from civil society and operating increasingly within these international institutions, “safe from the demands of voters”. Citizens were decreasingly willing to join professionalised political parties financed by large donors or public funds, or to identify strongly with them.

Membership fell across Europe and beyond, and among the sharpest falls were those in France and Britain, where levels of political participation had previously been high. Electoral turnout fell too.

As Mair saw it, “hand in hand with indifference goes inconsistency”, as low levels of participation were paralleled by rising levels of volatility. People who did vote for mainstream parties often changed allegiances at random, and made up their minds at the last minute in response to short-term factors. Others flooded into new movements, or even old ones that reinvented themselves as enemies of the system.

The political effects of the 2007-08 banking crisis are still being felt everywhere and subsequent policy failures have aggravated the discrediting of elites. Naturally, the most volatile element has been the young. Youthful radicalism is hardly new. In my youth, inspiration came from Mao, Che Guevara and even the Khmer Rouge. Now it comes from elderly white males such as Bernie Sanders, Jeremy Corbyn and Jean-Luc Mélenchon, who seem able to present old remedies as new revelations to those inevitably lacking political memory. Historians are perhaps tempted to seek precedents. My own choice is the 18th-century radical John Wilkes. His brilliantly provocative tactics made fools of successive governments and appealed to a largely London-based electorate.

Wilkes’s secret – apart from barefaced cheek – was that he was not seeking office. It has been liberating for Sanders, Corbyn and Mélenchon that they were not expected, and did not expect, to win, and hence were free to run election campaigns that were not programmes of government but protest movements aimed at generating maximum support and momentum. Brexit seems to have further liberated the British left. Only the hardest of Brexits would give free rein to a radical programme of nationalisation and support to industry, which would contravene EU legislation on equal competition and restrictions on state aids.

This kind of populism is a new phenomenon in modern British politics, because never has a major party entered a campaign with such an absolute conviction that it would lose. And never has the Labour Party been so dominated by the ideas and campaigning style of the hard Left: the ubiquitous rent-a-crowd, the conspiracy theories, the violence of language (especially online), the ruthless and immediate politicisation of national tragedies. This old recipe has been given unprecedented dynamism by social media. It is populism in its purest form: a movement purporting to represent “the many” against a corrupt and remote system.

Populism is unlikely to come to power in normal circumstances because of its evident risks. However, volatility is now “normal” and accidents happen.

The two most successful populists are Donald Trump and Emmanuel Macron. Both won only with the help of a chapter of accidents. The divisions in the Democratic Party, the peculiarities of the American voting system and the accusations directed at Hilary Clinton’s email system were crucial for Trump. The collapse of François Hollande’s Socialist presidency and the meltdown of the Parti Socialiste following Mélenchon’s populist challenge from the left, along with the “Penelopegate” scandal enveloping the conservative presidential favourite, François Fillon, have delivered both the presidency and a huge parliamentary majority to Macron. What might have resulted in Britain had the Grenfell Tower tragedy happened a few days before the poll?

***

Macron’s extraordinary victory in France, which some hail as a defeat of populism, is its most brilliant success. Macron came from outside politics, set up a new movement, and pledged to “renew” and “moralise” politics by recruiting half his party candidates from civil society and half from women, and excluding all with criminal records. His La République En Marche! has crushed the other parties. Unlike Trump, he has moved smoothly into power as if born to it.

The Fifth Republic is a “republican monarchy” and Macron seems to be pushing the system as far as it will go. His inauguration ceremonies equalled or exceeded the regal style of his loftiest predecessors, Charles de Gaulle, Valéry Giscard d’Estaing and François Mitterrand. He has been dubbed “Jupiter in the Elysée”, above the public fray, refusing to speak to journalists except in circumstances of his own choosing, and tightly muzzling his aides and ministers. Macron has ensconced himself in his palace with a tiny number of trusted young advisers – perhaps, as with Trump, a direct consequence of a populism that rejects established political elites. He has also begun an intensive centralisation and politicisation of the civil service, assuming the power to decide the reappointment or replacement of several hundred top officials.

However, Jupiter has an Achilles heel. The solidity of his support in the country is uncertain, and hence much depends on his cunning and charisma. This may seem paradoxical for the leader of a populist movement, but perhaps it is a fundamental feature of a politics that bypasses intermediaries and relies on the volatile support of the crowd-electorate: Trump, Macron, Corbyn, Farage, Mélenchon, Grillo – all one-man bands.


Emmanuel Macron’s success represents a populist eruption from the centre. Photo: Getty

In France’s recent legislative elections only 43 per cent of the electorate voted –probably the lowest turnout in a national election in its democratic history – due to uncertainty or suspicion. One survey puts the level of Macron’s positive support at only 11 per cent. His left-wing opponents have announced their intention of shifting the contest from the ballot box to the street, and Mélenchon has called for a “civic general strike”. Macron’s slick middle-class populism might have to confront the tough populism of the old left. I wouldn’t care to bet on the outcome.

How French and British politics develop in this time of volatility depends on the countries’ changing relationship with the European Union. France has chronic youth unemployment and its economic performance has long been sluggish. Some of its wounds are self-inflicted, but underlying them is the problem of the eurozone and the disparity of economic behaviour between France (and southern Europe) and Germany.

As long as the eurozone is managed as at present, this problem is insoluble. Germany is permanently in surplus and presses austerity on the laggards. France, while a less extreme case than Italy, needs Germany to agree to expand state borrowing by setting up eurobonds backed by the EU (that is, by Germany) and with an EU finance minister to control national budgets – hence, removing another core function of democratic governments. France’s future rests on Macron’s success. If his bold attempt to change France and the EU fails, it is hard to see where the country can go next.

