More than two weeks after nationwide protests erupted across Iran, the streets of many cities now appear quieter. Yet the possibility of a military attack by the United States hangs heavily over the country and its leadership. During this period of upheaval, Donald Trump has sent mixed and often contradictory signals. On January 13, he urged Iranians on his Truth Social account to continue protesting and to seize state institutions, adding that help was on the way.
Just two days later, on January 15, Trump shared a post quoting Iran’s foreign minister. Abbas Araghchi told Fox News that Iran did not intend to execute protesters. Trump described the statement as “good news.” The New York Times reported on the same day that Benjamin Netanyahu urged Trump not to postpone plans for an attack. These sharp shifts in tone have left analysts unsure about Trump’s real intentions. His 180-degree reversals have fueled doubts about whether Washington has a clear strategy toward Iran.
Conflicting Reports on the Death Toll
Meanwhile, the scale of the crackdown inside Iran has been alarming. On 14 January, Reuters reported that at least 2,571 people had been killed during the protests. Many observers believe the real number is significantly higher. Ongoing internet shutdowns and restricted access to information make it impossible to verify the true death toll. Still, as reports suggest streets have grown quieter, analysts believe the high number of casualties and the regime’s open use of violence have pushed many protesters back into their homes.
Calls for Foreign Intervention
In this context, some protesters inside Iran and opposition figures abroad have begun calling for foreign military intervention to defeat the Islamic Republic. After days of large demonstrations, the government responded with sweeping internet blackouts and an unprecedented crackdown, raising a central question: can this authoritarian system be challenged without outside help? On social media, many Iranians have openly appealed to President Trump to take military action against Iran’s leaders to help bring down the regime.
The sense of deadlock—between widespread public anger and a state capable of crushing dissent with ease—has strengthened arguments in favor of foreign intervention. But many analysts question whether such an approach would ultimately benefit Iranian protesters.
Trump’s Record on Military Intervention
Trump has long criticized interventionist policies. He has repeatedly condemned the wars in Iraq and Afghanistan under President George W. Bush, arguing that they imposed enormous costs on the United States with little return. At the same time, Trump’s record suggests support for quick, limited operations with minimal long-term consequences. The US strike on Iran’s nuclear facilities last summer and the operation in Venezuela in January 2026 are often cited as examples of this approach.
This has raised a critical question: would a limited strike on Iran necessarily lead to the collapse of the Islamic Republic, or even force a meaningful change in its behavior? Few analysts answer confidently in the affirmative.
Why Iran Is Not Venezuela
Iran’s security and intelligence institutions are far more complex than those of Venezuela, and so far there are no signs of defections within these forces. This alone makes repeating the Venezuelan model in Iran far more difficult.
Geography also matters. Iran’s size, terrain, and regional position create challenges that do not exist in Venezuela. As a result, the likelihood of a successful, low-cost, short-term military operation against Iran appears low for the Trump administration. In such a scenario, a strike might weaken the Iranian state without bringing it down. The regime would still retain its tools of repression but could lose effective control over parts of the country. For a nation with deep ethnic, religious, and geographic diversity, this in-between state is one of the most dangerous outcomes.
A Fragmented Opposition
The fragmented nature of Iran’s opposition further complicates the picture. Reza Pahlavi, the son of Iran’s last monarch, has supporters both inside and outside the country, but he also faces significant opposition. Trump himself acknowledged this in an interview with Reuters, expressing doubts about Pahlavi’s ability to command sufficient support inside Iran. He took a similar stance earlier toward Maria Corina Machado, a Venezuelan opposition leader and Nobel Peace Prize laureate, saying he was unsure she commanded enough respect inside her country.
Risks in Iran’s Border Regions
In the absence of a unified opposition, weakening the central government could reduce the state’s ability to manage non-political security threats — especially in border regions where separatist sentiments already exist. Kurdistan in western Iran has long seen separatist activism. Groups such as Komala and PJAK, based across the border in Iraqi Kurdistan, are accused by Tehran of armed attacks and terrorist activity.
In Iran’s northwest, particularly in the east and west Azerbaijan provinces bordering Turkey and the Republic of Azerbaijan, pan-Turkic sentiments have gained ground in recent years. These views have been especially visible at football matches in Tabriz, notably during games of Tractor FC, a popular local club that won Iran’s Premier League title last year. At some matches, a segment of fans has chanted pan-Turkic and anti-Iran slogans while waving Turkish and Azerbaijani flags. Although club officials have described these groups as marginal, images from the stadium suggest the phenomenon cannot be dismissed entirely.
In south eastern Iran, in Sistan and Baluchistan province near Pakistan, armed clashes between the state and militant groups have continued for years. Jaish al-Adl, largely based in Pakistan, has carried out repeated attacks on Iranian security forces. The region suffers from deep poverty and underdevelopment, and the presence of a Sunni minority has reinforced perceptions among some locals that sectarian discrimination lies behind these inequalities.
From Civil Protest to Armed Conflict?
Against this backdrop, some analysts warn that if the central government weakens, peaceful protests could give way to localized armed actions — especially in border regions already burdened by economic hardship, ethnic tensions, and security grievances.
Strengthening the Regime’s Narrative
Another major risk of foreign military action is that it would reinforce the regime’s preferred narrative. Iranian officials have consistently described the protests as a foreign conspiracy, blaming them on Israel and the United States. They have even attributed the high death toll to alleged actions by foreign intelligence services. A military strike would give the authorities more material to promote this narrative. The recent 12-day war with Israel showed how effectively the regime can mobilize nationalist sentiment in the face of an external threat. In such conditions, the narrative of “defending the country” can replace the reality of domestic repression.
As a result, segments of society that are currently critical of the government may adopt a defensive posture or withdraw from active protest. Rather than weakening the regime, foreign intervention could deepen polarization and increase the risk of internal conflict.
A Dangerous Endgame
The greatest danger is not sudden collapse, but gradual erosion of state control and the transformation of Iran into a battleground for competing armed groups — an outcome seen in countries such as Syria, Libya, and Yemen.
Many analysts argue that any lasting change in Iran must come through political pressure, internal organization, and divisions within the ruling system itself, not through foreign military action that risks pushing the country into uncontrolled violence.
[Further reading: What we know about Iran’s protests]
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