"Authorities... misread the real cause of the crisis": former Greek finance minister

Yannos Papantoniou on the Eurozone crisis.

The Cyprus bailout deal is a watershed in the unfolding eurozone crisis, because responsibility for resolving banks’ problems has been shifted from taxpayers to private investors and depositors. But imposing major losses on Cypriot banks’ depositors violates the deposit-insurance guarantee that forms part of the proposed European banking union, while the imposition of capital controls further erodes the monetary union’s foundations. So, is Europe chasing its tail?

Germany and the other countries of the eurozone core are signalling that debt mutualisation within the monetary union is out of the question, and that bailouts of countries or financial institutions will be balanced by “bail-ins” of their creditors. Increased uncertainty concerning the safety of deposits will push up interest rates and deepen Europe’s recession, and may also trigger capital outflows from the eurozone’s weaker peripheral economies to the core.
 

The implications of this shift may be far-reaching. The German model for resolving the debt crisis and returning to internal or external balance relies on fiscal consolidation and structural reforms for the deficit countries. But, if all countries simultaneously attempt to improve their fiscal or external balances by cutting spending and raising taxes, all will fail, because each country’s austerity implies less demand for other countries’ output, in turn perpetuating both domestic and external imbalances. “Bailing in” creditors will exacerbate these trends.

Moreover, a deep and prolonged recession implies vanishing support for reforms, as governments fail to convince citizens that current sacrifice will ensure a better future. Privatization, market liberalization, the opening of closed professions, and government downsizing involve conflicts with powerful vested interests, such as businesses in protected industries, public-sector unions, or influential lobbies. Resolving such conflicts requires social alliances, which are invariably undermined by discontent, civil disorder, and political instability.

The recent Italian election has shown how toxic the association of austerity policies with the pursuit of reform has become. Anti-austerity anger swept away the reform agenda of Mario Monti’s previous technocratic government, leaving Italy, its future uncertain, to continue muddling through. The same scenario seems to be emerging in Greece, where the depth of the austerity-induced recession, with output down by 25 per cent over five years and unemployment at 27 per cent, is paralyzing a reform-minded center-right government.

The gaps in the strategy are clear. First, the eurozone authorities misread the real causes of the debt crisis, which stemmed mainly from a growing competitiveness gap between the core and periphery countries. The resulting private-sector imbalances culminated in banking problems that were eventually transferred to sovereigns. Greece’s fiscal profligacy was the exception rather than the rule.

Indeed, in contrast to the United States, eurozone authorities were slow to consolidate the banking system after the global financial crisis erupted in 2008, and failed to sever the ties between sovereigns’ and banks’ balance sheets. Nor did they push strongly for structural reforms. Instead, they emphasized harsh austerity, which was to be pursued everywhere.

Second, the effects of austerity were exacerbated by the choice to pursue nominal, rather than structural, fiscal-deficit targets. Countries with a stronger fiscal position (that is, smaller structural deficits) should be encouraged to adopt more expansionary policies in order to contribute to lifting overall demand. Moreover, the European Investment Bank’s lending capacity could be increased substantially, and European Union structural funds mobilized, to finance investment projects in the peripheral economies.

Third, the European Central Bank’s announcement last August of its “outright monetary transactions” program – through which it guarantees eurozone members’ sovereign debt, subject to policy conditionality – has contributed significantly to subduing financial turbulence in the eurozone. But the OMT scheme has not been reinforced by a reduction in key interest rates, which would boost inflation in core countries with external surpluses and thus help to close the competitiveness gap with the periphery. Crucially, monetary-policy measures do not address the underlying problem of lack of demand.

Last, but not least, the eurozone authorities misread the confidence factor. In theory, simultaneous fiscal consolidation and supply-side reform facilitates economic recovery, because it increases confidence among consumers and investors, thereby inducing higher spending and production. But this does not necessarily work in an imperfectly functioning monetary union, such as the eurozone, where the continual appearance of systemic flaws erodes confidence; in such circumstances, the result may be hoarding and capital outflows, rather than increased spending.

The rest of this article can be read on economia.

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It’s obvious why Thais can’t resist our English footballers. But they want our schools, too

The only explanation is . . . our footer must be great and exciting to watch.

At Bangkok airport, sitting in the Club lounge, as I am a toff, I spotted a copy of Thailand Tatler, a publication I did not know existed. Flicking through, I came across a whole page advert announcing that RUGBY SCHOOL IS COMING TO THAILAND.

In September, Rugby will open a prep and pre-prep department, and then, in 2018, full boarding for ages up to 17. How exciting – yet another English public school sets up a satellite in Thailand.

But I was confused. Just as I was confused all week by the Thai passion for our football.

How has it happened that English public schools and English football have become so popular in Thailand? There is no colonial or historical connection between the UK and Thailand. English is not the Thais’ first language, unlike in other parts of the world such as India and Hong Kong. Usually that explains the continuation of British traditions, culture and games long after independence.

When I go to foreign parts, I always take a large wodge of Beatles and football postcards. I find deprived persons all over the world are jolly grateful for these modern versions of shiny beads – and it saves tipping the hotel staff. No young Thai locals were interested in my Beatles bits, but boy, my footer rubbish had them frothing.

I took a stash of seven-year-old postcards of Andy Carroll in his Newcastle strip, part of a set given away free in Barclays banks when they sponsored the Premier League. I assumed no one in Thailand would know who the hell Andy Carroll was, but blow me, every hotel waiter and taxi driver recognised him, knew about his various clubs and endless injuries. And they all seemed to watch every Premiership game live.

I have long been cynical about the boasts that our Prem League is the most watched, the most popular in the world, with 200 countries taking our TV coverage every week. I was once in Turkey and went into the hotel lounge to watch the live footer. It was chocka with Turks watching a local game, shouting and screaming. When it finished, the lounge emptied: yet the next game was our FA Cup live. So I watched it on my own. Ever since, I’ve suspected that while Sky might sell rights everywhere, it doesn’t mean many other folk are watching.

But in Thailand I could see their passion, though most of them have no experience of England. So the only explanation is . . . our footer must be great and exciting to watch. Hurrah for us.

Explaining the passion for English public schools is a bit harder. At present in Thailand, there are about 14 boarding schools based on the English public-school system.

Rugby is only the latest arrival. Harrow has had a sister school there since 1998. So do Shrewsbury, Bromsgrove and Dulwich College (recently renamed British International School, Phuket).

But then I met Anthony Lark, the general manager of the beautiful resort where I was staying in the north of the island. He’s Australian, been out there for thirty years, married to a Thai. All three of his sons went to the Phuket school when it was still Dulwich International College.

His explanations for the popularity of all these British-style schools included the fact that Thailand is the gateway to Asia, easy to get to from India and China; that it’s relatively safe; economically prosperous, with lots of rich people; and, of course, it’s stunningly beautiful, with lovely weather.

There are 200,000 British expats in Thailand but they are in the minority in most of these British-style public schools – only about 20 per cent of the intake. Most pupils are the children of Thais, or from the surrounding nations.

Many of the teachers, though, are from English-speaking nations. Anthony estimated there must be about five thousand of them, so the schools must provide a lot of work. And presumably a lot of income. And, of course, pride.

Well, I found my little chest swelling at the thought that two of our oldest national institutions should be so awfully popular, so awfully far away from home . . . 

Hunter Davies is a journalist, broadcaster and profilic author perhaps best known for writing about the Beatles. He is an ardent Tottenham fan and writes a regular column on football for the New Statesman.

This article first appeared in the 27 April 2017 issue of the New Statesman, Cool Britannia 20 Years On

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