The challenges facing Ed Miliband

Winning outright at the next election will prove as tough for Labour as the Tories.

Ed Miliband is considerably more likely to be the next prime minister than most people have realised.

The biggest reason is less to do with a solid Labour win in the Oldham East and Saddleworth by-election, or anything the Labour leader has yet done to set out his stall for the year ahead, which will be his task at Saturday's Fabian conference, but is rather the stark difficulty in identifying a plausible re-election strategy for David Cameron.

No postwar prime minister has ever governed for a full term and then increased their party's share of the vote at the next general election. It will not be enough for Cameron to recover his support if an economic upturn arrives at the end of his austerity parliament; he must break the mould and increase it. Unless he can become more popular while governing, something that has eluded his predecessors in the best of economic conditions, there will not be a Tory-majority government elected in May 2015.

Yet a Tory-Lib Dem pact seems close to impossible, and Michael Ashcroft is gathering evidence that it wouldn't work anyway. And Cameron will struggle to negotiate his way back in if he seeks a majority and falls short: this time it would be his legitimacy in question. Any outcome where alternative governing combinations are possible could well see him ousted.

These Tory difficulties are not cause for Labour complacency. Even with a fairly modest increase in Labour's vote from 29 per cent, Ed Miliband has every chance of drawing the next election by default. He would very likely become prime minister with one more seat or one more vote than the Conservatives. But winning outright is probably as tough for Labour as for the Tories. Hung parliaments are as likely to be the norm as the exception, as IPPR has recently set out. (Those who disagree need to complete the sentence: "It should be easier for the Tories to win a majority in 2015 than it was in 2010 because . . .")

Miliband has received much contradictory advice since becoming leader. He has been told that nobody wants to hear from the last government, and to define himself in 100 days. He has been reminded that he has a fragile mandate from a close, and split, leadership result, and told to assert himself on his critics. He has upset MPs concerned about his desire to draw a line under the New Labour era, and his repeated voicing of fears that Labour has yet to understand how much it has to change to reconnect. Such, inevitably, is the lot of the leader of the opposition.

In his first three months, Miliband established that he will have a more collegiate leadership style, and that he is in the foothills of a long campaign and doesn't see rushing into photo opportunities or political pyrotechnics as the answer. His party's morale is mixed. Among younger activists, who campaigned in great numbers in Oldham, it is high. But excepting the class of 2010, many Labour MPs have been fairly miserable ever since the autumn of 2007, with the novel experience of recession and defeat mixed into the cocktail of hatred towards MPs after the expenses crisis.

The most daunting challenges for the Labour leader are to restore the party's economic reputation and forge a new political economy, and to demonstrate some supple leadership in dividing the coalition and demonstrating Labour's ability to adapt to this more plural political environment. Punching the Liberal Democrats in the face is often not the best way to exploit the emerging coalition fault lines. He must also define the broad themes of his policy review. A quarter of current party members were not in Labour a year ago – the test remains whether Labour can show that they can shape its campaigns and policy.

Another feature of 2011 may be an ever sharper geographical polarisation in British politics. The electoral map between coalition and the opposition – except for Labour in London and the Scottish Lib Dems – presents quite a stark north-south divide, which the pattern of public spending and cuts will exacerbate. This is a problem for the government, whose "there is no alternative" mantra risks creating a bunker mentality. But it will not be enough for Labour to rack up enormous leads in Scotland and the north if it cannot also rebuild its collapsed support in the south outside London.

The opening to the new year has been good for Miliband. The government cannot win a public argument about why it is increasing VAT but refusing to renew the bank bonus tax.

If, as the governing parties claim today, Labour was always going to win the Oldham East by-election, it is quite a mystery why it took place.

While Tory tactical voting has averted a deeper Lib Dem party crisis, the by-election has cost Nick Clegg his governing strategy – his warnings to his party not to seek distinctiveness within the coalition now scrapped in favour of "Operation Detach", and an increasing amount of yellow dissent at every level.

Conservative MPs are in a mood to respond to this. The patently false Conservative claim that they fought a whole-hearted campaign has brought trust between Cameron and his party activists to new lows. If Cameron would like some form of pact or arrangement, he has increased the obstacles to it.

There is no threat to the coalition itself, but these self-inflicted wounds are potentially significant longer-term fissures. Ed Miliband will welcome the assistance but certainly cannot rely on his political opponents. At the Fabian New Year conference on Saturday, he will need to begin to colour in the shape of the alternative platform he is beginning to construct.

Sunder Katwala is general secretary of the Fabian Society. The New Statesman is media partner for the Fabian/FEPS New Year Conference "Next Left: What is the Alternative?" on Saturday.

Sunder Katwala is director of British Future and former general secretary of the Fabian Society.

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Hannan Fodder: This week, Daniel Hannan gets his excuses in early

I didn't do it. 

Since Daniel Hannan, a formerly obscure MEP, has emerged as the anointed intellectual of the Brexit elite, The Staggers is charting his ascendancy...

