Iran Watch: The myth behind Israel's attack on Osiraq

Iran Watch, part 5 - a response to some nonsense from Guido Fawkes.

Iran Watch, part 5 - a response to some nonsense from Guido Fawkes.

In a tweet to me this morning, libertarian blogger and Iran-war-agitator Paul Staines (aka "Guido Fawkes") claimed:

@ns_mehdihasan Israel bombed Saddam's nuclear reactor and ended his nuclear ambitions. Thank God.

I once told Staines that he should stick to blogging about bond markets and deficits and stay away from foreign affairs and, in particular, the Middle East. I wish he'd taken my advice.

"Ended his nuclear ambitions", eh? Staines is referring to the Israeli bombing of Saddam Hussein's Osiraq nuclear reactor in 1981 - codenamed "Operation Babylon". He couldn't be more wrong about the fallout from that now-notorious "preventive" attack on Iraq - and the lessons that we should learn from it now, three decades on, in relation to Iran's controversial nuclear programme.

Professor Richard Betts of Columbia University is one of America's leading experts on nuclear weapons and proliferation. He is a senior fellow at the Council on Foreign Relations and a former adviser to the CIA and the National Security Council. Here he is writing in the National Interest in 2006:

Contrary to prevalent mythology, there is no evidence that Israel's destruction of Osirak delayed Iraq's nuclear weapons program. The attack may actually have accelerated it.

...Obliterating the Osirak reactor did not put the brakes on Saddam's nuclear weapons program because the reactor that was destroyed could not have produced a bomb on its own and was not even necessary for producing a bomb. Nine years after Israel's attack on Osirak, Iraq was very close to producing a nuclear weapon.

Here's Malfrid Braut-Hegghammer, a post-doctoral fellow at Harvard's Kennedy School and an expert on weapons of mass destruction, writing in the Huffington Post in May 2010:

The Israeli attack triggered Iraq's determined pursuit of nuclear weapons. In September 1981, three months after the strike, Iraq established a well-funded clandestine nuclear weapons program. This had a separate organization, staff, ample funding and a clear mandate from Saddam Hussein. As the nuclear weapons program went underground the international community lost sight of these activities and had no influence on the Iraqi nuclear calculus.

And here's Emory University's Dan Reiter, an expert on national security and international conflict, writing in The Nonproliferation Review in July 2005:

Paradoxically, the Osiraq attack may have actually stimulated rather than inhibited the Iraqi nuclear program. The attack itself may have persuaded Saddam to accelerate Iraqi efforts to become a nuclear weapons power. . . Following Osiraq, the entire Iraqi nuclear effort moved underground, as Saddam simultaneously ordered a secret weapons program that focused on uranium separation as a path to building a bomb.

. . . In short, before the Osiraq attack, both the French and the IAEA opposed the weaponization of Iraq's nuclear research program, and had a number of instruments to constrain weaponization, including control over, including control over reactor fuel supply and multiple and continuous inspections. After the Osiraq attack, the program became secret, Saddam's personal and material commitment to the program grew, and the non-proliferation tools available to the international community became ineffective.

[Hat-tip: MediaMatters]

Then there's the Duelfer Report, released by the Iraq Survey Group in 2004 (and praised by the neoconservatives!), which admitted that

Israel's bombing of Iraq's Osirak nuclear reactor spurred Saddam to build up Iraq's military to confront Israel in the early 1980s.

Oh, and there's also the well-informed Bob Woodward, who wrote in his book State of Denial:

Israeli intelligence were convinced that their strike in 1981 on the Osirak nuclear reactor about 10 miles outside Baghdad had ended Saddam's program. Instead [it initiated] covert funding for a nuclear program code-named 'PC3' involving 5.000 people testing and building ingredients for a nuclear bomb.

So the clear lesson from Osiraq is the exact opposite of what Staines and others on the pro-Israeli, bomb-Iran, chickenhawk right want us to believe: bombing Iran's nuclear facilities is likely to increase, not decrease, the prospect of an illicit Iranian nuclear weapons programme. So far, there is no evidence of such a programme - see the IAEA's last report - but an illegal Israeli or American air attack on Iranian nuclear facilities would give the Iranian government the perfect excuse to take its nuclear programme underground, out of sight and out of reach. Don't take my word for it - here's the former CIA director Michael Hayden speaking in January:

When we talked about this in the government, the consensus was that [attacking Iran] would guarantee that which we are trying to prevent -- an Iran that will spare nothing to build a nuclear weapon and that would build it in secret.

On a related note, the Osiraq attack was followed, as I noted in an earlier blogpost, by a UN Security Council Resolution which condemned the Israeli government and called upon it "urgently to place its nuclear facilities under IAEA safeguards" - something Messrs Netanyahu and Barak continue to refuse to do. Why don't we ever talk about this particular aspect of the 1981 raid?

