Why the military covenant should not be made law

In a democracy, there is no mutuality of obligation between the armed forces and the government.

The enshrining of the military covenant into statute is a dangerous mistake. Oh, it's good politics. In fact, it's mandatory politics. The minister, or shadow minister, who attempts to stand in the way of the press and public clamour to "back our boys" won't remain a minister for long.

But the reality is that this proposed law is wrong in logic, practice and principle. I'm still at a bit of a loss to find out where this concept of the military covenant actually came from. Some claim it dates back to Henry VIII, which is odd, given that in his time Britain, or England, as it was, didn't even have a standing professional army or navy.

Obviously, the values underpinning it are sound. Britain's armed forces are ritualistically praised by politicians for their courage and professionalism, then rewarded with lousy pay, dysfunctional equipment and disgusting living conditions. When they cease to serve, the gratitude of a grateful nation has all too often consisted of a sleeping bag beneath the arches of Charing Cross railway station. But, in our desire to right that manifest wrong, it is important we do not inadvertently, and recklessly, alter the delicate nature of the relationship between the armed forces and the democratic state.

A number of arguments have been made in support of codifying the covenant in law. The main one is that members of the armed forces, uniquely, must be prepared to pay the "ultimate price" for their service. That is factually inaccurate, as the family of the Northern Ireland Police Service officer Ronan Kerr would tragically attest. Policemen, firemen and lifeboatmen, to pick just three professions, all accept death as an occupational hazard. That is not in any way to diminish the heroism of our soldiers, sailors and airmen. But heroism is not the unique preserve of the military.

How, too, is this enshrining of the covenant going to function in practice? Think of the following clause: "British soldiers must always be able to expect fair treatment, to be valued and respected as individuals."

What, in law, will be the definition of "respected as individuals"? If you order someone to charge an enemy machine gun nest, could you really be said to be valuing and respecting them?

A step change too far

The grim reality of military service is that, on occasion, personnel will be sacrificed to secure broader national objectives. The welfare of the individual will at times, by necessity, become secondary.

But there is a much more fundamental problem with this proposed legislation, one that goes to the heart of the power balance existing between ministers and generals. As the covenant states: "the unique nature of military land operations means that the army differs from all other institutions, and must be sustained and provided for accordingly by the Nation". It represents, it adds, a "mutual obligation".

That is wrong. In a democracy there is no mutuality of obligation between the armed forces and the civil power. The former is subservient to the latter. That is the founding principle on which all democracies are based.

There are rare exceptions to this rule. If the military are given orders that are illegal, they have a right to disobey them. But the implications of such a schism are so great that they can only be allowed to occur in extremis. Control of the military should be removed from the hands of the politicians only in the most exceptional circumstances. And to abolish that principle explicitly, via statute, is an incredibly dangerous step to take.

Because these are not abstract notions. In the run-up to the invasion of Iraq, the service chiefs sought independent advice on the legality of that operation. Admiral Sir Michael Boyce, chief of the general staff, specifically demanded unambiguous advice from Lord Goldsmith, then attorney general, that the US-led invasion was legal under international law and that existing UN resolutions provided a basis for the use of force.

Whatever your views on that conflict, imagine for a second if the response from the lawyers had not been adequate. If we had faced a situation where the prime minister had ordered our armed forces into battle, but the service chiefs had refused. Britain would have faced a constitutional crisis.

This is big politics that goes way beyond the peeling walls of the NAAFI and the level of the service pension. These matters certainly need to be addressed, but in a way that does not undermine the primacy of our elected politicians, or place them on an equal legal footing with the generals they purportedly command.

The true covenant between the military and its government is that it will serve it loyally, without fear or favour. If necessary, it will march and fight and die for policies or causes that it does not necessarily understand or support. Theirs is not to reason why. We replace that covenant at our peril.

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Leader: The unresolved Eurozone crisis

The continent that once aspired to be a rival superpower to the US is now a byword for decline, and ethnic nationalism and right-wing populism are thriving.

