Jeff Bezos poses on a lorry after handing over a two billion dollar cheque to Indian Vice President and Country Manager of Amazon.in, Amit Agarwal, in Bangalore. Photo: Manjunath Kiran/AFP/Getty
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The party is over for Amazon

The retail giant was unstoppable – until this year. What happened?

At Business Insider’s annual Ignition conference Tuesday, CEO Jeff Bezos explained why Amazon’s stock price keeps rising despite almost zero profits: the company continues to invest in new businesses, and Amazon’s investors are OK with that. “If you’re going to take bold bets, they’re going to be experiments,” he said. “And if they’re experiments, you don't know ahead of time if they're going to work. Experiments are by their very nature prone to failure. But a few big successes compensate for dozens and dozens of things that didn’t work.”

But Amazon hit a road bump in 2014: its stock is down 18 per cent, and investors are no longer optimistic about the company’s outlook. This year has exposed the limitations of Bezos’s business strategy.

For most of Amazon’s existence, the company has been barely profitable. From 2007 through 2013, its revenues quintupled from $14.8bn to $74.45bn, but profits dropped from $436m to $273m. Note: that's billions in revenue, and just hundreds of millions in profits. Meanwhile, Amazon’s stock has consistently risen because investors didn't care about the dwindling profit margins. Bezos’s strategy worked: Amazon is now the US leader in online retail. It’s so big that the editor of the New Republic, Franklin Foer, wrote a cover story declaring the company a monopoly.

Then 2014 hit, and investors turned on the company. When Amazon announced on Monday that it would issue new unsecured debt, Moody’s downgraded the company’s outlook to negative. There are two reasons for this change in investor sentiment.

1. Revenue growth has slowed from 40 per cent in 2010 and 2011, to 27 per cent in 2012, to 22 per cent in 2013. This year it is projected to be between 16 and 20 per cent.

2. Amazon’s newest investments aren’t paying off. The most notable failure has been the Fire phone, which has received terrible reviews. In October, the firm took a $170m write-down loss as its inventory piled up and the company cut the cost of the phone from $200 to 99 cents. The Fire’s failure, at least so far, does not necessarily reveal a flaw in Bezos’s strategy. After all, if you make big bets, you’re going to have some major failures as well. “What really matters is that companies that don’t continue to experiment – companies that don’t embrace failurethey eventually get in a desperate position, where the only thing they can do is make a ‘Hail Mary’ bet at the very end,” Bezos said on Tuesday. Of course, not all of Amazon’s recent investments have failed. Fire TV, for instance, has been a success. But investors get nervous when those bets fail to pay off at the same time the core business’ growth slows. And the Fire phone was a big bet that has not worked.

Matt Yglesias, then writing for Slate, predicted this in January. “Amazon gets away with relentlessly investing in the future only because, for now, investors have faith in Bezos and his strategy,” he wrote. “But that faith has been tested in the past, and it’s likely that some future convulsion in markets will cause it to wane again.” Yglesias didn’t see any reason for this strategy to fail soon, much less this year. “For the foreseeable future, the party can – and willgo on, crushing everything in its path and generating mighty gains for consumers.”

On that point, Yglesias was wrong: investors have turned the lights on. The party is over. And yet, if his comments on Tuesday are any indication, Bezos isn’t planning to change his strategy anytime soon. That’s good news for Amazon’s penny-pinching customers, but could mean a rocky 2015 for the retail giant.

This article first appeared on newrepublic.com

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Want an independent-minded MP? Vote for a career politician

The brutally ambitious are not content to fall in with the crowd. 

“Never having had a ‘real’ job outside of politics”: this is what the majority of respondents told a YouGov poll in 2014 when asked the most undesirable characteristic of the British politician. The result is hardly surprising. Type the words “career politician” into your search engine or raise the topic at a dinner party, and quickly you will be presented with a familiar list of grievances.

One of the fundamental criticisms is that career politicians in parliament are elitists concerned only with furthering their own interests. Their pronounced and self-serving ambition for climbing the ministerial ladder is said to turn them into submissive party-machines, sycophants or yes men and women, leading them to vote loyally with their party in every parliamentary division. But do we actually have evidence for this?

A new in-depth analysis, to be published later this month in the academic journal, Legislative Studies Quarterly, presents a forceful challenge to this conventional wisdom. In fact, I find that career politician MPs in the UK are more likely to rebel against their party than their non-career politician peers. Why?

My study was motivated by the observation that the existing impression of the party loyalty of career politicians is based mostly on anecdotal evidence and speculation. Moreover, a look through the relevant journalistic work, as well as the sparse extant academic literature, reveals that the two main hypotheses on the topic make starkly contradictory claims. By far the most popular — but largely unverified — view is that their exclusively professional reliance on politics renders career politicians more brutally ambitious for frontbench office, which in turn makes them especially subservient to the party leadership.

The opposing, but lesser known expectation is that while career politicians may be particularly eager to reach the frontbenches, “many of them are also much too proud and wilful to be content to serve as mere lobby fodder”, as the late Anthony King, one of the shrewdest analysts of British politics, observed nearly thirty years ago on the basis of more qualitative evidence.

Faced with these opposing but equally plausible prognoses, I assembled biographical data for all the MPs of the three big parties between 2005-15 (more than 850) and analysed all parliamentary votes during this period. I followed the debate’s prevalent view that an exclusive focus on politics (e.g. as a special adviser or an MP’s assistant) or a closely-related field (e.g. full-time trade union official or interest group worker) marks an MP as a careerist. In line with previous estimations, just under 20 per cent of MPs were identified as career politicians. The extensive statistical analysis accounted for additional factors that may influence party loyalty, and largely ruled out systematic differences in ideology between career and non-career politicians, as well as party or term-specific differences as drivers of the effects.

As noted above, I find strong evidence that career politician backbenchers are more likely to rebel. The strength of this effect is considerable. For example, amongst government backbenchers who have never held a ministerial post, a non-career politician is estimated to rebel in only about 20 votes per parliament. By contrast, a career politician dissents more than twice as often — a substantial difference considering the high party unity in Westminster.

This finding reveals a striking paradox between the predominantly negative opinion of career politicians on the one hand, and the electorate's growing demand for more independent-minded MPs on the other. In fact career politicians are the ones who perform best in delivering on this demand. Similarly, the results imply that the oft-cited career-related dependency of career politicians on the party can be overridden (or, at the very least, complemented) by their self-image as active and independent-minded participants in the legislative process. This should attenuate the prevalent concern that a rise in career politicians leads to a weakening of parliament’s role as a scrutinizing body.

Finally, the findings challenge the pervasive argument that a lack of experience in the real world disqualifies an MP from contributing meaningfully to the legislative process. Instead, it appears that a pre-parliamentary focus on politics can, under certain circumstances, boost an MP's normatively desirable willingness to challenge the party and the executive.

Raphael Heuwieser is researching political party loyalty at the University of Oxford.