The bias towards traditional welfare threatens social justice

Rather than defending existing social security entitlements, politicians need to mobilise public support for a new set of social investment priorities.

Reinforced by the wave of austerity following the financial crisis, a new Policy Network/IPPR report shows that social attitudes to welfare are overwhelmingly biased towards a small ‘c’ ‘conservative’ view of the welfare state – implying protecting higher pension payments, social security entitlements, and public expenditure on healthcare. On the other hand, public support for welfare state policies that are geared towards tackling new social risks – relating to structural changes in labour markets and employability, demography, gender equality and family support that traditional protection systems are poorly equipped to provide – is relatively weak. This is the great dilemma at the heart of the politics of the welfare state, which the present debate about welfare reform in the UK scarcely addresses.

In the ongoing discussion about the future role of the state, defending existing social security entitlements, rather than targeting investment at families and children is the public’s preferred option in many European countries, as new comparative polling data from Britain, France and Denmark highlights. Negative sentiment towards growth-oriented, social investment policies in education, active labour markets and family assistance is occurring at a time when slower growth and productivity are increasing the pace of de-industrialisation among developed economies, to the advantage of the emerging powers. The evidence is that shifting expenditure towards these growth-oriented strategies would help to build human capital and increase the capacity for innovation, while supporting the ‘gender revolution’ in paid work and household labour.

Since 2009, every type of welfare regime, including Germany, Sweden and the UK, has chosen a path of budget consolidation that is leading to severe cuts in social investment as a response to the financial crisis. If we consider the survey data on public attitudes towards the welfare state, it is possible to infer that this is merely a rational response by vote-seeking politicians: it is easier to cut back on "family-friendly" service-oriented aspects of welfare rather than healthcare and pension entitlements, as older citizens are more likely to vote.

This preference for the "traditional" welfare state over growth-oriented social investment policies that enhance equity gives serious cause for concern. Growing inequalities in electoral participation might further entrench the welfare status quo, heightening the risk of intergenerational inequality. Given that electoral participation in advanced democracies is falling quickest amongst the young and least affluent, better off and older votes are able to have a greater influence in the political process. For example, spending cuts in the UK have had a disproportionate effect on the young and poor –two groups that tend to have the lowest voter turnout, while universal benefits for the elderly have been largely untouched.

Indeed, support for the ‘traditional’ welfare state is strongest among the more influential cohort of older voters. In Britain, these voters are most likely to support the NHS (51 to 37 per cent), state pensions (44 to 13 per cent) and policing (36 to 18 per cent) as major public expenditure priorities. Conversely, they are less likely to support increased investment in primary and secondary school education by 16 to 32 per cent, and support cutting back maternity and paternity benefit by 37 to 15 per cent compared to younger voters. 78 per cent of Britons and 80 per cent of French voters believe that social protection for families is already more than sufficient. The diverging support for "traditional" welfare provision and a "social investment state" between young and old voters reflects a political context in which the population in many EU member states is getting older, and voters over 50 are most likely to vote.

Worryingly, the financial crisis seems to be consolidating support for ‘old’ welfare state structures at a time when social investment to tackle ‘new’ social risks is of great importance. Europe’s welfare states should be adapting to conquer new structural challenges, which currently pose a major threat to future equity, growth and social sustainability. The biggest threat to social justice in Europe is not institutional change, but the frozen welfare state landscape, perpetuated by the support of major interest groups that are able to control how welfare states operate. Politicians need to show leadership in order to mobilise public support for a transition to a different model of welfare capitalism based on a new set of social investment priorities, looking ahead to the next decade and beyond.

Patrick Diamond is senior research fellow at Policy Network and co-author with Guy Lodge of European Welfare States after the Crisis: changing public attitudes

Students protest against the abolition of the Educational Maintenance Allowance (EMA) outside Downing Street. Photograph: Getty Images.
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Can Nicola Sturgeon keep Scotland in the EU?

For Sturgeon, Scotland's rightful place is in the EU. If that means independence, so be it.

In the aftermath of the EU referendum, when Remain voters were still nursing their hangovers, a meme began to circulate on Scottish Facebook pages. It was an image of Nicola Sturgeon, the First Minister, her arms outspread, with a simple message: “F***in’ calm doon. Am oan it.”

