The reactor building at the Bushehr nuclear power plant in southern Iran. Photograph: Getty Images
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Iran Watch: Hats off to Guido, says Mehdi Hasan

"Staines has at least bothered to put together a response".

Hats off to Paul Staines, aka Guido Fawkes. Now there's a sentence I never thought I'd write. He's used a blogpost on an obscure, neocon-wannabe website to try and defend himself over his Osiraq gaffe that I highlighted here. (The website in question, incidentally, seems obsessed with me, once even accusing me of using too many "statistics" in my arguments. Damn those pesky facts and figures!)

The reason I say "hats off", however, is Staines has at least bothered to put together a response - unlike, say, John Rentoul, who hides behind snarky putdowns on Twitter and doesn't do substance. It's 1,300-words, which makes it the longest piece I've ever read by the self-described "pyrotechnician".

The problem is that, despite the length, it's fact-free, evasive and dodges the key issues. Poor Paul put a lot of effort into his "rebuttal" so let's take the effort of going through it para by para....

Poor Mehdi Hasan. His New Statesman blog is billed as a "polemical take on politics, economics and foreign affairs." No-one likes a good polemic more than I do. It's just that to be effective, it helps if you have a consistent approach to what you're talking about.

And so to the debate about Iran's nuclear weapons programme. Hasan can't make up his mind whether his strategy is to deny its existence or to allow it to progress to completion.

Really? My "strategy" is to point to the fact that the consensus view of 16 US intelligence agencies, as well as Israel's own intelligence chief, is that Iran isn't developing nuclear weapons and hasn't even made a decision as to whether it wants to develop and build such weapons - while at the same time pointing out how a putative Iranian nuclear weapons programme wouldn't justify military action and wouldn't automatically lead to nuclear armageddon. Is that not "consistent"? Perhaps it is for people who struggle with the English language...

More of that in a moment. But first there's some fun to be had. In an article last Tuesday Hasan took me to task for tweeting him about Israel's attack on Iraq's nuclear facility at Osiraq in 1981. The reactor was destroyed and Saddam's nuclear programme was halted in its tracks.

It's an obvious historical reference point for anyone seriously contemplating military action to stop the deranged Islamist theocracy in Tehran getting nuclear weapons. For the equal and opposite reason it's also obvious why apologists for said deranged-Islamist-theocracy feel the need to completely misrepresent its significance.

Hi-larious. I cited three leading experts on nuclear weapons (Richard Betts, Malfrid Braut-Hegghammer and Dan Reiter), who pointed out how Saddam's nuclear programme wasn't "halted in its tracks". They're all "apologists" for the "deranged Islamist theocracy in Tehran"? That's your best shot? How about Charles Duelfer, darling of the neocons and appointed by George W. Bush to hunt for Iraq's (mythical) WMDs? I quoted his report, which concluded that "Israel's bombing of Iraq's Osirak nuclear reactor spurred Saddam to build up Iraq's military to confront Israel in the early 1980s". Is he an apologist for Iran? How about Bob Woodward? Staines needs to pick up his game. So far, this is childish stuff.

Enter Mehdi Hasan with his call for me to "stick to blogging about bond markets and deficits and stay away from foreign affairs and, in particular, the Middle East." Fair enough, but what's he going to tell Bill Clinton (you know, former president of the United States and all that), speaking at the World Economic Forum in Davos in 2005, who said "...everybody talks about what the Israelis did at Osiraq, in 1981, which, I think, in retrospect, was a really good thing. You know, it kept Saddam from developing nuclear power."

Shock, horror! Staines quotes a sitting US president - one who has been described as "the most pro-Israel president" of the 20th century - saying he thinks Israel's attack on Iraq thing.

What would I "tell" Clinton? 1) That he's wrong. 2) That he knows he is wrong because if the Osiraq raid "kept Saddam from developing nuclear power", as Clinton argued in 2005, then why did the UN's weapons inspectors discover a nuclear weapons programme in Iraq, in the wake of the first Gulf War, and why did Clinton himself claim Saddam had "nuclear arms" in 1998? and 3) I would ask him to have a chat with Professor Richard Betts of Columbia University, one of America's leading scholars on nuclear proliferation and a former adviser to the CIA and the State Department. I quoted Betts as saying, in 2006:

Contrary to prevalent mythology, there is no evidence that Israel's destruction of Osirak delayed Iraq's nuclear weapons program. The attack may actually have accelerated it.

