Whoever is running Nato’s social media accounts wants you to know that the alliance takes Arctic security very seriously. “The Royal Marines are back in the Arctic Circle – stronger than ever,” the Nato Allied Special Operations X account posted on 7 January, accompanied by the flexed-bicep emoji. On 11 January, as Donald Trump was assuring reporters that “one way or the other, we’re going to have Greenland”, Nato posted an image of a German frigate on an Arctic exercise, “practising together in the harsh conditions of the far north to keep this strategically important region safe” (another flexed-bicep emoji). The next day, the UK Defence Operations team joined in with a montage of British commandos “training to operate in the Arctic – ready for global operations”(globe emoji).
The clear message, which we are told Keir Starmer conveyed to Trump in two recent phone calls, is that Nato allies share his concerns about the region’s security and are working, urgently, to address them. “All allies agree on the importance of the Arctic and Arctic security,” said Nato’s secretary general, Mark Rutte, on 12 January. The subtext: please don’t destroy Nato.
After the downfall of Nicolás Maduro, Europe’s leaders seem finally to have grasped that Trump is not kidding about his determination to “get” Greenland. The provisional strategy is twofold: convince the US president his security concerns can best be resolved within the existing alliance, and that if he attempts a military takeover, he will be responsible for bringing down Nato.
The problem with this approach is that if Trump was genuinely motivated by anxieties about Arctic security, he would not need to buy or seize Greenland to bolster America’s military presence. Under the existing agreement with Denmark, signed in 1951 and renewed in 2004, the US already has the right to surge forces to Greenland and even build new bases there. Instead, Washington has reduced its footprint from more than 10,000 troops and dozens of facilities at the height of the Cold War to around 150 troops at the dilapidated Pituffik Space Base in the north-west of the island.
In fact, the US stands to lose key capabilities by attempting to go it alone in Greenland and tearing down its alliances. Unlike Canada and the Nato Nordic powers, which have more than 30 icebreakers combined, the US has just two, only one of which is capable of operating in sustained, heavy ice. (Russia has at least 41; China already has three.) The US is working with Finland and Canada to build a new fleet of icebreakers, with the first two expected to enter service in 2028. Unless, of course, Trump annexes Greenland.
European leaders can, and should, continue to press these arguments, if only to underline the strategic incoherence of Trump’s claims to the American public and Congress, where Florida Republican Randy Fine has just introduced the “Greenland Annexation and Statehood Act”. But the best guide to Trump’s rationale is his own, refreshingly honest, account in a New York Times interview on 7 January as to why he needs to “own” Greenland. “Because that’s what I feel is psychologically needed for success,” Trump said. Greenland’s sheer size, which is artificially enlarged on most maps, also seems to be a significant part of its allure. “I love maps, and I always said, ‘Look at the size of this, it’s massive, and that should be part of the United States,’” he told journalists in 2021 in what remains the most convincing explanation for his interest.
So it is probably a mistake for Nato allies to put too much faith in Trump’s interest in preserving an alliance he has repeatedly derided, when weighed against what he appears to regard as a legacy-defining opportunity to redraw his beloved maps in America’s favour, and exploit the mineral wealth buried beneath.
The most optimistic scenario for Greenland is that Trump gets distracted by his many other foreign policy priorities, such as bringing down the regimes in Iran and Cuba, and his new role as “acting president of Venezuela”. Trump’s greatest constraint has often been his own attention span. But the other consistent feature of his leadership is that he prefers quick wins. When China punched back against his trade war, he backed down.
In an interview with the NS, the chair of the Danish parliament’s Defence Committee, Rasmus Jarlov, insisted his country would fight back against a US military takeover, and “that would mean war”. The UK and Germany are discussing the possibility of sending Nato troops to Greenland as part of an “Arctic Sentry” force. As well as nominally addressing Trump’s security concerns, this would also complicate any future military plans by forcing the US to reckon with the possibility of confronting its closest allies. The EU should also start brandishing its “trade bazooka” – a series of punishing trade and investment restrictions, as well as IP sanctions – and the damage it could do to American companies, as well as highlighting the utility of America’s European military bases. The strategy for Europe must be to persuade Trump that, far from securing his place on Mount Rushmore, any attempt to annex Greenland would be politically calamitous. He has made it more than clear that he does not respect weakness. Time to try some strength.
[Further reading: Cracks in Iran’s brutal regime are now visible]
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This article appears in the 14 Jan 2026 issue of the New Statesman, Battle for power
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