Debts, deficits and Toby Young: Mehdi Hasan responds to a critic

The Telegraph blogger's response to my ebook on austerity is interesting but ill-informed.

Imagine my surprise to discover that Toby Young had not just bought and read my 10,000-word ebook, The Debt Delusion, as he'd promised to on Twitter, but penned a 3,000-word response on the Telegraph website, entitled "New Statesman's political editor is wrong about the debt crisis" (note: I'm not, technically, the NS's "political editor".)

Young's attempt to debunk my arguments, as outlined in the ebook, begin with some kind and appreciative words:

On the principle that you should know your enemy, it's a must-read. It's also pitched at a reasonably grown-up level, allowing room for serious debate - and that's always welcome.

Young ends his post with equally high-minded and friendly words:

I hope he doesn't consider this blog post too 'hysterical'. This is an important debate and I look forward to his response.

It's a shame then that he undercuts his own seriousness and maturity by using a photo of me, to accompany his post, with the words "Deficit Denier" stamped over my face. I guess that's how he loses friends and alienates people. [Update: Young has since informed me, via Twitter, that he doesn't "choose the pictures at the top of my blog posts. That's out of my hands".]

Young's "critique" begins with him taking issue with my "over-reliance throughout the book on the economic 'expertise' of others." Shock! Horror! I dared to quote economists, books, reports and studies to buttress my arguments. Outrageous! Disgusting! Note, however, how Young (proudly?)cites just one expert over the course of his 3,000 words: Warwick University's Timothy Sinclair (who is, incidentally, a political scientist, not an economist). Is this going to be the approach at Young's new free school, I wonder? Ignore academics! Ignore evidence! Make it up as you go along!

"Appealing to the authority of others," harrumphs Young, "is to commit the fallacy of argumentum ad verecundiam" - a point I discuss in my recent NS column on experts and expertise. But Young - and his cheerleader, Paul Staines - fail to understand that arguments from authority, especially on complex subjects such macroeconomics and fiscal policy, can play an important and influential role; as the RationalWiki website points out: "(A)appeal to authority, when correctly applied, can be a valid and sometimes essential part of an argument that requests judgement or input from a qualified or expert source". And this philosophy website defines the argument as "the fallacy of appealing to the testimony of an authority outside his special field".

Yet Young, a writer and journalist, sets himself up as his own authority on economic issues which is as comical as it is egomaniacal.

He also disingenuously claims that I cited Johann Hari as an "expert" on the deficit. I didn't. I quoted Johann Hari saying, in a March 2011 blogpost:

If we are 'bust' today, as George Osborne has claimed, then we have almost always been bust. We were bust when we pioneered the Industrial Revolution. We were bust when we ruled a quarter of the world. We were bust when we beat the Nazis. We were bust when we built the NHS.

Young then goes off on a self-confessed "comic digression" in which he mocks Hari for having confused "debt" with "deficit" in the opening paragraph of the blogpost - a paragraph, incidentally, nowhere referred to or mentioned or quoted in my ebook! - and then moves swiftly on.

Highlighting Hari's name is a cheap if amusing shot from Young. But the points Hari posed still stand and are totally and utterly unrelated to his various scandals and subsequent downfall:

If we are 'bust' today, as George Osborne has claimed, then we have almost always been bust. We were bust when we pioneered the Industrial Revolution. We were bust when we ruled a quarter of the world. We were bust when we beat the Nazis. We were bust when we built the NHS.

Or is Young denying these points? Which ones? That our debt to GDP ratio was 200-per-cent-plus when the NHS was founded? We don't know; he doesn't deign to tell us. (He is, as he later admits in the blogpost, a master of the "sleight of hand".)

Young then summarizes the arguments in my ebook as follows:

The first is that it's simply not true that Britain would now be in the throes of a sovereign debt crisis if the Coalition hadn't embarked on a programme of fiscal tightening. . . The second part is that the theory of "expansionary fiscal contraction", i.e. the belief that you can stimulate growth by reducing public expenditure, is as oxymoronic as it sounds.

He then, however, bizarrely goes on to say:

I don't want to spend too much time taking issue with Hasan on the second point.

Um, er, why not? Given that it is one of the two key arguments, as he himself admits, of the ebook, why not try and "take issue" with it? Dare I say, rebut it? Undermine it?. Young, instead, claims:

When it comes to macroeconomic theories, it's impossible to prove or disprove them either way

Really? Then why did economists Ann Pettifor and Victoria Chick, having studied eight episodes between 1918 and 2009 over which changes in the UK's public debt (as a percentage of gross domestic product) could be compared with those in public expenditure, conclude:

The empirical evidence runs exactly counter to conventional thinking. Fiscal consolidations have not improved the public finances... Consolidation increases, rather than reduces, the level of public debt as a share of GDP and is, in general, associated with adverse macroeconomic conditions.