When I started this column, there were some nay-sayers talking Britain down by doubting that I was seriously going to write about Daniel Hannan every week. Surely no one could be that obsessed with the activities of one obscure MEP? And surely no politician could say enough ludicrous things to be worthy of such an obsession?

They were wrong, on both counts. Daniel and I are as one on this: Leave and Remain, working hand in glove to deliver on our shared national mission. There’s a lesson there for my fellow Remoaners, I’m sure.

Anyway. It’s week three, and just as I was worrying what I might write this week, Dan has ridden to the rescue by writing not one but two columns making the same argument – using, indeed, many of the exact same phrases (“not a club, but a protection racket”). Like all the most effective political campaigns, Dan has a message of the week.

First up, on Monday, there was this headline, in the conservative American journal, the Washington Examiner:

“Why Brexit should work out for everyone”

And yesterday, there was his column on Conservative Home:

“We will get a good deal – because rational self-interest will overcome the Eurocrats’ fury”

The message of the two columns is straightforward: cooler heads will prevail. Britain wants an amicable separation. The EU needs Britain’s military strength and budget contributions, and both sides want to keep the single market intact.

The Con Home piece makes the further argument that it’s only the Eurocrats who want to be hardline about this. National governments – who have to answer to actual electorates – will be more willing to negotiate.

And so, for all the bluster now, Theresa May and Donald Tusk will be skipping through a meadow, arm in arm, before the year is out.

Before we go any further, I have a confession: I found myself nodding along with some of this. Yes, of course it’s in nobody’s interests to create unnecessary enmity between Britain and the continent. Of course no one will want to crash the economy. Of course.

I’ve been told by friends on the centre-right that Hannan has a compelling, faintly hypnotic quality when he speaks and, in retrospect, this brief moment of finding myself half-agreeing with him scares the living shit out of me. So from this point on, I’d like everyone to keep an eye on me in case I start going weird, and to give me a sharp whack round the back of the head if you ever catch me starting a tweet with the word, “Friends-”.

Anyway. Shortly after reading things, reality began to dawn for me in a way it apparently hasn’t for Daniel Hannan, and I began cataloguing the ways in which his argument is stupid.

Problem number one: Remarkably for a man who’s been in the European Parliament for nearly two decades, he’s misunderstood the EU. He notes that “deeper integration can be more like a religious dogma than a political creed”, but entirely misses the reason for this. For many Europeans, especially those from countries which didn’t have as much fun in the Second World War as Britain did, the EU, for all its myriad flaws, is something to which they feel an emotional attachment: not their country, but not something entirely separate from it either.

Consequently, it’s neither a club, nor a “protection racket”: it’s more akin to a family. A rational and sensible Brexit will be difficult for the exact same reasons that so few divorcing couples rationally agree not to bother wasting money on lawyers: because the very act of leaving feels like a betrayal.

Or, to put it more concisely, courtesy of Buzzfeed’s Marie Le Conte:

Problem number two: even if everyone was to negotiate purely in terms of rational interest, our interests are not the same. The over-riding goal of German policy for decades has been to hold the EU together, even if that creates other problems. (Exhibit A: Greece.) So there’s at least a chance that the German leadership will genuinely see deterring more departures as more important than mutual prosperity or a good relationship with Britain.

And France, whose presidential candidates are lining up to give Britain a kicking, is mysteriously not mentioned anywhere in either of Daniel’s columns, presumably because doing so would undermine his argument.

So – the list of priorities Hannan describes may look rational from a British perspective. Unfortunately, though, the people on the other side of the negotiating table won’t have a British perspective.

Problem number three is this line from the Con Home piece:

“Might it truly be more interested in deterring states from leaving than in promoting the welfare of its peoples? If so, there surely can be no further doubt that we were right to opt out.”

If there any rhetorical technique more skin-crawlingly horrible, than, “Your response to my behaviour justifies my behaviour”?

I could go on, about how there’s no reason to think that Daniel’s relatively gentle vision of Brexit is shared by Nigel Farage, UKIP, or a significant number of those who voted Leave. Or about the polls which show that, far from the EU’s response to the referendum pushing more European nations towards the door, support for the union has actually spiked since the referendum – that Britain has become not a beacon of hope but a cautionary tale.

But I’m running out of words, and there’ll be other chances to explore such things. So instead I’m going to end on this:

Hannan’s argument – that only an irrational Europe would not deliver a good Brexit – is remarkably, parodically self-serving. It allows him to believe that, if Brexit goes horribly wrong, well, it must all be the fault of those inflexible Eurocrats, mustn’t it? It can’t possibly be because Brexit was a bad idea in the first place, or because liberal Leavers used nasty, populist ones to achieve their goals.

Read today, there are elements of Hannan’s columns that are compelling, even persuasive. From the perspective of 2020, I fear, they might simply read like one long explanation of why nothing that has happened since will have been his fault.

Jonn Elledge is the editor of the New Statesman's sister site CityMetric. He is on Twitter, far too much, as @JonnElledge.