On 4 September, Emmanuel Macron emerged from a meeting in Paris of the “coalition of the willing” – a group of more than 30 countries that includes the UK, Canada, and Japan – to announce significant progress in the effort to co-ordinate security guarantees for a post-war Ukraine. Twenty-six countries were now committed to deploying their own troops as part of a “reassurance force” to help deter another Russian attack, the French president said. He declined to specify how many of those forces would be stationed inside Ukraine and whether the United States would be involved.
Less than 24 hours later, Vladimir Putin delivered his response. Speaking at an economic conference in Vladivostok on his way back from a four-day visit to China, where he attended a vast military parade alongside Xi Jinping and Kim Jong Un, he first suggested, disingenuously, that such a force would not be necessary. “If an agreement is reached that leads to peace, to a long-term peace, then I don’t see any point in their presence in Ukraine. Then, he issued an unequivocal threat. “If some military forces start appearing there, especially now, while the fighting is ongoing, we will consider them legitimate targets to destroy.”
Putin is clearly trying to intimidate Western leaders and persuade them to rethink plans to commit their own troops. For all his bluster since the start of this war, it is far from certain that the Russian leader would be prepared to risk direct conflict with nuclear powers such as the UK and France, and other members of Nato.
Yet there is an element of bluff on both sides. Are we really to believe that Western leaders are now prepared to risk the lives of their own troops, and ultimately the prospect of war with Russia, to defend Ukraine? Given the tortuous past debates in parts of Europe about the wisdom of sending long-range weapons systems and tanks to Kyiv, Putin might well have reason to doubt – and perhaps test – their newfound resolve.
Macron was emphatic that the planned multinational force would not be positioned “on the front line, but in areas that are still being defined”. But Putin has been explicit since he launched this assault in 2022, that one of the primary objectives behind his war is to prevent Nato’s eastward expansion and thwart what he views as nefarious efforts by the alliance to establish a “military foothold” in Ukraine. He is unlikely to willingly accept an outcome that includes the very military presence he claims to be fighting to prevent.
The other great unknown is the extent to which the US, in its current iteration, is prepared to sign on. While Trump suggested in August that he was ready to provide air, and likely intelligence, support as part of any security guarantees for Ukraine. He has also repeatedly warned about the danger of the conflict escalating into “World War III” – to be fair, Joe Biden was also reticent to provide any support to Ukraine that risked widening the war or drawing the US into a direct confrontation. Trump has also previously suspended weapons transfers to Ukraine and indicated the US does not intend to provide any further military aid, although it is still prepared to sell weapons systems for use in Ukraine. The White House indicated on 4 September that the US also plans to halt hundreds of millions of dollars’ worth of funding for long-running security assistance programs for Europe.
Both Russia and Europe appear to be targeting Trump in their messaging. Macron, flanked by Zelensky and other European leaders, wants to show Washington that they are more than willing to do their part to end this war, and that the real obstacle to peace is Moscow. Putin, likewise, is playing to Trump’s oft-stated fears and trying to convince him that Europe is playing a dangerous game that could result in a much larger conflagration.
While the transcontinental struggle to retain Trump’s favour and attention, goes on, it is clear that Putin has no serious interest in negotiating an end to this war any time soon. His insistence in Vladivostok that the best place to hold peace talks with Volodymyr Zelensky would be Moscow was plainly ludicrous given his efforts to assassinate the Ukrainian president in recent years. For now, he still believes he is winning on the battlefield and well positioned to outlast Western unity.
The best way for the “coalition of the willing” to change this calculus – and ensure long-term security guarantees – remains building up the strength of the Ukrainian armed forces. This means investing in long-term weapons production capabilities, robust air defences and accelerating efforts to train and equip the Ukrainian military. That way, neither Putin or Trump will have a veto over the future of the continent’s security.
[See also: Putin, Xi and Kim debut their new world order]
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