Staines uses the testimony from a partisan politician to avoid having to deal with the Betts quote. How convenient - and how unlike the anti-politican "Guido Fawkes" persona he likes to hide behind. Also, while we're on the subject of Bill Clinton, does Staines agree with Clinton's critique of the coalition's austerity measures? If not, why not? Why the selective quoting of Clinton?

The point is uncontestable, as long as you are clear about what is being claimed.

Hasan obviously isn't which is why he devotes much of his article to weirdly diversionary arguments on the questions of whether the strike on Osiraq encouraged Saddam to redouble his efforts, this time taking his nuclear programme underground.

Sorry, the point is quite clear: Staines claimed on Twitter that "Israel bombed Saddam's nuclear reactor and ended his nuclear ambitions". This isn't just contestable, it's wrong. Plain and simple. I'm not sure how pointing how Saddam didn't just continue his nuclear programme, but intensified it, weaponised it and took it outside of French and IAEA controls is "weirdly diversionary". The only one guilty of diversions and evasions here is Staines himself.

But that's irrelevant to the issue at hand which is how one assesses the balance of risk and reward prior to adopting a course of action, and what can reasonably be expected to be achieved right now. You can never know in advance of any given action precisely what the consequences will be. Nor can you know what the world would have looked like had you not taken such action. (That's logic Mehdi; go take a class in it.)

"Logic"? It's been around 13 years since I attended logic classes but I can guarantee that there's no logical reasoning on display in that previous paragraph at all. None. I'm not sure which classes Staines took at the Humberside College of Higer Education but formal logic clearly wasn't one of them.

The Israelis looked at Saddam Hussein - almost as big a Jew-hating fanatic as the warmongers in Tehran - saw he was building a nuclear capability, and rightly decided it was far too risky to allow Iraq to proceed. Any threat of weaponisation arising from Osiraq was eliminated along with the facility. That's my claim, and that's hard to refute.

Well, of course, if you're specific and narrow claim is that "any threat of weaponisation from Osiraq was eliminated along with he facility", then, of course, Staines is correct. But there's some rather brazen and embarrassing goal-post-shifting going on here. Remember: Staines claimed that "Israel bombed Saddam's nuclear reactor and ended his nuclear ambitions". And, as I've shown, and as the experts agree, it didn't. Even Bill Clinton agrees.

On a side note, Staines omits to mention the fact that Israel, during the period he refers to, chose to arm "the warmongers in Tehran". According to the Jaffee Institute for Strategic Studies at Tel Aviv Arms, arms sales to Iran were worth around $500 million between 1980 to 1983. Then there's Israel's role in the Iran-Contra affair. Funny how Staines fails to mention any of this. To borrow a later line from his blogpost: "An inconvenient truth perhaps?"

Eight Israeli F-16s destroyed five years of work in less than 90 seconds. On 8 June 1981, Iraq was once again years away from obtaining a nuclear weapon.

Er, I'm sorry to have to break it to Staines but, on 6 June, Iraq was also "years away from obtaining a nuclear weapon". Here's Professor Dan Reiter, a specialist on national security policy, writing in the The Nonproliferation Review in July 2005:

. . . before the Osiraq attack, both the French and the IAEA opposed the weaponization of Iraq's nuclear research program, and had a number of instruments to constrain weaponization, including control over reactor fuel supply and multiple and continuous inspections. After the Osiraq attack, the program became secret, Saddam's personal and material commitment to the program grew, and the non-proliferation tools available to the international community became ineffective.

The facts don't fit Staines's spin on behalf of Israel.

Of course, the magnificently executed attack on Osiraq did not mean Saddam would not have another go at acquiring nuclear weapons. And when he did have another go he was obviously going to do it as covertly as possible.

