Rally Against Debt? It was more of a long queue

Lisa Hamilton, who observed the pro-cuts demonstration, was not impressed.

On 26 March nearly half a million people descended on the capital to oppose the government's cuts agenda and demand an alternative. Six weeks later 200 people (I'm being generous) stood on a pavement outside parliament to give a big "thumbs-up" to the same policies.

To say turnout at the Rally Against Debt was low is to be very polite. It was abysmal. Don't think protest. Think long queue.

In an attempt to gloss over the low turnout, one attendee has described the event as "not bad for a Facebook flashmob stunt". (Presumably the usual, good old Tory "blame it on the weather" excuse was rejected due to the unfortunately good weather.)

Hmm. A flashmob is, at least according to Wikipedia, a group of people who assemble to perform a seemingly pointless act often for the purpose of satire. A flash mob is not a publicised event with a shiny website.

The site (which hasn't been updated since a "we're trending on Twitter" post on Friday afternoon) promised a "great networking opportunity", a number of "high-profile guests" and "plenty to do" during the rally.

Unfortunately, the low turnout (Guido Fawkes claimed 500, but it looked less than half that to me) meant that most of the attendees already seemed to know each other and while Ukip's Nigel Farage had indeed flown in for the event, "plenty to do" seemed to involve standing increasingly closer together in order to make the crowd look bigger. There were also a couple of short-lived chants and EU flag-burning for those who like that sort of thing.

Toby Young, one of the most high-profile supporters of the rally, came in for mockery when he missed it – because he took his children to an exhibition about pirates at a (publicly funded) museum.

If the March for the Alternative suggested that a cross-section of society strongly opposed the cuts being made by the Tory government, then the Rally Against Debt suggested that white, middle-class, middle-aged men are opposed to taxation, don't like Europe or public services, but do like chinos, rugby shirts, looking after their own interests, and causing minor obstructions outside parliament.

The Rally Against Debt taught us nothing new. However, it did leave one big question: Why did this failure of an event generate so much news coverage?

Perhaps the snappers enjoyed the novelty of outnumbering the crowd.

You can find Lisa on Twitter: @lefty_lisa

Photo: Getty Images
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I'm far from convinced by Cameron's plans for Syria

The Prime Minister has a plan for when the bombs drop. But what about after?

In the House of Commons today, the Prime Minister set out a powerful case for Britain to join air strikes against Isil in Syria.  Isil, he argued, poses a direct threat to Britain and its people, and Britain should not be in the business of “outsourcing our security to our allies”. And while he conceded that further airstrikes alone would not be sufficient to beat Isil, he made the case for an “Isil first” strategy – attacking Isil now, while continuing to do what we can diplomatically to help secure a lasting settlement for Syria in which Assad (eventually) plays no part.

I agreed with much of David Cameron’s analysis. And no-one should doubt either the murderous barbarism of Isil in the region, or the barbarism they foment and inspire in others across the world.  But at the end of his lengthy Q&A session with MPs, I remained unconvinced that UK involvement in airstrikes in Syria was the right option. Because the case for action has to be a case for action that has a chance of succeeding.  And David Cameron’s case contained neither a plan for winning the war, nor a plan for winning the peace.

The Prime Minister, along with military experts and analysts across the world, concedes that air strikes alone will not defeat Isil, and that (as in Iraq) ground forces are essential if we want to rid Syria of Isil. But what is the plan to assemble these ground forces so necessary for a successful mission?  David Cameron’s answer today was more a hope than a plan. He referred to “70,000 Syrian opposition fighters - principally the Free Syrian Army (FSA) – with whom we can co-ordinate attacks on Isil”.

But it is an illusion to think that these fighters can provide the ground forces needed to complement aerial bombardment of Isil.  Many commentators have begun to doubt whether the FSA continues to exist as a coherent operational entity over the past few months. Coralling the myriad rebel groups into a disciplined force capable of fighting and occupying Isil territory is a heroic ambition, not a plan. And previous efforts to mobilize the rebels against Isil have been utter failures. Last month the Americans abandoned a $500m programme to train and turn 5,400 rebel fighters into a disciplined force to fight Isil. They succeeded in training just 60 fighters. And there have been incidents of American-trained fighters giving some of their US-provided equipment to the Nusra Front, an affiliate of Al Qaeda.

Why has it proven so hard to co-opt rebel forces in the fight against Isil? Because most of the various rebel groups are fighting a war against Assad, not against Isil.  Syria’s civil war is gruesome and complex, but it is fundamentally a Civil War between Assad’s forces and a variety of opponents of Assad’s regime. It would be a mistake for Britain to base a case for military action against Isil on the hope that thousands of disparate rebel forces can be persuaded to change their enemy – especially when the evidence so far is that they won’t.

This is a plan for military action that, at present, looks highly unlikely to succeed.  But what of the plan for peace? David Cameron today argued for the separation of the immediate task at hand - to strike against Isil in Syria – from the longer-term ambition of achieving a settlement in Syria and removing Assad.  But for Isil to be beaten, the two cannot be separated. Because it is only by making progress in developing a credible and internationally-backed plan for a post-Assad Syria that we will persuade Syrian Sunnis that fighting Isil will not end up helping Assad win the Civil War.  If we want not only to rely on rebel Sunnis to provide ground troops against Isil, but also provide stable governance in Isil-occupied areas when the bombing stops, progress on a settlement to Syria’s Civil War is more not less urgent.  Without it, the reluctance of Syrian Sunnis to think that our fight is their fight will undermine the chances of military efforts to beat Isil and bring basic order to the regions they control. 

This points us towards doubling down on the progress that has already been made in Vienna: working with the USA, France, Syria’s neighbours and the Gulf states, as well as Russia and Iran. We need not just a combined approach to ending the conflict, but the prospect of a post-war Syria that offers a place for those whose cooperation we seek to defeat Isil. No doubt this will strike some as insufficient in the face of the horrors perpetrated by Isil. But I fear that if we want not just to take action against Isil but to defeat them and prevent their return, it offers a better chance of succeeding than David Cameron’s proposal today. 

Stewart Wood is a former Shadow Cabinet minister and adviser to Ed Miliband. He tweets as @StewartWood.