The draft Libel Reform Bill is a good thing

Why the proposals should be welcomed.

The draft Libel Reform Bill, published two days ago, has had a mixed reception. Those in favour of libel reform have broadly welcomed it, though some do not think it goes far enough; and many established libel practitioners have sought to minimise the draft bill's importance and novelty. Some libel veterans even say it will make no difference: it is almost as if they are discouraging the government from taking the draft bill forward at all.

However, as a practising media defence lawyer, I would say that there is a lot of good in the draft bill, and that if it were to pass into legislation in its present form it would make a marked difference to the nature of libel litigation. That is not to say that the draft bill could not be improved; but it is to say that it is misconceived and illiberal to dismiss the bill completely.

Let us start from first principles. One problem with libel litigation is that it is far too easy to bring a libel claim and thereby to threaten plausibly to bring a libel claim. This is one of the main causes of "libel chill". As it currently stands, libel is one of few areas of law where the claimant does not have to show any damage at all to threaten or actually bring a claim: damage is presumed. Until fairly recently, the courts used to allow claims where there had been no actual damage to proceed to full trial: the claimant could then get nominal damages of a penny or a pound, and may have to pay the defendant's legal costs, but there was nothing in principle preventing the claim running its full expensive course.

This complacent approach has shifted over the last few years. The courts are now more willing to allow a defendant to strike out a claim as an abuse of process where there has been little or no damage. But it is still for the defendant to make that application and at his or her own costs risk. It is not for the claimant to show there is substantial damage to the reputation, but for the defendant to show there has not been substantial damage.

The proposed clause 1 of the draft bill addresses this problem head on in a satisfactory and subtle way. By introducing a requirement that the claimant has to show substantial harm, the draft bill is in effect reformulating the tort of libel. Some established claimant lawyers are saying this will lead to more expense because of futile debates about whether there is substantial harm or not. I do not think this will be the case. It is more likely that the same lawyers will have to explain to their clients why claims cannot now be threatened because of this new requirement. Indeed, one may say that if a claimant and their lawyer thinks it is open to genuine dispute whether an alleged libel has not caused (or is not likely to cause) substantial harm, then they have no business to bring or threaten a claim in the first place.

The substantial harm test set out in clause 1 of the draft libel bill is a liberal and constructive provision, and one should be rather sceptical of the libel claimant lawyers who say it is not really needed. It is common sense that potential libel claimants should be required to show substantial harm before they can even threaten a libel case: at a stroke it weakens the might of heavy-handed "reputation management" lawyers who somehow appear to think that using legal threats is a legitimate form of pubic relations.

Equally significant, if not more so, is the proposed abolition of the presumption of a jury trial. Again, established libel lawyers will seek to downplay the importance of this provision. And it is indeed correct that jury trials are now infrequent. However, the effect of there being usually a jury trial at the end of the litigation process forces parties into years of complex and expensive interim litigation, as applications are made for striking out parts of the claim and the defence that will eventually go before the jury. Moreover, rulings on each of these interim applications can then be appealed by the losing party, sometimes all the way to the Supreme Court (formerly the House of Lords).

The mere fact of defamation cases having an eventual jury trial makes pre-trial proceedings more costly and elaborate than they need to be. Bringing them to an end will have a beneficial effect on libel litigation generally.

The proposal for a statutory public-interest defence should also be welcomed. However, the draft bill makes this defence more elaborate than it needs to be. It should be enough that the publication was on a matter of public interest and was published without malice: after all, the United States seems to manage with libel law being on a restricted basis without any grave problems. The draft bill, however, subjects the proposed public interest defence to a non-exhaustive checklist of matters to which the court should have regard. Some of these factors are common sense; however, the risk is that the courts will apply these factors in a formulaic and pedantic manner without any regard to the overall purpose of a public-interest defence.

There are other good parts to this draft bill. The "truth" and "honest opinion" defences are not merely cosmetic changes to the old "justification" and "fair-comment" defences as has been asserted by some commentators. Instead, the old defences are expressly abolished. Therefore, these new statutory defences will not necessarily be suffocated by the case law of the old defences; indeed, deployed sensibly by the courts, these new defences could mean that truth and honest opinion are full defences to any claim, unencumbered by the complexities of the current common law defences. And the proposed single-publication rule will bring certainty and sanity to libel litigation: no longer will each download constitute a fresh tort and the basis of a new libel claim.

The draft bill could be better. For example, one hopes the consultation period will address issues such as the capability of corporations to sue for libel. The issue of costs also have to be dealt with, though that will be done by other costs-specific legislation.

But, for me, the tests of this draft legislation are simple. Will it make it harder for a libel (or "reputation management") lawyer to advise his or her client that a spurious claim can be threatened? Will it make libel litigation less expensive and complex? Will it make it easier for defendants to point to complete defences when threatened? And will it make it easier for statements to be published on matters of public interest without the adverse effects of "libel chill"?

On each of these questions, the answer is cautiously affirmative. But the draft bill is not a default position: it is certainly not the case that this is what will be passed into law unless it can be improved. There is a real risk the established libel claimant lawyers will persuade the government that no legislation is really needed, other than in respect of making libel litigation cheaper to bring. In other words, after years of campaigning, there still may be no legislative change to libel law and procedure.