These are my favourite two sentences of the entire blogpost: buried in the middle of a random para. If the attack didn't prevent Saddam from having "another go at acquiring nuclear weapons", and that too as "covertly as possible", then how did it end his "nuclear ambitions" as Staines claimed in his original gaffe? And how does it serve as a template for military action against Iran? In these two sentences, Staines reinforces the argument that some of us have been making for months: attacking Iran's nuclear facilities 1) won't end their nuclear ambitions but just delay them, and 2) will lead to a covert intensification of Iran's nuclear programme. As former CIA director Michael Hayden has argued, attacking Iran:

would guarantee that which we are trying to prevent -- an Iran that will spare nothing to build a nuclear weapon and that would build it in secret.

I'm glad Staines, finally, agrees.

The best one may be able to hope for in such circumstances is that one delays a dangerous regime's acquisition of nuclear weapons until it is finally overthrown and replaced by something less unpalatable. Via a long and circuitous route at great cost in blood and treasure that is actually what happened in Iraq, and it shows why a policy of regime change is vital in and of itself but also as a complement to any military attack.

Is Staines claiming here that the Israeli attack on Osiraq in 1981 led to the fall of Saddam in 2003? Really? I mean, really?? And if that's the case, let's do the maths. There was a 22-year time gap between Osiraq and the fall of Saddam but an attack on Iranian nuclear facilities would set back Iran's nuclear programme by two or three years, according to former US defence secretary Robert Gates. So what do we do in the intervening twenty years until the mullahs fall, Paul? Keep bombing? Every two years? That's your plan? Fantastic. I bow to your Metternichian skills.

Now, I'm curious about something. I would never accuse Mehdi Hasan of being completely out of his depth, ignorant of basic facts or deliberately distorting a picture so as to produce a convenient outcome. But I do have a couple of questions for him about his article.

Great. Can't wait. Go on...

Why didn't he tell his readers that Israel was not the first country to attack Osiraq? Why didn't he say that none other than the Islamic Republic of Iran attacked Osiraq in September of the year prior to the Israeli operation, damaging the facility but failing to destroy it?

Er, because it's not relevant to our discussion about whether or not Osiraq offers a template for a future military action against Iran.

An inconvenient truth perhaps?

No, an irrelevant truth. More evasion from Staines. Stick to the subject, man!

Surely he would not have been concealing a piece of information that shows that it wasn't just the dreaded Jewish state that regarded Iraq's nuclear programme as a security risk; a devastating revelation that the very regime Hasan is desperate we do not attack today, was the one that set the precedent for using military force to destroy another country's nuclear programme in the first place. Oh, my. It's going to be a treat seeing how Mehdi gets out of this one.

How do I get out of it? By pointing out how 1) Iran was at war with Iraq, which had attacked it in 1980 with the encouragement and support of Staine's heroes, Ronald Reagan and Margaret Thatcher. Israel, on the other hand, wasn't - which is why it was condemned by the members of the UN Security Council, including the United States. 2) Whether or not it was Iran or Israel that attacked Osiraq, my overall point still stands. It intensified Saddam's pursuit of a nuclear bomb. It didn't stop him or, as Betts points out, delay him:

Obliterating the Osirak reactor did not put the brakes on Saddam's nuclear weapons program because the reactor that was destroyed could not have produced a bomb on its own and was not even necessary for producing a bomb. Nine years after Israel's attack on Osirak, Iraq was very close to producing a nuclear weapon.

By the way, Staines curiously glosses over the fact that the Iranian strike on Osiraq in 1980 was encouraged by the . From the relevant Wikipedia page:

At the onset of the war, Yehoshua Saguy, director of the Israeli Military Intelligence Directorate, publicly urged the Iranians to bomb the reactor. . . a senior Israeli official met with a representative of the Khomeini regime in France one month prior to the Israeli attack.

Hmm. How does this fit with Staines's argument that Iran is a "deranged Islamist theocracy" bent on Israel's destruction? Why were Iran and Israel working together in the 1980s then? Guess the Iranians are more rational than Staines gives them credit for, and the Israelis aren't as fearful of Iran as apologists like Staines like to claim. Otherwise, how to explain the first (Iranian) strike on Osiraq, with Israeli support, that Staines so gleefully refers to?

