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21 October 2026

In space, no one can hear Britain scream

Europe and the UK have belatedly woken up to the fact that we need our own satellites

By Will Dunn

Three hundred miles above our heads, a chase is in progress. A reconnaissance satellite called ICEYE-X36, made in Finland, is being pursued by a Russian satellite; the two craft are moving at almost five miles per second. The Finnish craft weighs 90kg and looks, to the untrained eye, like a dishwasher attached to a shiny fence. It can see through clouds, and the data it produces is used by the Ukrainian military. Last week, the Russian satellite Kosmos-2612 began to close in on it. First, it approached within a few hundred miles, then a few hundred metres; on 18 October, it is estimated that it may have come as close as 26 metres. The Russians may be trying to intercept communications, or they may just be preparing to cause a crash that takes out a piece of infrastructure useful to Ukraine’s defence. Or, as with the Russian ships that loiter near undersea cables, they may simply be demonstrating a threat, because they can.

Back on Earth, on parliament’s Committee Corridor, experts from the space industry are preparing to present MPs and peers with a new item on the list of frightening things they probably can’t do anything about. The space geeks seem out of place in the long, gloomily panelled corridor, with its heavy oak doors and carpet that seems transplanted from an elderly Wetherspoons; they are scientists in a lawyers’ domain. Some of them seem to know each other. “Fancy seeing you here,” they say, as they wait to be summoned by the Joint Committee on the National Security Strategy.

Room 4A has a National Security feel to it. In the ceiling are long rows of sunken circular lights, the walls are a patchy institutional beige. The parliamentarians sit around a long horseshoe of a desk, facing the table where the experts have been positioned. The blinds are all rolled down, permitting a faint glow of natural light. Outside it could be 5pm or 5am; in Room 4A, it is the eternal afternoon of bureaucratic process.

But here we are, hearing about “hostile activity in space”. The new kind of war that is starting to be fought in orbit is not just a risk for Ukraine. Most of our critical national infrastructure depends, in some way, on the thousands of satellites that circle the Earth. Europe and the UK have belatedly woken up to the fact that we need our own satellites, controlled by us (rather than by, say, an unpredictable American billionaire). Germany has committed €35bn to military space infrastructure. France plans to invest around €20bn. Britain’s spacelords have launched a document: the Space Strategy, published last month, which committed to “£7.8bn of investment to 2030”. In the grand tradition of British government spending, however, much of this is money that won’t actually be spent until the next parliament, and much of it isn’t really new money, but a bundle of previously existing commitments that have been hastily repainted to look like the sort of policy we’d enact if we could afford to.

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We have become used to the idea that in our country, fixing a bridge or upgrading a road can take years, if not decades. A person could spend their entire career trying to get permission to build a power station or a runway. In October 2020 the UK government announced that “hundreds of space jobs” would be created by a new spaceport in the far north of Scotland, but the first rockets have yet to launch. So far, one British satellite has been put into orbit by a British rocket; this took place in 1971. And yet here, in a fusty Westminster committee room, Will Marshall – a British scientist who runs a very successful satellite company – says that from the moment they signed a contract to provide satellites to Ukraine, it took two months to get them operational. And by “operational”, he means in orbit. In space, no one can hear you file a planning objection.

Marshall’s company, Planet Labs, is headquartered in San Francisco, listed on the New York Stock Exchange, and those satellites were built in Germany. (“Because Germany is in the EU,” he explains; in the latest in a long list of Brexit dividends, we’ve taken ourselves out of the satellite business.) Starlink, the system of more than 10,000 small satellites owned by Elon Musk’s SpaceX, has a very close relationship to the Trump administration, giving Trump and Musk direct influence over Ukraine’s ability to defend itself. The satellites Marshall’s company has sold to Ukraine and Sweden are “sovereign” – entirely controlled by the governments that own them. The UK remains highly dependent on US infrastructure. We are also reliant on satellites that may not have been sufficiently hardened to resist damage from solar flares, nukes, cyber-attacks, or being crashed into by Russian craft. Britain has just four military satellites (called, disconcertingly, “SkyNet”, although to be fair to the MoD, this name was coined in the 1960s, long before James Cameron used it as the name for the AI doomsday machine in his Terminator films). When your infrastructure is whizzing through the vacuum at 17,000 miles an hour, it’s tricky to pop round and fix it. Elizabeth Seward, the CEO of a space telescope company, tells the committee that the UK has so few “sovereign” satellites that “we really don’t have very much infrastructure to secure… [or] to rely on, if we lose access to everything else”.

If Britain’s handful of satellites were compromised, warns the cybersecurity expert Jessie Hamill-Stewart, it is not only our defence capabilities that would be affected; the loss of communications could “undermine trust in things working well”. Arguably this has been achieved already, but things can always get worse. It is unnerving to hear an expert considering, in academic tones, “how society would continue” if the unseen infrastructure in the sky was taken out by a war or a solar storm. Another expert, the former soldier Robert Atchison, points out that while our military is heavily reliant on technologies such as GPS, Russia trains its soldiers on the assumption that they will have to go without it. Matt Western, the Labour MP who chairs the committee, asks if the government “get it” that these risks are real, which is a question you only ask if you know the answer is going to be no; Hamill-Stewart says diplomatically that the security risks to satellites are “a much bigger problem than the Space Strategy really depicts”.

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A couple of hours before the committee began, the Defence Secretary, Wes Streeting, told the Commons: “We are not at war with Russia.” Perhaps not, but as Fiona Hill, one of the authors of the Strategic Defence Review, put it more accurately last year: “Russia is at war with us.” Our government is in the process of admitting to itself, and its citizens, that we are directly involved in a conflict. This committee, and many others like it, form part of a broader conversation about “resilience” – a word that is now used about ten times more often in parliament than it was a decade ago, according to Hansard – and about a different kind of war. When the first satellite, Sputnik, began its lonely journey through the heavens in October 1957, Britain could rely on the assumption that its vastly richer ally, the US, would blast money into space until it achieved supremacy. Today, it’s less clear if that’s the winning approach – or even if our old friends will still be entirely on our side.

[Further reading: Zack Polanski’s thwarted promise]

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This article appears in the 21 Oct 2026 issue of the New Statesman, Sally Rooney is a writer, not a terrorist