All this said, this draft Libel Bill is a great step forward. It is important that all right-minded people press for improvements; but it is also crucial to recognise that even these modest reforms are still up for grabs.

 

David Allen Green is legal correspondent of the New Statesman and is a practising media lawyer. His Jack of Kent blog chronicled the libel defence campaign of Simon Singh, 2008-10.

David Allen Green is legal correspondent of the New Statesman and author of the Jack of Kent blog.

His legal journalism has included popularising the Simon Singh libel case and discrediting the Julian Assange myths about his extradition case.  His uncovering of the Nightjack email hack by the Times was described as "masterly analysis" by Lord Justice Leveson.

David is also a solicitor and was successful in the "Twitterjoketrial" appeal at the High Court.

(Nothing on this blog constitutes legal advice.)

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Junior doctors’ strikes: the greatest union failure in a generation

The first wave of junior doctor contract impositions began this week. Here’s how the BMA union failed junior doctors.

In Robert Tressell’s novel, The Ragged-Trousered Philanthropists, the author ridicules the notion of work as a virtuous end per se:

“And when you are all dragging out a miserable existence, gasping for breath or dying for want of air, if one of your number suggests smashing a hole in the side of one of the gasometers, you will all fall upon him in the name of law and order.”

Tressell’s characters are subdued and eroded by the daily disgraces of working life; casualised labour, poor working conditions, debt and poverty.

Although the Junior Doctors’ dispute is a far cry from the Edwardian working-poor, the eruption of fervour from Junior Doctors during the dispute channelled similar overtones of dire working standards, systemic abuse, and a spiralling accrual of discontent at the notion of “noble” work as a reward in itself. 

While the days of union activity precipitating governmental collapse are long over, the BMA (British Medical Association) mandate for industrial action occurred in a favourable context that the trade union movement has not witnessed in decades. 

Not only did members vote overwhelmingly for industrial action with the confidence of a wider public, but as a representative of an ostensibly middle-class profession with an irreplaceable skillset, the BMA had the necessary cultural capital to make its case regularly in media print and TV – a privilege routinely denied to almost all other striking workers.

Even the Labour party, which displays parliamentary reluctance in supporting outright strike action, had key members of the leadership join protests in a spectacle inconceivable just a few years earlier under the leadership of “Red Ed”.

Despite these advantageous circumstances, the first wave of contract impositions began this week. The great failures of the BMA are entirely self-inflicted: its deference to conservative narratives, an overestimation of its own method, and woeful ignorance of the difference between a trade dispute and moralising conundrums.

These right-wing discourses have assumed various metamorphoses, but at their core rest charges of immorality and betrayal – to themselves, to the profession, and ultimately to the country. These narratives have been successfully deployed since as far back as the First World War to delegitimise strikes as immoral and “un-British” – something that has remarkably haunted mainstream left-wing and union politics for over 100 years.

Unfortunately, the BMA has inherited this doubt and suspicion. Tellingly, a direct missive from the state machinery that the BMA was “trying to topple the government” helped reinforce the same historic fears of betrayal and unpatriotic behaviour that somehow crossed a sentient threshold.

Often this led to abstract and cynical theorising such as whether doctors would return to work in the face of fantastical terrorist attacks, distracting the BMA from the trade dispute at hand.

In time, with much complicity from the BMA, direct action is slowly substituted for direct inaction with no real purpose and focus ever-shifting from the contract. The health service is superficially lamented as under-resourced and underfunded, yes, but certainly no serious plan or comment on how political factors and ideologies have contributed to its present condition.

There is little to be said by the BMA for how responsibility for welfare provision lay with government rather than individual doctors; virtually nothing on the role of austerity policies; and total silence on how neoliberal policies act as a system of corporate welfare, eliciting government action when in the direct interests of corporatism.

In place of safeguards demanded by the grassroots, there are instead vague quick-fixes. Indeed, there can be no protections for whistleblowers without recourse to definable and tested legal safeguards. There are limited incentives for compliance by employers because of atomised union representation and there can be no exposure of a failing system when workers are treated as passive objects requiring ever-greater regulation.

In many ways, the BMA exists as the archetypal “union for a union’s sake”, whose material and functional interest is largely self-intuitive. The preservation of the union as an entity is an end in itself.

Addressing conflict in a manner consistent with corporate and business frameworks, there remains at all times overarching emphasis on stability (“the BMA is the only union for doctors”), controlled compromise (“this is the best deal we can get”) and appeasement to “greater” interests (“think of the patients”). These are reiterated even when diametrically opposed to its own members or irrelevant to the trade dispute.

With great chutzpah, the BMA often moves from one impasse to the next, framing defeats as somehow in the interests of the membership. Channels of communication between hierarchy and members remain opaque, allowing decisions such as revocation of the democratic mandate for industrial action to be made with frightening informality.

Pointedly, although the BMA often appears to be doing nothing, the hierarchy is in fact continually defining the scope of choice available to members – silence equals facilitation and de facto acceptance of imposition. You don’t get a sense of cumulative unionism ready to inspire its members towards a swift and decisive victory.

The BMA has woefully wasted the potential for direct action. It has encouraged a passive and pessimistic malaise among its remaining membership and presided over the most spectacular failure of union representation in a generation.

Ahmed Wakas Khan is a junior doctor, freelance journalist and editorials lead at The Platform. He tweets @SireAhmed.