Oh, my. It's going to be a treat seeing how Paul gets out of this one.

But back to the issue of the day.

Finally...

What do we do about Iran? In effect, Mehdi Hasan's answer is nothing. Which may be fine if you're Mehdi Hasan. But it's not quite so fine if you care about the future of the West and the survival of the State of Israel.

The Iranian regime has repeatedly threatened to destroy Israel.

No, sorry, it hasn't. I have dealt with this hoary old myth here. And here is the latest statement from the Iranian government on the subject.

It has backed up words with deeds in the form of the funding, arming and training of appalling Islamo-fascist terror groups such as Hamas and Hezbollah which are also committed to destroying Israel. It employs anti-Semitic rhetoric unheard of since the days of the Third Reich.

I don't deny that Iran has backed Hamas and Hizbollah - which, incidentally, were formed after Israel illegally invaded and occupied Palestinian and Lebanese land! - or that some Iranian leaders employ "anti-Semitic rhetoric" but how is this relevant to the debate over nukes? Pakistan and North Korea back terrorists and possess nukes - the former with the consent of the United States. And, lest we forget, Iran was backing Hamas and Hizbollah and deploying anti-Semitic rhetoric back in the eighties too, when Israel was selling it arms - why does Staines keep evading this issue? Oh, wait, because it doesn't fit his convenient and simplistic "Iran-is-a-deranged-theocracy-bent-on-destroying Israel" narrative.

Oh, and it's building a nuclear programme which every serious analyst in the world is concerned may lead Iran ultimately to acquire nuclear weapons.

Evidence, please! Staines knows full well that the consensus views of the US and Israeli intelligence agencies is that Iran is not "building a nuclear programme". The IAEA agrees. "Every serious analyst"? How about Leon Panetta, the US Defence Secretary? Here's Panetta speaking in January:

Are they trying to develop a nuclear weapon? No.

And here's Lieutenant General Ronald Burgess, director of the Defense Intelligence Agency, speaking in February:

[Iran] is unlikely to initiate or intentionally provoke a conflict or launch a preemptive attack.

Serious enough for you, Paul?

That is why the UN security council has implemented tough sanctions. That's why Israel is worried Mehdi, and since Israel is on the front line of the same civilisational battle as we are, that's why we should be worried too.


"Israel" isn't "worried". Netanyaho doesn't represent Israel as a whole. XX

In a previous article, this time for the Guardian last November, Mehdi argued that it would be "rational for Iran... to want its own arsenal of nukes" and in the same article asks us to accept that "bombastic" (his word, honestly) President Mahmoud Ahmadinejad's "goal is only to develop a civilian nuclear programme, not atomic bombs". Muddled Mehdi wants us to rely on Ahmadinejad's irrationality for our security.

1) Since that article, both Ehud Barak and General Martin Dempsey, the chairman of the joints of staff in the United States, have agreed with my assessment that Iran is a rational actor. Poor Paul. 2) Poor Paul, like so many hawks, has a very limited understanding of how the Iranian government works. Ahmadinejad has nothing to do with any decision to stop or start building nuclear weapons; the person who decides whether Iran goes nuclear is the "Supreme Leader", Ayatollah Khamenei, who has repeatedly said he considers nuclear weapons to be unIslamic and sinful. You may not believe him but his views on this issue should at least be mentioned - and Staines is the one who mentioned how Iran is a "theocracy" so why not pay attention to the words of the theocrat-in-chief?

Finally, on the specific question, would a military attack be effective? No-one knows the answer for certain. The Osiraq precedent from 1981 certainly suggests that it could be. But there are no guarantees.

No, I'll give you a guarantee: if we attack Iran, it will be a disaster - both for the west's security and Israel's. We won't be able to prevent Iran building nukes unless we invade and occupy the country, burn down all the labs and kill all the scientists. Is that what Staines is arguing? If not, he should just keep quiet and stop posturing and invoking fraudulent historical analogies.

