Why the Afghan surge will fail

The Taliban will bide their time and emerge undefeated.

As the "surge" begins in Afghanistan, we are told that there are early signs of success in the Nato coalition's final attempt to defeat the Taliban. But while it is true to say that in some areas -- such as the town of Marjah, in Helmand -- the Taliban appear to be giving up land without a fight, the weaknesses of the US military plan remain clear.

As the US ambassador in Kabul, Karl Eikenberry, pointed out in leaked cables to President Obama, the sanctuaries that matter most to the Taliban are not in Afghanistan at all, but just across the border in Pakistan. So long as they can hold on to these strongholds, the Taliban will bide their time and regroup once US troops begin to withdraw in 18 months' time.

The group's oft-quoted boast that "Nato has all the watches, but we have all the time" rings truer than ever.

The Taliban have learned from experience to avoid costly hand-to-hand combat, but as the assault proceeds they are likely to return and target the new Afghan security forces with roadside bombs and suicide attacks.

The surge in Afghanistan is closely modelled on that in Iraq, but is unlikely to meet with similar success. The key factor in the success of the Iraqi surge was the US recruitment of Saddam Hussein's old Sunni militias to police some of the most violent enclaves. After several years of vicious sectarian warfare, Iraq's Sunni minority had come to fear Shia militias and Iran more than the US occupation forces, and formed the "awakening councils" in response.

Yet such conditions and incentives do not exist in Afghanistan, where the Pashtuns, who dominate the Taliban, are by far the largest ethnic group and face no major sectarian or regional threat to their interests. Any attempt to "buy off" the insurgents is likely to fail, as anti-occupation sentiment shows no sign of diminishing.

At best, the surge will provide the political cover necessary for Barack Obama to withdraw with some semblance of dignity. In the meantime, the Taliban are content to sit this battle out, aware that they can strike back at a more opportune moment.


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George Eaton is political editor of the New Statesman.

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The Manchester attack will define this election: Broadcasters have a careful line to tread

It's right that the government should be given a chance to respond, but they must not be allowed to use it to campaign.

Every election campaign has its story, its place in the political history of this country. 2017 will forever be known for Manchester and the horror of the attack on Britain's young; and fighting terrorism will be a theme, overt or underlying, of what we see and hear between now and polling day.

The broadcasters have covered the events comprehensively yet sensitively. But they are aware that we're in an election campaign too; and when other news drives aside the carefully-balanced campaign formats, ministerial appearances give them a dilemma.

The fact is that what the Prime Minister and Home Secretary are doing in response to Manchester is newsworthy. It was Theresa May's duty to implement the recommendations of her security advisers on the elevation of the terror alert, and it would have been unthinkable for the news channels not to broadcast her various statements.

But it is also true that, if the bomb hadn't been detonated, Tuesday would have been a day in which the PM would have been under relentless damaging scrutiny for her u-turn on social care. All the opposition parties would have been in full cry across the airwaves. Yet in the tragic circumstances we found ourselves, nobody could argue that Downing Street appearances on the terror attack should prompt equal airtime for everyone from Labour to Plaid Cymru.

There are precedents for ministers needing to step out of their party roles during a campaign, and not be counted against the stopwatch balance of coverage. Irish terrorism was a factor in previous elections and the PM or Northern Ireland secretary were able to speak on behalf of the UK government. It applied to the foot and mouth epidemic that was occupying ministers' time in 2001. Prime ministers have gone to foreign meetings before, too. Mrs Thatcher went to an economic summit in photogenic Venice with her soulmate Ronald Reagan three days before the 1987 election, to the irritation of Neil Kinnock.

There are plenty of critics who will be vigilant about any quest for party advantage in the way that Theresa May and Amber Rudd now make their TV and radio appearances; and it’s inevitable that a party arguing that it offers strength and stability will not object to being judged against these criteria in extreme and distressing times.

So it's necessary for both broadcasters and politicians to be careful, and there are some fine judgements to be made. For instance, it was completely justifiable to interview Amber Rudd about the latest information from Manchester and her annoyance with American intelligence leaks. I was less comfortable with her being asked in the same interview about the Prevent strategy, and with her response that actions would follow "after June", which edges into party territory and would be a legitimate area to seek an opposition response.

When the campaigning resumes, these challenges become even greater. Deciding when the Prime Minister is speaking for the government and nation, or when she is leader of the Conservative Party, will never be black and white. But I would expect to see the broadcast bulletins trying to draw clearer lines about what is a political report and what is the latest from Manchester or from G7. They must also resist any efforts to time ministerial pronouncements with what's convenient for the party strategists' campaign grid.

There might also usefully be more effort to report straight what the parties are saying in the final days, with less spin and tactical analysis from the correspondents. The narrative of this election has been changed by tragedy, and the best response is to let the politicians and the public engage as directly as possible in deciding what direction the nation should now take.

Roger Mosey is the Master of Selwyn College, Cambridge. He was formerly editorial director and the director of London 2012 at the BBC.

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