Why did a study by the IMF of specific fiscal measures taken to reduce the deficit in 15 advanced economies between 1980 and 2009 find just two cases (yes, just two out of 170!) in which spending cuts turned out to be expansionary for the economy as a whole - in Denmark in 1983 and in Ireland in 1987 - and conclude:

Fiscal consolidation typically has a contractionary effect on output.

Now I'm starting to understand why Young is so allergic to citing experts or studies. They tend not to be on his side! But, as a very minimum, he could have at least have cited, in defence of his claims, the now-notorious paper by deficit hawks Alberto Alesina and Silvia Ardagna purporting to empirically demonstrate a link between cuts and growth (but, I should add, since debunked by the IMF and a study by the Roosevelt Institute). Reading Young's post on the subject of cuts and growth, the words "cop" and "out" come to mind.

As with so many embarrassed and defensive deficit hawks these days, Young briefly concedes what those of us who he smears as "deficit deniers" have been concerned about, and warning of, for sometime now:

[I]t seems likely that the British economy will be plunged back into recession

before promptly - and defensively - adding:

but that won't prove that a policy of "expansionary fiscal contraction" wouldn't have worked in a more favourable economic climate, as it did in the case of Canada.

Canada? Young says in his blogpost that it too him "no more than a couple of hours to read" my ebook but, at this point, I started to wonder whether he'd read it or not. After all, I devote an entire chapter of The Debt Delusion to pointing out "the myriad ways in which Britain in 2011 differs from Canada in 1995" and I quote the opinion and analysis of Michael Mendelson, a Canadian academic and forner government adviser on fiscal consolidation, who wrote in May 2011:

None of Canada's economic conditions in 1995 apply in the UK in 2011. The UK is not currently experiencing vigorous economic growth, to say the least. Unemployment is high and rising, not falling as it was in Canada in 1995. The UK's main export markets are anything but booming: the US, Spain and Ireland alone account for about 25 per cent of UK exports. These countries are not going on an import binge anytime soon. The UK begins its fiscal consolidation with interest rates already more or less at zero. UK interest rates have nowhere to fall, only to rise. It is impossible for monetary policy in the UK to be deployed to counteract fiscal policy as occurred in Canada.

Young's next para is difficult to disagree with:

I think Hasan is right when he claims that the reason David Cameron and George Osborne have embraced "expansionary fiscal contraction" is because it chimes with their visceral dislike of Big Government. What he neglects to say is that the reason Ed Miliband and Ed Balls favour a Keynesian approach is because it chimes with their visceral dislike of free market capitalism. In short, both sides are equally guilty of embracing a particular economic theory for ideological reasons.

I actually think there's a lot of truth in this (although, conveniently, Young understates Cameron and Osborne's dislike of "Big Government" and exaggerates the two Eds' "visceral dislike of free market capitalism" - Balls, after all, is the former City minister who pushed for further deregulation of the banking sector). However, just because the "conflict is fundamentally an ideological one and the economic argument is simply a proxy war", that doesn't change the fact that economic history, empirical evidence and common sense all seem to be on the side of the Keynesian doves, not the deficit hawks. Facts are facts.

Young prefers speculation and counterfactuals to facts, figures and studies, writing:

Hasan is so plainly wrong on the first point. It really doesn't matter who's right on how best to deliver long-term growth because had Britain not embarked on a programme of fiscal tightening last year we would now be facing a sovereign debt crisis.

Really? How does he "know" this? Is this the crystal-ball theory of economics that will be taught at the West London Free School? In the very next sentence, Young admits that his claim is "a hard one to prove, I grant you". Yep, it sure is. As Jonathan Portes, the former chief economist at the Cabinet Office and current director of the National Institute of Economic Social and Economic Research (NIESR), commented in a round-robin email this morning:

[A]nyone who thinks that the gilt markets would have panicked if we'd stuck with the trajectory we were on in June 2010 (before the Emergency Budget and Spending Review) has to explain why they're not panicking now, when we're on a trajectory that implies higher, rather than lower, borrowing than was projected then.