All we can do - those, that is, who truly appreciate what is at stake - is give our full support to military action if indeed it is taken, and hope against hope that it succeeds.

At least he's honest in his final paragraph. Staines wants war, and he wants us to uncritically support such an illegal, "preventive" and self-defeating war. He makes no mention at all of civilian casualties in his 1,300-word post (innocent Iranian women and children? Who cares!), nor does he analyse the potential, catastrophic consequences - from terrorist blowback in the west, to a secret Iranian weapons programme, to attacks on Israel, to a global oil price shock. For chickenhawks like Staines, this is all about, in the words of one academic, "mainstreaming" a war against Iran.

 

 

 

 

 

Mehdi Hasan is a contributing writer for the New Statesman and the co-author of Ed: The Milibands and the Making of a Labour Leader. He was the New Statesman's senior editor (politics) from 2009-12.

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How Jeremy Corbyn won the Labour leadership election

The revolt against the leader transformed him from an incumbent back into an insurgent. 

On the evening of 12 July, after six hours of talks, Jeremy Corbyn emerged triumphantly from Labour’s headquarters. “I’m on the ballot paper!” he told supporters gathered outside. “We will be campaigning on all the things that matter.”

The contest that Corbyn’s opponents had sought desperately to avoid had begun. Neither a vote of no confidence by 81 per cent of Labour MPs, nor 65 frontbench resignations had persuaded him to stand down. Days of negotiations led by Tom Watson had failed (“For years I’ve been told that I’m a fixer. Well, I tried to fix this and I couldn’t,” Labour’s deputy leader sorrowfully told the parliamentary party). The rebels’ last hope was that the National Executive Committee would force Corbyn to reseek nominations. After being backed by just 40 colleagues in the confidence vote, both sides knew that the leader would struggle to achieve 51 signatures.

But by 18-14, the NEC ruled that Corbyn would be automatically on the ballot (“Watson, Watson, what’s the score?” chanted jubilant aides in the leader’s office). After withstanding a 16-day revolt, Corbyn appeared liberated by the prospect of a summer of campaigning. His confidence prefigured the outcome two months later.

Corbyn did not merely retain the leadership - he won by a greater margin than last time (with 61.8 per cent of the vote to last year's 59.5 per cent) and triumphed among all three sections: party members, affiliated supporters and registered supporters. The rebels had hoped to narrow his mandate and win among at least one group: they did neither. Far from being a curse for Corbyn, the contest proved to be a blessing. 

***

The day before the pivotal NEC meeting, Angela Eagle, who had been preparing to stand for months, launched her leadership bid. The former shadow business secretary was admired by MPs for her experience, tenacity, and economic acumen. Her trade union links and soft left background were further cited in favour of her candidacy.

But after an underwhelming launch, which clashed with Andrea Leadsom’s withdrawal from the Conservative contest (leaving Eagle calling questions from absent journalists), MPs gravitated towards Owen Smith.

Like Eagle, Smith hailed from the party’s soft left and had initially served under Corbyn (two prerequisites in the rebels’ eyes). But unlike her, the former shadow and work pensions secretary did not vote for the Iraq war (having entered parliament in 2010) or the 2015 Syria intervention. “It looks like the war party,” a senior Corbynite said of Eagle’s campaign launch with Hilary Benn. Many Labour MPs feared the same. With the left-leaning Lisa Nandy having ruled herself out, only the ambitious Smith met the criteria.

“I’d been in hospital for two days with my brother, who was unwell, in south Wales,” he recalled when I interviewed him.  “I came out having literally been in A&E at Cardiff Heath hospital for 29 hours, looking after him, to have my phone light up with 30, 40, 50 colleagues, MPs and members, ringing up saying ‘there’s going to be a contest, Angela Eagle has thrown her hat into the ring, you should do likewise.’ And at that point, on the Wednesday night, I started ringing people to test opinion and found that there was a huge amount of support for me.”

On 19 July, after Smith won 90 MP/MEP nominations to Eagle’s 72, the latter withdrew in favour of the Welshman. A week after the Conservatives achieved their second female prime minister, Labour’s 116-year record of all-male leaders endured. Though Smith vowed that Eagle would be “at my right hand throughout this contest”, she went on to appear at just one campaign event.

