In his first remarks after the death of Iran’s Supreme Leader, Ayatollah Ali Khamenei, on 28 February, Vladimir Putin condemned what he called an “assassination” as a “cynical violation of all norms of human morality and international law”. The Russian president offered his “deepest condolences” to his Iranian counterpart, Masoud Pezeshkian, and vowed that Khamenei would be remembered in Russia as an “outstanding statesman”.
Yet beyond offering the diplomatic equivalent of thoughts and prayers, Putin will be weighing both the short-term opportunities and longer-term strategic risks for Russia in the conflict that now lies ahead.
Russia signed a 20-year strategic partnership treaty with Iran in January 2025, but Russian officials were careful to stress at the time that this did not amount to a military alliance, or a commitment to provide “mutual military assistance”. During the 12-day war with Israel five months later, which culminated in the United States bombing three Iranian nuclear facilities in June, Moscow had neither the resources nor the apparent inclination to mount a military defence of the Iranian regime.
The Kremlin can be expected to follow the same approach this time. Putin will likely decline to take any action that risks military entanglement in the conflict while offering rhetorical support for Tehran and making use of Russia’s permanent seat at the UN Security Council to denounce the US. During an emergency meeting of the Security Council on 28 February, Russia’s ambassador, Vassily Nebenzia, accused the US of “yet another unprovoked act of armed aggression”. Russian officials will point to the US-Israeli strikes to dilute criticism of their own continuing bombardment of Ukraine, accusing the West of hypocritical “double standards” in Iran.
In the short term, the conflict promises to deplete the US’s already limited stockpile of air-defence interceptors, threatening future supplies to Ukraine and leaving the country more vulnerable to Russian attacks. The surge in oil prices will also benefit Moscow, temporarily relieving some pressure on its war-strained budget. As will the prospect of a distracted US, that will now have even less capacity to focus on the war in Ukraine and compel the Kremlin to agree to a negotiated peace. Iran provided valuable supplies of Shahed combat drones and assistance with sourcing artillery shells during the first 12 months of Russia’s war, but Moscow has since built its own domestic production facilities and adapted the drone technology it received from Iran, so those capabilities are unlikely to be significantly affected.
The killing of Khamenei, following the capture of Venezuela’s president, Nicolas Maduro in January, will only reinforce Putin’s apparent conviction that the US is determined to use force to impose its will on other countries and has no compunction in going after the leadership of perceived adversaries. Never mind the fact that Russia is accused of dispatching kill teams to attempt to assassinate Ukraine’s president, Volodymyr Zelensky, during the initial hours of the full-scale invasion in 2022. Putin is said to have been deeply affected by the death of Muammar Gaddafi at the hands of Libyan rebels during the Nato-led military intervention in 2011. He now has further evidence that hard power and territorial control, rather than diplomatic agreements, are the only real guarantee of regime security.
Similarly, any suggestion that Donald Trump is an isolationist, or that he would be content to focus solely on the Western hemisphere, can now be retired. This is only likely to make Putin more determined to pursue his war against Ukraine, despite the staggering toll in casualties and the economic cost.
In the longer-term, the most significant threat to Russia is that a new Iranian regime emerges from this conflict that reconsiders its partnership with Moscow. This would seriously diminish Russia’s leverage and standing in the region, although it is far from clear that this war will induce a fundamental shift in government in Iran. Long-term instability in Iran, or even civil conflict, could further jeopardise Russian transit routes, which had already been complicated by the loss of access to several European options after the invasion of Ukraine.
“Russia’s entire Middle East policy has been predicated on balancing, and occasionally mediating, between Iran and its adversaries,” wrote Hanna Notte, director of the Eurasia Non-proliferation programme at the Middlebury Institute of International Studies, after the death of Khamenei. “Its ties with Iran gave Russia leverage – with Israel and the Gulf Arab states – with a new Iran, Russia could lose this role.”
It is tempting to view Russia’s response to the conflict as another indication of the country’s weakness, following the downfall of Bashar al-Assad’s regime in Syria in 2024 and the removal of Maduro in January. The regime in Cuba, another long-standing Russian partner, could meet the same fate under increasing pressure from the US. But Nicole Grajewski, the author of Russia and Iran: Partners in Defiance from Syria to Ukraine, cautions against confusing the lack of overt military support for the Iranian regime with the absence of any support behind the scenes.
“They’re not being so loud at the moment, but I’m sure they’re doing something,” Grajewski told me in a telephone interview. “They might be providing some kind of support to Iran that doesn’t cross US and Israeli red lines, but I wouldn’t be surprised if I found out that the Russians were providing Iran with some [help] when it comes to satellites, when it comes to tracking some movement of troops.” She said the same could also be true for China. “For both of them, this is beneficial, especially for China, when you see the US exhausting its munitions over Iran.” The longer Iran can endure the attack, she said, the better for Russia and China, “because they all still view themselves as being in this together, even if they don’t fight on each other’s behalf”.
Grajewski noted the presence of a senior official from the Russian General Staff’s Main Directorate (GRU), Russia’s foreign military intelligence agency, at a meeting between Putin and Iran’s foreign minister Abbas Araghchi after the US strikes in June 2025. “They specifically brought in the GRU’s head of military intelligence at the meeting, which I view as reminding the Iranians of some of the behind-the-scenes support that they gave them.” She said it was likely that Moscow had helped Tehran develop the capability to throttle the country’s internet and disrupt Starlink terminals during the mass protests in December, which would have helped the regime retain control.
“Arguably Russia provided Iran with the crucial support that they needed during the protests, and for me that has always been the biggest driving force of the relationship – it is regime security and concern about overthrow,” Grajewski said. “Those are the kind of ways that Russia can help, perhaps less overtly than weapons transfers, that actually have a real impact on Iran’s ability to survive.”
A protracted conflict that draws the US back into the Middle East, depletes its stores of munitions, and further tarnishes America’s global standing would serve Russia’s interests and more than compensate for the loss of Khamenei. For all his condolences over the demise of the Supreme Leader, Putin is not a sentimental man. He will be prepared to work with the regime’s new leadership in whatever form survives this war.
[Further reading: Will Iran’s Islamic Republic survive the US onslaught?]
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