The eurozone crisis was never resolved. It was merely conveniently forgotten. The vote for Brexit, the terrible war in Syria and Donald Trump’s election as US president all distracted from the single currency’s woes. Yet its contradictions endure, a permanent threat to continental European stability and the future cohesion of the European Union.

The resignation of the Italian prime minister Matteo Renzi, following defeat in a constitutional referendum on 4 December, was the moment at which some believed that Europe would be overwhelmed. Among the champions of the No campaign were the anti-euro Five Star Movement (which has led in some recent opinion polls) and the separatist Lega Nord. Opponents of the EU, such as Nigel Farage, hailed the result as a rejection of the single currency.

An Italian exit, if not unthinkable, is far from inevitable, however. The No campaign comprised not only Eurosceptics but pro-Europeans such as the former prime minister Mario Monti and members of Mr Renzi’s liberal-centrist Democratic Party. Few voters treated the referendum as a judgement on the monetary union.

To achieve withdrawal from the euro, the populist Five Star Movement would need first to form a government (no easy task under Italy’s complex multiparty system), then amend the constitution to allow a public vote on Italy’s membership of the currency. Opinion polls continue to show a majority opposed to the return of the lira.

But Europe faces far more immediate dangers. Italy’s fragile banking system has been imperilled by the referendum result and the accompanying fall in investor confidence. In the absence of state aid, the Banca Monte dei Paschi di Siena, the world’s oldest bank, could soon face ruin. Italy’s national debt stands at 132 per cent of GDP, severely limiting its firepower, and its financial sector has amassed $360bn of bad loans. The risk is of a new financial crisis that spreads across the eurozone.

EU leaders’ record to date does not encourage optimism. Seven years after the Greek crisis began, the German government is continuing to advocate the failed path of austerity. On 4 December, Germany’s finance minister, Wolfgang Schäuble, declared that Greece must choose between unpopular “structural reforms” (a euphemism for austerity) or withdrawal from the euro. He insisted that debt relief “would not help” the immiserated country.

Yet the argument that austerity is unsustainable is now heard far beyond the Syriza government. The International Monetary Fund is among those that have demanded “unconditional” debt relief. Under the current bailout terms, Greece’s interest payments on its debt (roughly €330bn) will continually rise, consuming 60 per cent of its budget by 2060. The IMF has rightly proposed an extended repayment period and a fixed interest rate of 1.5 per cent. Faced with German intransigence, it is refusing to provide further funding.

Ever since the European Central Bank president, Mario Draghi, declared in 2012 that he was prepared to do “whatever it takes” to preserve the single currency, EU member states have relied on monetary policy to contain the crisis. This complacent approach could unravel. From the euro’s inception, economists have warned of the dangers of a monetary union that is unmatched by fiscal and political union. The UK, partly for these reasons, wisely rejected membership, but other states have been condemned to stagnation. As Felix Martin writes on page 15, “Italy today is worse off than it was not just in 2007, but in 1997. National output per head has stagnated for 20 years – an astonishing . . . statistic.”

Germany’s refusal to support demand (having benefited from a fixed exchange rate) undermined the principles of European solidarity and shared prosperity. German unemployment has fallen to 4.1 per cent, the lowest level since 1981, but joblessness is at 23.4 per cent in Greece, 19 per cent in Spain and 11.6 per cent in Italy. The youngest have suffered most. Youth unemployment is 46.5 per cent in Greece, 42.6 per cent in Spain and 36.4 per cent in Italy. No social model should tolerate such waste.

“If the euro fails, then Europe fails,” the German chancellor, Angela Merkel, has often asserted. Yet it does not follow that Europe will succeed if the euro survives. The continent that once aspired to be a rival superpower to the US is now a byword for decline, and ethnic nationalism and right-wing populism are thriving. In these circumstances, the surprise has been not voters’ intemperance, but their patience.

This article first appeared in the 08 December 2016 issue of the New Statesman, Brexit to Trump