Corbyn’s challenger was embraced by MPs as a “clean skin”, untainted by service during the New Labour years. But Smith’s non-parliamentary past was swiftly - and ruthlessly - exploited by his opponents. His time at the US drugs firm Pfizer was cited as evidence of his closeness to big business. Corbyn’s supporters also seized on interviews given by Smith as a by-election candidate in 2006.

The man pitching to the left was found to have defended Tony Blair (suggesting that they differed only over the Iraq war), supported private sector involvement in the NHS and praised city academies. “I'm not someone, frankly, who gets terribly wound up about some of the ideological nuances,” he told Wales Online. Such lines were rapidly disseminated by Corbyn supporters through social media.

“Getting out early and framing Owen was crucial,” a Corbyn source told me. A Smith aide echoed this assessment: “It helped secure their base, it took a load of people out of contention.”

Throughout the campaign, Smith would struggle to reconcile his past stances with his increasingly left-wing programme: opposing private provision in the NHS, returning academy schools to local authority control, banning zero-hours contracts and imposing a wealth tax of 1 per cent. “It was easy for us to go for the jugular over his background when he portrayed himself as a left candidate,” a Corbyn source said.

Smith insisted that the charge of opportunism was unmerited. “To be honest, my opponents have extrapolated rather a lot in an attempt to brand me as a ‘Blairite wolf in sheep’s clothing,’” he told me in August. “Well, I’m nothing of the sort, I’ve always been a democratic socialist and I always will be.” He added: “I’m someone who’s been surrounded by people who’ve been on the left of the Labour movement all their lives. It should come as no surprise that I’ve come out of that background and I’m pretty red. Because I am.”

But a former shadow cabinet colleague said that Smith did not stand out as “a radical” in meetings. “The only time that I remember him becoming really animated was over further tax-raising powers for Scotland and the implications for Wales.”

As well as Smith’s ambiguous past, Corbyn’s allies believe the breadth of his political coalition hindered him from the start. “He was trying to bring together Blairites, Brownites and every other -ite in between,” a campaign source said. “That was never going to hold, we knew that and from the moment there were splits it was easy to point out.”

Jon Trickett, the shadow business secretary and one of Corbyn’s early supporters, told me: “They tried to pretend that there was no distinction between them and Jeremy on policy grounds, they tried to narrow down the areas of difference to electability. But, frankly, it didn’t seem credible since some of the people behind it were absolutely ideologically opposed to Jeremy. Peter Mandelson and people like that.”

A frequently expressed charge was that Smith’s left-wing pledges would be overturned by Blairite figures if he won. John McGeechan, a 22-year-old postgraduate student who joined Labour after “self-indulgent, self-serving MPs initiated their corridor coup”, told me of Smith: “He’s just another mealy-mouthed careerist who says whatever he thinks is going to get him elected. I don’t believe at all that he means what he says about creating a radical socialist government given that he’s got the backing of Peter Mandelson, Alastair Campbell and Tony Blair, people who’ve disagreed with Corbyn on pretty much all his socialist policies. I don’t believe that he’s going to stand up to these people.”

Whether believable or not, Smith’s programme showed how Corbyn had shifted Labour’s centre of gravity radically leftwards - his original aim in June 2015.

***

On the night Corbyn made the leadership ballot, the rebels still found cause for hope. Unlike in 2015, the NEC imposed a freeze date of six months on voting (excluding 130,000 new members) and increased the registered supporter fee from £3 to £25 (while reducing the sign-up period to two days). “It’s game on!” a senior figure told me. By narrowing the selectorate, Corbyn’s opponents hoped to achieve a path to victory. With fewer registered supporters (84 per cent of whom voted for Corbyn last year), they believed full party members and affiliated trade unionists could carry Smith over the line.

But when 183,000 paid £25 to vote, their expectations were confounded. Far from being “game on”, it looked to many rebels like game over. Once again, Corbyn’s opponents had underestimated the left’s recruiting capacity. Smith’s lack of name recognition and undistinctive pitch meant he could not compete.

