Displaced Iraqi women arrive at a camp in Aski Kalak in the north of the country. Photo: Getty
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With Iraq, Obama was dealt a bad hand – and he’s playing it badly

The latest violence exposes the administration’s lack of vision for the broader Middle East.

The Islamic State in Iraq and Syria (ISIS), the Sunni extremist group that was kicked out of Al Qaeda for being too violent, has seized Mosul and Tikrit in Iraq, and is now heading toward Baghdad. They are in pursuit of an Islamic Caliphate, which would encompass territory across Syria and Iraq. They have harnessed the past decade of Sunni oppression in Iraq and are bolstered by the influx of foreign fighters that flooded Syria to fight President Bashar Al Assad. Just three years after the US withdrawal from Iraq, the Iraqi military is proving incapable of resisting ISIS fighters and the US is struggling with a series of bad response options.

The prospect of an ISIS takeover in Iraq has presented pundits with ample opportunity to point out that the US invasion of Iraq was a bad idea and the withdrawal was poorly coordinated. But more importantly, it exposes the fact that the Obama administration still has no cohesive regional policy for the broader Middle East.

In his statement about Iraq, President Obama acknowledged the need to increase military and intelligence support to the Iraqi military and said his national security team was looking at all options. But he also said, “ultimately, it’s up to the Iraqis, as a sovereign nation, to solve their problems”. The President’s frustration with Iraq’s unravelling is understandable, but it does not excuse his lack of a foreign policy strategy, especially since US intervention in Iraq and the surrounding area is partly to blame for the current chaos. 

Last week, Obama said the US can’t “play Whac-a-Mole wherever there ends up being a problem in a particular country”. But that it is increasingly what his Middle East policy resembles – a game of forcing enemies back into a hole, with repeated failure to address long-term regional outcomes. The US has responded individually to conflicts in the Middle East, without recognition of the overlapping causes and strategic interests between states in the region. The crisis in Iraq cannot be separated from the civil war in Syria. Furthermore, the alternative to military intervention is not inaction – it is diplomacy. Diplomatic efforts between the US and Iran on the nuclear deal, though turbulent, are progressing; this cooperation should be harnessed to negotiate a diplomatic solution to the civil war in Syria and to contain the spread of ISIS in Iraq.

At this point, the US is limited in its response to Iraq. Iraqi President Nouri al-Maliki reportedly asked the Obama administration to carry out targeted drone strikes in extremist areas last month and Obama refused. There is speculation that he will now be compelled to reverse his decision, though he has only gone as far as saying “I don’t rule out anything.” While drone strikes can effectively target the leadership of an organisation and disrupt isolated terrorist attacks, they cannot be used to reclaim entire cities from well-organised fighters. 

Frederic Wehrey, senior associate at the Carnegie Endowment for International Peace, explained, “ISIS is very adaptive and proficient. It’s not just a terrorist organisation, but a hybrid army that really incorporates elements of guerilla strategy with conventional strategy.” He added that air strikes could slow ISIS’s advance toward Baghdad and buy Maliki more time, but will not ultimately destroy the group.

In Tuesday’s press briefing, State Department spokesperson Jen Psaki said that the US has also been increasing shipments of military equipment and training for Iraqi security forces since the beginning of the year in recognition of growing instability. Her announcement was unconvincing to the press pack. “You had about a decade, though, to train the Iraqi security forces ... what makes you think ramping up training since the start of this year is going to do much in this circumstance?” asked an attending reporter.

Further complicating things for outsiders who want to prop up Maliki’s regime is the fact that Iraq’s inability to defend itself from ISIS does not stem from a lack of weapons and training –  over the course of the war, the US spent $25bn to train and equip the Iraqi security forces –  as much as a lack of trust in Maliki, whose sectarian politics have carved deeper divides between Iraq’s Shia, Sunni and Kurdish populations. Ultimately, a stable Iraq will require increased power sharing among sects.

This week’s events in Iraq are caused, at least in part, by the deteriorating security situation in neighboring Syria. Three years into the civil war, Obama’s policy in Syria has amounted to arming moderate Sunnis opposed to Assad, and giving them political legitimacy by declaring that Assad must go. However, Assad, strongly backed by the Iranians, has made it clear that he plans to stay, and outside support for the opposition has not been enough to pose any real threat to Assad’s hold on power. Rather, it has allowed the bloody war to continue indefinitely, during which time the opposition has fractured, and these days, the most extremist of the opposition are fighting with ISIS in Iraq.

To recap: the US is supporting the Sunnis in Syria as they fight Assad, backed by the Iranians. Meanwhile, the US is considering airstrikes to kill Sunni extremists as they fight Maliki, who is backed by Iran. If this seems utterly incomprehensible, it’s because it is.

In the aftermath of ISIS’s seizure of major cities in Iraq, the US has been caught without a grand strategy in the Middle East. Obama’s short-term solutions in Syria and Iraq contradict one another and have little chance of stabilising either country. 

