At the first political cabinet meeting of the year, Keir Starmer declared: “Governments do not lose because polls go down. They lose when they lose belief or nerve.”
There are two ripostes from the Prime Minister’s critics. The first is that governments do indeed lose if the polls only ever go down; the second is that belief is precisely what Starmer’s administration has too often lacked. It’s one thing to be an unpopular prime minister – as Margaret Thatcher sometimes was – and quite another to also be a shapeless one (in a striking piece, government PPS and Blue Labourite Preet Kaur Gill has praised Shabana Mahmood for showing what “leadership looks like”).
But there have been moments when Starmer has commanded the political agenda. One came last spring, when he announced an increase in defence spending to 2.5 per cent of GDP and, as Donald Trump and JD Vance turned on Volodymyr Zelensky, vowed for the first time to put “boots on the ground” in Ukraine. Starmer’s approval ratings briefly rose, former Tory cabinet ministers rushed to praise his leadership, and the Economist even likened him to Winston Churchill.
A year on, even as he vows to spend “every minute” discussing the cost of living, it is geopolitics that is once again shaping Starmer’s premiership. After yesterday’s Élysée summit, the UK and France signed a “declaration of intent” pledging to deploy troops to Ukraine if a peace deal is agreed, while German forces would be based in neighbouring countries. More significantly, the US special envoy Steve Witkoff has said that Donald Trump “strongly stands behind” the security arrangements, describing them as intended to “deter” Russia and, if necessary, “defend” Ukraine. “We have pushed back in a meaningful way against the idea that the West can be divided,” a senior UK government source concludes.
But doubts persist. The US did not, as hoped, formally sign the joint declaration on security guarantees, while Trump’s imperial designs on Greenland continue. “Utilising the US military is always an option,” the White House said last night, as it reaffirmed that acquiring the Nato territory remains a “national security priority” – though the Secretary of State, Marco Rubio, has suggested the US would use monetary rather than military means
Then there is the question of whether there is any world in which Russia will sign a peace deal. Vladimir Putin has never needed Donald Trump as an excuse to break international law – just ask the Chechens or the Crimeans – but US expansionism will hardly dissuade the Kremlin from seeking to colonise its “near abroad”.
But let us assume that British troops are eventually deployed to Ukraine. Will a public weary of squeezed living standards revolt against a new foreign commitment? Starmer, it is worth noting, begins from a stronger position than almost any of his counterparts. British voters are among the most pro-Ukraine in Europe: 56 per cent support sending peacekeepers to Ukraine (with 23 per cent opposed), compared to just 42 per cent in Germany and 40 per cent in France. That even Nigel Farage has backed a UN peacekeeping force and Nato membership for Ukraine speaks to the strength of this consensus – albeit one yet to be tested by events.
Yet any UK mission will only intensify calls for a further increase in defence spending. Despite pledging that core defence spending will rise to 3.5 per cent of GDP by 2035, Rachel Reeves made no reference to this target in her Budget, to the dismay of armed forces leaders (some cabinet ministers favoured a defence tax to help fund the ambition). “When I hear senior political leaders, heads of state and government, commit to spend 3.5 per cent of GDP by 2035, I want to see it programmed,” one senior military commander told a defence conference last month. “If we do commit, let’s bloody commit.”
In a world in which the US loyalty to Nato has never appeared more fragile, the air is thick with talk of European “strategic autonomy” – Charles de Gaulle’s approval ratings have surged. If the UK wishes to remain one of Europe’s premier military powers, it must confront the truth that the US is no longer a reliable ally, and what Wes Streeting this week called the “morbid symptoms” of a crumbling global order. The question for Starmer and Reeves, then, is whether they are prepared to embrace this cold new reality – and the price Britain will have to pay.
This piece first appeared in the Morning Call newsletter; receive it every morning by subscribing on Substack here
[Further reading: Why Starmer won’t condemn Trump on Venezuela]
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