Alongside the main contest were increasingly fractious legal battles over voting rights. On 28 July, the high court rejected Labour donor Michael Foster’s challenge to Corbyn’s automatic inclusion on the ballot. Then on 8 August, a judge ruled that the party had wrongly excluded new members from voting, only for the decision to be overturned on appeal.

In the view of Corbyn’s allies, such legal manevoures unwittingly aided him. “They turned Jeremy, who was an incumbent, back into an insurgent,” Trickett told me. “The proponents of the challenge made it seem like he was the underdog being attacked by the establishment.”

Smith, who repeatedly framed himself as the “unity candidate”, struggled to escape the shadow of the “corridor coup”. That many of his supporters had never accepted Corbyn’s leadership rendered him guilty by association.

“The coup had an enormous galvanising effect and an enormous politicising effect,” a Corbyn source told me. “For a great number of people who supported Jeremy last year, there was a feeling, ‘well, we’ve done the work, that’s happened, now over to him.’ What the coup meant for a lot of people was that this isn’t about Jeremy Corbyn, this is a people’s movement, which we all need to lead.” The Corbyn campaign signed up 40,000 volunteers and raised £300,000 in small donations from 19,000 people (with an average donation of £16). Against this activist army, their rivals’ fledgling effort stood no chance.

“At the launch rally, we had 12 simultaneous events going on round the country, livestreamed to each other,” a Corbyn source said. “We had a lot of communication with people who were big in the Sanders campaign. In the UK context, it’s trailblazing.”

On 12 August, after previously equivocating, Smith ruled out returning to the shadow cabinet under Corbyn. “I've lost confidence in you. I will serve Labour on the backbenches,” he declared at a hustings in Gateshead. In the view of Corbyn’s team, it was a fatal error. “He shot apart his whole unity message,” a source said.

Smith, who initially offered Corbyn the post of party president, was rarely booed more than when he lamented Labour’s divisions. As one of the 172 MPs who voted against the leader, he was regarded as part of the problem, rather than the solution. By the end, Smith was reduced to insisting “I wasn’t in favour of there being a challenge” - a statement that appeared absurd to most.

As well as his leftist credentials and unifying abilities, Smith’s other main boast was his competence and articulacy. “HIs USP was that he was this media-savvy guy,” a Corbyn source said. “As a result, he threw himself up for any and every media opportunity and made tons of gaffes. We just made sure people were aware of them.”

The most enduring gaffe came early in the campaign, on 27 July, when he spoke of wanting mto “smash” Theresa May “back on her heels”. Though Smith initially defended his “robust rhetoric” (“you’ll be getting that from me”), by the afternoon his campaign had apologised. What was explained as a “rugby reference” dogged them for weeks. “It played into the hands of how Corbyn wanted to depict us,” a Smith source told me. “It was really hard to shake off.”

More unforced errors followed. Smith suggested getting Isis “round the table”, in anticipation, many believed, of Corbyn agreeing. But the Labour leader baulked at the proposal: “No, they are not going to be round the table”. Corbyn’s communications team, more organised and agile than in 2015, denounced Smith’s remarks as “hasty and ill-considered”. As with “smashed”, the Labour challenger had achieved rare cut-through - but for the wrong reasons.

Smith’s rhetorical looseness became a recurring problem. At a rally on 23 August, he appeared to refer to Corbyn as a “lunatic”. In an interview with the Daily Mirror, he said of meeting his wife: “1,200 boys, three girls and I pulled Liz. So I must have something going on. That must be leadership.”

Earlier in the campaign, Smith’s team denied that the candidate referred to the size of his penis when he quipped of his height: "5ft 6. 29 inches - inside leg!” The guffaws from his supporters suggested otherwise.

We used to have a gaffe counter,” a Corbyn source told me. “I think it got up to 30 by the end.”

Smith’s team, meanwhile, despaired at how the Labour leader’s own missteps failed to dent him. The discovery that Corbyn had in fact secured a seat on a Virgin train, contrary to initial impressions, did little lasting damage. “It’s priced in, the bar is much lower for him,” a Smith source complained.