Brexit may prove an easier prospect than that facing Macron, but its successful management – not least because of its centrality in the national debate – is equally crucial to our political stability. A crisis here could mean the wreckage of the Conservative Party, Jeremy Corbyn in Downing Street, turmoil in Northern Ireland and the breakaway of Scotland. Readers may regard some or all of these outcomes with favour.

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Theresa May’s failure to secure a majority has revived doubts about how resolved the British really are. Labour’s side-stepping of the issue – accepting Brexit but not the Prime Minister’s version of it – was electorally clever but adds to the uncertainty. Adopting David Cameron’s approach to negotiation, Corbyn declares that “there is no such thing as ‘no deal’”. This inevitably encourages those in the EU who wish Brexit to be damaging enough to deter others: there have already been provocative statements from Jean-Claude Juncker and Guy Verhofstadt. Macron recently declared that “the door is always open” to Britain dropping Brexit; reversing national electoral choices is something the EU has past form on.

Quasi-Remainers of all parties are trying to strip the issue of everything except “jobs and the economy”, blithely denying the importance of democratic legitimacy, national sovereignty, immigration, strategic security and the future of the EU itself. Imagine the divisive effects on British politics and British society if a future government were forced to apologise for the referendum and asked to be readmitted to the EU: bitter recrimination, national humiliation, evaporation of international influence – all far beyond anything we are experiencing today

It would deliver a death blow to any attempt to reassert democratic choice over bureaucratic and financial power within Europe, and would mark the effective eclipse of national sovereignty for the foreseeable future. Nor would it make sense in the long run: the eurozone, if it is to survive, must create greater central control, which hardly anyone in Britain accepts; so we would in any case find ourselves on the outside.

The effort to restrict debate to “jobs and the economy” is based on reiteration of the dogma that Brexit threatens economic disaster. This revives the narrative created during the referendum campaign, whose most influential element was the official report produced by George Osborne’s Treasury. The IMF and the Organisation for Economic Co-operation and Development naturally followed Whitehall’s lead: that is how such bodies operate. The Treasury predicted that a “no deal” Brexit would cost around 7.5 per cent of GDP by 2030, an average loss of £6,600 per family. Even some Remainers were alarmed at what seemed a politicisation of the civil service. The former governor of the Bank of England Mervyn King has since described the report as “not an objective presentation of the facts”.

Nevertheless, the report had a huge impact on the referendum (most Remain voters said they were motivated mainly by economic fears) and its pessimism continues to overshadow the Brexit negotiations and provide grist to the mill of anti-Brexit groups in the UK and beyond: “we didn’t vote to become poorer”.

Significantly, the Treasury refuses to discuss with academics how it arrived at its forecast. However, a group of economists based in Cambridge, led by Graham Gudgin and Ken Coutts, has for the first time applied the standard scientific method of verification by trying to reproduce the Treasury’s results using the same economic models. Their findings, now accessible through Policy Exchange (“A Critique of Estimates of the Economic Impact of Brexit”), are startling.

Astonishingly (or perhaps not) the Treasury did not produce an estimate of the effects on UK trade of leaving the EU. Instead, it worked out the average importance of EU trade for all 28 member states, including the new eastern European states that do most of their trade within the EU. It also adopted a long time-scale, rather than focusing on the years since the creation of the euro – which have seen a slowing of intra-EU trade generally, and for the UK particularly.

This approach greatly magnifies the importance of EU trade for Britain, which is less than for any other EU country, and which has been declining in importance for years. Finally, the Treasury made the extraordinary assumption that if Britain did less trade with the EU, it would not be able to compensate significantly by embarking on more trade outside the EU – even though its non-EU trade has been growing and shows a favourable balance. In consequence of these methods, the Treasury prediction of the results of a “hard Brexit” was a considerable exaggeration.

Using the same methods as the Treasury, but applying data relating specifically to the UK rather than to the EU as a whole, the Cambridge researchers reach a very different conclusion. Even if it proved impossible to reach a free trade agreement and the UK reverted to trading under WTO rules (“falling off a cliff”, as some express it) there would be “only a minor loss” in overall GDP by 2030, as tariffs in 90 per cent of products have already been more than compensated for by the fall in a previously over-valued sterling. As for per capita GDP – that is, average living standards – they predict that this could actually rise if the rate of immigration were reduced.

So no deal is clearly better than a bad deal, including the “soft Brexit” advocated by Corbyn and others: to leave the single market but stay in the customs union. This would mean being unable to trade freely either inside or outside the EU or to influence EU policies from within.

In short, we have no reason to be frightened by the Brexit negotiations. Being inside or outside the EU has made no difference to our economic fortunes: our national wealth has increased at exactly the same rate as that of the US for the period since 1945. We are not facing economic disaster. It is not the case, as Nick Clegg recently asserted, that we face a choice between “painful concessions” and “economic disruption”.

Moreover, Britain is a major power independently of its ties with the EU. The international relations specialist and New Statesman contributing writer Brendan Simms estimates that it is the third power in the world after the US and China because of its wealth, size, “soft power”, military potency, and its relative internal cohesion and long-term political stability. A good relationship with Britain is important for the security, stability and prosperity of the whole European continent. Unless we play our hand extraordinarily badly in these negotiations, the outcome should reduce the potential of that volatile populism of which we are presently feeling the shock: volatility, after all, is a two-way process.

Peter Mair feared the democratic world was losing control of its political institutions, and thought it “not at all clear how that control might be regained”. Brexit should, as many of us hope, provide the beginning of an answer.

Robert Tombs is the author of “The English and their History” (Penguin) 

This article first appeared in the 24 September 2012 issue of the New Statesman, Lib Dem special