In June 2010, before the Budget/SR, the OBR [Office for Budget Responsibility] projected that PSNB [Public Sector Net Borrowing] in 2014-15 would be £70 billion; after the 2010 Budget, it projected £37 billion. Our forecast is now that it will be £90 billion, and still over £70 billion the year after. I imagine the OBR will be somewhat more optimistic, but we are clearly no better than back where we started. And the gilts market is doing what, precisely?

Young falls back on the credit rating agencies for support, and accuses me of being "particularly complacent about the risk of a credit-rating downgrade". Yes, I am. I plead guilty. On Friday 5 August, I wrote a piece for the Guardian entitled, "The US should let its credit rating be downgraded - and shrug". That afternoon, Standard & Poors downgraded the United States for the first time in the nation's history. Guess what's happened since? US borrowing costs have plunged to historic lows. The fact is that a country's economic fundamentals have much more influence on the bond markets than the credit rating agencies - which is why, in my ebook, I cited a warning from Moody's, in March 2011, that the UK economy could lose its prized triple-A rating if growth continues to stagnate - as it has done in recent months. It is a point that Young conveniently overlooks and omits to mention in his 3,000-word post.

Young then pompously pronounces that "the problem with Hasan's argument is that his understanding of the bond markets isn't sophisticated enough". He's got me there. Again, I plead guilty. I'm not very "sophisticated". So am I allowed to invoke an expert? Please? Pretty please? Because Pimco's Bill Gross, manager of the world's biggest bond fund, told the Times in September:

The economy in the UK is worse off than it was when the plan was developed, so there should be at a minimum fine-tuning and perhaps re-routing of the plan

Gross added:

The UK is actually in the best position of all to make a mid-course correction.

Is Young going to accuse Gross of having an unsophisticated understanding of the bond markets too? Or how about Jonathan Portes who, according to the Financial Times:

has found a strong correlation between lower gilt yields and greater investor concerns about economic prospects.

Young mocks the view that these cuts are "monstrous - just monstrous", rather than "fairly modest", before conceding that the amount of money spent on public services is set to fall by 11 per cent (or 19 per cent, if you strip out the ringfenced departments) and admitting:

There's no disputing that the government's deficit reduction plan involves cutting public services by significantly more than the figures for the overall reduction in public expenditure would suggest - I myself have been guilty of that particular sleight of hand in the past.

There are a fair few sleights of hand from Young in his lengthy blogpost. For example, he claims:

[W]hat Hasan neglects to mention is that these "cuts" only pare down public expenditure to the level it was at a few years before the Coalition came to power. TME [Total Managed Expenditure], for instance, is forecast to be higher in real terms in 15/16 (£668.5 billion) than it was in 08/09 (£658.823), some 11 years after Labour had been in power.

Eh? Again I ask: has Young read The Debt Delusion? Or just flicked through it? In Chapter 8, I not only "mention" but rebut and refute this lazy, statistically-dodgy argument proferred by what Young's fellow Tory, Tim Montgomerie, has rightly referred to as the "pain deniers":

This is. . . a deeply flawed and misleading comparison: it doesn't compare like with like. For a start, [it] doesn't take into account the above-inflation cost pressures on public services - in particular, in the NHS - and nor does it adjust for a bigger population (in 2014/15 versus 2006/07).

There is also, again, the issue of how the spending breaks down - in 2014/15, a bigger chunk of the cash (£66bn) will go towards interest expenditure on the debt, compared to the much smaller chunk (£26bn) in 2006/07. This, in turn, will leave a much smaller amount of money to invest in public services.

As another of Young's fellow Tories, Matthew D'Ancona, has pointed out:

Statistics conceal as much reality as they convey: the fact that public spending is rising in cash terms, or that it will still account for 41 per cent of national income  as it did in 2006 is of no comfort to the public sector worker losing her job, or the commuter concerned about fare rises, or the victim of a burglary worried about police cuts, or the mother-of-three facing the loss of her child benefit, or the university applicant anxious about debt, or the RAF safety officer wondering if his career is over.

But Young continues to roll out the right-wing talking-points:

What Hasan and other left-wing critics of the "cuts" always gloss over is that public expenditure increased massively under the last government - more than 50% in real terms between 97/98 and 09/10. That's why the UK had the third largest deficit in Europe last year, behind only Ireland and Greece.