Incorrect claims, such as Labour being level in the polls before the coup attempt and Corbyn giving 122 speeches during the EU referendum campaign, were believed by many of his supporters. “How do you rebut bullshit?” a Smith aide asked. “If you respond, it becomes a story.”

So frequently had Labour MPs condemned their leader that extraordinary charges were soon forgotten. On 22 August, shadow business minister Chi Onwurah wrote in the New Statesman that Corbyn’s treatment of her and Thangam Debbonaire could constitute “racial discrimination”.

If this had been any of my previous employers in the public and private sectors Jeremy might well have found himself before an industrial tribunal for constructive dismissal, probably with racial discrimination thrown in,” she argued. But within a day, the story had moved on.  

For Smith, fleeting momentum was achieved through significant endorsements. On 10 August, the GMB backed his campaign after becoming the only trade union to ballot its members. The following week, Labour’s most senior elected politician, Sadiq Khan, endorsed Smith. Unlike Andy Burnham, the London mayor believed he could not remain neutral during this profound schism. Smith was subsequently also backed by the Scottish Labour leader, Kezia Dugdale. Neil Kinnock and Ed Miliband trumpeted his cause. Yet such declarations counted for little. “It’s like the Remain campaign and the Archbishop of Canterbury,” one Smith ally told me, suggesting that Labour members, like Leave voters, ”weren’t listening” to such grandees.

But in the view of Corbyn’s team, the rebels profoundly “underestimated” their opponent. “He’s a nice guy but he also has an inner steel and won't flinch from a challenge. The Obi-Wan Kenobi comparison is very accurate when you work up close with him. He’s also extremely intelligent and has a great grasp and retention of detail. It showed in the debates.”

“I have to say, I felt pretty sorry for Owen at several points,” another Corbyn source reflected. “Whatever it was, his ambition or being pushed into it, it didn’t seem like it was the right time for him. He hadn’t worked out what he was about and why that fitted with the times.”

***

Those Labour MPs who long warned that an early challenge to Corbyn would prove futile have been vindicated. “Party members are always loyal to the incumbent,” a senior source astutely noted. In the case of Corbyn, a lifelong campaigner, who many contended was “never given a chance”, this traditional fealty was intensified.

“Most of the people backing and funding him didn’t think Owen was going to win,” a Corbyn source said. “Their aim was, one, to reduce Jeremy’s mandate and, secondly, to map the selectorate.”

Having won a second leadership contest - an unprecedented achievement for the Labour left - the leader’s supporters insist their ambitions do not end here. “We’ve got to think incredibly seriously about how we win a general election in a totally changed landscape,” a Corbyn source told me. “This campaign has been showing how to do it.” But a Smith aide warned that it was a “massive strategic error” to make electability, rather than principle, the defining test of Corbyn. The leader, he suggested, could withstand a general election defeat provided he simply affirmed his values.

Beyond regarding a split as worthless, Labour MPs are divided on how to proceed. Some want another leadership challenge as early as next year. Rather than seeking to narrow the selectorate, they speak of recruiting hundreds of thousands of new members to overpower the left. “There are lots of people out there who want a credible, electable, centre-left proposition and we have not given them enough of a reason to sign up,” a former shadow cabinet minister told me. “Who has an offer and the charisma to be able to bring in new people? That has to be the question the next time round.”

Others believe that backbenchers should follow Thumper’s law: “If you can’t say something nice, don’t say anything at all.”  A senior MP argued that MPs should “just shut up” and “let Jeremy crack on with it.” The imperative, he said, was to avoid MPs “taking the blame for us getting thumped in a snap election”. Some are prepared to move beyond neutrality to outright support by serving under Corbyn.

The Labour left and their most recalcitrant opponents both confront challenges of electability. The former must demonstrate a path to victory despite Corbyn’s subterranean poll ratings. The latter, who boast so often of their superior appeal, must face a remorseless truth. Until they are electable in the party, they will never be electable in the country.

George Eaton is political editor of the New Statesman.