Mulcaire and confidentiality

What impact will the withdraw of litigation funding have?

Since the revelations in the New York Times revived the phone hacking scandal back in September 2010, one of the most puzzling aspects has been the "settlement" agreement that News International had entered into with Glenn Mulcaire. In particular, as was pointed out at Jack of Kent, a conventional settlement agreement made no sense if Mulcaire was not actually an employee to begin with.

Since then, it has become clear that the agreement had two key terms in addition to any cash payment for Mulcaire to compromise all and any legal claims against News International, if he ever had any such claims at all.

First, there was an obligation of confidentiality on Mulcaire. This is standard in such agreements, though in this case it was clearly convenient to News International. A cynic may even suggest that was the whole point.

Second, there appears to have been an indemnity for the payment of Mulcaire's legal fees for defences to civil claims. This may have been tied into a further right of News International to conduct his defence. This would have been sensible from a strategic point of view, as it appears News International was facing a number of actions as co-defendant with Mulcaire.

However, after pressure at yesterday's select committee hearing, it has been announced that this funding of legal costs has been withdrawn. Apart from the direct financial detriment this will have on Mulcaire, it is not clear what impact this will have on either the confidentiality provision or any right of News International to conduct his defence on his behalf. If the agreement is sophisticated and well-drafted, it may be that the indemnity can be dropped without any effect on whether other obligations can be enforced.

In any case, it would now seem that Mulcaire has no direct interest in co-ordinating any defence to the civil claims with News International. He may well feel at least morally released from any obligation of confidentiality. The withdraw of funding his defence may have a significant impact on the course of the outstanding civil claims. In this way, as in many others, the events of this week mean that News International cannot carry on as before.

David Allen Green is legal correspondent of the New Statesman. He is the author of the Jack of Kent blog and can be followed on Twitter and on Facebook.

David Allen Green is legal correspondent of the New Statesman and author of the Jack of Kent blog.

His legal journalism has included popularising the Simon Singh libel case and discrediting the Julian Assange myths about his extradition case.  His uncovering of the Nightjack email hack by the Times was described as "masterly analysis" by Lord Justice Leveson.

David is also a solicitor and was successful in the "Twitterjoketrial" appeal at the High Court.

(Nothing on this blog constitutes legal advice.)

Photo: Getty
Show Hide image

It's not WhatsApp that was at fault in the Westminster attacks. It's our prisons

Britain's criminal justice system neither deterred nor rehabilitated Khalid Masood, and may even have facilitated his radicalisation. 

The dust has settled, the evidence has been collected and the government has decided who is to blame for the attack on Westminster. That’s right, its WhatsApp and their end-to-end encryption of messages. Amber Rudd, the Home Secretary, wants tech companies to install a backdoor into messages like these that the government can then access.

There are a couple of problems here, not least that Adrian Russell aka Khalid Masood was known to the security services but considered to be low-risk. Even if the government had had the ability to gain entry to his WhatsApp, they wouldn’t have used it. Then there’s the fact that end-to-end encryption doesn’t just protect criminals and terrorists – it protects users from criminals and terrorists. Any backdoor will be vulnerable to attack, not only from our own government and foreign powers, but by non-state actors including fraudsters, and other terrorists.

(I’m parking, also, the question of whether these are powers that should be handed to any government in perpetuity, particularly one in a country like Britain’s, where near-unchecked power is handed to the executive as long as it has a parliamentary majority.)

But the biggest problem is that there is an obvious area where government policy failed in the case of Masood: Britain’s prisons system.

Masood acted alone though it’s not yet clear if he was merely inspired by international jihadism – that is, he read news reports, watched their videos on social media and came up with the plan himself – or he was “enabled” – that is, he sought out and received help on how to plan his attack from the self-styled Islamic State.

But what we know for certain is that he was, as is a recurring feature of the “radicalisation journey”, in possession of a string of minor convictions from 1982 to 2002 and that he served jail time. As the point of having prisons is surely to deter both would-be offenders and rehabilitate its current occupants so they don’t offend again, Masood’s act of terror is an open-and-shut case of failure in the prison system. Not only he did prison fail to prevent him committing further crimes, he went on to commit one very major crime.  That he appears to have been radicalised in prison only compounds the failure.

The sad thing is that not so very long ago a Secretary of State at the Ministry of Justice was thinking seriously about prison and re-offending. While there was room to critique some of Michael Gove’s solutions to that problem, they were all a hell of a lot better than “let’s ban WhatsApp”. 

Stephen Bush is special correspondent at the New Statesman. His daily briefing, Morning Call, provides a quick and essential guide to British politics.