There is devilish detail in the new euro pact

Forget use of EU buildings, the threat is members of the new fiscal union cooking up deals that affe

The issue of David Cameron's "phantom" European veto has fallen out of the headlines pretty quickly, ousted from the agenda by the news of Fred Goodwin losing his Knighthood. (The announcement landed yesterday, by remarkable coincidence, within moments of the Prime Minister getting a bit duffed up in a Commons statement on Monday's European summit and after a weekend of bad headlines around banker bonuses.)

Conservative Eurosceptics, however, will not forget how the gesture of anti-Brussels defiance they so celebrated in December has turned, as they see it, into a supplicant bow to the forces of continental integration. It doesn't help that the Lib Dems are conspicuously pleased by Cameron's restoration of normal diplomatic service with regard to the EU.

As I wrote last week, upholding the spirit of the "veto" to the satisfaction of Tory back benchers and doing what it takes to secure British influence in European Union diplomacy were mutually exclusive demands. In fact, it seems, Cameron has done neither.

The sceptics have concentrated on the Prime Minister's failure to prevent signatories to the new Fiscal Union (FU) treaty using EU institutions to enforce their agreement. That was always a bizarre and unrealistic fixation. If Britain's position is to support other countries pursuing their plan, why would we sabotage the obvious mechanism for making it work. (There is an argument that says Britain should be opposing FU on the principle that any countries surrendering control of their budgets to a central European authority and insisting on choreographed austerity in the middle of a downturn is bonkers - but that is a different matter and definitely not government policy.)

The real issue for concern, as far as British influence is concerned, is not the use of institutions by the FU members, but the prospect that they will crowd the UK out in discussions of the single market. This is the problem that euro-wonks refer to as "caucusing" - the danger that plans will be hatched, positions agree, alliances cemented within the FU members that can then be presented at European Council meetings as faits accomplis.

This is not a threat for today or even tomorrow, but it is clearly a problem and potentially a very big one. If Britain struggles to build alliances in the Council it can get outvoted on things that matter deeply to our economy - on tax and regulation policy, for example. In the past, this hasn't happened too often, but the new FU structures, including regular summits (combined with some ill will generated by the whole "veto" episode) make caucusing much more likely.

Thus, as I have written before, the eurosceptic prophecy is self-fulfilling. Marginalisation diminishes influence leading to bad deals, suspicion of a conspiracy and more marginalisation. Onward towards the exit. Cameron told a press conference in Brussels that the government would "take action" if there was any sign of the FU members "encroaching on the single market". And that he would watch out for such encroachment "like a hawk". He didn't say what action would or could be taken.

The main safeguard in the draft fiscal union treaty appears to be in the preamble:

NOTING, in particular, the wish of the Contracting Parties to make more active use of enhanced cooperation, as provided for in Article 20 of the Treaty on European Union and in Articles 326 to 334 of the Treaty on the Functioning of the European Union, without undermining the internal market, as well as to make full recourse to measures specific to the Member States whose currency is the euro pursuant to Article 136 of the Treaty on the Functioning of the European Union, and to a procedure for the ex ante discussion and coordination among the Contracting Parties whose currency is the euro of all major economic policy reforms planned by them, with a view to benchmarking best practices.

Yes, I know that isn't even a sentence - such is the language of European treaties. Anyway, in something approximating English, this seems to be saying that the FU treaty is recognised as a special deal between some but not all existing EU member states - "enhanced cooperation" - for which a legal framework already exists in the much revised founding treaties of the EU.

The key passage on "enhanced cooperation" in the Treaty on the Functioning of the European Union says:

Such cooperation shall not undermine the internal market or economic, social and territorial cohesion. It shall not constitute a barrier to or discrimination in trade between Member States, nor shall it distort competition between them.

In other words, cooperation between FU members mustn't formally skew the single market against the non-FU members (Britain and the Czech Republic). In practice, however, some or all FU members could end up deciding on things that would subsequently be put to a full EU Council and comfortably outvote Britain.

To what extent this will happen and what Cameron could do about it are the real questions that should be asked about the changing nature of Britain's status within the EU after Monday.

Rafael Behr is political columnist at the Guardian and former political editor of the New Statesman

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Is the Great Fire of London a blueprint for how governments deal with disasters?

Visible leadership, an established authority, and a common external enemy: an enduring defence mechanism 350 years on.

In 1968, the science journal The Lancet ran a report into human behaviour. When populations are confronted with disaster, it recommended, effective “communications, coordination, and control, and the establishment of a recognised authority” are of utmost importance (advice that should have been heeded immediately after the Brexit result in June this year).

