Why did Tesco's use car arm fail?

It turns out selling used cars is very different to selling eggs

In a week where supermarket giant Tesco is battling to keep some of its biggest shareholders amid concerns about the group’s future strategy, it was an interesting time to pull the plug on its fledgling car retailing venture, almost exactly a year to the day after it launched.

Using the infrastructure of a used car operation called Carsite, Tesco Cars saw itself reforming the used car landscape, offering sellers of cars up to three years old – mainly fleet operators, car leasing companies and rental firms – a sales channel that it claimed would offer faster sales at higher prices than other routes such as auctions.

The reality has proved very different, and it turns out selling used cars is very different to selling eggs. When Tesco came in, the used car market was in a fairly depressed state, with plenty of stock around. But in the last six months in particular, volume has dried up considerably as the depression in new car sales of 2008 and 2009 now hits supply of three-year-old vehicles. Good used cars can currently command top dollar from buyers, as there simply aren’t enough around to satisfy demand.

Anecdotally, my contacts tell me Tesco came in and tried to act as it does with farmers and its other supermarket suppliers, using its size to try and dictate terms by wanting customers to keep cars on their books and wait for a sale, rather than taking them to the nearest auction where the cash would come through much faster. Ultimately, Tesco struggled to get hold of enough decent quality used cars as the company learned, slightly too late, that the used car market didn’t need Tesco as much as it thought it would.

Don’t mistake this as a weakness in the car market though. Private sales are struggling because of general fears about the economy leading to people not making luxury purchases like a new car when their current one serves a purpose for now, but Tesco isn’t pulling out of selling cars because it’s a struggling sector of the UK economy. The general view of people I’ve spoken to in what is a mature and established car industry is that Tesco came in and though it could easily become a big player overnight, and that people would buy cars from the brand the recognise as the place they get their groceries. Approached in a softer way and with a perceived greater understanding of how and why the new and used markets work, Tesco Cars may have survived beyond its first birthday, but the famous supermarket brand has found used cars too tough a nut to crack.

Paul Barker is group automotive editor at BusinessCar.co.uk.

Tesco's used car venture failed, Getty images.

Paul Barker is group automotive editor at BusinessCar.co.uk.

Photo: Getty
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The Prevent strategy needs a rethink, not a rebrand

A bad policy by any other name is still a bad policy.

Yesterday the Home Affairs Select Committee published its report on radicalization in the UK. While the focus of the coverage has been on its claim that social media companies like Facebook, Twitter and YouTube are “consciously failing” to combat the promotion of terrorism and extremism, it also reported on Prevent. The report rightly engages with criticism of Prevent, acknowledging how it has affected the Muslim community and calling for it to become more transparent:

“The concerns about Prevent amongst the communities most affected by it must be addressed. Otherwise it will continue to be viewed with suspicion by many, and by some as “toxic”… The government must be more transparent about what it is doing on the Prevent strategy, including by publicising its engagement activities, and providing updates on outcomes, through an easily accessible online portal.”

While this acknowledgement is good news, it is hard to see how real change will occur. As I have written previously, as Prevent has become more entrenched in British society, it has also become more secretive. For example, in August 2013, I lodged FOI requests to designated Prevent priority areas, asking for the most up-to-date Prevent funding information, including what projects received funding and details of any project engaging specifically with far-right extremism. I lodged almost identical requests between 2008 and 2009, all of which were successful. All but one of the 2013 requests were denied.

This denial is significant. Before the 2011 review, the Prevent strategy distributed money to help local authorities fight violent extremism and in doing so identified priority areas based solely on demographics. Any local authority with a Muslim population of at least five per cent was automatically given Prevent funding. The 2011 review pledged to end this. It further promised to expand Prevent to include far-right extremism and stop its use in community cohesion projects. Through these FOI requests I was trying to find out whether or not the 2011 pledges had been met. But with the blanket denial of information, I was left in the dark.

It is telling that the report’s concerns with Prevent are not new and have in fact been highlighted in several reports by the same Home Affairs Select Committee, as well as numerous reports by NGOs. But nothing has changed. In fact, the only change proposed by the report is to give Prevent a new name: Engage. But the problem was never the name. Prevent relies on the premise that terrorism and extremism are inherently connected with Islam, and until this is changed, it will continue to be at best counter-productive, and at worst, deeply discriminatory.

In his evidence to the committee, David Anderson, the independent ombudsman of terrorism legislation, has called for an independent review of the Prevent strategy. This would be a start. However, more is required. What is needed is a radical new approach to counter-terrorism and counter-extremism, one that targets all forms of extremism and that does not stigmatise or stereotype those affected.

Such an approach has been pioneered in the Danish town of Aarhus. Faced with increased numbers of youngsters leaving Aarhus for Syria, police officers made it clear that those who had travelled to Syria were welcome to come home, where they would receive help with going back to school, finding a place to live and whatever else was necessary for them to find their way back to Danish society.  Known as the ‘Aarhus model’, this approach focuses on inclusion, mentorship and non-criminalisation. It is the opposite of Prevent, which has from its very start framed British Muslims as a particularly deviant suspect community.

We need to change the narrative of counter-terrorism in the UK, but a narrative is not changed by a new title. Just as a rose by any other name would smell as sweet, a bad policy by any other name is still a bad policy. While the Home Affairs Select Committee concern about Prevent is welcomed, real action is needed. This will involve actually engaging with the Muslim community, listening to their concerns and not dismissing them as misunderstandings. It will require serious investigation of the damages caused by new Prevent statutory duty, something which the report does acknowledge as a concern.  Finally, real action on Prevent in particular, but extremism in general, will require developing a wide-ranging counter-extremism strategy that directly engages with far-right extremism. This has been notably absent from today’s report, even though far-right extremism is on the rise. After all, far-right extremists make up half of all counter-radicalization referrals in Yorkshire, and 30 per cent of the caseload in the east Midlands.

It will also require changing the way we think about those who are radicalized. The Aarhus model proves that such a change is possible. Radicalization is indeed a real problem, one imagines it will be even more so considering the country’s flagship counter-radicalization strategy remains problematic and ineffective. In the end, Prevent may be renamed a thousand times, but unless real effort is put in actually changing the strategy, it will remain toxic. 

Dr Maria Norris works at London School of Economics and Political Science. She tweets as @MariaWNorris.