Across marginal seats in the spring of 2015, posters displayed a giant Alex Salmond with a tiny Ed Miliband in his top pocket. It was an image that encapsulated one of the most effective electoral messages of recent times – a vote for anything other than Conservative would result in “a coalition of chaos”.
The absence of chaos, it has to be said, was not a strong feature of politics following David Cameron’s subsequent election victory, but this should not detract from the success of the message at the time. It reinforced voters’ concerns about Miliband’s weakness; highlighted the perceived risk to English voters that Scotland could benefit at their expense from SNP influence; and sent a message to Liberal Democrat voters who approved of the existing coalition that switching to the Tories was the best way to vote for continuity.
In the context of a general election when many assumed that another hung parliament was likely, swing voters looked at the options and preferred an outcome in which the Conservative governed alone or with the support of the Liberal Democrats rather than a Labour-led coalition, potentially including the SNP, the Lib Dems and the Greens. The choice was not just about Labour versus Conservative, but about which other parties might have influence if one of the larger parties lacked a parliamentary majority.
I mention this moment because we have of late had a number of polls suggesting that an election today would result in a hung parliament. Three parties – Labour, Conservative and Reform – are competing for the largest number of votes and seats; two other parties – the Liberal Democrats and SNP – look on course to have sizeable presences in the House of Commons. If these polls are replicated at the general election in 2029, it will be a fragmentation that is unprecedented in our politics.
Of course, a lot can (and, almost certainly, will) happen between now and 2029. There is some chatter that a Conservative/Reform merger might be on the cards. We should be sceptical about that. It is hard to see what incentive there would be for Nigel Farage to agree such a deal when the current arrangements are working out very nicely for him. Tory Brexiteers tempted by a deal with Reform would have to reconcile themselves to a significant surrender of sovereignty as Farage would demand to take control.
It would be too much of a humiliation for Kemi Badenoch. Were she to fall (not by any means impossible), a new leader – such as Robert Jenrick – might make the case for a deal with Reform at the risk of making the Tory party a vassal state of Reform. “Elect me as leader and I will end the party” is not that attractive a campaign message.
A more likely scenario is a series of defections of Tory MPs to Reform. (Perhaps we should call it “Conexit”.) But defecting is a big step for an individual and can make those who stay behind even more determined to resist a closer relationship. The loss of a few “Conexiteers” might even remind the Tories that they have lost votes to the centre as well as the right. A further possibility is that somehow Reform implodes. It is certainly true that new political parties can flatter to deceive, but an implosion is unlikely as long as Farage’s health holds up. One can be sceptical about claims that they are heading to a parliamentary majority (and I am) but Reform is likely to be a force at the next election.
For all the threats this poses to Labour’s Red Wall seats, it remains the case that the split on the right of politics is good news for the government. The most obvious reason for this is that Reform attracts most of its support from 2019 Conservative voters. If the Johnson coalition of voters is split in two directions relatively evenly – as it was in 2024 – Labour can win with a low share of the vote.
But there is a second aspect to this, which brings us back to the 2015 experience. Let us for a moment assume that the polls in 2029 look similar to today. Labour would look set to fall short of a majority, but it would not need much of an increase in votes to get there. Even if it falls short, it could plausibly provide at least a functioning government with the support of the Liberal Democrats.
And the alternative? Even if a pact had not been reached in advance, the assumption would be that the Conservatives and Reform would reach some kind of post-election arrangement. That might not be a safe assumption (playing the role of junior party in a coalition can be disastrous) but it would be widely shared.
In an era when election communications can be closely targeted, Labour could simultaneously make the case that if you vote Tory, you get Farage and that if you vote Farage, you get Tory. For political centrists, the former message will drive them away from the Conservatives towards Labour or the Lib Dems; for populist voters still furious with the Tories, the latter argument might keep them at home if they perceive Farage as being too much like a careerist politician willing to do a deal to get ministerial office.
And for both types of voters, the prospect of a Reform/Conservative combination would be reminiscent of the worst days of the 2016-24 psychodrama. One might even call it a coalition of chaos.
[See more: Britain is trapped in the long Seventies]
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