The 350th anniversary of the Great Fire of London this week seems is a good time to think about how we deal with disasters: over 13,000 homes were destroyed, 87 churches ruined and thousands of Londoners displaced.

For me, one of the most striking parts of the story of the Great Fire is not the fire itself nor the dramatic rebuilding programme that followed, but the state of flux in between.

When the fire broke out, England was at war with both the Dutch Republic and France. As soon as news reached France, the Venetian ambassador Alvise Sagredo, declared that the fire would be “worse than the plague and any other disaster, capable of making [the English] change their government and their principles”.

In England, even the London Gazette warned that England’s foes would try “to persuade the world abroad of great parties and disaffection at home against his majesties government”. Faced with unparalleled destruction and unprecedented disarray, how did the king, his advisers and civic authorities regain control of London?

With the Guildhall severely damaged and the Royal Exchange destroyed, the first step was to find a new base for civic and mercantile power. On 6 September, Charles II instructed the Lord Mayor and the city aldermen to resume governance of the city. Gresham College and buildings around Bishopsgate were taken over and efforts were immediately taken to re-establish trade. Vendors were granted permission to set up sheds in temporary markets at Bishopsgate Street, Tower Hill, Smithfield and Leadenhall Street.

“Honest and able persons” were selected to monitor the ruined city to ensure fire did not break out afresh, appeals were made across the country for charitable donations and neighbouring counties were called upon to provide sustenance. From the navy stores, ship’s biscuit was offered to the needy and canvas was provided so that the tens of thousands of homeless people stranded in the fields surrounding London could fashion tents.

The measures were not perfect. Visiting Moorfields, the diarist John Evelyn described, “the poor inhabitants . . . some under tents, some under miserable huts and hovels, many without a rag”.

Those stranded found food to be in short supply and many succumbed to the illnesses bred by a reduced condition in life, including aged playwright James Shirley, who died in October 1666.

But it wasn’t long before people started to disperse – either leaving London altogether, finding accommodation elsewhere, or returning to the locations of their former homes and shops to erect makeshift shacks above the ruins.

In the background, the trial and execution of French watchmaker Robert Hubert, who falsely claimed to have started the fire, provided a focus for any anger and rage.

With communication ruptured following the destruction of the London Gazette printing house and the General Letter Office, rumours of plots, arson and invasions had spread almost as quickly as the fire itself. Indeed, terrible violence had broken out during the fire, with mobs targeting any “strangers” or foreign-born Londoners. One French servant, for example, reported how gangs of “English women did knock down strangers for not speaking good English. Some of them armed with spits, some with bread staffs, and the captain with a broad sword.”

When the London Gazette was released the week after the fire – after only skipping one edition of its biweekly run – it provided readers with a detailed description of the catastrophe, emphasising its accidental nature and promoting the role played by Charles II and his brother and heir, James, Duke of York, in preventing the fire spreading even further.

Against protocol, the newspaper also allowed important tradespeople to advertise their new offices: the goldsmith-bankers, for example, informed readers that they had found premises along Broad Street.

By mid-September, the etcher Wenceslaus Hollar had already begun his survey of the city and plans had been submitted to the king from John Evelyn and architects Christopher Wren and Robert Hooke, to name just a few, as to how to rebuild the capital.

Writing at the time, Sir Nathaniel Hobart, believed that the “rebuilding of the Citty will not be soe difficult as the satisfying all interests, there being many proprietors”. As such, one of the most important innovations following the disaster was the establishment of a judiciary, known as the Fire Court, to untangle the complex web of formal and informal agreements between tenants and landlords. From 1667 until 1672 the Fire Court settled hundreds and hundreds of cases.

There were certainly many bumps along the way – for a while, the City of London was plundered and inhabited by gangs. Plus, anger towards foreign-born Londoners continued; owing to his Dutch background, one Johan Vandermarsh had to fight tooth and nail to keep hold of his property on Lime Street, despite helping to save many of his neighbours’ homes.

All of this considered, there was nothing like the widespread disorder that Charles II had feared and his enemies expected. On the contrary, the visibility of the king and his brother and heir – and the convenient suspicion that the fire had been started by an external enemy – worked to bind the people to their king and settle unrest. Although hard to believe at the time, there was also the promise of “a more beautiful city”.

Rebecca Rideal is a historian, factual television producer and author of 1666: Plague, War and Hellfire.

She will be speaking at London’s Burning festival on Friday 2 September – a contemporary festival of art and ideas produced at Artichoke to commemorate the 350th anniversary of the Great Fire of London. Free to the public, it runs from 30 August-4 September.