1) The "50%" figure, of course, includes the costs of the credit crunch/bank bailout/stimulus, all of which were caused by the 2008 financial crisis, as Young well knows; 2) So what if "public expenditure increased massively" under Labour - has he forgotten how decrepit and crumbling our schools and hospitals were after 18 years of Conservative (mal)administration? I haven't; and 3) the UK's ballooning budget deficit was a consequence of a post-recession decline in tax revenues, rather than a pre-recession binge in spending. And, if New Labour under Blair and Brown was as spendthrift and wasteful as Young claims, why did the Cameroons pledge to match the government's spending plans right up until the crash?

On cuts, Young concludes:

So the programme of cuts embarked upon by the present government last year is, in the grand scheme of things, fairly modest.

No wonder he has issues with argumentum ad verecundiam: he prefers to make sweeping value judgements without reference to any expertise or authority. Based on the numbers, however, the independent Institute for Fiscal Studies describes the coalition's cuts as "the longest, deepest, sustained period of cuts to public services spending at least since World War II." Young or the IFS? Sweeping statements versus empirical evidence? Take your pick.

Young asks:

Does Hasan really believe that if Gordon Brown had been re-elected - and made Ed Balls his Chancellor - Britain wouldn't be in the same boat as Ireland, Greece, Portugal, Italy, Spain, Belgium and, now, Hungary?

Yes, I do. The evidence - darn, there's that word again that Young seems to so despise - suggests the British economy wouldn't be in such dire straits if Labour had been re-elected in May 2010. Young may have an irrational loathing for his late father's party but the fact is that when Labour left office last year the economy was growing, unemployment was falling and inflation was under control. Under this Tory-led government of deficit fetishists and austerity junkies, growth has stalled, consumer confidence has plummeted, unemployment has ballooned to 2.6 million - a 17-year high - and inflation has crossed 5 per cent, helped on by Osborne's VAT rise. Young makes no reference to any of this in his blogpost. Surprise, surprise!

18 months after Young's hero, George Osborne, entered Number 11, the results are in: austerity has failed. The cuts aren't working. The private sector hasn't stepped in to plug the gap.

It's time for Young to stop living in denial. He writes plays and movies for a living; he has set up a free school. But economics clearly isn't his strength. Nonetheless, his lengthy and amusing blogpost was a good effort at a semi-rebuttal and a nice plug for The Debt Delusion so I applaud him for it and now await his response to my response to his response to my ebook.

(P.S. You can download The Debt Delusion at Amazon for just £1.79.)

 

 

Mehdi Hasan is a contributing writer for the New Statesman and the co-author of Ed: The Milibands and the Making of a Labour Leader. He was the New Statesman's senior editor (politics) from 2009-12.

Photo: HANNAH MCKAY/REUTERS
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The lure of Lexit must be resisted – socialism in one country is a fantasy

Much of the left still must learn that the existing British state is the prison of their hopes.

Lexit, the left-wing case for leaving the EU, is rising from the dead. Its hopes were best captured in 1975. In the run up to the first referendum on EU membership, E P Thompson, the historian of the early English working class, published his clarion call to leave what was then called the Common Market. Doing so would see “Money toppled from power” as Britain moves “from a market to a society”.

“As British capitalism dies above and about us”, Thompson asserted, in a revealing passage worth quoting at length, “one can glimpse, as an outside chance, the possibility that we could effect here a peaceful transition – for the first time in the world – to a democratic socialist society. It would be an odd, illogical socialism, quite unacceptable to any grand theorist…  But the opportunity is there, within the logic of our past itinerary. 

"The lines of British culture still run vigorously to that point of change where our traditions and organizations cease to be defensive and become affirmative forces: the country becomes our own. To make that leap, from a market to a society, requires that our people maintain, for a little longer, their own sense of identity, and understanding of the democratic procedures available to them…”

Thompson spoke for the majority of the British political left at the time, from the then numerous Communists and Trotskyists through to the conservative-wing of the Labour Party and trade unions via the Bennites. All were hostile to sharing sovereignty with the capitalists running the rest of our continent. All believed that just as Britain was the birth-land of the industrial revolution so it could create a unique socialism across its land by going it alone.

I expected a resurgence of a similar left anti-Europeanism in last year’s referendum, and a renewed advocacy of a British road to world progressive leadership. Instead, with few exceptions, the inherently right-wing nature of Brexit bore down on advocates of left-wing politics. Owen Jones, with his family roots in that past history, flirted with Lexit. He has described how his comrades across Europe, such as those in Podemos in Spain, were appalled at the prospect and he wisely backed away.

Labour Leave was mainly business-oriented in its call for UK democracy. The decisively working class vote for Brexit was neither socialist nor social democratic. It simply and understandably rejected the all-party consensus that things should carry as hitherto. Given a chance to say what they thought of ‘the whole lot of them’, millions of Labour voters displaced their disgust with Westminster onto the EU.