At a time when British politicians are mired in the kind of chaos seen once in a generation, Sturgeon has emerged as a figure of calm. While her fellow Remain campaigners were speaking tearfully to news cameras, she addressed EU citizens, telling them: “You remain welcome here. Scotland is your home and your contribution is valued.”

When Boris Johnson declared, “Project Fear is over,” she retorted on Twitter, “Project Farce has now begun.” Her message has been retweeted more than 6,000 times. Faisal Islam, the political editor of Sky News, remarked on air that she seemed to be “the person with the most thought-through plan”.

Sturgeon now presents herself as Scotland’s anchor to Europe. Yet critics view her actions as those of a veteran independence campaigner seizing a chance denied to her by the Scottish referendum two years ago. In reality, she is working for both objectives.

It is hard to imagine now but the Scottish National Party was once suspicious of the idea of an independent Scotland in Europe. The idea took hold thanks to Jim Sillars, the Labour MP who led the 1976 breakaway that formed the Scottish Labour Party. He defected to the SNP in the early 1980s and became one of its strongest pro-EU advocates. The promise of an independent state within a larger framework was soon a mainstay of the party’s campaigns. The 1997 manifesto promised voters “the restoration of self-confidence and the creation of a modern democracy in the mainstream of European life”.

In the early years of the Scottish Parliament, Sturgeon’s approach to the EU was one of a negotiator, not an idealist. In 2003, she put forward a motion that the Scottish Executive should oppose the reduction of Scottish seats in the European Parliament from eight to seven. “Scotland, with no seat on the Council of Europe, no commissioners and fewer MEPs than comparably sized independent member states, has little enough influence in the EU,” she argued.

Her interest in representation emerged again in 2005 when she described an EU proposal on software patents as “a serious threat” to developers. She noted that: “There was apparently no Scottish minister at the Council to represent Scottish interests, the UK instead being represented by an unelected member of the House of Lords.”

Sturgeon’s commitment to work with the EU has not always been reciprocated. In the Scottish referendum, as deputy first minister, she promised the continuity of EU membership. Yet José Manuel Barroso, the then president of the European Commission, said it would be “extremely difficult, if not impossible”, for an independent Scotland to join. Some consider his statement to have been crucial to the success of the No campaign.

When the EU referendum arrived, Sillars, the architect of the SNP’s Europhile agenda, criticised the “love affair” that he believed his party was indulging in and joined the campaign for Brexit. Sturgeon made a different calculation. She threw herself into the Remain campaign, though she was careful not to stand alongside David Cameron. She played down the Scottish independence line – when asked, in the run-up to the vote, if she was a unionist, she described herself as “an enthusiastic European”.

She turned her reputation as a “nippie sweetie” to her advantage. Once viewed as a dour machine politician, now Sturgeon was warm to voters while cutting Boris Johnson down to size. There was no need to scaremonger over Europe, she said. A positive campaign was enough. There is no doubt that she tapped in to the popular feeling: 62 per cent of voters in Scotland opted to remain in the EU, compared to 48 per cent in the UK as a whole. Every local authority area north of the border voted Remain.

As the referendum results rolled in, she prepared to go it alone. “There are no rules,” Sturgeon told Andrew Marr. “The status quo we voted for doesn’t exist.” To her, Scotland’s rightful place is in the EU and if that requires independence, so be it.

She offered to meet Brussels diplomats. She contacted EU institutions. She put forward a motion in the Scottish Parliament demanding “the Scottish government to have discussions” in pursuit of “protecting Scotland’s relationship with the EU”.

Yet Barroso’s warnings may come back to haunt Sturgeon. She has always painted a picture of an independent Scotland in Europe as one that is nevertheless tied to the British Isles. Its currency is the pound; Scots and the English move freely between Glasgow and Carlisle. EU member states may seize on her proposal, or use it as a way of repeating the rebuff of 2014. Sturgeon the nippie sweetie negotiator has her plan for a European Scotland. Now she must wait for Europe to answer. 

This article first appeared in the 30 June 2016 issue of the New Statesman, The Brexit lies