The IMF has debunked the myth of Osborne's fiscal "credibility"

Slowing the cuts would not trigger a bond market revolt.

There is a huge amount of interesting material in the full IMF staff report on the UK, released today, in particular the lasting damage ("hysteresis" to economists) done by this prolonged period of very low growth.  But in this post I wanted to draw attention to one particular paragraph (it is para 43 on page 38).   I reproduce it here in full:

Some further slowing of consolidation is unlikely to trigger major market turmoil

43. Further slowing consolidation would likely entail the government reneging on its net debt mandate. Would this trigger an adverse market reaction? Such hypotheticals are impossible to answer definitively, but there is little evidence that it would. In particular, fiscal indicators such as deficit and debt levels appear to be weakly related to government bond yields for advanced economies with monetary independence. Though such simple relationships are only suggestive, they indicate that a moderate increase in the UK’s debt-to-GDP ratio may have small effects on UK sovereign risk premia (though a slower pace of fiscal tightening may increase yields through expectations of higher near-term growth and tighter monetary policy).  This conclusion is further supported by the absence of a market response to the easing of the pace of structural adjustment in the 2011 Autumn Statement. Bond yields in the US and UK during the Great  Recession have also correlated positively with equity price movements, indicating that bond yields have been driven more by growth expectations than fears of a sovereign crisis.

This couldn't be clearer.  It is saying two things.  First, the reason long-term gilt yields are low in the UK (and similarly in virtually every other "advanced economy with monetary independence") is weak growth, not "confidence" or "credibility".  "Bond yields are driven more by growth expectations."  That is, yields are low not because of economic confidence but because of its exact opposite. This is precisely what I and others (Simon Wren-Lewis here, and of course Paul Krugman in the US) have long been arguing.  Indeed, the specific evidence the IMF cites - that yields have fallen when stock markets have fallen - is precisely that, in the UK, I first pointed  here a year ago.  

Second, that there is no reason to believe that slowing fiscal consolidation would "trigger an adverse market reaction".  In other words, when the Chancellor said that "these risks [of slowing consolidation] are very real, not imaginary", he was, once again, indulging in evidence-free speculation, not serious analysis.  Indeed, the Fund accurately points out that the main reason yields might rise (slightly, not precipitiously) if fiscal policy were to be loosened would be because of "expectations of higher near-term growth". As I pointed out here, this would be good news.

So, the IMF agrees that the reason gilt yields are low is because of weak growth, not confidence; and that we could loosen policy with minimal risk and probable benefit.  This is an explicit endorsement of the argument set out by Paul Krugman and Richard Layard (and endorsed by a long list of eminent economists, not to mention me) in their Manifesto for Economic Sense:  "there is massive evidence against the confidence argument; all the alleged evidence in favor of the doctrine has evaporated on closer examination."

 As I noted, the Fund's recommendations are, to be polite, inconsistent. But the analysis is spot on. And it explodes whatever is left of the credibility of the analysis underlying the government's fiscal strategy.

This piece originally appeared on Jonathan Portes's blog Not the Treasury view ...

George Osborne, "indulging in evidence-free speculation, not serious analysis." Photograph: Getty Images.

Jonathan Portes is director of the National Institute of Economic and Social Research and former chief economist at the Cabinet Office.

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Europe's elections show why liberals should avoid fatalism

France, Germany and the Netherlands suggest there is nothing inevitable about the right's advance.

Humans are unavoidably pattern-seeking creatures. We give meaning to disparate events where little or none may exist. So it is with Brexit and Donald Trump. The proximity of these results led to declarations of liberalism's demise. After decades of progress, the tide was said to have unavoidably turned.

Every election is now treated as another round in the great duel between libralism and populism. In the Netherlands, the perennial nativist Geert Wilders was gifted outsize attention in the belief that he could surf the Brexit-Trump wave to victory. Yet far from triumphing, the Freedom Party finished a distant second, increasing its seats total to 20 (four fewer than in 2010). Wilders' defeat was always more likely than not (and he would have been unable to form a government) but global events gifted him an aura of invincibility.

In France, for several years, Marine Le Pen has been likely to make the final round of the next presidential election. But it was only after Brexit and Trump's election that she was widely seen as a potential victor. As in 2002, the front républicain is likely to defeat the Front National. The winner, however, will not be a conservative but a liberal. According to the post-Trump narrative, Emmanuel Macron's rise should have been impossible. But his surge (albeit one that has left him tied with Le Pen in the first round) suggests liberalism is in better health than suggested.

In Germany, where the far-right Alternative für Deutschland was said to be remorselessly advancing, politics is returning to traditional two-party combat. The election of Martin Schulz has transformed the SPD's fortunes to the point where it could form the next government. As some Labour MPs resign themselves to perpeutal opposition, they could be forgiven for noting what a difference a new leader can make.

2016 will be forever remembered as the year of Brexit and Trump. Yet both events could conceivably have happened in liberalism's supposed heyday. The UK has long been the EU's most reluctant member and, having not joined the euro or the Schengen Zone, already had one foot outside the door. In the US, the conditions for the election of a Trump-like figure have been in place for decades. For all this, Leave only narrowly won and Hillary Clinton won three million more votes than her opponent. Liberalism is neither as weak as it is now thought, nor as strong as it was once thought.

George Eaton is political editor of the New Statesman.