In his statement yesterday, the President also expressed a need to build new partnerships to deal with regional threats. While there are political barriers to an outward alliance with Iran, the US needs to recognise the influence that Iran has in the Middle East, and harness the cooperative gains made in the nuclear negotiations to wider cooperation in dealing with Syria and Iraq. Iran is equally, if not more, threatened by ISIS. And the Iranians see a direct connection between ISIS’s growth and the terrorism safe-haven that became Syria. While it is not clear what form their intervention will take, collaborative effort with the Iranians, whether overt or covert, is necessary in stabilising Iraq.

The US should also reassess its diplomatic efforts in Syria. Though the Obama administration has claimed to support a negotiated end to the war, he unequivocally insists on Assad’s ouster and attempted to exclude Iran from previous negotiations in Geneva earlier this year. This is not negotiation. A true negotiated conclusion to the war will have to include a power-sharing government, that possibly includes Assad, and all regional powers must be included in the discussion –  including Iran. Critics who say this is impossible should look to the 15-year-long civil war in Lebanon, which concluded with the Taif Agreement, granting each side to the conflict proportional representation in the new government. While the Lebanese government is far from perfect, is has resisted falling back into civil war for over 20 years. 

This article first appeared on newrepublic.com

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After Article 50 is triggered, what happens next?

The UK must prepare for years, if not decades, of negotiating. 

Back in June, when Europe woke to the news of Brexit, the response was muted. “When I first emerged from my haze to go to the European Parliament there was a big sign saying ‘We will miss you’, which was sweet,” Labour MEP Seb Dance remembered at a European Parliament event in London. “The German car industry said we don’t want any disruption of trade.”

But according to Dance – best known for holding up a “He’s Lying” sign behind Nigel Farage’s head – the mood has hardened with the passing months.

The UK is seen as demanding. The Prime Minister’s repeated refusal to guarantee EU citizens’ rights is viewed as toxic. The German car manufacturers now say the EU is more important than British trade. “I am afraid that bonhomie has evaporated,” Dance said. 

On 31 March the UK will trigger Article 50. Doing so will end our period of national soul-searching and begin the formal process of divorce. So what next?

The European Parliament will have its say

In the EU, just as in the UK, the European Parliament will not be the lead negotiator. But it is nevertheless very powerful, because MEPs can vote on the final Brexit deal, and wield, in effect, a veto.

The Parliament’s chief negotiator is Guy Verhofstadt, a committed European who has previously given Remoaners hope with a plan to offer them EU passports. Expect them to tune in en masse to watch when this idea is revived in April (it’s unlikely to succeed, but MEPs want to discuss the principle). 

After Article 50 is triggered, Dance expects MEPs to draw up a resolution setting out its red lines in the Brexit negotiations, and present this to the European Commission.

The European Commission will spearhead negotiations

Although the Parliament may provide the most drama, it is the European Commission, which manages the day-to-day business of the EU, which will lead negotiations. The EU’s chief negotiator is Michel Barnier. 

Barnier is a member of the pan-EU European People’s Party, like Jean-Claude Juncker and German Chancellor Angela Merkel. He has said of the negotiations: “We are ready. Keep calm and negotiate.”

This will be a “deal” of two halves

The Brexit divorce is expected to take 16 to 18 months from March (although this is simply guesswork), which could mean Britain officially Brexits at the start of 2019.

But here’s the thing. The divorce is likely to focus on settling up bills and – hopefully – agreeing a transitional arrangement. This is because the real deal that will shape Britain’s future outside the EU is the trade deal. And there’s no deadline on that. 

As Dance put it: “The duration of that trade agreement will exceed the life of the current Parliament, and might exceed the life of the next as well.”

The trade agreement may look a bit like Ceta

The European Parliament has just approved the Comprehensive Economic and Trade Agreement (Ceta) with Canada, a mammoth trade deal which has taken eight years to negotiate. 

One of the main stumbling points in trade deals is agreeing on similar regulatory standards. The UK currently shares regulations with the rest of the UK, so this should speed up the process.

But another obstacle is that national or regional parliaments can vote against a trade deal. In October, the rebellious Belgian region of Wallonia nearly destroyed Ceta. An EU-UK deal would be far more politically sensitive. 

The only way is forward

Lawyers working for the campaign group The People’s Challenge have argued that it will legally be possible for the UK Parliament to revoke Article 50 if the choice is between a terrible deal and no deal at all. 

But other constitutional experts think this is highly unlikely to work – unless a penitent Britain can persuade the rest of the EU to agree to turn back the clock. 

Davor Jancic, who lectures on EU law at Queen Mary University of London, believes Article 50 is irrevocable. 

Jeff King, a professor of law at University College London, is also doubtful, but has this kernel of hope for all the Remainers out there:

“No EU law scholar has suggested that with the agreement of the other 27 member states you cannot allow a member state to withdraw its notice.”

Good luck chanting that at a march. 

Julia Rampen is the editor of The Staggers, The New Statesman's online rolling politics blog. She was previously deputy editor at Mirror Money Online and has worked as a financial journalist for several trade magazines.