The event that resuscitated the Anglo-Lexiteers was not the referendum result but this year’s UK general election. On the summer solstice, two weeks after its astounding outcome, the Lexit-Network posted its first blog entry. It’s aim to help steer a future Corbyn government. In parallel, the New Socialist website, with its strapline for “robust debate and intransigent rabble rousing”, launched a week before the election, also gives voice to Lexiteers.

Prominent among them are sirens from across the Atlantic: Joe Guinan and Thomas M. Hanna and Harvard’s Richard Tuck. They draw on the outstanding work of Danny Nicol who has shown how the EU’s constitutional structures embed neoliberalism. Their arguments – often published in the New Statesman and openDemocracy – pre-existed the referendum. But only as opinions. Now they are gathering energy with the prospect of a Corbyn-transformed Labour Party taking power.

The underlying dream of ‘socialism in one country’ may be potty. But it is essential to recognise the core issue that could give legitimacy a left-wing call for Brexit, a democratic argument anchored on the moment that changed British politics, the launch of Labour’s 2017 election manifesto.

The June 2017 general election was a political watershed. The outcome was due to combination of the 5 “M”s. The man, the movement, the manifesto, May and McDonnell. Of the five, the keystone was the manifesto, whose architect was John McDonnell. In the first place, however, it was “the man” who was crucial.  

Jeremy Corbyn was the personal embodiment of unbroken resistance to the military and financial priorities of Blairism. His personal vision, however, is mostly limited to opposition to tangible injustices and he is not a natural leader. But the outrageous presumption of his unsuitability by a failed New Labour establishment and the torrid injustice of the media contempt unleashed a surge of support. The blowback to the ruthlessness of the assault upon him generated the credibility of the call for a halt that he personified. With poetic justice, the elite aura of entitlement provoked a wave of solidarity that crystallised around Jeremy. A movement was born that took a new form suitable to the age of the platform capitalism of Google, Facebook and Amazon.

Thanks to Momentum, Corbynism became a social-media driven ‘social movement’ independent of Labour officials and MPs. The confinement of politics to parliamentary routines permits the corporate acquisition of policy. The hysteria around Momentum signalled the pain of a genuine threat to its domination.

Even so, the combination of the man and the movement was incapable of moving public opinion. Especially when it seemed that the Tories under May, with the Brexit breeze filing their sails, were now a party of ‘change’. The local election results on 4 May this year saw Labour crash to 27% support, with the Tories establishing an 11 per cent lead and making gains after seven years in office. The general election had already been called. What turned things around was Labour’s Manifesto. It was leaked shortly after the local elections (probably to ensure it was not filleted by the party’s executive) then published. It turned the tables on a Tory party whose leader had foolishly decided to present herself as the allegory of ‘stability’.

After two decades of the wealthy stealing from the rest of us, Labour set out how it proposed to take a little from the rich to help the poor. After decades of rip-off privatisation, it proposed nationalising railways and water to remove them from what are in effect a publically subsided form of taxation by profiteering monopoly suppliers. In the face of an acute rise of indebtedness among the young, it proposed free university education. A neat contrast of the winners and losers was posted by the New Statesman’s Julia Rampen.

The key to its success was that Labour’s manifesto was not an opportunist response of unfunded promises concocted in response to the surprise challenge of a general election that the government had repeatedly pledged it would not call. McDonnell told Robert Peston on the Sunday following: “We geared up last November. As soon as the Prime Minister said there would not be a snap election we thought there would be”. The result was a fully-costed, professional challenge to the outrageous inequity of the neoliberal consensus. By contrast it was Theresa May’s manifesto that was composed in secret, bounced on the Cabinet, contained amateurishly formulated commitments and had to be promptly disowned by the Prime Minister herself.

The outcome was the most dramatic upset in the history of general election campaigns and, more important, a reversal of the terms of Britain’s domestic politics, grounded on Labour’s well-judged pledges. As Jeremy Gilbert argues, “The June 2017 UK General Election was a historic turning point not just because it marked the full emergence of the Platform Era. It also marked the final end of neoliberal hegemony in Britain” – although not he emphases, neoliberalism itself.

It follows that quite exceptionally for the platform of a losing party, Labour’s manifesto has an afterlife. This poses a fundamental question with respect to Brexit. If the UK were to remain in the EU would a Labour government be allowed to carry out the nationalisations and redistribution that its manifesto promises? If the answer is ‘No’ then the democratic case against continued membership is immeasurably strengthened. Whatever the immediate costs, it would be essential to leave the trap of an EU in order even to start to build fairer and more just 21st century society. 

