The Iranian regime is fighting for its survival. It was doing this before the Israelis and Americans launched their attacks on the country on 28 February and now the challenge is even greater. The regime is in trouble because it has governed with cruelty, rigidity and incompetence. Its economy is a mess; a consequence of the combined impact of sanctions, corruption and mismanagement. Inflation is around 50 per cent and the currency is worthless. Banks are close to failing. Decades spent boosting its military power and that of its proxies has left energy infrastructure neglected, leading to regular blackouts and severe water shortages. The standard of living has plummeted. The surging price of basic foodstuffs, caused by a reduction in subsidies, triggered the revolt in the bazaars last December, which soon grew into wider protests across the country.
The popular urge to shake off an oppressive clerical regime is powerful, but so is the regime’s determination to hold on to power. In January it killed thousands of demonstrators in a matter of days to keep the opposition subdued. This was not the first time it has used brutal force to quell dissent. The regime is fully aware that one purpose of the air strikes is to leave them so weak that an emboldened opposition might topple them. It still relies on the Islamic Revolutionary Guard Corps (IRGC), some 190,000 strong. This is more than just a military force. Helped by tax breaks and its privileged networks, the IRGC has a controlling interest in at least a third of the Iranian economy. It will fight because it has much to lose.
Aware that its leaders might be assassinated should Israel and the US strike, elaborate succession plans were made in advance, with the IRGC primed to deal with any local uprising. It was still caught out. The first Israeli strike on 28 February killed the supreme leader, Ayatollah Ali Khamenei, along with many of his top advisers, during a meeting in his palace. Given what was known about Israel’s intelligence penetration of the Iranian system, this gathering showed extraordinary complacency. Presumably the plan was to whisk Khamenei to safety when the bombing began, not anticipating that the bombing would begin with his assassination.
This lax approach gave Iran’s enemies an early victory and cheered the opposition, even leading some to take to the streets in celebration. By the evening of 1 March, the Americans were claiming that 48 members of the Iranian leadership had been killed. Donald Trump, asked about the replacement for Khamenei, observed that, “It’s not going to be anybody that we were thinking of because they are all dead. Second or third place is dead.”
With the internet shut down to prevent the opposition organising, and an awareness that turning on a mobile phone might invite an Israeli strike, these are far from optimal conditions for a depleted regime to fight a war of survival. One of the survivors, the foreign minister Abbas Araghchi, acknowledged in an early interview that Iran’s “military units are now, in fact, independent and somehow isolated”, explaining why the generally friendly Oman had been struck by Iranian fire. (He suggested that this was a mistake but it is still being struck.) In the days ahead, local commanders might find that they have to make fateful decisions without being able to call on an authoritative leader for guidance first.
The regime is also fighting largely on its own. Until recently, Iran appeared as a formidable regional power, but it overreached. Following the attacks on 7 October 2023, its proxies, in particular Hamas in Gaza and Hezbollah in Lebanon, were battered by the Israelis. Hezbollah, which was always supposed to come to Iran’s aid in scenarios such as the one now unfolding, has nowhere near the power it once had. It has attacked Israel with rockets, leaving the Lebanese government furious at having to cope with yet more retaliatory Israeli strikes. The Israel-Lebanese border is the only current location for any land war.
For years, Tehran propped up the regime of Bashar al-Assad in Syria but could do little to help him when the civil war suddenly turned against him in late 2024 and he was forced to flee. It supplied ammunition and drones to Russia that helped sustain the war against Ukraine, but Moscow has been unable to offer help when Tehran faced its own hour of need.
The isolation has been aggravated by the strategy adopted by the regime in response to the attacks. (A response that was planned in advance and was implemented with little hesitation.) As expected, Iran fired missiles back in retaliation against Israel but it also attacked neighbouring states that could be accused of hosting US facilities that were also easier to hit. The UAE, Qatar, Kuwait, Bahrain and Saudi Arabia provided the main targets. So far, given the numbers of missiles and drones used, the air defences have managed to limit the impact but notable targets have been hit, including US embassies, air and sea ports, gas and oil installations. There is continuing uncertainty about whether the Strait of Hormuz will remain open. There have been warnings from the IRGC about closing it. Little has been actioned but the threat – and the higher insurance premiums – might be sufficient to deter shipping.
