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Scenes of mild peril

Hugh Aldersley-Williams

Published 03 April 2008

Despite what the papers say, we live in pretty safe times.

Will ours be a "century of viral pandemics", "the century of drought" - or both, and more? These headlines (from the Independent) show how the media are always on the lookout for the next big scare. And both these threats are sure to feature on the "register of risks" that the government plans to publish this year as part of the national security strategy, announced last month by Gordon Brown.

The trouble is that we live in pretty safe times. Instead of vivid dangers (wild beasts, say), we face distant threats. The further they are postponed, the more apt we are to discount them. Yet, at the same time, the threats are many and varied. This leaves us unsure how to respond. Economists have shown how bad we are at making decisions that involve weighing risks even with known values. Most of the risks that would feature in a register are the nebulous but potentially catastrophic ones beloved by the press.

Bird flu is a good example. Some scientists genuinely fear H5N1's potential to mutate into a human-transmissible form; others say that because it hasn't done so yet, it probably won't now. How do you weigh that risk? A pandemic of another kind is possible, but that is not to say, as the media love to do, that one is "overdue".

The strategy raises other problems. It's a fair bet that the register won't include many of the things statistically likely to hurt you - heart disease, road accidents, chronic illness - because they lack the requisite drama. Other risks, notably climate change, are not framed nationally, so the role of any national strategy is limited. The register apparently won't offer guidance on what people should do about the risks it advertises. Yet unless somebody does, it might be just another tease. It would replicate for other risks the government position on terrorism, which asks us to be alert without telling us what to be alert for, thereby merely encouraging undirected fears and increasing public panic.

If we cannot respond usefully, we can at least talk. However vague, these risks, once imagined, can be communicated and amplified. According to Mary Douglas and Aaron Wildavsky's Risk and Culture, "people select their awareness of certain dangers to conform with a specific way of life". And at the moment they are selecting from the all-you-can-eat buffet served up by the media. Our water-cooler gossip - about where's safe to go on holiday, whether to give our children the MMR jab, the safety of genetically modified foods and the rest - leads either to a consensus about the risk that serves to strengthen the social fabric, or disagreement that weakens it.

Talking about the risks we face may not only help us set priorities as to what we feel are the greatest dangers, it might also prove to be the elusive national glue Brown is so keen to find, which will cement an idea of British identity. It will be a shame, however, if it turns out that all we have in common is our fears.

"Panicology" by Hugh Aldersley-Williams and Simon Briscoe is published by Viking (£18.99)

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2 comments from readers

Raghu1
03 April 2008 at 18:09

Iam living in India city Pune.I donot think Iam living safe. 15 years back Pune is safe city. Today over populated too mmuch vicals , most congested road,most polluted air, voices,, ---Over population is worse curse to India.

Our government soft, people are self centar, When India through away their old tradinational values only then we can make progress.

wilfriedsoddemann
05 April 2008 at 08:51

Spread of avian flu by drinking water can explain small clusters in households

Proved awareness to ecology and transmission is necessary to understand the spread of avian flu. For this it is insufficient exclusive to test samples from wild birds, poultry and humans for avian flu viruses. Samples from the known abiotic vehicles also have to be analysed. There are plain links between the cold, rainy seasons as well as floods and the spread of avian flu. That is just why abiotic vehicles have to be analysed. The direct biotic transmission from birds, poultry or humans to humans can not depend on the cold, rainy seasons or floods. Water is a very efficient abiotic vehicle for the spread of viruses - in particular of fecal as well as by mouth, nose and eyes excreted viruses.

Infected birds and poultry can everywhere contaminate the drinking water. All humans have very intensive contact to drinking water. To prove viruses in water is difficult because of dilution. If you find no viruses you can not be sure that there are not any. On the other hand in water viruses remain viable for a long time. Water has to be tested for influenza viruses by cell culture and in particular by the more sensitive molecular biology method PCR.

There is a widespread link between avian flu and water, e.g. in Egypt to the Nile delta or Indonesia to residential districts of less prosperous humans with backyard flocks and without central water supply as in Vietnam:

http://www.cdc.gov/ncidod/EID/vol12no12/06-0829.htm.

See also the WHO web side:

http://www.who.int/water_sanitation_health/emerging/h5n1back... and

http://www.umg-verlag.de/umwelt-medizin-gesellschaft/407_m_s...

“Influenza: Initial introduction of influenza viruses to the population via abiotic water supply versus biotic human viral respirated droplet shedding” and

http://www.thelancet.com/journals/laninf/article/PIIS1473309...

“Transmission of influenza A in human beings”.

Avian flu infections may increase in consequence to increase of virus circulation. Transmission of avian flu by direct contact to infected poultry is an unproved assumption from the WHO. There is no evidence that influenza primarily is transmitted by saliva droplets.

In hot climates/the tropics flood-related influenza is typical after extreme weather and floods. Virulence of influenza viruses depends on temperature and time. Special in cases of local water supplies with “young” and fresh H5N1 contaminated water from low local wells, cisterns, tanks, rain barrels, ponds, rivers or rice paddies this pathway can explain small clusters in households. At 24°C e.g. in the tropics the virulence of influenza viruses in water amount to 2 days.

Human to human and contact transmission of influenza occur - but are overvalued immense. In the course of influenza epidemics in Germany, recognized clusters are rare, accounting for just 9 percent of cases e.g. in the 2005 season.

In temperate climates for “older” water from central water supplies cold water is decisive to virulence of viruses. At 7°C the virulence of influenza viruses in water amount to 14 days. In temperate climates the lethal H5N1 virus will be transferred to humans via cold drinking water, as with the birds in February and March 2006, strong seasonal at the time when drinking water has its temperature minimum.

The performance to eliminate viruses from the drinking water processing plants regularly does not meet the requirements of the WHO and the USA/USEPA. Conventional disinfection procedures are poor, because microorganisms in the water are not in suspension, but embedded in particles. Even ground water used for drinking water is not free from viruses.

Dipl.-Ing. Wilfried Soddemann - Free Science Journalist - soddemann-aachen@t-online.de

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