The Lexiteers claim exactly this. That the EU would prevent Labour from renationalising, under its rules favouring the private sector. The argument quickly becomes technical and clearly there are ways that EU membership restricts a government’s freedom of action. But it does not prevent the exercise of all self-interested national economic measures.

In July, to take the most immediate example, the still fresh President Macron nationalised shipyards about to be taken over by an Italian bidder. In the same month, in his barbaric speech in on how Europe should belong to Europeans, Hungary’s Prime Minister Orban claimed he had achieved, “clear majority national ownership in the energy sector, the banking sector and the media sector. If I had to quantify this, I would say that in recent years the Hungarian state has spent around one thousand billion forints on repurchasing ownership in strategic sectors and companies which had previously been foolishly privatised."

Both the French and Hungarian measures are right-wing forms of national takeover to which the Commission will be naturally less opposed than a Corbyn one. But the Lexiteer argument is not that there will be resistance, there will be plenty of that here in the UK as well, but that EU membership makes nationalisation illegal and therefore impossible as beyond politics. The only response to the EU, therefore, is Leave!

The tragic reality is that the UK political-media class, especially the Tories, made the EU a scapegoat for their domestic policies. They hid behind the EU to claim they were powerless to prevent unpopular policies they were in fact themselves pursuing. The most egregious example was immigration. But the UK is not powerless within the EU. Brussels would not be able to prevent Labour from implementing a social-democratic reorientation of the economy to ameliorate the gung-ho marketisation that is the legacy of Cameron and Osborne’s six disastrous years.

But what about red-bloodied socialism? Could this be allowed by the corporatist constitution of the European elite? Of course not. But, however much this might be McDonnell’s and my own dream, it is hardly on the immediate agenda. The stated priority for Labour is securing jobs, preserving the benefits of the EU’s single market and reversing the acute regional inequalities that have made the UK the most territorially unbalanced society in the whole of the EU (mapped by Tom Hazeldine in New Left Review).

Absurd as it may seem, however, the lure of Lexit is a belief that a Corbyn majority can unleash British socialism while the EU groans under the austere regimentation of the Eurozone.

For example, Guinan and Hanna writing in New Socialist assert that Labour can “seize upon the historically unique opportunity afforded by Brexit to throw the City under the bus”. Apparently the ‘opportunity’ of a Commons majority created by first-past-the-post means a Labour government can snap its fingers at the House of Lords and the monarchy not to speak of the media and the banks, to use the imperial British state to “assert public control over finance, and rebalance the UK economy”. No consideration is given the fact that the ‘opportunity’ is likely to be based on considerably less than 50 per cent support amongst the voters. Meanwhile, the country’s largest export market will, apparently, despite its ineradicable neoliberal character, sit idly by as the path to socialism is pioneered on its largest island.

Perhaps we should be grateful to brazen Lexiteers for being carried away when others, such as the Guardian’s Larry Elliot are less candid about the logic of their views.

It hardly needs the genius of a Varoufakis to grasp that the UK is made up of European nations and when it comes to the dominant economic system this will be changed only through a shared European process that defies EU corporatism, or not at all. Much of the left still must learn that the existing British state is the prison of their hopes and will never be the instrument for their delivery.

Back in 1975 when E. P. Thompson hurled his diatribe against the ‘grand theorists’ of socialism he had Tom Nairn in his sights, whose fine polemic, The Left Against Europe had recently scorched every corner of anti-European prejudice. Against the fantasy of socialism in one Britain, Nairn had argued:

“The Common Market—Europe’s newest ‘constitutional regime’—represents a new phase in the development of bourgeois society in Europe. To vote in favour of that regime ‘in a revolutionary sense alone’ does not imply surrender to or alliance with the left’s enemies. It means exactly the opposite. It signifies recognizing and meeting them as enemies, for what they are, upon the terrain of reality and the future. It implies a stronger and more direct opposition to them, because an opposition unfettered by the archaic delusions of Europe’s anciens regimes”.

Nearly 50 years later the terrain of reality and the future is still shunned by the Lexiteers as they cling to the fetters of the old regime. 

Anthony Barnett’s “The Lure of Greatness: England’s Brexit and America’s Trump” is published by Unbound

This article first appeared in the 21 September 2017 issue of the New Statesman, The revenge of the left