The regime’s aim is to cause as much economic disruption as possible. Oil prices have so far risen while gas prices have shot up. If the disruption lasts for some time, then that will create international pressure for an end to the war, although there is still no obvious path to its termination. If Iran hoped that this would get the Gulf states to put pressure on Trump, so far these actions appear to have the opposite effect. While in recent years they had sought ways to co-exist with the country and showed no interest in getting involved in the current operation, they still see Iran as a past and potentially future source of trouble. These events confirm such a view, but it also means that the US cannot simply declare the war over while these allies are still being struck.
Iran has a finite supply of missiles and drones, and it is spreading them across a number of countries. As Israel and the US have effective control over the airspace of Iran, their main challenge will be to find the regime’s launch sites and take them out. The more they succeed, and the more stocks are used up, the more the tempo of attacks will subside and eventually peter out – but this could take some time.
It is in the regime’s interest to keep this going for as long as possible. After missile facilities were struck last June, Iran managed to rebuild at least some of its arsenal and has proved to be adept at concealing sites and stocks. Even with careful tracking of launches and good intelligence, it will be difficult to degrade missile and drone capabilities to the point of ineffectuality. If Iran can keep going, and air defence stocks start to run low in the Gulf, then that will create pressures for more direct forms of intervention to stop the strikes.
Sometimes Trump says that the war could be over soon; sometimes he says weeks. The fighting might subside as all parties run through their stocks of weapons and the president might simply decide to call it a day. He has mused about the Venezuelan precedent but this provides no guide. In that instance, the Americans abducted the leader, Nicolás Maduro, but were able to do deals with the rest of the regime, leaving the opposition frustrated. He has spoken about possible negotiations but it is unclear with whom the US could negotiate or what they would talk about. If Trump did find someone with whom to do a deal, where would that leave regime change?
Of course, there is no guarantee that the result of this war will be regime change. In their opening statements both Benjamin Netanyahu and Donald Trump said that this is what they wanted but they made no promises that they would do the changing. Their promise to the Iranian people was only to make it easier for them to seize power. As a result of the strikes, the regime has lost many of its leaders and its means of command and communication. IRGC buildings and assets are being struck, but members of the guard are unlikely to be hanging around in known sites. It still has the weapons and the demonstrators do not. If it comes to a fight for the streets and it shows the commitment to killing their fellow citizens that it showed a few weeks ago, an uprising could still be put down.
In 1979, the revolution succeeded when it was evident that the army would stand aside and not get involved to protect the old order. But then there was no equivalent of the IRGC, charged with protecting the regime. There is however still an army, separate from the IRGC, and how it responds to the developing situation could be important. There have been rumours that elements of the army are disaffected with the regime. But with the internet down it is hard to know exactly what is going on.
One scenario is that the situation inside the country will become confused. The regime might start to lose control without anyone else gaining it. Anti-regime elements, including members of non-Persian minorities, might seize some places but be pushed back elsewhere. Even without a war this is a country where basic services do not work and people struggle to look after themselves and their families. A peaceful transfer of power to a popular revolutionary government able to restore law and order seems to be the least likely outcome even if the regime starts to collapse under its own dysfunctions. Chaos is more likely.
[Further reading: The Iran war, oil and gas prices, and a potential new inflation spike]
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This article appears in the 04 Mar 2026 issue of the New Statesman, Trump's global terror
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Subscribe here to commentAimless violence on all sides defines this war. Iran is at war externally and domestically; Israel is caught up on multiple fronts: the USA is in a state of muscle flexing without comprehending the cause and Europe dithers. All is compounded by belief systems, religious, cultural and political, with little or no mutual understanding. Israel, Iran and the USA claim to be doing God’s work! It can be assumed that God is working on behalf of the coming elections in Israel and the USA but it is not clear which candidate has been endorsed?
In the final analysis there is no rational explanation of the why of this war other than the Israeli Vs Iran competition to be the hegemon on the region. The body count of Israel’s campaigns, the butcher’s bill, has eroded popular western sympathy and support for Israel. Israel’s future is permanent Warfare Politics. The USA is increasing viewed as untrustworthy and the major source of global disorder.
All of this military waste is but another violent spasm to be suffered by poor people who have been for to long been treated as pawns by political intellectuals.