On an unrelated note, Staines and co continue to try and label opponents of military action as "friends of Ahmadinejad" - despite the fact that these include, among others, the afore-mentioned former director of the CIA as well as the ex-head of Mossad. It's a cheap, smear tactic to try and close down debate on this all-important, life-and-death issue and is a perfect reflection of how poor and weak the hawks' arguments are.

Finally, if you haven't read it yet, please read and share Harvard University professor Stephen Walt's excellent and informed blogpost on the "top ten media failures in the Iran war debate" and Israeli novelist David Grossman's Guardian column on how "an attack on Iran will bring certain disaster, to forestall one that might never come".

Mehdi Hasan is a contributing writer for the New Statesman and the co-author of Ed: The Milibands and the Making of a Labour Leader. He was the New Statesman's senior editor (politics) from 2009-12.

Jeremy Corbyn in Crewe. Photo: Getty
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Is it too late to replace Jeremy Corbyn as Labour leader before the general election?

Make no mistake, replacing the Labour leader now would terrify the Tories. 

Received wisdom states that Jeremy Corbyn’s position in the Labour party is guaranteed, at least for the next six weeks, until the general election on 8 June. However, this belief is in large part down to polls conducted earlier this year among the Labour membership, which showed continued support for him.

In light of the changing political landscape, and the looming General Election, these polls should be revisited. It is clear they offer enough cause for hope to Labour moderates who might be willing to take the risk of removing Corbyn before the country makes this decision for them.

If you listen to pollsters talk about their surveys, one of the most common refrains you'll hear is that the results are "a snapshot, not a prediction". During the peacetime years between elections, this claim is made for solid reasons. With an election years away, polls offer the public a risk-free method to register dissatisfaction or support for a political parties and politician without consequence.

Nowhere is this clearer than in the polls we’ve seen in the past week. In every poll conducted after May's announcement on an early election, there has been a rise in the Tory lead. Elections focus minds and the risk-free toying with another party is no more; the public now need to make a decision about who they'll vote for in a little over a month and this decision matters.

Back in March, just 35 per cent of Labour members thought it likely that Corbyn would lead Labour to victory at the next election - yet they still supported him (PDF). Many commentators and Labour moderates asked why. They couldn't understand why the members would support someone who was so clearly electoral kryptonite.

The reason is relatively straightforward. The election was still years off and Corbyn was doing, for the members, a vital job in repositioning Labour on the left. With an election so far away, it didn't matter how Labour were performing in the polls, it was risk-free to support Corbyn.

The early election changes all that and the question is no longer about whether another leader gives Labour a better chance of winning but whether another leader gives Labour a better chance at surviving.

In the last poll published on Labour members, a majority wanted Corbyn to either step down immediately (36%) or before the next election (14%). Just 44% wanted him to lead Labour into the next General Election. With May’s announcement of a vote on 8 June, Labour's existential crisis has been brought forward by three years and it is likely that 14% who thought Corbyn should step down before the next election would side with those who wanted Corbyn gone immediately rather than those who wanted him to fight on in 2020.

There is also an argument to be made that the 44% who wanted Jeremy to fight the next election assumed he would have three more years to grow into the role and turn Labour’s fortunes around and these members could easily be swayed from their support given the change in terms the early election brings about.

What's more, 68% of Labour members felt Corbyn should go if Labour lost the next election and this includes 42% of those who say they would definitely/probably vote for Jeremy at a future leadership election. Only the most hardcore Corbyn supporters still believe he has a chance of victory in a few weeks. So, faced with the prospect of Jeremy going in June, after a heavy defeat, or now - giving Labour a better chance - many would reluctantly go for the latter.  

So how can Jeremy be removed? There are three things that need to happen. Firstly, pick the right candidate. For a new leader to have any impact with the public, it has to be someone who is not associated with Corbyn. However, to win over the members, the candidate cannot be seen as an instigator in the coup last year.  It would also be wise to choose someone the public are at least partly familiar with. This is a narrow pool but there are MPs who meet this requirement and could get through a leadership election and limit Labour losses.  

Secondly, limit the selectorate to the members. There is no time to vet 10s or 100,000s of new voters and they are unlikely to be favourable to an Anyone-But-Corbyn candidate. Among current members, Corbyn can be defeated and that must be the battle on which any leadership election was fought.

Finally, remove the risk of a centrist takeover in Labour members' minds by committing to a further leadership election in six months' time. Make it clear that Jeremy Corbyn needs to go - but that this isn't the end for his supporters. Any new leader is just an interim measure, someone who can limit the losses and give Labour the chance to fight again. Position yourself like the football manager who comes in three matches before the end of the season, promising to save the club from relegation before handing over to someone more suited to their team.

Make no mistake, replacing the Labour leader now would terrify the Tories. Their attacks on Corbyn will be worthless and new leaders typically enjoy a honeymoon period which would come at the perfect time. There are risks, of course, but the greater risk is in allowing Corbyn to lead Labour to a defeat from which there may be no return.

Laurence Janta-Lipinski is a former pollster with YouGov and now a freelance political consultant. He tweets at @jantalipinski

 

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